Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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betweenthetwoGermanies,BonnhadalsoopenedupdiscussionswiththeUSSR

onatreatyontherenunciationofforce.PreliminarycontactsbytheWest

GermanAmbassadorinMoscowhadresultedinapre dictablestalemateover

SovietinsistencethattheFederalRepublicfirstrecognizeEastGermany. Brandt

thendecidedtoescalatetheleveloftalksbyappointingEgonBahr,hisconfidant,

toleadthesecondround.Bahrinformedmeofthis stepbybackchannel.On

February20,afterhisreturnfromMoscow,Bahrusedthebackchannelagainto

conveyhisgenerallyoptimisticassessmentofhistalksthere.Hebelievedthatthe

Sovietswere“seriouslyinterested”inthepossibilityofatreatyrenouncingthe

useofforceandwereonthevergeofsubmittingconcreteproposalsclearedby

thePolitburo.



ButBahr’stalkshadalsobroughthometohimthatthelinkag etoBerlin

wasouraceinthehole.BahrassuredmethathehadpressedGromykotoagree

toundisturbedciviliantraffictoBerlin,anessentialquidproquoforGerman

publicopinion.Gromykohadnotreacted,buthadtakennote.Bahrwantedto

makesurethatBerlinnegotiationsdidnotlagbehindtheGermantalks.Ihadthe

oppositeview;oncetheGermantalkswerecompletedourbargainingposition

overBerlinwouldbevastlyimprovedbecausetheSovietswouldbeeagertosee

theEasterntreatiesratified.



AfterhavingstalledonBerlintalksforsixmonths,theSovietshadbegunto

perceivethesamerealities.OnFebruary10theSovietsformallyinvitedthe

UnitedStates,Britain,andFrancetobeginnegotiationsaboutBerlinonFebruary

18.Theshortdeadlinewastotallyunrealistic,giventheglacialproceduresof

interalliedconsultation.ButitbespokeSovieteagerness;ithighlightedour

opportunityforimprovingourpositioninBerlinjustsolongaswedidnotlet

ourselvesbestampeded.IrecommendedtothePresidentthatweacceptthe

SovietproposalbutphasethetalkssothattheSovietscouldnotplayofftheallies

againstoneanotherbytwosimultaneous setsoftalks.Thisledtoacarefulminuet

inwhichneitherwenorourGermanallycouldmakeourpositionsexplicit.Brandt

wantedtospeeduptheBerlinnegotiationssothathecouldusethemfor

leverageand,ifnecessary,shifttheonusforanyfailureofhisOstpolitiktous.

Conversely,wefavoredamoreleisurelypace,lestwebeaskedtopayfor

progressintheinter‐GermannegotiationsinthecoinofFour‐Powerrightsin

Berlin.



BrandtwrotetoNixononFebruary25reportingformallyonBahr’svisitto

MoscowandgentlyurgingtheearlyopeningofBerlinnegotiations.Wewaited

untilMarch12toreply;Nixon’sletteragreedtoworkforaunifiedWestern

position;wesuggestedthattheFour‐PowerBerlintalksmightopenonMarch26.

TheintricaciesoftheBerlinquestion,theneedtodevelopacommonWestern

position,andthesharplyconflictingviewsbuiltupovertheyearsallensuredthat 

Berlinnegotiationswouldbeprotracted.Brandtcouldsetamuchbriskerpacein

hisbilateralinitiatives;thestyleofBahr,hischiefnegotiator,madeitinescapable.

Allofthisincreasedourleverage.Toputitdiplomatically,Ididnotconsiderthe

slowpaceoftheBerlintalksatacticaldisadvantage.



Brandt’smeetingwithWilliStophinErfurtwasamajorsuccess.Hewas

greetedwithgreatenthusiasmbytheEastGermancrowds,whobeganchanting

“Willy,Willy,”andthen,realizingthatbothparticipantshadsimilarfirstnames,

changedtheirgreetingto“WillyBrandt.”Nomajoragreementresulted;the

significancewasthatforthefirsttimetheleadersofadividedGermanyhadmet

andtalked.TheclassicWesternposition—thatanyEuropeansettlement

presupposedthereunificationofGermany—therebypassedintohistory.



ThiswasthestateofaffairswhenBrandtpaidhisfirstvisittoWashington

asChancellorthreeweekslater.BeforeBrandt’sarrival,IsawEgonBahrprivately

onApril8inmyWhiteHouseoffice.Hebriefedmeinmore detailonhistalksin

Moscow,thoughforsomereasonheomittedthree“newpapers”thathehad

handedtotheSovietsbutneverdiscussedwithus.(Dobrynin,neverloathto

widenanypotentialcracksinalliedunity,hadmentionedthemtome!)Bahrwas

confidentthattheSovietswouldurgetheEastGermanstonormalizerelations

betweenBonnandEastGermanyandthattheywouldeaseBerlinaccess.What

wewanted,ofcourse,wasnotaSovietadministrativegesturerevocableatwill

butalegalregimentounder pinWestBerlin’sviability.Brandt’smeetingwith

Nixonwentwell,asIhavedescribedinChapterXI.BrandtleftWashingtonwitha

generalendorsementofhispolicy.WestGerman‐SoviettalksresumedfromMay

12to22andresultedinanagreementon“principles.”Atthesemiannualmeeting

ofForeignMinistersoftheAtlanticAllianceinRomeonMay26‐27,Brandt

receivedthesolidsupportofallhisallies.



AllthetimecontroversywasgrowingwithinWestGermany.Theopposition

ChristianDemocratslaunchedabitterattackonBrandt’spolicy.Former

ChancellorKiesingerwarnedthatitwas“fiveminutestohighnoon”;Rainer

Barzel,whowassuccessfullychallengingKiesingerfortheoppositionleadership,

declaredominously,“turnbackbeforeitistoolate.”EgonBahr’snegotiating

paperwasleakedintheGermanpress,inflamingpassionsfurther.Thefurormade

itstarklyobviousthatnotreatywiththeSovietUnionwouldberatifiedbythe

WestGermanParliamentunlesstherewasasatisfactoryagreementonBerlin.



Brandt,buttressedbyagoodshowinginalocalelectioninJune,decidedto

proceedintothefinalphaseofhisnegotiationwiththeUSSR,appointingForeign

MinisterWalterScheelaschiefnegotiator.AftertwelvedaysinMoscowScheel

initialedadrafttreatyontherenunciationofforcewithForeignMinister

Gromyko,andfivedayslaterBrandtfollowedtoMoscowtosignthetreatyand

taketheopportunityofanextendedtalkwithBrezhnev.TheFederalRepublichad

crosseditsRubicon:IthadacceptedthedivisionofGermany;ithadsealedthe

statusquoinCentralEurope.



TwodayslaterBrandtwroteNixon,sayingthathehadempha sizedthe

crucialimportanceofsolvingtheBerlinproblemtobothKosyginandBrezhnev.

TheSovietshadbeeninformedofficiallyandrepeatedlythatthetreatywouldnot

comeintoforceunlessasatisfactoryBerlinsettleme ntwasreached.OnAugust17

BahrvisitedWashingtonagaintobriefmeaboutBrandt’sMoscowsojourn.His

mainconcernwastoemphasizeBrandt’sdesireforrapidprogressonBerlin.

Therewasadanger,IpointedouttothePresident,thatwewerebeingsetupas

thefallguyshouldtheintricatesetofnegotiationscollapse.ButIthoughtmatters

hadgonetoofarforthat.Wehadbecomethedecidingelement,thoughneither

MoscownortheFederalRepublicwastounderstandthisfullyforfivemore

months.



TheSovietshadstalledtheBerlintalksuntiltheconclusionoftheirtreaty

withtheFederalRepublic.NodoubttheycalculatedthattheWestGermans

wouldthenbringpressureonustodeliveraBerlinsettlement—astheyindeed

halfheartedlydid.Butthiswasagravemiscalculation.Bonn’s marginofmaneuver

waslimited;ithadexhausteditsstoreofconcessions;itwasinnopositionto

pressusformore.TomuchofGermanpublicopinionthetreatywiththeSoviet

Unionseemedinequitable;Bonnforsworeitsnationalclaimsinret urnforan

improvementoftheatmosphereandeasingofinter‐Germancontacts,which

shouldneverhavebeeninterruptedtobeginwith.Thetreaty’sfateinParliament

nowdependedonunambiguousSovietconcessionsoverBerlin.Thelinkage

betweenthetreatyandBerlinwasclearlyworkingagainst,notfor,Moscow.To

besure,negotiationsonBerlinwouldbecomplicated.TheWesternallieswere

seekingaSoviet,ratherthanEastGerman,guaranteeforfreeaccessacrossEast

Germanterritory.ThiswasboundtoberesistedbyEastGermany.ButtheSoviets

hadanotherstrongincentivetoovercomeEastGermanhesitations:AEuropean

SecurityConferencecouldnevertakeplacewithoutouragreement.Weleftno

doubtthatwewouldnotevenconsideritbeforetheBerlintalkswereconcluded.

ThuswehadharnessedthebEastofdétente,makingbothaEuropeanSecurity

ConferenceandratificationofBrandt’sEasterntreatiesdependentuponaBerlin

agreementthatmetourobjectives.



Wehadtoreininouralliesinthemeantime.BrandtwantedtheAllianceto

agreeoncriteriaformutualandbala ncedforcereductions(MBFR)inEurope,in

ordertopreparefornegotiationsandalsotopreventunilateralAmericantroop

withdrawals.BritainurgedtheimmediatecreationofaStandingCommissionfor

East‐Westrelations.WedeflectedtheGermaninitiativebysupportinga Canadian

setofgeneralMBFRprinciplesofinspiredvagueness.AndweopposedtheBritish

proposalaltogether.Wewantednoinstitutionsthatwouldaddtheirmomentum

tothealreadyexcessivepressuresforarelaxationoftensionsbasedon

atmospherics.



Timewasonourside;wewereinastrongposition,providedwekeptour

cool.ThisdidnotbecomeapparentimmediatelytotheSoviets,whostill

consideredtheagreementwiththeFederalRepublicamajorstepinselective

détenteandcontinuedtotrytouseittoweakenalliedcohesionbyaseriesof

crisesaimedattheUnitedStates.Ittooksomemonthsoffirmnesstobringhome

totheKremlintherealitieswithwhichitwouldhavetodeal. 



<<Contents>>



****



SALTandtheDefenseDebate



T

herewasonenegotiationwithMoscow,however,thatwasdevelopingalife

ofitsown,theSALT negotiations,whichalternated betweenHelsinkiand

Vienna.Thefirstphaseofthesetalks,heldinHelsinki,hadbeenexploratory;they

weretoberesumedinViennabythemiddleofApril1970.TheprincipalSoviet

concernhadbeentolimitABMs—adramaticchangefromKosygin’scommentto

PresidentJohnsonatGlassborothattheideaoflimitingmissiledefenseswasone

ofthemostabsurdhehadeverheard.Onemightplausiblydrawtheconclusion

thatwhatchangedSovietperceptionswasourdecisiontodevelopanABM

systemofourown.Regrettably,thisinsightwasnotwidespread.Infact,thebitter

debateof1969overABMwassubstantiallyrepeatedin1970,thistimeoverthe

sizeofthealreadyapprovedprogram.TheissuewaswhethertoconfineourABM

totheso‐calledPhaseI,thetwositesprotectingMinutemanICBMfields,which

hadbeennarrowlyapprovedbythepreviousCongress;orwhethertoproceed

withPhaseII,buildingtowardourannouncedobjectiveofdefendingour

populationagainsta ccidentallaunchesandattacksbythirdcountries.



AtanNSCmeetingonJanuary23,1970,Isummeduptheconflictingpoints

ofview.ItwastheperennialdebatewhetherSovietinterestincompromisewas

bestelicitedbymakingunilateralAmericangesturesorbypresentingtheKremlin

withrisksandprogramstheywereeagertostop.Theissuehasbedeviledour

defensedebatefromthehydrogenbombtotheB ‐1bomber.Iknownoinstance

whereunilateralAmericanrestraintelicitedasignificantorlastingSoviet

response.



Theadvocatesofunilateralgesturesurgedamorato riumonfurther

AmericanABMdeploymentsandcitedtheSovietinterestinlimitingdefensive

systems.Theyfeltsuspensionofourprogramwouldsignalourseriousnessof

purpose;CongressionalcriticsofABMwouldbemollifiedinthebargain.The

moratoriumcouldalwaysbeliftediftheSovietsdraggedoutthenegotiations.

ThisviewwasheldbytheStateDepartmentandtheArmsControland

DisarmamentAgency(ACDA).ThosewhowishedtoproceedwithPhaseII,

however,includingmyself,arguedthatsuspensionofourABMprogramwould

doomtheprospectsforagreement.TheSoviets’attitudestowardmissiledefense

hadbeenreversedbythestartofourprogram;theywouldhavenoincentiveto

negotiateseriouslyoncewehadceasedconstruction,allthelesssosinceour

Congressionalopposition,havingstoppedPhaseII,wouldsurelyseektoeliminate

ABMaltogether.TheSovietscouldachievetheirobjectiveofkillingourABM

simplybydraggingoutthenegotiations.Itseemedtomeimprobablethatour

moratoriumwouldbelifted,howevermuchtheSovietsstalled.Moratoria are

alwayssoldbyfiercepromisesthattheassumptionsonwhichtheyarebasedwill

bevigilantlyenforced;theyalmostneverendunlessthereisaprovocationso

blatantthatitsimplycannotbeignored.



TheNSCmeetingofJanuary23wasunabletocometoadecision;theissue

hadgonebeyondSALTorABMtothenationaldebateoverthenatureofour

country’ssecurity.



Thedominantsloganofallattacksonourdefenseprogramwastheneedto

“reordernationalpriorities”—aeuphemismforcuttingthedefensebudget.Itwas

thecounterpartoftheVietnamdebateinthefieldofstrategy.Theplethoraof

amendmentstorestricttheuseoffundsforVietnamwassoonextendedto

specificweaponssystems.SenatorGeorgeMcGovernproposedcuttingofftheB‐1

bomber;SenatorsWilliamProxmireandRichardSchweikerurgedpostponingthe

C‐5Atransportplaneuntiltheendofaninvestigationoffinanciallyailing

Lockheed;SenatorBirchBayhwantedtolimitthetotalsizeofourarmedforces.

SenatorEdwardBrookewasengagedinhisannualcampaignagainstABMand

MIRV.Therewerenoresolutionsorspeechesindicatingthatthedefensebudget

mightbeinadequate.Thebelieversinstrongdefensewereclearlyfightinga

rearguardaction.



AswithVietnam,wewerecaughtinaviciouscircle.Topreserveany

supportfornationaldefenseNixonthoughtthathehadtoappearresponsiveto

thepressuresfortrimmingthedefensebudgetandreducingthepercentageof

theGrossNationalProductdevotedtomilitarypurposes.Allseniormembersof

theAdministrationexceptLairdandmeagreedinthis.Theyfearedthatotherwise

theCongresswouldimplementthedrasticcutsproposedbyantimilitary zealotsin

theCongress,themedia,andacademia.Ihadseriousmisgivings.Ifearedthe

long‐termdiplomaticimpactofthepersistentreductionofourforcesatthevery

timethatwewerelosingourrelativestrategicsuperiority,whilewewerevisibly

retrenchinginSouthEastAsia,andwhiletheSovietmilitaryexpenditureswere

increasingsteadily.



Nixon’sdefensebudget,announcedonFebruary2,1970,calledfora

reductionofmorethan$5billionunderthepreviousyear.(Thefigure,ofcourse,

doesnottellthewholestory,becauseeventhepreviousyear’sbudgethadbeen

inadequate,thankstothesamepressuresoperatingin1969.)Thedefensebudget

representedabout7percentoftheGrossNationalProductascompared with8.7

percentthepreviousyear,and34.6percentofthenationalbudgetascompared

with37.7percentin1969.(Indeed,theproposeddefensebudgetinrealterms

wasonly7percentabovethelastpeacetimebudgetof1964,eventhoughthe

warinVietnamcontinued.)Wit hintheseconstraintsMelLairdperformeda

miracleofmanagementandplanningbyincreasing,ifonlyslightly,allstrategic

programs:theB‐1bomber,theTridentsubmarineandmissile,theMinutemanIII

ICBM,andthe“Safeguard”ABM.



Buttheeffectofthereductionwasneverthelessinsidious.Itpreventedus

fromdevelopingacoherentresponsetothegrowingimbalanceinconventional

forces.Itfrozeourstrategicplanningintoadaptationsofthefamiliar.Itcaused

thePentagontoslighttheABMprogram,whichcostussoheavilydomestically

andwasattheheartofourSALTstrategy,becausethefundsforitwereboundto

affectotherpriorities.Wewerethusnegotiatingdisarmamentonthreefronts:at

ViennaandHelsinkiwiththeSoviets;athomewithinourgovernment,andwith

theCongress.Andeventhesharplyreduceddefensebudgetwasassaultedinthe

Congress.SenateMajorityLeaderMikeMansfieldobjectedtoPhaseIIoftheABM

programevenbeforeitwasofficiallysubmitted. OnJanuary31,forecastinganew

Senatedebate,hesaid:“Wherethehellisitgoingtoend?Whatisgoingto

happentopeople?…Whereisthemoneycomingfrom?”SenatorJ.William

FulbrightcalledPhaseIIofABM“agreatmistake.” Whenthenewbudgetwas

announcedonFebruary2,thecriticismstartedinearnest.SenatorMansfield

indicatedthatthenewbudget,whilelowerthanthatofthepreviousyear,was

stillfartoohigh.Hewarnedthatitcontained“seedmoney”formanynew

projects.Hewasright,althoughafterhavingvoluntarilystoppedourmissile

buildupintheSixties,seedmoneywastheleastthenewAdministrationcouldask

forinthefaceoftherelentlessgrowthofSovietstrategicforces.



InMayabipartisangroupofSenators,includingGeorgeMcGovern,Philip

Hart,WilliamFulbright,WalterMondale,CliffordCase,andMarkHatfield,

announcedplanstoputforwardanalternativebudgetdemandingmoresevere

cuts.OnJune15anothergroupofliberalSenatorsandCongressmen

recommendedanadditionalreduct ionof$4.5billion,specificallycuttingmoney

fortheMIRVprogram,forPhaseIIofthe“Safeguard”ABM,andforprocurement

oftheNavy’sF‐14fighter.ABrookingsInstitutionreport,preparedbyhigh

officialsofthepreviousAdministration,outlineda“lowoption”defensebudgetof

$59billion—$14billionlessthanthePresident’s.

TheWashingtonPostofAugust

17,1970,conciselysummedupthesituation:



Whatwasatonetimeanalmostroutinebitoflegislation—passageoftheannual

militaryspendingbill—hasnowbeenturnedintoalengthyandfrequentlybitterbattleovera

scoreofmilitaryprogramsandpolicies…[ThelongABMdebate]hasobscuredwhatisinfact

themostwidespreadassaultonallkindsofmilitaryactivitiesevermadeonCapitolHill.



Thiscallfordefenseretrenchmentwasallthemoreremarkableinlightof

theacceleratingbuildupofSovietstrategicandconventionalforces.TheSoviet

Unionhad250operationalICBMsinmid‐1966;570inmid‐1967;900in

September1968;andovertookuswith1,060inSeptember1969.Bytheendof

1970theywereexpectedtohavecloseto1,300ICBMs.(Theyturnedouttohave

1,440.)Nooneknewwhattheupperlimitmightbe;intelligenceestimatesover

thepreviousfiveyearshadbeenconsistentlytoolow.Sovietsubmarine‐launched

missileswereexpectedtoincreasefrom45inSeptember1968toover900by

1975.Atthesametimetheexpansionandmodernizationof Sovietconventional

forcesinbothEuropeandtheFarEastwereproceedingrapidly.



CongressandthemediadismissedthesefactsastypicalPentagonscare

tacticstomaintainaninflateddefensebudget.Evenstaunchadvocatesofa

strongdefensebegantowaver.SenatorHenryJackson,akeysupporterofABM

whowasupforreelection,opposedlocatinganyABMsitesinhishomestateof

Washington.SenatorJohnPastore,influentialChairmanoftheJointAtomic

EnergyCommittee,opposedanyextensionofABMbeyondthetwositesalready

approvedbytheCongress:“Peopleinmystatewonderwhymoremoneyfor

educationisinflationary whilemoremoneyforSafeguardisnot.”

Representative

MendelRivers,thepowerfulChairmanoftheHouseArmedServicesCo mmittee,

favoredcuttingABMtostrengthentheNavy—showinghowbudgetarypressures

wereshapingPentagonpriorities.EvenSpeakeroftheHouseCarlAlbert,a

longtimedefensesupporter,complainedthatdomesticprograms,es peciallyfor

theenvironment,werebeingslightedtobenefitdefense,acriticismechoedby

suchkeyHousemembersasChetHolifieldandCharlesVanik.



ThiswastheatmosphereinwhichtheAdministrationhadtodevelopnot

onlyaviabledefense programbutalsoacoherentSALTstrategy.Latter‐daycritics

ofSALTforgethowdifficultitwastomaintainevenembryonicstrategicprograms

intheearly1970sandhowsomeofthemwereevenjoiningtheattack.

The

AdministrationhadtomarshalallitsstrengthtokeeptheCongressfromimposing 

unilaterallywhatwewereseekingtonegotiatereciprocallywiththeSoviets.We

facedconstantassaultsonouroverseastroopdeployments,includingtheyearly

struggleoverattemptstoreduceourforcesinEurope.Whenwenegotiatedits

mutuallimitationin1972,ABMwasonthevergeofbeingeliminatedbythe

Congressorshrunktoa meaninglessprototype.MIRVwasattackeduntilthefirst

SALTagreement,permittingmodernization,putanendtothedebate.Ifitwanted

tomaintainanadequatedefenseprogram,theAdministrationwasincreasingly

pushedintothe“bargainingchip”rationaleforindividualweaponsprograms—

thatis,arguingthatitwasbuildingthemnottofulfillstrategic purposesbutin

ordertogivethemupinarmscontrolnegotiations.Thismayhavehelpedsave

minimumprogramsbutwasnotlikelytoproduceaprofoundstrategicdoctrine.



ThedomesticdebateoverABMillustratedourdilemma.Ononelevelitwas

highlytechnical,beyondthekenofmostlaymen.Atthesametimeitinvolve d

seriousissuesofstrategicdoctrineandwenttotheheartofourarmscontrol

negotiationswiththeSovietUnion.Eachoftheconflictingapproacheshadits

ownspokesmeninthebureaucracyandintheCongress.Whichofthemprevailed

dependedonmanyfactors,includingtheaccidentaloneofwhethertheissuewas

posedasadefenseproblemorasa negotiatingcounterforSALT.Thisexplainsin

partwhytheAdministrationwounduptakingtwoincompatiblepositionson

ABM.Whatwasputforwardinthedefensebudget,wherethePentagon

predominated,wasquiteinconsistentwiththepositionweputforwardinSALT,

whichcameoutofacomplexinteragencyprocessincludingState,Defense,the

JointChiefs,ACDA,andtheNSCstaff.Andthecacophonyofpubliccontroversy

graduallyoverwhelmedsystematicconsiderationinanycase.



TherationaleforABMputforwardbytwoadministrationswasthatit

wouldprovideprotectionforourpopulationagainstattacksbythirdcountries

andsomeinsuranceagainstaccidents;thedefenseofourMinutemanICBMshad

beenasubsidiaryobjective.Yetouractualprogramwastendingmoreandmore

inthelatterdirection.OnFebruary7,IexplainedourdilemmatothePresident.If

ABMweretofulfillitsproclaimedpurpose,wewouldhavetobeginPhaseII,the

defenseofourpopulationatleastagainst attacksfromthirdcountriesor

accidentallaunches.Themostlogicalnextstepwouldbetoproceedwithone

moremissilefield(WhitemanAirForceBaseinMissouri)andonesitesuitablefo r

populationdefenseinthePacificNorthWest.(Whiteman,beingnearSt.Louis,

hadtheadditionaladvantageofprovidingsomepopulationdefenseaswell.)

However,theNorthWestsitewasruledoutbythecampaigningSenatorJackson.

ThenextbestalternativewasWhitemanplusasitethatwouldprotect

Washington,D.C.(InthetechnicaljargonthiswastheNationalCommand

Authority,orNCA.)Butthealreadypassionateoppositionwouldbecomeeven

shrillerifwesoughttoprotect“politiciansandgenerals,”nottomentionthe

difficultyoffindingtherequisiterealestatewithinfifteenmilesofWashington.

Forallthesereasons,LairdrecommendedWhitemanonly.Ihadseveredoubts

aboutthelogicofimplementingaprogrampresentedayearearlieraspopulation

defenseagainstthirdcountries,byprotectingmissilesitesfromtheSovietUnion.



Nixon,convincedthatnothingelsewouldpasstheCongressandpreferring

anillogicalABMdevelopmenttononeatall,optedforLaird’srecommendationof

Whiteman.ThuswithinoneyearpublicandCongressionalpressureshadaltered

thecharacterandobjectiveofourABMprogramby180degrees.



Asalmostalwayshappens,retreatbytheAdministrationspurred,rather

thanstilled,critics.Thosewithinthegovernmentwhohadopposedthewhole

conceptofABMwereencouragedtohaveanothergo.TheArmsContro land

DisarmamentAgencyhadalwaysbeenlukewarmatbestinitssupportofABM.

(This,indeed,hadcausedNixontosendmeanoteinAprilthatGerardSmithhad

bettersupportABMorresignasDirectorofACDA.Itransmittedthethoughtto

Smithinsomewhatattenuatedformbecause,whateverhisownopinionsmay

havebeen,hehadthroughoutloyallyandhonorablysupported Administration

policy.Hecouldnot alwayscontroltheprivateexpressionsofpassionate

subordinates,however.)OnMarch10eventhePresident’sGeneralAdvisory

CommitteeonArmsControlandDisarmament,chairedbythestalwartJohn

McCloy,reflectedtheprevailingmoodandrecommendedacompletebanon

ABMsaswellassuspensionofMIRVtesting.Aweeklater,onMarch18,during

thefirstNSCVerificationPanelmeetingtoexaminetheissues ,GerrySmith

arguedthattheSALTdelegationshouldbeinstructedtoseekatotalmutualban

onABMs.



Astheweekswentby,Smith,Rogers,ElliotRichardson,andPaulNitzeof

theSALTdelegationurgedthatinSALTweputfo rwardanABMsystemlimitedto

Washington—primarilyonthegroundthatthiswouldmakeourprogram

symmetricalwiththeSovietABMdeploymentaroundMoscow.Thusthe