Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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•WehadassumedthatthePalestinianscouldbedealtwithinasettlement

purelyasarefugeeproblem.Instead,theyhadbecomeaquasi‐

independentforcewithavetooverpolicyinJordan,andperhapsevenin

Lebanon.



MymemorandumproposedafundamentalreexaminationofourMiddle

Eastpolicy.Thesurroundingcircumstancespreventedthemusteringofenergies

forsuchabattle.Thephysicalandpsychic tolloftheCambodiaincursionwastoo

great.NotuntilWatergatewasNixonsoconsumedandshaken;hewasnot

preparedtoaddtohisproblems.WhenweturnedagaintotheMiddleEast,itwas

inthecontextofaStateDepartmentpeaceinitiativewhosepractical

consequencewastoratifytheSovietbuildup.



SothecrisisintheMiddleEastdeepened.NasserinaspeechonMay1

addressedanopenmessagetoNixon,theperemptorytoneofwhichemphasized

thedeclineinourposition.TheUnitedStates“mustorderIsraeltowithdrawfrom

theoccupiedArabterritories.”Ifwewereunabletodoso,Nasserrequestedthat

we“refrainfromgivinganynewsupporttoIsraelaslongasitoccupiesourArab

territories—beitpolitical,militaryoreconomicsupport.”Otherwise,“theArabs

mustcometotheinevitableconclusionthattheUnitedStateswantsIsraelto

continuetooccupyourterritoriessoastodictatethetermsofsurrender.”That

theprospectofSovietpredominanceintheMiddleEastwasnotjusttheresultof

overwroughtimaginationsbecameapparentwhenNassertoldadistinguished

Americanvisitor,EugeneBlack,aformerheadoftheWorldBank,thathewould

preferanyAmericandiplo maticinitiativetobeconductedthroughtheSoviet

Union;hedidnottrustusenoughtodealdirectlywithus.



InthisatmospherethedepartmentsresistedNixon’sdecisiontokeepopen

thesupplylinetoIsrael(whencurrentcontractsforairplanedeliveriesranoutin

July)bydelaysinimplementationandbyusingtheloopholethathehadnot

prescribedanyoverallnumbers.Theissueeventuallymergedwiththegeneral

debateoverMiddleEaststrate gy.Formally,thedisputeresolveditselfintothe

essentiallyphonyquestionofwhetherweshould pursuea“political strategy”ora

“confrontationwiththeUSSR.”Wheneverissuesareframedinthisfashion,senior

policymakersshouldbeware.Nooneinhisrightmindwouldnotpreferapolitical

solution;confrontationcannotpossiblybesoughtasapolicyobjective.The

questionwefacedintheMiddleEastin1970was,however,quitedifferent;itwas

whetherapoliticalsolutionwasachievablewithoutfirstmakingcleartothe

SovietUnionanditsradicalfriendsthatmilitarypressurewouldnotwork.Insuch

asituation,ifconfrontatio nisrejectedasamatterofprinciple,theterm“political

solution”becomesaeuphemismforsettlingontheopponents’terms.AsIsaidin

someexasperationatameetingoftheSeniorReviewGroupinlateMay:“What

willdiscouragetheSovietsisfearofconfrontationwithus.Wehavetohave

thoughtofhow toconveythatideatothem.”



Butthetimewasnotripeforsuchanappraisal.Shakenbypublicprotest,

focusedonVietnam,halfhopingforanegotiationwithMoscow,theExecutive

Branchwastornbetweenitspremonitionsanditshopes,betweentherealityofa

Sovietchallengeandthenightmareofconcurrentcrises.Reflectingthis

ambivalence,onJune2RogerscalledinDobrynintoreadhimthefollowing

extraordinarystatement,withoutinformingeitherme,or(sofarasIknow)Nixon:



TheUSSRhasindicatedthatSovietmilitaryactivitiesintheUARwillremaindefensive.

WewanttomakeclearthatwewouldnotviewtheintroductionofSovietpersonnel,byairor

ontheground,intheCanalcombatzoneasdefensivesincesuchactioncouldonlybeinsupport

oftheannouncedUARpolicyofviolatingtheceasefireresolutionsoftheSecurityCouncil.We

believethattheintroductionofSovietmilitarypersonnelintothedelicateSuezCanalcombat

zone[withinthirtykilometersoftheCanal]couldleadtoseriousescalationwithunpredictable

consequencestowhichtheU.S.couldnotremainindifferent…



Onthesurfacethisseemsastrongwarning.Whatitreallydid,however,

wastogivetheSovietsablankcheck;itacquiescedintheSovietcombatpresence

inEgyptexceptintheimmediatevicinityoftheSuezCanal.TheSovietswerein

effecttoldthattheywerefreetobuildupsubstantialforcesinEgyptsolongas

theydidnotmovethemdirectlyintothecombatzone.Buildthemuptheydid.

Andwithintwomonthstheywereinapositiontoadvancetheirunitsrapidlyinto

thecombatzonewhenevertheopportunitypresenteditself.MyassociateBill

Hylandsummedupthegrowingcrisis:



LookingatourpositionandtheIsraelistanddownfromdeepraids,theSovietsmust

concludethatwehaveacquiescedintheirdirectintervention.Indeed,theycouldwellreadour

lateststatement(RogerstoDobrynin)asconfirmationthatweaccepttheSovietclaimof

“defensive”involvement,andareonlyconcernedthatamovementtowardthecanalwouldnot

be“defensive.”…



TheconventionalwisdomisthattheSovietswillprobablynotmove,mainlybecauseof

theriskofcombatwiththeIsraelis.Thereis,however,someevidencethattheyareindeed

already“inching”forward(theconstructionsitesalongthecanal).Moreover,itwouldseema

logicalextensionofSovietstrategytodoso.TheneartermSovietobjectiveintheMiddleEastis

todestroyWesterninfluence.ThemainenemyisnotIsraelbuttheWestingeneralandthe

UnitedStatesinparticular.TheroadtothedisplacementoftheWest,however,nowlies

throughSovietdemonstrationthattheycannotonlyprotecttheirclients,butreversethelosses

theysufferedin1967…



Warningsalonearenotenough.Indeed,sincewehavepresentedseveralserious

warnings,themorewepresentthelesscredible.Breakingoffcontactsservesnoend,and

movingmilitaryforcesisatleastpremature…BecausethedispatchofaircrafttoIsraelhas

becomethesymbolformeasuringourpolicy,ithas,perhapsunfortunately,becometheonly

immediateissue.



Onlyafterdemonstratingourwillingnesstotakeupthisoptioncanweexpectto

convinceIsraeloftheneedtomakesomepoliticalconcessionandconvincetheSovietsand

Arabsthatwearenotdeterredbytheirrecentactions.



ButtheUnitedStatesgovernmentwasnotyetreadyforsuchacourse.And

thelongerwedelayed,thehigherbecametheultimateprice.Welearnedthis

painfully,albeitslowly.Eventsfinallyforcedourhand.Theyproducedaseriesof

confrontationsovertheautumninthecourseofwhichtheSovietadvancewas

firstarrestedandfinallyreversed.



<<Contents>>



****



AnAmericanDiplomaticInitiative

O



urfirstmovewastheoppositeofconfrontation;itwasanotherpeace

initiative.IhadtriedtouseanNSCmeeting onJune10tobringabouta

fundamentalreviewofourstrategy.TheStateDepartmentpreemptedmeby

transformingitintoadiscussionofatacticaldecis ion.Rogershadprepareda

complexscenarioinvolvinganAmericandiplomaticinitiativetogetthepartiesto

“stopshootingandstarttalking.”IsraelandEgyptwouldbeaskedtoaccepta

ninety‐daystandstillcease‐fireandindirectnegotiationsunderUNRepresentative

GunnarJarring.ToencourageIsraeltheUnitedStateswouldoffer—asthe

responsetoitsarmsneeds—threePhantomsforJulyandAugustandfour

PhantomsandSkyhawkspermonthforreplacementpurposesthereafter.These

supplyarrangementswere,however,subjecttoreview“ifnegotiations...had

startedandshowedsignsofsuccess.”



Amazingly,theStateDepartmentproposalthusgaveIsraelanincentiveto

havethenegotiationsfail;theplanesaleswouldbereviewedonlyifnegotiations

“showedsignsofsuccess.”Andtheproposedscenariodidnotaddressatallthe

criticalissueoftheSovietcombatpresenceinEgypt.IhadadvisedNixonofmy

concernsinadvanceoftheNSCmeeting.Istressedthatnegotiationshadtobe

seeninthecontextoftherecent—andcontinuing—Sovietmoves:



ThecharacteroftheSovietmoveintheUARshouldnotbeunderrated.Youmayhear

theargumentmade(byDefense)thatthismovewasprecipitatedbyIsraeliactionorthatitis

purelydefensiveanddoesnotthreatenIsrael.Theseargumentsdonotmeetthemainpoint:

ThisisauniqueturnofSovietpolicy—neverbeforehavetheSovietsputtheirownforcesin

combatjeopardyforthesakeofanon‐Communistgovernment.



ItisarguedthatnowtheSovietshaverescuedNasserbothofthemmaysuddenly

changecharacterandbepreparedtonegotiateseriously.Thisseemsdoubtful.Havingscoreda

psychologicalgainwithapparentimpunity,ithasgenerallybeentheSoviettacticfirstto

consolidatetheirgainsandthentopressforward,testingthegroundastheymove.



AttheNSCmeetingonJune10,CIADirectorHelmssummedupthe

deterioration.TheSovietshadfourtofiveregimentsofSA‐3Sandthreetofive

squadronsofSoviet‐pilotedMiG‐21sinEgypt;therewasnodoubtaboutthe

numbers.TheSovietcombatpresencenowamountedtotenthousandmen

introducedsinceMarch.Egypt’sabilitytodestroyIsraeliaircrafthadbeengreatly

augmented.Mountinglosseswouldcreatenewpsychologic alpressuresonIsrael.

Withtheirpreemptiveoptionlost,Israelhadanoverwhelming incentiveto

controltheareaalongtheSuezCanal.Thecentralquestionsthereforewere

whethertheSovietswouldmovetheirSA‐3missilestowardtheCanalandengage

theirairplanesthere,andwhetherIsraelwouldrefrainfromchallengingthemif

theydid.Inanyevent,thesituationcouldbealteredtoIsrael’sdisadvantagevery

rapidly,byasuddenforwardmovementoftheSovietmilitarycomplex.



RogersthenpresentedtheStateDepartmentscenarioforanimmediate

cease‐fireandtalksthroughJarringasifHelms’sbriefinghadnotoccurred.In

effect,theproposal,likehisJune2conversationwithDobrynin,ratifiedtheSoviet

combatpresenceinEgypt.



Nixonconfinedhimselftoopaquephilosophicalstatementsthatindicated

hewasnotreadyforadiscussionofbasicassumptions.Hespeculatedaboutthe

impactofthe1956SuezcrisisonBritain’sconceptionofherselfasa worldpower.

HeconsideredthefailuretodealwiththeproblemofArabrefugeesoneofthe

majorlapsesofthepostwarperiod.Evenwhilewewereconsideringaunilateral

Americaninitiative,hemusedabout theprospectforajointUS‐Sovietenterprise,

nodoubtanticipatingameetingIwouldhavewithDobryninaboardthe

PresidentialyachtSequoiathateveningtodiscusshisideaforasummit.Allofthis

meanderingwaslargelyasmokescreentoenableNixontodeferaformal

decision.NixonhadnorealbeliefthattheStateDepartmentdiplomaticplan

wouldwork,butalsohehadlittlestomachforoverrulingRogers.Hetoldme

privatelythathethoughtthecurrentMiddleEasttrackwouldleadusinto

disaster.Iagreed,addingthattheworstcoursewastoputin“alittlearmsanda 

littleproposal.”(ThisdoesnotexcludethatNixontoldRogerstheopposite.)



MymeetingwithDobryninontheSequoiaontheeveningof June10was

inconclusive.DobryninrenewedhispleathatwenegotiateontheMiddleEastin

theChannel.InordertohavesomecarrotforNixon’scherishedsummitIdidnot 

rejectthispossibilityoutofhand.ButIins istedthatitcouldworkonlyifthe

SovietUnionwouldasksacrificesfromitsArabfriendscommensuratewiththe

territorialconcessionswewouldhavetourgeonIsrael.Moreover,thepresence

ofSovietcombatpersonnelintheMiddleEastwasofthemostprofo undconcern

totheUnitedStates.ItwasthereforecrucialforustoknowwhethertheSoviet

Unionwouldbepreparedtowithdrawitsmilitaryforcesaspartofanegotiated

peace.Dobryninrepliedthathewouldaskforinstructions.



TheexchangewithDobryninfurtherstrengthenedmyconvictionthatwe

wereonthewrongtrack;therequisitebalanceofforcesforeffectivenegotiations

simplydidnotexist.OnJune16IsentNixonanotherassessmentwarningagainst

theproposedinitiative:Thenewproposalto“stopshootingandstarting talking”

hadtobejudgedagainstthebackdropofourcompulsivepeaceinitiativesofthe

previousyear:“TheyemboldenedtheArabs,whosteppeduptheirborder

pressures.Israelbeganmakingdeeppenetrationraidswhich,inturn,caused

NassertoallowamassiveinfluxofSovietpersonnelandinflue nce.”Thenew

proposalseemedtometoinvolvethesamedangers;itwouldbuyusatmosttwo

months:



TheStateapproachwouldhaveusforcetheIsraelisbacktopre‐warborderswhilethey

getnofurtherplanesafterthesummer.Theywouldbeaskedtogiveupbothelementsoftheir

securityatthesametime—theirterritorialbuffersandtheprospectofmoreaircraft.Aspeace

withmorevulnerablefrontiersapproached,theiraircraftinventorywoulddrop.If,ontheother

hand,Israelbelievesthatshewillgetthelargeraircraftpackageifnegotiationsaregoingbadly,

shewillhavenoincentivetomakenegotiationsgowell….



Nasserwouldinterpretouractionasahalfwaymove.Hewouldseriouslydoubtthatwe

couldreallypressIsraeltowithdrawonthebasisofsixaircraftandperhapsotherslateron.…



TotheSoviets,theStateDepartmentproposalwouldbeaweakgestureinthefaceof

theircontinuedexpansionofinfluence.Ourformulawouldbeoftoolittlemilitaryconsequence

andtoohesitanttoconvincethemthatwearepreparedtomatchtheirescalationinthearea.

TheyconsideredourMarchannouncementuncertain;theywillreadthisonethesameway.



Aboveall,Iconsideredamajorinitiativeinopportuneunlessitsettledthe

issueoftheSovietcombatpresence,whichseemedtometheheartofthe

problem.Ithereforesuggestedanalternativeapproach:WewouldtellNasser

explicitlythatonlytheUnitedStatescouldbringaboutIsraeliwithdrawal;all

otherrouteswouldproveillusory,andwewouldseetoitthatthisremainedso. 

ButwecouldurgeIsraeliwithdrawalonlyinthecontextofanIsraelmadesecure

bysubstantialAmericanmilitarydeliveriesandanEgyptwillingtonegotiate

detailedconditionsofpeace.Sovietcombatpersonnelwouldhavetobe

withdrawnaspartofasettlement.



Suchanapproach,Iargued,wouldgiveIsraelanincentivetonegotiateby

offeringdetailedsecurityarrangements,acontractualpeace,andthewithdrawal

ofSoviettroops.ItwouldprovideEgyptagreaterprospectofregainingtheSinai.

TheSovietswouldfacethedangerofescalationbyawell‐suppliedIsrael,andthe

escapehatchofanacceptablesettlement.ButIwarnedNixonthattoacceptmy

planwouldinvolveabureaucraticnightmare:“ShortlyafterourCambodian

experience,youwouldhavetooverridetherecommendationsofyourtop

Cabinetadvisers,andimposeawhollydifferentpolicyuponaveryreluctant

bureaucracy,whichwouldthenbechargedwithimplementingit.”



AlmostcertainlyforthesereasonsNixonchosenottofacetheproblemat

thatpoint.Thepolicyimplicitinmyrecommendationswouldrequirethreemore

yearstoobtainhisapproval.OnJune18,thePresidentembracedState’s

proposal.Hethoughtitwouldberejectedanyway;hewouldratherdealwitha

deadlockthananotherhasslewithhisbureaucracy.Thus,threemonthsafterwe

hadturneddownacease‐firebecauseofthefirstintro ductionofsomeone

thousandSovietcombattroopsintotheMiddleEast,weacceptedoneeven

thoughSovietpersonnelhadsincegrownto tenthousand.Thatsimplefactwasto

dogourfootstepsintheMiddleEastuntiltheSovietUnionfinallyoverplayedits

handinSeptemberandgaveusanewopportunitytorestorethepsychologicalas

wellasthephysicalbalance.



TheStateDepartmentrespondedtoNixon’sdecisionwithalacrity.The

proposalforcease‐fireandtalksunderJarringwastransmittedprivately

immediatelytoIsrael,Egypt,theSovietUnion,andalsoJordan.Itwasannounced

publiclyonJune25.



ThefirstrumblingresponsecamefromIsrael.Alreadyalarmedatthedelays

inmilitarysuppliesandtheweakAmericanreactiontotheinfluxofSovietcombat

personnel,Israelnowobjectedtoanumberofprovisionsinourscheme,but

abovealltothevaguenessofthepromiseofairplanes.Alett erfromNixonon

June20,draftedbyState,didnotallayMrs.Meir’sconcernsbecauseitstated,

withlessthandazzlingclarity,thatdeliveryofaircraftwasconditionalonthe

negotiationsonlywithrespecttotiming—inotherwords,thatwecouldpostpone

agreeddeliveriesifinourjudgmentthishelpedthenegotiations.TheIsraelis,not

unreasonably,consideredthatthisexceptiondeprivedthecommitmentofmuch

ofitssignificance.Nixon,whofromlongcampaigningconsideredpro misestobe

thecurrencyfordealingwithtomorrow’sproblems,hadatypicalNixonian

solution.HetoldmeprivatelythatIcouldseeRabinand“tellthemwe’vewritten

theletterfortherecord.We’regoingtogoforwardontheplanesunlessthere’s

anenormouschange.”(Thattoobeggedthequestionofwhatwewoulddefineas

anenormouschange.)



ThenitwasMoscow’sturn.OnJune23Dobryninreactedrathercoollyto

ourMiddleEastoverture.IaskedifMoscowhadgivenhimanyreplytomyquery

aboutthewithdrawalofSovietcombattroops;DobryninrepliedthatIhadputso

manyquestionsthathecouldnotkeepthemallinmind.Dobryninmightwell

havethoughthecouldevadetheissuesincethefo rmalStateDepartment

initiativehadmadenoreferencetoSoviettroops.Heprofessedtobeoutragedby

whatheclaimedwasa“unilateral”AmericanattempttotakeoverMiddleEast

diplomacy.Negotiationswereourproblemnow,heasserted,buthesuspected

wewouldhavetocomebacktoMoscow later.Hedidnotknowwhat

“concessions”wouldbeavailablethen.InMoscowonJune29,Gromykotold

AmbassadorBeamthatwhiletheSovietswerestudyingourproposaltheysaw

nothingnewinitandthatithadallthefailingsofpreviousefforts.



Egyptcontinuedtoenvelopitselfinsilence.



IntheseconditionswedecidedtomakeclearthatthePresidentwasnot

actingfromweaknessandthatSoviettroopswerea seriousissue.OnJune26in

SanClemente,inabackgroundbriefing,Itooktheinitiativeinchallengingthe

SovietmilitarypresenceinEgypt.TheSovietUnion’soriginalintentionsinsending

combatpersonnelintotheMiddleEastwereirrelevant,Isaid.Eveniftheyhad

beensenttoshoreupNasser,theircontinuedpresencerepresentedastrategic

threatthathadtobedealtwith:“Wearetryingtogetasettlementinsuchaway

thatthemoderateregimesarestrengthened,andnottheradicalregimes.Weare

tryingtoexpeltheSovietmilitarypresence,notsomuchtheadvisors,butthe

combatpilotsandthecombatpersonnel,beforetheybecomesofirmly

established[emphasisadded].”



Themostaccurate,ifnotelegant,wayofdescribingthereactionisthatall

hellbrokeloose.IwasaccusedbytheStateDepartmentandpunditsinthemedia

oftryingtoscuttlethepeaceinitiative,ofmakingvaingloriousthreatsbeyondour

capacitytocarryout.ThecriticismscamefromallquartersexcepttheSoviets,

whoareusuallyprovocativeonlywhentheycancalculateawidemarginofsafety

andwhohadheardtheseviewsprivatelyforthreemonths.OnJune30,ina

backgrounderontheCambodianoperation,I waspressedonmyallegedthreatto

“expel”theRussians.Istucktomyposition;theSovietmilitarypresenceinEgypt

createdadangerousnewsituation.PerhapsIshouldhaveusedamorewaffling

expressionthan“expel,”Isaid,butaSovietcombatpresencewasincompatible

withpeace.Moreover,“atsomepointoftheSovietpresenceintheMiddleEast

therewillbesomeindigenousArabforcesthatwillhavetheirownreasonsfornot

wantingtosubstitute onecolonialismforanother.”Threeyear slaterwemade

thispredictioncometrue.



ByJuly1Nixonhadsubstantiallyrecoveredfromthetraumaof Cambodia.

Andwhilehemightnothavebeenprepar edyetto engagehimselfontheArab‐

Israeliissue,herequirednoinstructiononthegeopoliticaldangerofSoviet

combattroopsinEgypt.WithRogersawayonatrip,Nixonusedatelevised

interviewtoexpresshisessentialagreementwithmyanalysis.Hewarnedthatthe

twosuperpowerscouldbedrawnintoconfrontationovertheMiddleEastand

thattheUnitedStateswouldnottoleratetheupsettingofthemilitarybalance

there.“OncethebalanceofpowershiftswhereIsraelisweakerthanits

neighbors,therewillbewar.Therefore,itisinU.S.intereststomaintainthe

balance…AstheSovietUnionmovesintosupporttheUAR,itmakesitnecessary

fortheUnitedStatestoevaluatewhattheSovietUniondoes,andoncethat

balanceofpowerisupset,wewilldowhatisnecessarytomaintainIsrael’s

strengthvis‐à‐visitsneighbors.”



TheSecretaryofStatewouldhavenoneofthis.FromEuropeheprotested

bitterlythat“his”peaceinitiativewasbeingtorpedoed;heevenreprimanded

SiscoforsupportingthePresidentinatelevisionappearanceonJuly12.



ButSovietsensitivitiesarenotsotender;theircalculationsarebasedonan

assessmentoftheirinterests,notonatmospherics.NowthatMoscowsuspected

thatwemightmeanbusiness,Dobrynin’sconductintwomeetingsonJuly7and9

couldnothavebeenmorejovial.Heexudedcooperativeness;hewouldhave

somethingtosayontheMiddleEastsoon.Hemadenoreferencetoourwarning.

Asitturnedout,thathadbeennonetoo soon.ForinearlyJulytheSovietmissile

complex,aftersecuringtheprotectionofCairo,Alexandria,andAswan,had

beguninchingtowardtheSuezCanal,despiteRogers’swarningtoDobryninof

June2.IsummedupwhatweknewforNixononJuly22:TheSovietsand

EgyptianswereconstructinganewdefensebarrierroughlyparalleltotheSuez

Canalandatadistanceoftwentytothirtynauticalmilesfromit.Thatbarrier

includedthreeSA‐3andelevenSA‐2sites,whichcould,ofcourse,beaugmented.

ItwascloseenoughtotheCanaltoprotectEgyptianartillerypositionsthatwere

firingacrossit.Ataminimum Egypt’scapabilityforawarofattritionhadbeen

vastlyenhanced;ifthesystemgrewinsizeandcontinuedtomoveforward—asit

gaveeveryindicationofdoing—itmightlaythebasisforanEgyptianoffensive

intotheSinai.



Inshort,wewereexperiencingforthefirsttimeintheNixon

AdministrationtheSoviettechniqueofusingamilitarypresencetoenhance

geopoliticalinfluence.WithinwhatitconsiderstheSovietorbittheKremlinuses

itsmilitaryforcesmassively,rapidly,andruthlessly.Butwhenitoperatesbeyond

thedividinglinebetweenEastandWest,itmoveswithinfinitecare.Thefirst

commitmentisusuallymoderateandjustifiedbyarguablydefensivemotives.At

thatpointitisrelativelysimpletoforceawithdrawalbydeterminedopposition.

Whennoresistanceisencountered,theSovietstendtoescalaterapidly.Itis

remarkablethatapatternsorecurrentastoapproachastereotypeshould

evoke—fromEgypttoAngolatoEthiopia—thesamedoubtsandhesitationsthat,

farfromencouragingmoderation,serveonlytoguaranteethattheSoviet

involvementbecomesmassive.



SoitwasintheMiddleEastinJuly1970.Whathadstartedasaprotectiv e

moveagainstdeeppenetrationraidsbyIsraelwasonthevergeoftransforming

theentirestrategicequation.Someofoursystemsanalystsalreadybeganto

arguethatIsraelwouldbebetterservedbyhavingequipmentsuitablefor

resistingacross‐Canalinvasio nthanbyexpendingitsaircraftinfutileeffortsto

destroythegrowingairdefensesystemontheothersideoftheCanal.These

argumentsoverlookedthatadefensivestrategyimpliesawarofattrition,a

prospectfundamentallyintolerableforacountryoutnumberedbyaroundthirty

toone.Israelwasapproachingthepointofdesperation,whichmighttemptitinto

preemptiveactionbeforethebalanceshiftedirrevocably.Nassermightbecome

recklessthrougheuphoria.TheSovietswerebecomingindispensabletothe

radicalArabs.TheUnitedStatesseemedincapable ofperceivingtheessenceof

thedanger,whichwasthegrowthoftheSovietmilitarypositioninEgyptandthe

changeintheregionalbalanceofpower.Wehadexpendedourprestigein

startingtalksbasedonincompatiblepremisesandinpayingeachsideforagreeing

tonegotiateaboutapeacethattheyneededmoreurgentlythandidwe—the

IsraeliswithairplanesandNasserwithhintsofsupport‐ontheterritorialquestion.

Thatweofferedeachsidetoolittleonly compoundedthetensions.



OnJuly1GoldaMeirwrotea bitterlettertothePresident.Notingthatboth

SA‐2andSA‐3batterieswerebeinginstalledtocovertheSuezCanal,shepointed

out:“Whilethesedevelopmentsweregoingon,wewerebeingtoldthatthe

balanceofpowerhasremainedintact.”ShewarnedthatIsraelwouldhaveno

choiceexcepttobombtheseinstallations.ButifIsraelattackedamissilecomplex

mannedinpartbySovietpersonnel,therewasadistinctpossibilitythatthe

Sovietswoulddefenditwiththeirownaircraft.AdirectclashbetweenIsraeland

theSovietUnionwasadangerthatwecouldnolongerignore .Iinstitutedurgent