Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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tobepaidforbyvariousformsofAmericancredit.Theconsensusofthe

departmentswasthatIsraelcouldmaintainitsmilitarysuperiorityforthenext

threetofiveyearswithoutsubstantialnewdeliveries.Thiswasbuttressedbyan

interagencyappraisalbasedonthearcaneinsightsofsystemsanalysisthat

remarkablyparalleledthepolicypreferencesoftheheadsoftheagencies.(As

eventsturnedout,the1973MiddleEastwardemonstratedthatevenafterthe

fairlysubstantialmilitarydeliveriesof1970‐1973themilitarybalanceinthe

MiddleEasthadbecomemoreprecariousthananyofouranalystshadpredicted.)

Thegeneralreluctanceinourbureaucracytoundertake newarmsdeliveriesfor

IsraelwasreinforcedbywarninglettersfromourfriendsintheArabworld,such

astheKingofMoroccoandtheKingofJordan.



Thegovernment’sdeliberationswerethustendingtowardaminimum

responsewhenaneventoccurredthat,whilenotdirectlyrelevanttotheissue,

triggeredaresolutionofit.AttheendofFebruary,PresidentPompidouwason

hisStatevisittotheUnitedSta tes,towhichNixonattachedgreatimportance.

InsensitivetothelikelydomesticreactionintheUnitedStates,probably

indifferentto it,PompidouhadinJanuarycompletedanarmsdealwiththenew

revolutionarygovernmentofColonelMuammarQaddafitosellLibyamorethana

hundredMirageaircraftoverfouryears.TherewasnorationalLibyanneedfor

suchnumbersofaircraft;indeed,atthattimetherewereonlyafewpilotsinallof

Libyacapableofflyinghigh‐performanceaircraft.Clearly,theseplaneswere

intendedforusebyotherArabcountries,probablyEgypt.Predictably,supporters

ofIsraelintheUSCongressprotestedstrongly.Thereweredemonstrationsin

everycitythatPompidouandhiswifevisited.Aparticularlyegregiousincident

occurredinChicago,wheresomedemonstratorswereespeciallyoffensiveto

MadamePompidou.PompidouabruptlycutshorthisChicagovisitandreturned

toNewYork.ForafewhoursitappearedthathemightalsocancelhisNewYork

sojournandemplaneforFrance.Pompidounevergotoverthisinexc usable

incident;itmortgagedhisattitudetowardtheUnitedStateseverafter.



Nixonwasbesidehimself.Hereactedintwoways,onegenerous,theother

petty.ThegenerousgesturewastoflyunexpectedlytoadinnerinNewYorkon

March2inhonorofPompidou wherehedeliveredaspeechthatwasasgraceful

asitwaswarm.ThevindictivereactionwasaPresidentialorderdirectlytoState

viaJoeSisco—apparentlytoavoidgoingthroughme—todeferconsiderationof

theIsraeliarmspackageindefinitely.HadIbeenconsultedI wouldsurelyhave

emphasizedtheinadvisabilityofpunishingaforeigncountryfortheactionsofan

AmericanminorityandtemptingtheSovietUnionwiththeprospectofafreeride.



Thesewere,infact,thepointsImadewhen,characteristically,Nixonhad

secondthoughtswithinhoursofhisordertoSisco.HehadHaldemantellmein

effectthatthiswasnotafinaldecisionandhewouldworkthingsoutontheplane

toNewYorkforthePompidoudinner.WhenHa ldemanwasassignedtosucha

task,onecouldbecertainthatthePresidentmeantbusiness;Haldeman’s

studiedlycultivateddisinterestinsubstancepreclude ddebate.Still,Haldeman

performedatherapeuticrole;heprovidedachannelforprotestbutnomeansto

implementit.UnabletoreachNixon,IwarnedHa ldemanthatthePresident’s

actionhadincreasedthechanceofaMiddleEastexplosion;tocutoffIsraelwould

headusintoasimultaneousconfrontationwiththeSovietsandtheIsraelis.Israel

couldscarcelyavoidpanicandmightpreempt;theSovietswereboundtobe

emboldenedbyourvisibledissociationfromourally.WeknewthattheSoviets

wereplanningsomeunspecifiedmilitarymove;thiswasnotthetimeforthe

PresidenttoissueanordertocutoffmilitaryaidtoIsrael,againstwhichthis

imminentSovietmovewasdirected.Haldeman,withthelong‐sufferingpatience

ofamancaughtbetweentheoutbursts firstofhischiefandthenofthosewho—

incomprehensiblytoHaldeman—tooksubstanceseriously,a ssuredmethatthe

matterwouldbepatchedup.Hedidnotsayhow.Heprovedtobewrong.



TheStateDepartment,whenitreceivesanorderofwhichitsbureaucracy

approves,isawonderouslyefficientinstitution.Whenitwishestoexhaust

recalcitrantsuperiors,draftsofmemoranda wanderthroughitslabyrinthine

channelsforweeksandevenmonths.Butwhenitreceivesaninstructionit

considerswise,paperworkissuddenlycompletedinamatterofhoursandthe

bureaucracyspringstomarvelous action.Hence,withinthirty‐sixhoursofNixon’s

ordertoSisco,RogerssentoveramemorandumtellingNixonthathehadalready

preparedandhadinhandascenarioto“carryoutyourdecisiontopostponefo r

nowthequestionofadditionalaircraftforIsrael.”



Ithoughtitunwiseintheextremetoannouncesucha decisionbeforewe

hadanyideaofthenextSovietmoveintheMiddle East.BynowIhadhadenough

experiencewithNixon’ssecondthoughtstobecertainthathewouldindeed,in

Haldeman’swords,seektopatchthingsup.Therefore,intransmittingRogers’s

memorandumtothePresident,Ipointedoutthatwhilethedomesticimplications

wereself‐evident,“abroad,theappearanceofbowingtoSovietpressurecannot

bedisposedofbysimpledenial.”I thereforesuggestedthatRogers’s

recommendationsbemodifiedto softentheblowtoIsrael.Eitherweshould

agreetoreplaceaircraftlostintheperiod1969‐1971(uptoagivennumberto

avoidanincentiveforcostlyraids),orelseweshouldkeepopentheproduction

lineandearmarkaspecificnumberofPhantomsandSkyhawksthatcouldbe

giventoIsraelimmediatelyshouldamassiveintroductionofSovietarms

endangerthemilitarybalance.EvenSiscohadtoldme(privately)thatheagreed

withmyapproach.Toavertsomeofthebacklashofthepostponement I

recommendedthatState,nottheWhiteHouse,announceit.



MyproposaldemonstratedthatontheMiddleEastIwasnotinthe

dominantposition.Thebestthatcouldbesaidforitwasthatitpro videdapause

whilethePresidentreconsidered.ThuswemightavoidtemptingtheSovietsat

theverymomenttheyweresettlingontheirownnextmove.



Wedidnothavetowaitlongforthatmove.



<<Contents>>

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****



SovietSoldiersandMissilesAppearinEgypt

O



nMarch10DobryninappearedattheWhiteHousewiththeKremlin’s

responsetomydemarcheofFebruary10warningagainsttheintroductionof

Sovietcombatpersonnel.WemetintheofficeofthePresident’smilitaryaide,the

MapRoombeingforsomereasonunavailable.Themilitaryaide’sofficeinthe

EastWingoftheWhiteHouseisbyitslocationfarremovedfrompolicymaking.

OfficesofmostsubstantivestaffassistantsareclusteredaroundtheOvalOfficein

theWestWing.Thereareworseyardsticksformeasuringtheimportanceof

WhiteHouseaidesthantheirpropinquitytotheseatofpower;manyaideswill

gladlycontentthemselveswithacubbyholeintheWestWingratherthanrisk

losingstatusinmorespaciousandelegantquartersintheEastWingthree

hundredyardsawayorintheExecutiveOfficeBuildingacrossthestreet.But

preciselybecausetheofficesintheEastWingdeallargelywithsocialorlogistical

mattersitwasagoodplaceforanunobservedmeeting.



Dobryninexudedbonhomie.WithrespecttoAmericanexhortationsfora

cease‐fire,heconveyedtheconvictionofhisleadersthat“iftheIsraelisstoptheir

bombingsoftheUAR[Egypt],theUARonitspart willdisplayrestraintinits

actions,without,ofcourse,anyofficialstatementstothateffect.” Inotherwords,

Dobryninwasofferingadefactocease‐firealongtheSuezCanal.Moreover,

Dobryninwashappytoannouncethathehadbeenauthorizedtoresumebilateral

talkswithRogers.Hegavemeapreviewoftwo“concessions”thathewouldoffer

inthesetalks:First,aMidEastsettlementwouldnotsimplyendthestateofwar

butwouldestablishastateofpeace;andsecond,Arabgovernmentswould

undertaketocontroltheoperationsofguerrillaforcesfromtheirterritory.



Therewaslesstothese“concessions”thanmettheeye.Itwasameasure

ofthenever‐neverlandofMiddleEastpolicythatthesuggestionthatapeace

settlementmightestablishpeacewasseriouslyputforwardasaconcession.To

askIsraeltowithdrawfromalloccupiedterritorieswithoutofferingwhatis

normalbetweenmoststates,namelypeace,wouldhavebeenanabsurdity.Nor

couldacommitmenttoendguerrillaattacksafterpeacehadbeenmadebe

describedasasacrifice;nobodycouldhavemaintainedtheoppositeproposition.

Still,Dobrynin’sofferofacease‐fireseemedsufficientlysignificanttopreventme

fromnoticingthattheSovietshadnotrespondedtothechiefthrustofthe

February10conversation—mywarningagainsttheintroductionoftheircombat

personnel.Thereasonforthis omissionwastobecomeclearalltoosoon.



IreportedtothePresidentwithwhatturnedouttobeprematureelation:

“Dobryninmadeanumberofsignificantconcessions… Inthenegotiationson

Egyptourpolicyofrelativefirmnesshaspaidoffonallcontestedissues.The

SovietUnionhasmadeafirstmoveand,whileitmaynotbeenough,atleastit

showedthatholdingfirmandofferingnoconcessionswastherightcourse.”The

PresidentreactedtothisseemingsofteningoftheSovietattitudebymodifyinghis

originaldecisiononIsraelimilitaryaid.RealizingthatwecouldnotapproachIsrael

withthecease‐fireproposalwhilerejectingitsmilitaryrequests,Nixonthesame

dayapprovedmysuggestiontoreplaceIsraeliaircraftlosseswithuptoeight

PhantomsandtwentySkyhawksin1970.Heendorsedwithalacritythesuggestion

thatthebadnewsholdingtheoverallpackageinabeyancecomefromState,but

addedaNixonianwrinkle:IshouldinformIsraeliAmbassadorRabinimmediately

ofNixon’sdecisiontoreplaceIsraelilosses.



OnMarch12ImetwithRabintoinformhimofDobrynin’sceasefire

proposalandalsotoconveythePresident’sdecision.AtthesametimeIasked

thatIsraelstopitsdeeppenetrationraidsandagree toanundeclaredcease‐fire.

Anaide‐mémoirefromthePresidentwouldformalizeboththerequestandthe

assurance.



YitzhakRabinhadmanyextraordinaryqualities,butthegift ofhuman

relationswasnotoneofthem.IfhehadbeenhandedtheentireUnitedStates

StrategicAirCommandasafreegifthewouldhave(a)affectedtheattitudethat

atlastIsraelwasgettingitsDuc,and(b)foundsometechnicalshortcominginthe

airplanesthatmadehisacceptingthemareluctantconcessiontous.Not

surprisingly,hedidnotembrac ethereplacementformula.Infact,Rabinhanded

overtwomessagesfromMrs.MeirtoNixon(oneofthemhandwritten).These

weregeneratedbyreportsalreadyinpubliccirculationthatwemightpostponeor

turndownIsrael’spackageofaircraftrequests.Mrs.Meirwrotethatsucha

decisionwouldincreasethemilitarydangertoIsraelandencouragefurtherSoviet

andArabaggressionatthesametime.Thesenseof“abandonment,”shefeared,

wouldincreasedesperationandthecapacityforirrationalbehaviorinIsrael:“One

cannotoverstatetheseriousnessofthesituationthatwillresult.”



Rabinwasalsogenerallyunenthusiasticaboutthecease‐fire.Itwouldsave

Nasser;itwouldsettlenothing.Nevertheless,heconsideredtheproposal

importantenoughto taketoJerusalempersonally.HeflewtoIsraelandreturned

fivedayslaterwiththeCabinet’sreply:Israelwouldagreetoanundeclared

cease‐fireprovidedallmilitaryactivityceasedsimultaneously,thereplacement

figurewasdoubled,andtherewasapublicannouncementofNixon’sassurance

aboutmaintainingIsraeliairstrengthandthemilitarybalanceintheMiddleEast.

(IwasnowbeingdirectlyexposedforthefirsttimetoIsraelinegotiatingtactics.In

thecombinationofsingle‐mindedpersistenceandconvolutedtacticstheIsraelis

preserveintheirinterlocutoronlythoselastvestigesofsanityandcoherence

neededtosignthefinaldocument.)



BeforetheissuewithIsraelcouldberesolved,however,wefoundoutat

lastwhatmilitarymovetheSovietsintendedforEgypt.Theveryday—March17—

thatIsraelacceptedthecease‐fire,Rabininformedmethatasubstantial

shipmentofSovietarmshadarrivedinEgypt,includingthemostadvancedSoviet

antiaircraftsystem—theSA‐3surface‐to‐air‐missile.Thishadneverbeforebeen

giventoaforeig ncountry,noteventoNorthVietnam.Moredisturbingstill,the

missileswereaccompaniedby1,500Sovietmilitarypersonne l.Clearly,thiswas

onlythefirstinstallmentofamajorSovietmilitarymove.Itmarkedauniqueturn

inSovietpolicy:Neverbeforehadtheyputtheirownmilitaryforcesinjeopardy

foranon‐Communistcountry.ItwasapparenttomethatastheSovietsincreased

theirforces,theywoulddevelopa vestedinterestinprotectingthemandthenin

showingresultsfortheircommitment.



AllexperienceteachesthatSovietmilitarymoves,whichusuallybeginas

tentative,mustberesistedearly,unequivocally,andinafashionthatgivesSoviet

leadersajustificationforwithdrawal.Ifthismomentispermittedtopass,the

commitmentgrowstoolargetobedismantledshortofamajorcrisis.Butastrong

responsewhenthechallengeisstillambiguousispeculiarlydifficulttoorganize.

Theevidence,bydefinition,isnotlikelytobeconclusive.Theearlystagesofa

buildupareusuallylimitedbytheneedtoestablishalogisticinfrastructure.

Intelligenceagencies—contrarytothemythologicalperceptionofthemas

recklessadventurers—tendtoplayitsafe;theygenerallyflocktoacautious

hypothesis.Inmyexperienceinalmosteverycrisistherehasbeenaninitial

disputeaboutwhetherwefacedachallengeatall—adebatethatquicklyspreads

fromtheExecutiveBranchtotheCongress.Thoseopposedtoafirmresponse

claimthattheAdministrationis“overreacting.”AndiftheAdministrationactsin

timeandavertsthedanger,theywillfeeltheywereprovedright.Whattheyfail

toconsideristhattherealchoiceisbetweenseeminglyoverreacting(and

containingthechallenge)orlettingeventstakeover.Bythetimethetrue

dimensionsofthethreatbecomeunambiguous—wheneveryoneagreesaboutits

overwhelmingnature—itisoftentoolatetodoanything.Andsomewherealong

thelinethequestionofwhatcausesaSovietmovebecomesirrelevant;American

policymustdealwithitsconsequences,notwithitscauses.



SoitwaswiththeNixonAdministration’sreactiontotheappearanceof

SovietmissilesandcombatpersonnelinEgyptinthespringof1970.Preoccupied

withVietnam,Cambodia,andLaos,shakenbydomesticupheaval,morethanhalf

convincedthatIsraelibelligerencehadprovokedtheSovietmove,theUnited

Statesgovernmentvacillatedandmissedwhateveropportunitytherewasto

containthechallenge.



Ourfirstreactionwasintherightdirection.OnMarch20Icalledin

Dobryninforatoughdressingdown.IsaidthatwehadtakentheSoviet

communicationofMarch10extremelyseriously.Wehad,infact,recommendeda

cease‐firetoIsrael;Israelhadacceptedinprinciple.Butattheprecisemoment

thatIwasgettingreadytoapproachhimto settleonanagreedtimeforthe

cease‐firewehadlearnedabouttheintroductionofSA‐3missilesandSoviet

combatpersonnel.Thetroopshadbeensentdespitemyexplicitwarningofthe

dangersofsuchastep.Thetactic,I said,wasreminiscentoftheCubanmissile

crisis.Wehadnochoiceexcepttoterminatealloureffortsforthecease‐fireand

toinformIsraelaccordingly.



DobrynindidnotreturntothesubjectuntilApril7,whenheaskedwhether

wewouldhaveadifferentviewoftheSovietweapondeploymentsiftheywere

limitedtoAlexandria,Cairo,andAswan;hewasvagueaboutthepersonnel.I

askedhimwhetherthiswasaformalproposal.Hesaidhewouldletmeknow.He

neverdid.



Oncewelaiddownthechallenge,ournextmoveshouldhavebeento

followitup.TheproperresponsetotheintroductionofadvancedSovietmissiles

andcombatpersonnelwouldhavebeentoincreasemilitaryaidtoIsrael—notjust

topromiseafewreplacementaircraft.Thiswouldhaveshownthatwewould

matchanySovietescalationandthatSovietmilitarypressureswerenottheroad

tosolvingthepoliticalproblemsoftheMiddleEast—anessentia l firstconditionto

encouragingmoderationandtofulfillingwhatIconsideredtheoptimumstrategy.

TherationaleformyviewwasthoughtfullystatedbyBillHyland,aSovietexpert

onmystaff,onJune8:



TheSovietsrespectpowerandstrength.Theyunderstandmilitarystrengthbestofall.

Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thattheyareeagertofight,orthattheybelieveinthe

indiscriminateuseofforce.Buttheydonotunderstandrestraint;itconfusesthem,andinthe

endleadsthemtoconcludethatthereisroomfortheirownforwardmovement.



IftheUnitedStatesdoesnotsupportIsraeldemonstrativelywithmilitaryassistance,the

Sovietswillponderwhywerefusetodoso.Ultimately,theywillconcludethatwearedeterred

becauseofeitherdomestic,politicalandeconomicconcernsorbecauseoftheconsequencesof

militaryescalation.



Ididnotsucceedingettingsuchastrategyconsidered.Ouragencies

blamedIsraelforthetensionalongtheSuezCanal,arguing—notwithout

evidence—thatIsraelhadprovokedtheSovietreactionbyitsdeeppenetration

raids.Their“solution”totheSovietmilitarymovewastopressIsraeltobemore

flexible.Precioustimewaswasteddebatingirrelevancies.Ourintelligence

communityconcentratedontryingtomeasurewhetherinprecisehardware

termsthemilitarybalancehadinfactbeenupset.Allthismissedtheessential

point.Whateverone’sviewaboutgreaterIsraeliflex ibility,wenowhadfirstto

facedowntheSovietsandtheArabradicals.Otherwise,Israeliconcessionswould

beperceivedasresultingfromtheintroductionofSovietmilitarypersonnel.Our

positionwoulddeteriorateasdemandsescalated. OncetheSovietsestablished

themselveswithacombatroleintheMiddleEastandweacceptedthatrole,the

politicalbalancewouldbedrasticallychanged,andthemilitarybalancecouldbe

overthrownatanymomentofSovietchoosing.Israelwasnotfreeof

responsibilityforthepresentstateofaffairs,butwewouldbeabletodealwith

thepoliticalproblemonlyaftermasteringthemilitarychallenge.



ThisviewdidnotprevailsinceIwasstillintheearlyyearsofmyroleas

PresidentialAssistantandtheMiddleEastwassubstantially aStateDepartment

fiefdom.Inanyevent,atthatstageofmycareerintheWhiteHouse,myinfluence

wasgreatestwhentheagencies’viewsdifferedandthePresidenthadnostrong

viewsofhisown;Iwasleastlikelytoprevailwhentherewasunanimityamong

theagencies,particularlyontheMiddleEast.Andinthiscase,Nixon’sassessment

wasmuchclosertothatofthedepartme ntsthantomine.Hespentmuchofhis

timeonCambodia;hewashankeringafteraMoscowsummit;hehopedthatthe

problemwouldgoaway,and,ifitdidnot,thatheandIcouldoverpoweritlater. 



Infact,atthisverymomentNixon’searlierdecisiontoholdtheIsraeliarms

packageinabeyance—takeninquitedifferentcircumstances—caughtupwith

him.TheStateDepartmenthadgoneaheadwiththecumbersomeprocessof

draftingapublicstatementonthearmsdecision.Andtheyhadproceededwith

theirconsultationswithkeyCongress ionalleadersevenafternewsofthelatest

Sovietmove.Thethinkingwasthatouractionwouldshowourgoodfaithtothe

Arabs;ataminimumitwouldpreventtheexplosionthatoura genciesconsidered

inevitableifweproceededwithadditionaldeliveriesofhardware.Discouragedby

previousrebuffsandconvincedthatthePresident’smindwasmadeup,Ilet

mattersproceed.InretrospectIbelievethatIerredinnotbeingmoreemphatic.

SoithappenedthatonMarch23—lessthanaweekafterwelearnedofthe

dispatchofSovietcombatpersonneltoEgypt—Rogersannouncedthat“inour

judgment,Israel’saircapacityissufficienttomeetitsneedsforthetimebeing.

ConsequentlythePresidenthasdecidedtoholdinabeyancefornowadecision

withrespectto Israel’srequest.…”



Tobesure,thestatementaddedthat“ifstepsaretakenwhichmightupset

thecurrentbalanceorifinourjudgmentpoliticaldevelopmentswarrant,the

Presidentwillnothesitatetoreconsider…”Thisqualificationwasunderstoodfor

thesoporificitwas.Noverbalreassurancecouldobscurethefactthatlessthana

weekaftertheintroductionofSovietcombatpersonnelintotheMiddleEast,and

threedaysaftercancelingthecease‐firediscussionwithDobrynin,theUnited

StateshadpubliclydeniedadditionalplanestoIsrael.Thedecisionevenseemed

toimplythatthemostsophisticatedSovietweaponsandSovietcombat

personneldidnotaffectthemilitarybalance,animplicationthatalmostinvited

theiraugmentation.



AtriplongplannedbyJoeSiscototheMiddleEast—ostensiblytoconsult

ambassadorsbutinrealitytosoundoutpeaceprospects—reinforcedthe

impressionofAmericanindifferencetotheSovietmilitarypresence.Sisco’s

missionsosoonafteraSovietpowerplayseemedtosuggestthatSovietcombat

personnelinEgyptwerenoobstacleandmightevenbeaspurtoUSpeace

efforts.TheIsraelis,inturn,rattledbythetwinblowsfromtheSovietUnionand

theUnitedStates,suspendedtheirdeeppenetrationraidsandadoptedamore

selectiveretaliatorypolicy.Agesturethatafewweeksearliermighthave

contributedtoimprovingtheatmospherebecameaconcessiontoSovietmilitary

blackmail.Andtocompoundtheerrors,Nixonchosethismomenttobeginhis

overturesforaUS‐Sovietsummitmeeting—removinganyremainingSoviet

hesitations.April1970wasnottheproudestmonthoftheNixonAdministration.



Itwasinevitable,givenourweakresponse,thattheSovietsshouldgivethe

screwanotherturn.Sovietmissilesmultiplied;thenumberofcombatpersonnel

increaseddramatically,tosometenthousandinthenextsixweeks.Rabin

informedmeonApril24thatSovietpilotshadbeenflying defensemissionsover

Egypt’sinterior.Thus,theEgyptianairforcewasfreedforattackingIsraeli

positionsalongtheCanalandwasbecomingmoreaggressive.Aircombat

betweenSovietandIsraelipilotswasavirtualcertainty.



AtlasttheUSgovernmentbestirreditself.TheWhiteHouseannouncedan

“immediateandfull”reviewofthesituation.NixonauthorizedmetotellRabinon

April30(thedayheannouncedtheCambodianoperation)thatwewouldprovide

moreplanesdespitehisearlierdecision.Hewasstillsufficientlyworriedaboutthe

Arabreactiontorequestnopublicity,thusdeprivingthedecis ionofsomeofits

deterrenteffect.Andsincehegavenoindicationaboutthenumbershehadin

mind,helethimselfinforweeksofadditionalinteragencyhagglingfromthose

whohadopposedanyplanesalestobeginwith.Foreventheappearanceof

Sovietpilotsdidnot alterthecautiousofficialanalysis.Theintelligenceconsensus

wasthattheSovietmissionwaspurelydefensive.Buttheintelligencecommunity

didnotproposetotrapitselfbyanunambiguousstatement;anescapeclause

warnedthat“ashiftinthesituation,however,couldradicallyaltertheirmission

withlittle,ifany,advancewarning”—whichwasofcoursetheheartofthe

problem.



OnMay12,atthepeakoftheCambodiahysteria,Iwassufficiently

concernedtosumupthedevelopingimpasseforNixon:Nasserbelievedhecould

outwaittheIsraelisandMrs.Meirthoughtthatnopeacewaspossiblewith

Nasser.Mrs.Meirwaspreparedtostickitoutuntiltherewasachangeofheart

ontheArabside.IsraelwantedtheUnitedStatestostandupmorefirmlytothe

SovietsandgiveIsraelmoreplanes.EvenSisco—asaresultofhistrip—now

recommendedareevaluationofmajorassumptionsaboutAmericanstrategy.

Siscowasright,becausethoseassumptionshadbeenwrongacrosstheboard:



•Wehadassumedthatmajor‐powertalksmightbr eak theimpasse.Infact,

theyhadnotsignificantlychangedthepositionsofanyoftheparties.



•WehadassumedthattheSoviets,inordertodefusethesituationand

limitSovietinvolvementinEgypt,mightfeelaninterestinpressingNasser

tocompromise.Onthecontrary,Moscowhaddeepeneditsmilitary

commitment,thusencouragingNasser’swarofattritionagainstIsrael.



•WehadassumedIsraelmightintheendgoalongwithaproperly

balancedAmericanproposal.ButtheIsraelishadflatlyrejectedourvarious

planswhileaskingustosupportthemmilitarilyandeconomicallywhether

ornottherewasprogressinnegotiations.

