Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

totheNATOinfrastructure(aircraftshelters,barracks,otherfixedfacilities)of

$420millionoverfiveyears,improvementsofnationalforcesamountingtoabout

$450to$500millionoverthesameperiod,andsomeotherfinancialmeasures

thatwouldbeinterpretedtoamountto$79million.Thiswasatotalofabout$1

billion,or$200millionayearforfiveyears.Therewasnowayoftellinghowmuch

ofthiswasgenuinelyneworhowmuchrepresentedsimplybookkeepingchanges.

Atbest,itwasanincreasecomparabletoalmostone‐halfpercentofourdefense

budget.Theamountwastootrivialtogototheheartoftheproblem.Thebest

thatcouldbesaidforitwasthatitreversedthetrendtowardr eductions.



Onthewholeourallieswereclearlycountingonthedeusexmachinaof

mutualforcereductionswiththeWarsawPact.Theywouldurgeustokeep

AmericanforcesinEuropependingnegotiationsandwouldseektoavoid

additionalexpenditureswiththeargumentthattheymightbemadeirrelevantby

newarmscontrolagreements.Thisraisedawholenewsetofproblems.Ihadno

objectiontousingMBFRasabrakeonunilateralCongressionalcuts.Butmy

doubtsaboutitscomplexityandinherentdisadvantageshadnoteasedsincethe

previousyear.IwrotethePresident:



…wehavenotbeenabletodevelopanapproachtoMBFRwhichwouldeithermaintain

orimproveNATO’smilitarypositionalthoughsmallmutualreductionscouldhaveaminimal

adverseeffect.Wehavenotbeenabletoidentifynegotiable“collateralconstraints”which

wouldinhibitPactmobilizationandreinforcementwithoutharmingNATOatthesametime.

Wehavejustscratchedthesurfaceinthinkingaboutverificationproblems.



InthesecircumstancesanNSCmeetingofNovember19,1970,toreview

NATOstrategycoulddolittleexcepttoregisterourdilemma.Isummedupthe

strategicproblemagaininabriefingmemorandumtothePresident:



…weandourAlliesmustmaintainstrongenoughconventionalforcestobeableto

meetSovietaggressionorthethreatofitimplicitintheirsubstantialforces.Unlessweandour

AlliesreworkourNATOstrategyandforcessothattheycanprovidethiscapability,wewillsoon

experiencethegradual“neutralization”ofWesternEurope.Toavoidthissituation,wemustact

vigorouslytomaintainNATO’sconventionalcapabilitywhiledevelopingastrategyforitsuse

thatmakessenseinthisfundamentallynewstrategicsituation.



Theassaultondefenseexpenditures growingoutoftheVietnamwar

preventedthiseffortuntil1974.



TheNSCmeetingofNovember19wasunusuallyseriousandsubstantive.

Foroncetherewasnobureaucraticmaneuvering,becauseallthePresident’s

senioradviserswereinagreementonthemajorissues.Themeetingledtotwo

significantdecisions:anotherstrongreaffirmationofourtroopcommitmentsin

Europe,andadecisiontoreexaminethewholequestionofmutualforce

reductions.TheEuropeandefenseimprovementprogram,howeversparseand

essentiallyirrelevant,thusachieveditsimmediatepurpose.AttheDecember

meetingofAllianceForeignMinisters,SecretaryRogersreadaletterfromNixon

thatannouncedthatinthelightofEurope’sincreaseddefenseeffo rts,theUnited

StateswouldmaintainandimproveitsforcesinEuropeandwouldnotreduce

themexceptinthecontextofmutualreductionsnegotiatedwiththeEast.



Inthenatureofthingsthesewerestopgapmeasuressufficienttoprevent

immediatedisaster,inadequateasalong‐termremedy.Analliancewhoseonly

meansofpreservingitsstrengthwastooffertonegotiateforcereductions(with

anenemyawareofenormouspressuresinthedirectionofunilateralreductions)

wasnotinitsmostcreativephase,especiallywhenitsbasicforcestructurewas

inadequate.Afundamentalreexaminationwouldhavetowaitforarestorationof

ournationalunitywiththeendoftheVie tnamwar.



<<Contents>>



****



East‐WestRelationsinEurope



n1969,impatiencewiththerigorsoftheColdWarwaspervasiveintheWest.

Allleaderswereunderpressuretodemonstratetheircommitmenttopeace;

theSovietUnionplayedonthesesensitivitiescleverly.Withinmonthsafterthe

brutalinvasionofCzec hoslovakia,Westerngovernmentshadbeenmaneuvered

intothepositionoffeelingobligedtoprovetheirgoodwill inEast‐Westrelations.



AteachstoponhisfirstEuropeantripinearly1969,Nixonhadfound

himselfindiscussionsofhowtorespondtoSovietovertures.Eachleaderhad

urgedhimtostarttheSALTnegotiationsasrapidlyaspossibleandtoconsultas

theyprogressed;theaxiomthattheSovietswerereadyforrealdétentebecause

ofdomesticpressuresforconsumergoodsandexternalpressuresfromChinawas

unchallenged.Expandedexchangesandtradewerealsosought. DeGaulle

stronglyurgedanapproachtotheSovietUnion.WhenWalterScheel,leaderof

theWestGermanFreeDemocratic PartyandsoontobeForeignMinister,called

onNixoninJune,hemadethepointthatEuropeansnolongerfearedaUS‐Soviet

condominium;themajorityofEuropeanpublicopinionnotonlyendorseddétente

butsoughttobecomepartoftheprocess.



ThoughNixonwasskeptical,andIsharedhisview,thesenearlyunanimous

appealsposedaseriouschallengeforus.Inpreviousdecades,Americanrigidity

hadbecomeatargetforleftistcriticisminEurope,makingNATOacontroversial

subjectineveryEuropeancountryandforcingEuropeanleaderstoshifttoa

détenteline,purportingtoactasa“bridge”betweenEastandWest.Thestark

factwasthatifAmericawasintrans igent,weriskedbeingisolatedwithinthe

AllianceandpushingEuropetowardneutralism.Similarly,withinAmericawe

wouldbepummeledforourbellicosity,andthehysteriaoverVietnamwould

spreadtootherareasofpolicy.



Forallthesereasonswecametotheconclusionthatwecouldbestholdthe

Alliancetogetherbyacceptingtheprincipleofdétentebutestablishingclear

criteriatodetermineitscourse.OnhistripthroughEuropeNixonnevertiredof

preachingthegospelofhisAdministration:Wewerereadyforaneraof

negotiations,buttherewouldremainsubstantialelementsofconfrontation;

negotiationshadtobeseriousandconcrete,notatmospheric.Tothatend,

Atlanticunityandstrengthwerevital.TheSovietsmustentertainnohopeof

dividingtheAlliancebyselectivedétentewithsomealliesbutnotwithothers.We

weredeterminedtoestablishanagendathatdidnotpermittheSovietstopick

theirownissues,imposetheirowndefinitionofdéte nte,orlull theWestinto

complacency.



ThefirsttrickyproblemwasSALT.WhenNixonenteredoffice oneofthe

mostinsistentargumentsofdevoteesofstrategicarmslimitationwasthatthe

Europeansdesiredit.Andindeedwhenwedelayedthetalksin1969inorderto

reviewoptionsandtolinkSALTtootherissues,manyEuropeanleade rsstressed

itsurgency.Thiswaseasyforthemsinceitinvolvednodecisionsontheirpart.As

oneofmyassociateswrotetomeafteratriptoEurope:“Onecanexpecta

growingappetitefordétente,ifonlybecauseitissomuchmorepleasanttothink

aboutthanmilitaryproblems.”ButtheinevitableEuropeanambivalenceemerged

whenthenegotiationsthathadbeensoinsistentlydemandedwereinfact

approaching.AssoonaswesetadatefortheopeningofSALTandbeganbriefing

ourallies,theybegantograspthestrategicimplications.Anagreementbetween

theSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatestolimitstrategicweaponswould

inevitablyratifystrategicequality.Therecouldbenootherbas isfornegotiation;

andindeedourbriefingspointedouttothemthatparitywasapproachingeven

withoutagreementasaresultofthesteadygrowthofSovietforces.JosefLuns,

thenDutchForeignMinister,saidtothePresidentthatthenotionofparitywas

oneofthemostshockingpropositionsthathehadeverheard.Similarly,

ChancellorKiesingercommentedthathehadnotfollowedthestrategicsituation

closelyinrecentyears;ithadcomeassomethingofa“thought‐provoking”

surprisetorealizehowclosethetwosidesweretoequality.Ourallieshadno

reasontobesurprisedbuteverycauseforconcern:Strategicparitywasboundto

increasethedangersoftheconventionalsuperioritythattheSovietUnionhad

longheldontheEuropeancontinent.



TheBritishrepresentativeatthebriefingoftheNATOCouncilonJune30

questionedwhetherinviewofthetrendintheweaponsdevelopmentofboth

sidesthiswasthemomentfortalks.WestGermanAmbassadorRolf Pauls,in

conversationwithmeonJuly4,hitthenailonthehead:SALTmarkedtheendof

Americanstrategicsuperiority;theSovietUnionwoulderodeouradvantage

eitherthroughitsownbuilduporthroughnegotiations.IrepliedthatIwouldhate

tothinkthattheworld’sgreatestindustri alpowerwouldbedoomedtolosean

armsrace.Butbecauseofprocurementdecisionsmadeinthe1960s,thetrends

oftechnology,thedivisionscausedbyVietnam,andthemassivedifficultyin

obtainingCongressionalapprovalforanynewstrategicprograms,Iknewthat

Paulswasright.



IsummeduptheEuropeanreactionforNixononJuly10:



ItisafairestimatethatsomeoftheoriginalenthusiasmforSALTiswaning.Onereason

forthisistheunderlyingconcernovertheeffectofaSALTagreement.Somecountries

apparentlyfearthatanagreementbasedonparitywouldleavetheSovietUnionwitha

substantialmarginofsuperiorityinconventionalforcesinEurope,andthenetresultwouldbe

thattheover‐alldeterrentagainstSovietattacksmightbeweakened.Thereisalsosome

concern,mainlyGerman,thattheconnectionbetweenSALTandpoliticalmattersisnolonger

tobemaintained.



Fortunatelyforallconcerned,theSovietUnionprocrastinatedinaccepting

thedateproposedforopeningthenegotiations.Thisgaveusanoppor tunityto

completeourowninternalstudiesandtoachieveasatisfactoryunderstanding

withourEuropeanallies.



Wecouldnotfullyovercomethedisquietofourallies,eventhoughitwas

generatedinlargepartbytheirurgingusintodétenteandthenshrinkingbefore

itsconsequences.OnJuly4IhadwarnedAmbassadorPauls —onlyhalf

facetiously—thatourallieshenceforthhadbetterbecarefulaboutwhatthey

proposedtousbecausewemightwellaccepttheirrecommendations.Theperil

toEuropearosenotfromunilateralAmericanconcessionsasaresultofdétente,

however;itresultedfromthefactthatunderconditionsofstrategicparitythe

inequalityofforcesonthecontinentofEuropewouldsoonerorlatermakea

difference.Thegovernme ntsoftheAllianceforavarietyofreasons,mostly

domestic,wereunwillingorunabletotakethenecessaryremedialmeasures;in

theirabsencetheywereboundtoliveincreasinglydangero usly.Noamountof

reassurancewouldbeabletochangethis.Buttosynchronizealliedcohesionand

East‐Westnegotiationsonmanysubjectsdependedonsomeagreedviewofthe

worldwelivedin,ofthepurposeswesoughttoachievetogether,andofthe

requirementsofthecommondefense.



<<Contents>>



****



BerlinandBrandt’sOstpolitik



T

herelationshipoftheCommunistworldandtheWestcanneverhavea

uniformtexture.SALTnegotiationswereconfinedtotheUnitedStatesand

theSovietUnion,thoughourNATOallieshadanobviousinterestinthem.Berlin

involvedallthewartimealliesthathadalegalresponsibilityforthecity:Britain,

France,theUnitedStates,andtheSovietUnion.BecauseBerlinwastechnically

undermilitaryoccupation,WestGermanyhadnolegalstatustonegotiate.The

almostperennialcrisesoftwodecadeshadmadeclearthatthefreedomofBerlin

paradoxicallydependedonmaintainingitsstatusasacitystillunderoccupation.

ThiswasthesolelegalbasisonwhichtheUnitedStatesanditsWesternallies

couldresistSovietandEastGermanpressures,anomalousthoughthiswasa

generationaftertheendoftheSecondWorldWar.In1959andagainin1961‐

1962,WesternfortitudeinmaintainingoccupationrightsandKhrushchev’s

inabilitytosticktoonestrandofpolicyhadpreservedBerlin’sfreedom.But

nothingcouldchangethegeographicrealities ofacityisolatedahundredmiles

deepinCommunistterritory,subjecttoharassment,susceptibleatalltimesto

newblackmail.ItsvulnerabilitysymbolizedthetenuousnatureofEast‐West

relations;itwasthelivingproofoftheimportanceofourconceptoflinkage.We

coulddefendBerlinonlybylinkingitsfreedomtootherSovietconcerns.Any

policythatdealtwithBerlinasaseparateissuewasboundtofindtheWestern

alliesatasignificantnegotiatingdisadvantagebecauseofBerlin’smilitary

vulnerability.



TheproblemofBerlinreemergedalmostaccidentallyearlyintheNixon

Presidency,largelyasaresultofthevagariesoftheGermanconstitutionalcycle

thatmade1969apresidentialelectionyear.AsIhavementioned,Federal

electorsfromtheBundestagandstate sintended,asbefore,toholdtheirspecial

sessiontoelectthePresidentinWestBerlin,intheoldReichstagbuilding.In

December1968,theSovietForeignMinistryformallyprotestedthecoming

sessioninBerlintoUSAmbassadorLlewellynThompson. TheJohnson

Administrationdecidedtoleavetheresponsetoitssuccessor.OnJanuary22,

1969,SecretaryofStateRogersforwardedtoPresidentNixonadraftrejectingthe

Sovietprotest.IagreedwithRogers’sproposedreply;however,Irecommended—

subjecttoGermanconcurrence—thatwenotsendituntilmuchclosertothedate

oftheGermanpresidentialelection,whichwasMarch5.Itdidnotseemtometo

beinourinteresttoinvitewhatwasboundtobeanunproductive andpotentially

acrimoniousexchange.Thereplywasheldup.



TheEastGermansthereuponbegansomeminorharassmentofcivilian

traffictoBerlin.InmemorandaofJanuary28andFebruary11ItoldthePresident

thatweshouldstaycool;thisdidnotlooktobethetimefortheSovietUnionto

seekaconfrontationwithus.Ialsoinformedhimofourcont ingency plansif

harassmentcontinuedorincreased.InmybriefingpaperforthePresident’sfirst

meetingwithSovietAmbassadorDobryninonFebruary17,Irecommended:“I

thinkitespeciallyim portantthatyoudisabuseDobryninoftheideathatSoviet‐

EastGermaninterferencewithaccesstoBerlininconnectionwiththeFederal

AssemblymeetingthereonMarch5isamatterthatdoesnotdirectlyconcernthe

UnitedStates.”NixonmadethispointsharplytoDobrynininhismeetingof

February17.Dobrynin,showingthattheSovietUnionwasnotpre paredtotest

thenewPresidentsoearlyinhisterm,hastenedtoreassurethePresidentthat

Moscowsoughtnoconfrontation.



OnFebruary22,thedaybeforethePresidentwastoleaveforEurope,

DobryninpassedamessagetomeurgingustointervenewiththeKiesinger

governmenttocallofftheelectioninBerlin.Thiswouldallowusto“avoid

unnecessarytensionsandcutshortatendencytowardsmountingoftension,”

saidtheSovietnote.Irejectedtheproposition;wewouldmakenosuchrequest

ofKiesinger.IwarnedDobryninsternlyagainstunilateralacts;tounderlinemy

warning,thePresident,onmyrecommendation,orderedastep‐upinUSmilitary

trafficovertheaccessroutestoBerlin.



AsIhavealreadydescribed,whilevisitingBerlinonFebruary27,Nixonina

speechattheSiemensfactorystronglyreaffirmedtheAmericancommitmentto

thefreedomofthecity:“Lettherebenomiscalculation:Nounilateralmove,no

illegalact,noformofpressurefromanysourcewillshaketheresolveofthe

Westernnationstodefendtheirrightfulstatusasprotectorsofthepeopleoffree

Berlin.”Afterourreturn,andshortlybeforetheelection,Dobrynincomplained

mildlyaboutthePresident’srhetoric.IrepliedthatthePresidenthadsimply

reaffirmedexistingcommitments;wewouldconsideranyharassmentofaccessto

Berlinwiththeutmostgravity.Nothingwouldcontributemoretotheeasingof

tensionsthantoregularizeaccessprocedurestoBerlin.Dobryninforthefirsttime

suggestedthattherewere“positivepossibilities”tonegotiateonthatsubject.

TheelectionofthenewFederalPresident,GustavHeinemann,tookplaceon

March5inBerlinwithoutfurtherincident.Wehadwithstoodourfirst,albeit

minor,confrontationwiththeSoviets.



Thismini‐crisissetinmotionaseriesofmaneuversthatresultedinaformal

negotiationoverBerlin.NoneoftheWesternPowersandprobablynoteventhe

SovietUnionhadintendedthisearlyin1969.(Theprocessgatheredmomentum

onlyslowly.Butaftermanyfalse startsitculminatedinthelatesummerof1971

inanewFour‐Poweragreementthatputatleastatemporaryendtotwenty‐five

yearsoftensionsoverBerlin.)



InthelightofDobrynin’shints,NixoninhislettertoKosyginofMarch26

repeatedhisoffertodiscussBerlin.KosyginrepliedonMay27totheeffectthat

theSovietUnionhadno“objections”toadiscussionofBerlinbutthattheFederal

Republicwastoblameforanytensionsthere.Irecommendedagainstpursuing

thesubjectfurtherinabilateralchannel:“Idoubtthatthisisagoodtimetorush

intoanyfull‐scaletalks.Following theGermanelection,[

Theforthcoming

parliamentaryelectionscheduledforSeptember1969.]wemightraisetheissuewiththe

newgovernmentinBonnandthenconsiderwhetherandhowtofollowupwith

Moscow.”



ReceivingnofurtherreplyfromtheUnitedStates,theSovietsturnedtothe

publicarena.OnJuly10,SovietForeignMinisterGromykogaveaspeechaffirming

Sovietwillingnessto“exchangeviewsastohowcomplicationsconcerningWest

Berlincanbeavoidednowandinthefuture.”Brandt,stillForeignMinister,had

beenurginghisallieseversincetheNATOministerialmeetinginApriltoseekto

negotiate“improvements”incivilianaccesswithouttellingushowtodothis;he

nowurgedrapidacceptanceofGromyko’soffer.Hissenseofurgencywasinmy

viewnotunconnectedwiththeimminentGermanelection.Inanyevent,“rapid”

inthecumbersomemachineryofalliedconsultations translatedintoafour‐week

delay.OnAugust7,togetherwiththeBritishandFrench,weinformedtheSoviet

Unionofourreadinesstoconductexploratorytalks.



TheSoviets,however,waitedwelloveramonthtoreturnwhatwasa

basicallydisappointingreply.TheyacceptedFour‐Powertalksbutresistedany

discussionofimprovedaccesstoBerlin;theywantedthediscussionstofocuson

curbingtheactivitiesoftheFederalRepublic inWestBerlin.



OnOctober20whenhemetwithNixon,Dobryninmadeanotherrunata

bilateralUS‐Sovietnegotiation,proposingaformalexchangeofviews.AsI

mentionedinChapterV,IcautionedthePresidentagainstit:“Ithinkweshould

notencouragethenotionofbilateralUS‐SoviettalksonBerlinatthisstage.The

SovietswouldusethemtostirupsuspicionsamongtheAlliesandtoplayusoff

againsteachother.Ibelievewewoulddobesttokeepthisissueinthe

quadripartiteforumforthemomentandnottopresstoomuchourselves.”



Infact,bythenSovietpolicyoverBerlinwasshiftingitsfocustoBonnafter

theadventofthenewgovernmentofWillyBrandt.



AsaresultoftheGermangeneralelectionofSeptember28,1969,anew

coalitionofSocialDemocratsandFreeDemocratscameintoofficepledgedto

newopeningstowardtheEast.[

Nixon,mistakenlyassumingthattheChristianDemocratic

pluralitymeantthatKurtKiesingerwouldcontinueasChancellor,hadtelephonedKiesingerto

congratulatehim.WhentheSocialDemocrats(SPD)andtheFreeDemocrats(FDP)formeda

majoritycoalitioninstead,Brandtgraciouslyforgavethegaffebycommenting:“Toerris

human,themoresoatadistance.”]TheleaderoftheFreeDemocrats,WalterScheel,

hadforeshadowedthisapproachinhisconversationwithNixononJune13.He

hadarguedthattheHallsteinDoctrine—whichforbadediplomaticrelationswith

non‐CommunistgovernmentsthatrecognizedEastGermany—wouldisolatethe

FederalRepublicfromtheThirdWorld.Closerrelationsbetweenthetwo

Germanieswereessentialeitheronthebasisofanewtreatyarrangementor

someotherlegalformula.



Butsuchapolicywasnotwithoutitsdangers.TheStateDepartment,ina

thoughtfulpaperofOctober6,pointedoutthatthenewcoalitioncouldnot

pursuesimultaneouslyactivepoliciestowardEastGermanyandintegrationofthe

FederalRepublicintoWesternEurope.TheStateDepartme ntconcluded—andI

agreed—that“underanSPD‐FDPcoalitionanactiveall‐GermanandEasternpolicy

willhavethefirstpriority.”



IsharedtheseconcernsinamemorandumtothePresident:



ItshouldbestressedthatmenlikeBrandt,WehnerandDefenseMinister[Helmut]

Schmidtundoubtedlyseethemselvesasconductingaresponsiblepolicyofreconciliationand

normalizationwiththeEastandintendnottohavethispolicycomeintoconflictwith

Germany’sWesternassociation.TherecanbenodoubtabouttheirbasicWesternorientation.

Buttheirproblemistocontrolaprocesswhich,ifitresultsinfailure,couldjeopardizetheir

politicallivesandifitsucceedscouldcreateamomentumthatmayshakeGermany’sdomestic

stabilityandunhingeitsinternationalposition.



ItseemedtomethatBrandt’snewOstpolitik,whichlookedtomanylikea

progressivepolicyofquestfordétente,couldinlessscrupuloushandsturnintoa

newformofclassicGermannationalism.FromBismarcktoRapalloitwasthe

essenceofGermany’snationalistforeignpolicytomaneuverfreelybetweenEast

andWest.Bycontrast,American(andGerman)policysincethe1940shadbeento

groundtheFederalRepublicfirmlyintheWest,intheAtlanticAllianceandthen

theEuropeanCommunity.



Brandt’selection,infact,threwintosharpreliefthecentralproblemof

Germanforeignpolicy.TheGermannationhadbeendividedintotwostatesfor

twodecades.AbrutalassertionofSovietpowerhadimposeda Communist

regimeontheEasternthirdofthecountryagainstthewillofthepopulation—the

so‐calledGermanDemocraticRepublic.Itwaspreposterous,ofcourse,thatinthe

centerofEurope,wherenationalismhadoriginated,theworldcommunityshould

acquiescein,ifnotpositivelyendorse,theacceptanceofaregimeartificially

imposedbyforeigntroops,aregimewhichcouldneverhavewonafreeelection.

Such“imperialism”inAsiaorAfricawouldhaveproducedoutragedoutcriesand

demonstrations;inCentralEuropeacceptanceofthestatusquobecamethetest

ofreasonableness.



AnyWestGermangovernmentwasboundtoavowthegoalof

reunification.Butinprevailingcircumstancesthiswasunachievablewithouta

massivecollapseofSovietpower.TheWesternallieswerewillingtowait;they

werenotpreparedtorunsignificantrisksonbehalfofreunification—inpart

becauseaunifiedGermanyraisedinmanyWestEuropeanandsomeAmerican

mindsthespecterofnewGermanhegemony.



ButtheFederalRepubliccouldnotsimplywait;itneededsomeplausible

conceptfordealingwithadividedGermany.ThroughouttheFiftiesandSixties

successiveGermangovernmentshadattemptedtoresolvethisdilemmaby

ostracizingtheEastGermanregime.Butby1970moreandmorecountrieswere

recognizingEastGermanyindefianceofBonn’sthreattocutoffrelations(the

HallsteinDoctrine).Thepolicyincreasinglyrantheriskofbackfiring;itthreatened

toisolateBonnrat h erthanEast Germany.BythemiddleSixtiestheFederal

Republichadfeltobligedtomakean“exception”forthecountriesofEastern

Europeontheweakexcusethattheywerenotfreeintheirdecisions.



IhadgreatlyadmiredAdenauerandhiswiseinsistenceonsubordinatingall

otherconsiderationstotheneedforgaining forhiscountryareputationfor

reliabilityandsteadiness.ButbytheSeventiestheAdenauerpolicieson

reunificationwereboundtobringtheFederalRepublicintoincreasingconflict

withbothalliesandthenonaligned.Bonnwouldhavefacedapossiblecrisiswith

theEastpracticallyalonehaditheldtoitsearliercourse.ItwastoBrandt’ s

historiccreditthatheassumedforGermanytheburdensandtheanguish

imposedbynecessity.