Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Nixonwasnotthateager.Norwasheincompetent.Heagreedtononeof

thesedemands,andtheSovietsachievednothing.

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TheSovietleadersactedsoinsensitivelyinpartbecausetheybelievedthey

hadisolateduswiththeirEuropeaninitiatives,inpartbecausetheyimaginedus

paralyzedbyVietnam.Inthesummerof1970theyprobablydidnotthinkthey

neededtodealwithusurgently,calculatingthatthepress ureswhichhadmadeus

pressforasummitin1970wouldmakeusevenmoreeagerlater.Moreo ver,they

wereintheprocessoffomentingtensionsintheMiddleEastandattempting

militarydeploymentsintheCaribbeanthatmusthaveseemedtothemto

promiseevengreateropportunitiesthefollowingyear.Andasummitwouldhave

madesuchactionsextremelyawkward.

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Butthefirsttestofstatesmanshipistheaccurateassessmentofthe

bargainingrelationship.ThistesttheSovietsdidnotpassinthesummerof1970.

NixonsoughtasummitbuthedidnotneeditasdesperatelyasMoscow

reckoned.TheGermannegotiationswereboundfinallytoputusintothedriver’s

seatinEuropeandiplomacy.OurweakestperiodwithrespecttoSALTwasbehind

us,andheretootheSovietshadplayedintoourhandsbytheirinflexibility.The

Soviets’rejectionofourreasonableoptionsputanendtoourdomesticdebateon

MIRVand,tosomeextent,onABM.Wecouldstandonourpositionwithout

unbearabledomesticpressureuntilthefinalbreakthrough.TheMiddleEastwas

movinginadirection where,withallitsupsanddowns,theSovietinabilityto

shapeeventswasbecomingmoreapparentasthemonthspassed.Andwehadan

aceintheholeinourChinainitiative.

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Thesummerofcrisesinwhichtheseassessme ntswouldbeseverelytested

wasstillbeforeus.Butcrisestemperadministrationswhentheydonotbreak

them.Theyrevealwhocanbecountedon.Theyestablishthebalanceofstrength

internationallyandwithinagovernment.AndNixon,withallhiscomplexmetho ds

ofgovernment,wasathisbestwhenunderpressuresthatcorneredhimand

forceddecisions.Thesummerandautumnof1970becamesucha period.Andas

sooftenbefore,itsgenesiswasintheMiddleEast.

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XIV

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MiddleEast1970

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s1970began,thegodsofwarwereinspectingtheirarmaments,foritwas

cleartheywouldsoonbeneeded.TherewasdailycombatalongtheSuez

Canal.TheninJanuaryIsraelbegan“deeppenetration”airraidswith

bombingattacksaroundCairoandtheNileDelta,designedtodemonstrate

Nasser’simpotenceandforceanendtotheso‐calledwarofattrition.Israeli

PrimeMinisterGoldaMeirwasquotedastellingvisitorsshecouldnotsaywhen

peacewouldbepossiblesolongasNasserruledEgypt.OntheJordanfrontthe

viciouscycleoffedayeenraidandIsraelireprisalaccelerated.IsraelandSyria

clashedintheGolan.Finally,attheendofJanuary,Nassersuddenlypaidasecret

visittoMoscow.Thereafter,theproblem softheMiddleEastbeganincreasingly

tomergewiththerelationsofthesuperpowers.

A

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TheUnitedStateswashandicappedatthisstagebyaseriousdisagreement

withinourgovernmentonthenatureoftheproblem.TheperceptionoftheState

DepartmentwasthattherootofourdifficultieswastheArab‐Israeliconflictover

territory.Oncethatwasresolved,theexpertsheld, theinfluenceoftheradical

ArabswoulddwindleandwithittheSovietroleintheMiddleEast.Theseviews

hadguidedourdiplomacythroughout1969andhadcausedustoputforward

increasinglyspecificproposalsforcomprehensivesettlements.

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Ihadgravedoubtsabouttheseassumptionsandthecoursetheyseemedto

suggest.Myassessment,asIexplainedtothePresidentinamemorandum,was

thatArabradicalismhadfivesources:Israel’sconquestsofterritory;Israel’svery

existence;socialandeconomicdissatisfactions;oppositiontoWesterninterests;

andoppositiontotheArabmoderates.Onlythefirstofthesecomponentswould

beaffectedbyasettlement.Theotherswouldremain.Westerncapitalismwould

remainanathematotheradicals.Arabmoderateregimeswouldcontinuetobe

unacceptable.Thecausesofsocialandeconomicunrestwouldpersist.Israel

wouldstillbetherefortheArabradicalstoseektoerase.AndtheIsraelis

understoodthis.Itwaspreciselybecausetheissueforthemwastheexistenceof

Israel,andnotitsparticularfrontiers,thattheyweresoreluctanttogiveuptheir

conquests.

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NorwasIconvincedthatSovietinfluencewouldinevitablybediminished

byaresolutionoftheArab‐Israeliconflict.Muchwouldturnonthemannerand

detailofthesettlement.Acomprehensiveapproachinvolvingalltheparties

wouldinherentlyfavortheradicalsbygivingthemostintransigentgovernmentsa

vetoovertheentireprocess.IfasettlementthenappearedtoresultfromSoviet

pressureorblackmail,theradicalregimeswiththeiranti‐Westernandpro‐Soviet

orientationwouldbestrengthened. Territorieswouldbeseenasreturningto

Sovietclients.

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Weneededtoworknotjustforanysolutionbutalsotodemonstratethat

progresscouldbeachievedbestbyourfriends;that,inotherwords,the

moderatesheldthekeytopeaceintheMiddleEast.Iwasconvincedthatwe

wereinastrongpositiontoteachthislesson.“Theadvantagetous,”Iadvised

NixoninearlyFebruary,“isthattheArabswillcometorealizethatitistheU.S.

andnottheUSSRthatholdsthekeytowhattheywant.”Andatameetingofthe

SeniorReviewGrouponFebruary25I observed:“Atsomepointitwillbecome

apparentthattimeisnotworkingfortheSoviets.IftheycannotgetArabterritory

back,theArabsmaywellcome tous.”Therefore,weshouldnotyieldto

blackmail;weshouldnotbepanickedbyradicalrhetoric;patiencecouldbeour

weapon.Bythesametoken,oncethebreakthroughhadoccurredandthe

moderateArabshadturnedtous,wehadtomovedecisivelytoproduce

diplomaticprogress.

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ButIwasinnopositiontocarryoutsuchastrategy.Nixonhadassignedthe

MiddleEasttoRogers.ThePresidentwasreluctanttointerveneevenwhenhe

hadsecondthoughts.Norwashe—atthisstage—convincedthatmystrategywas

correct.HestillbelievedthattheSovietUnionhadbeenthepoliticalvictorofthe

1967war.Hehadnotabandonedsomevaguenotionofatrade‐offwiththe

SovietUnionbetweentheMiddleEastandVietnam.Heconsideredhimselfless

obligatedtotheJewishconstituencythananyofhispredecessorshadbeenand

waseagertodemonstratethathewasimpervioustoitspressures.Healsohadhis

doubtsastowhethermyJewishfaithmightwarpmyjudgment.NormallyIwould

haveshapedhisstrategicoptionsandgiventacticalguidancetothedepartments.

ButIwasprecludedfromdoingthisinMiddleEastpolicyuntillatein1971.

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Thus,intheMiddleEastourpolicylackedthesingle ‐mindedsenseof

directionthatNixonusuallydemandedandInormallyimposed.Heletmatters

drift,confidentthatwithmyhelphecouldalwaystakeoverbeforemattersgot

outofhand.HepermittedarangeofdiscretiontotheStateDepartment

unthinkableinanyotherarea.Butbecausewhenallwassaidanddonehis

convictionswereclosertominethantothoseofRogers,heappliedthebrakes

justoftenenoughtopreventacoherentapplicationoftheStateDepartment

approach.

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Intheprocesswehadtolearnthepainfullessonthateventscanbe

dominatedonlybythosewithaclearsetofgoals.Anationgetsnoawardsfor

confusionmasqueradingasmoderation.Fortheadversarymaymistakegoodwill

foracquiescenceandconfuserestraintwithweakness.Hemaybegenuinely

surprised—indeed,feeltricked—whenaftermuchtravailwefinallyand

grudginglyturntothedefenseofourinterests.Theresultisacrisis.

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FromtheperspectiveofadecadeIdonotdoubtthatourdesiretoavoid

furthershowdownsintheyearofCambodiaanddomesticturmoil,and

compulsiveeagernessforsolutionsunrelatedtothepsychologicalnecessitiesof

theMidEastparties,temptedSovietprobes.Ibelieve,too,thatitwasour

ultimatedecisiontoresisttheseprobesthatprovidedthebasisfortheeventual

turntowardnegotiations,bothintheMiddleEastandwiththeSovietUnion

generally.

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TheKosyginLetter

O

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nJanuary31,1970,AmbassadorDobrynindeliveredaletterfromSoviet

PremierAlexeiKosygintothePresidentatmybasementofficeintheWhite

House.Normally,thiswouldhavemadeitpartofthespecialChannel.Onthis

occasion,however,wewereinformedthatsimilarcommunicationswerebeing

senttoPrimeMinisterWilsonandPresidentPompidou.SincetheBritishand

Frenchwerecertaintoconsultwithus,wethushadnochoicebuttoputitinto

regularchannelsonourside.Obviouslyoncetheexchangehadgrownsoformalit

wasboundtobecomepublic.

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Kosygin’sletterwarnedthatIsraelhadineffectresumedmilitary

operationsagainsttheArabstates.TheSovietUnionwasstudyingtowhatextent

Israel’soperationshadbeencoordinatedwiththediplomaticactionsof“certain

powers”—anotverysubtlehintthatourinnocent1969peaceproposalshadbeen

acoverforIsraelideeppenetrationairraids.IfIsrael’sattackscontinued,the

lettersaid,“theSovietUnionwillbeforcedtoseetoitthattheArabstateshave

meansattheirdisposal,withthehelpofwhichaduerebufftothearrogant

aggressorcouldbemade.”KosygincalledontheFourPowersto“compel”Israel

toceaseitsattacksandtoestablishalastingpeacebeginningwiththe“speediest

withdrawalofIsraeliforcesfromalltheoccupiedArabterritories.”



ForwardingthislettertoNixon,I pointedoutthatthiswasthefirstSoviet 

threattothenewAdministration.WhileKosyginstoppedshortofthreateningany

specificaction,“thepositionthatIsraelmustwithdrawbeforeotherissuesare

settledisareturntotheSovietpositionof1967,whichseemstonegatemuchof

theprogressmadeintheUS‐USSRtalkslast summer.”AtthesametimeIsawthe

Kosyginletteraspartoftheprocessthroughwhichourstrongerpositioninthe

MiddleEastwasbeingdemonstrated:



Ourpolicyofholdingfirmcreatesthefollowingdilemmaforthem[theSoviets]:Ifthey

donotagreetoourproposals,theygetnothing,theonusforescalationfallsonthemandtheir

clientwillloseiftheescalationleadstoamajorclash.Iftheydoagree,theywouldhaveto

delivertheirclientonourterms.ThestrategyofourreplythatIproposeistocomedownvery

hardontheSovietthreat;torelateIsraeliobservanceofthe cease‐firetocorresponding

observancebytheotherside,includingirregularforces;topresstheSovietstospellouttheir

viewsonwhattheArabswouldcommitthemselvestoifIsraelwithdrew.



Foronceourgovernmentwasatoneonhowtorespond. RogersandSisco

agreedthatweneededafirmreply.APresidentialresponsewassentonFebruary

4.ItfirmlyrejectedtheSovietallegations.Itpointedoutthatthecease‐firewas

beingviolatedbybothsides;ithadbeenEgyptthatearlyin1969deliberately

initiatedthecycleofescalationbybeginningthewarofattrition.Nixon’sreply

warnedthattheSovietthreattoexpandarmsshipments,ifcarriedout,could

drawthemajorpowersmoredeeplyintotheconflict:“TheUnitedStatesis

watchingcarefullytherelativebalanceintheMiddleEastandwewillnothesitate

toprovidearmstofriendlystatesastheneedarises.”Themessageconcludedby

rejectingtheSovietpositionthatIsraelwouldhaveto withdrawbeforeanyother

peaceissuescouldbesettled.



OnthesamedayIsentthePresidentfurtherreflectionsontheSovietnote.

Iconsideredthenoteanoddmaneuverandthereforedisturbing:



ItshouldnothavetakenmuchintelligencetoexpectatleasttheUS(ifnotFranceand

theUK)toreplythatitfavorsrestorationoftheceasefireonareciprocalbasis…Thusthe

upshotoftheSovietmovewillbetoplacetheonusforgettingtheceasefirerestoredonNasser

andtheArabs,andthroughthemontheSovietsthemselves,ratherthanonusandtheIsraelis.



Twodayslater,inalonganalysisforthePresidentofbasicissuesofMiddle

Eaststrategy,Ireiteratedmyview:“Nowthathe[Nasser]hasturnedtoMoscow

toleanonustopressIsraeltostopthebombing,heisabouttodemonstrate

Sovietinabilitytogethimoutofhisbox.”



PreciselybecauseKosygin’sletterseemedsodiffuseandaskedfornothing

thatcouldinfactbedone,Ibegantobeconvincedthatitcouldnotbeanisolated

move;ithadtobepartofalargerscheme,almostcertainlytheprecursorofsome

concreteactioninthemilitaryfield.Itsvaguenessmightbeexplainedbythe

desiretodiscouragearesponsethatmightinterferewithdecisionsalreadymade.

FromtheautobiographiesofAnwarSadatandMohamedHeikalwenowknowin

factthatwhileNasserwasinMoscowinlateJanuaryadecisionhadbeenmadeto

sendEgyptthemostadvancedSovietantiaircraftmissiles.TheKosyginletterwas

notawarningbutasmokescreen.



InthefirstweekofFebruary,indicationsappearedthattheSovietsmight

sendnewarmstoEgypt.IexpressedtoNixonmydoubtsthatmilitaryequipment

alonewouldbeofuse.Ifthenewarmssimplyaugmentedtheexistingarsenal,

theywouldbedestroyedbytheIsraelis;iftheyweremoresophisticated,the

Egyptianswouldnotbeabletooperatethem.Thisraisedamoreominous

possibility:IftheSovietssoughttodosomethingeffectiveagainstIsraeliattacks,

“thiswouldalmostcertainlyseemtoinvolveSovietpersonnel. ”Readingmy

analysis,Nixonwroteinthemargin:“Ithinkitistimetotalkdirectlywiththe

Sovietsonthis.Acheson’s idea—‘letthedustsettle’—won’twork.[

Thiswasa

referencetoaletterfromDeanAchesoninJanuaryurgingthatwedealwiththeMiddleEastby

“intelligentneglect.”AtthattimeNixonhadindicatedhisgeneralagreementwithAcheson’s

approach.]State’s‘negotiateinanyforum’won’twork.Wemust makeatryata

bilateraltalktoseeifadealinourinterestsispossible.”



TocarryoutNixon’swishesImovedontwofronts.OurAmbassadorin

Moscow,JacobBeam,wasinstructedbytheStateDepartmenttotellForeign

MinisterGromykothattheUnitedStateswaspreparedtoworkforrestorationof

thecease‐fireandtodiscussarmslimitationonbothsides.Notunexpectedly,

Gromyko’sresponsetoBeamonFebruary11wasnoncommittal.TheUSSR,he

said,couldnotconsideracease‐fireunlessIsraelfirststoppeditsdeep

penetrationraids. Hewasnotagainstdiscussingarmslimitations,butnotsolong

asIsraeloccupiedArablands;inotherwords,Israelwouldhavetowithdrawfrom

allterritoriesoccupiedin1967.AllthiscouldbesettledintheTwo‐Powertalks,

whichtheSovietUnionwaspreparedtoresume.



OnereasonforGromyko’sevasivenesswasundoubtedlythattheSoviet

UnionwasalreadyexaminingamoreauthoritativestatementoftheAmerican

position.Forthedaybefore,onFebruary10,ImetwithDobryninonbehalfofthe

President,andbythetimeBeamhadhisinterviewwithGromykotheSoviets

couldnothavecompletedtheiranalysisofmymessage.ItoldDobryninthat“we

wanttheSovietleaderstoknowthattheintroductionofSovietcombatpersonnel

intheMiddleEastwouldbeviewedwiththegravestconcern.”Wechosethis

methodofcommunicationbecausewedidnotwanttomakeaformal

confrontation.Atthesametime,reflectingNixon’sinstructions,ItoldDobryninof

ourwillingnesstobeginbilateraldiscussionsontheMiddleEastinthespecial

Channel.



Dobryninneverwastedameetingevenwhenhewasclearlywithout

instructions—aswasthecasehere.Hefellbackonhislitanyofcomplaintsabout

Americanactions;experiencehadtaughthimthatintheWashington

Establishmenttherewasaninexhaustiblereservoirofmasochismeagerto

assumetheblameforeveryimpasse.Appealingtothistrait,heobjectedtothe

publicitysurroundingtheKosyginletter(whichofcoursetheSovietshadtriggered

bysimultaneousdemarchesinParisandLondon)andtothepublicpositionofthe

StateDepartment,which,heargued,haderroneouslyinterpretedMoscow’s

Decemberreplytoourproposalsonborders(the “RogersPlan”)asarejection.

Thislatterrevelat ionhadclearlyescapedeveryonewhohadreadMoscow’s

Decembernote,includingme.NorhadtheSovietspreviouslycontestedthe

interpretationthattheyhadrejectedourformulat ions.



NothingmorewasheardfromtheSovietleadersfornearlyamonth.I

soughttousetheintervalforcontingencyplanninginanticipationofsome

significantSovietmove—almostcertainlyinvolvingtheintroductionofmilitary

personnelintheMiddleEast.Thevarious meetingsoftheWSAGonceagain

exposedthedivisionsthathadbedeviledtheinternaldebatein1969.Myview

wasthatiftheSovietsintroducedmilitarypersonnelwehadnochoicebutto

resist,regardlessofthemeritsoftheissuethattriggeredtheaction.Wecouldnot

acceptanewSovietmilitarypresenceunlesswewerepreparedtoseetheradical

Arabsgivenaperhapsdecisivemomentum.Iwantedareviewofourplansincase

theSovietsthreatenedIsraelwithretaliation. Ialsoaskedformeasurestoprevent

theattritionoftheIsraeliairforceshouldtheSovietsintroducesophisticated

equipmentmannedbytheirownpersonnel.



Thedepartmentswerelessthanenthusiastic.Mostinthegovernment

blamedtheimpasseonIsraeliintransigence.All(exceptmyself)wereconvinced

thatnewlarge‐scaleaidtoIsraelwould,atthatjuncture,“blowtheplaceapart.” 

Asforcontingencyplans,noonecouldthinkofaplausibleexcusetoresistthe

efforttothinkahead,butitwasclearthatimplementationofanymilitarycounter

toanymajorSovietmovewouldfacemassivebureaucraticopposition.The

DefenseDepartmentsubmittedaformalmemorandumstressingthatitpreferred

politicaloptions—whichmeant,asinVietnam,thatsomeotherdepartment

shouldcarrytheburdenandrisk.Itdidnotexplainjusthowweweregoingto

bringabouttotalIsraeliwithdrawal(whichhappenedtobetheonlypolitical

optiononthetable)orhow,ifSovietcombatpersonnelshowedup,the

withdrawalwouldnotappeartobetheresultofSovietpressure.



Nixon’sattitudewasambivalent,coloredbybothinternationa land

domesticconsiderations.Heagreedwithmygeopoliticalanalysis.Ononeofmy

memorandaheinstructed:“ ‘EvenHandedness’istherightpolicy—Butaboveall

ourinterestis—whatgivestheSovietthemosttrouble—Don’tletAraB‐Israeli

conflictobscurethatinterest.”Atthesametimeheleanedtowardthe

departmentalviewsthatIsrael’spolicieswerethebasiccauseofthedifficulty,

andhedoubtedwhetherdemonstrationsofSovietimpotencetoproduce

progresswouldreallydisenchanttheArabs.Henotedonamemoranduminwhich

Ihadsuggestedthispossibility:“Icompletelydisagreewiththisconclusion—The

SovietsknowthatArabsarelongontalk—WehavebeengloatingoverSoviet

‘defeats’intheMidEastsince‘67—&StateetalsaidtheJunewarwasa‘defeat’

forSoviet.Itwasnot.TheybecametheArabs’friendandtheU.S.theirenemy.

Longrangethisiswhatservestheirinterest.”



Theproblem,ofcourse,washowtoreconcileNixon’stwonotes;howwe

couldgivetheSovietstroublewhilelettingthememergeasthedominant forcein

theregionbyacquiescingintheintroductionofcombatpersonnel.Nixonnever

settledsuchissuesintheabstract,preferringtowaitforaneedfordecisionto

arise.Hisusualambivalenceinthefaceofdisagreementsamonghis

subordinates—atoncefuelingthemandreactingonlywhentheyspilledoverinto

hisoffice—applie daswelltothedomesticimplicationsoftheMiddleEastcrisis.

ThePresidentwasconvincedthatmostleadersoftheJewishcommunityhad

opposedhimthroughouthispoliticalcareer.ThesmallpercentageofJewswho

votedforhim,hewouldjoke,hadtobesocrazythattheywouldproba blystick

withhimevenifheturnedonIsrael.Hedelightedintellingassociatesandvisitors

thatthe“Jewishlobby”hadnoeffectonhim.



Unfortunatelyforhisimageofhimself,Nixonrarelyhadoccasionto

demonstratethistheoryinpractice.Foronalmostallpracticalissueshis

unsentimentalgeopoliticalanalysisfinallyledhimtopositionsnotsodistantfrom

onesothersmightta keonthebasisofethnicpolitics.Hewouldprivatelythreaten

direreprisalstoanyconstituencyhethoughtwasthwartinghim.Hewouldmake

gesturestodemonstrate—inparttohimself—thathewasfreeofthetraditional

influencesthathadconstrainedotherPresidents.Butattheendoftheday,when

confrontedwiththerealitiesofpowerintheMiddleEast—aftermuchanguish

andcircuitousmaneuvers—hewouldpur sue,inthenationalinterest,thesame

strategy:toreduceSovietinfluence,weakenthepositionoftheArabradicals,

encourageArabmoderates,andassureIsrael’ssecurity.SoNixonandIoften

traveleddifferentroadsforpartoftheway,butatthepointsofdecis ioninthe

MiddleEastwemet,agreed,andactedinmutualsupport.



DuringFebruarytheannualIsraelishoppinglistofmilitaryassistance

requestswasbeingconsideredinourgovernment.In1970itamountedto

twenty‐fiveF‐4Phantomjetfighter‐bombers,onehundredA‐4Sky ‐hawkattack

bombers,andasubstantialnumberoftanksandarmoredpersonnelcarriers,all