Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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bureaucraticanddiplomaticrequirementsofSALTclashedwithourdefense

program.Seniorofficialswhohadendorsedandindeedrecommende d threesites

inthecenterofthecountryaspartofourdefensebudgetweresuddenly,for

purposesofSALT,urgingaradicallydifferentdeploymentcenteringon

Washington,whichhadneverbeenputbeforetheCongress.IftheSoviets

acceptedourpositionwewouldhavetoteardownwhatwewerebuildingand

startagainfromscratch.



Allofthiscriedoutforsomecoherence.Inresponsetomyrequesttothat

effect,amind‐bogglingcollectionofninedifferentvariationsofABMlimitations

wasproudlyputforwardbyaninteragencycommitteeofexperts.Inthe

VerificationPanelmeetingthatIchairedonMarch25,I complainedthatthe

processwasbecomingchaotic.ForthePresidenttomakeadecisionwehadto

offerhimsomegeneralconceptsrelatedtoournat i onalstrategy,ratherthan

makehimarbitrateexcruciatinglytechnica lcontroversies.



ThefullNationalSecurityCouncil metonMarch25.AsIhadfeared,the

discussionbecameaseriesofunrelatedventuresbytheprincipalsintoissuesof

highscience.Howdidwelimitthetwosides’radarnetworks?Andhowdidwe

guaranteethatsurface‐to‐airmissiles(SAMs)againstaircraftwouldnotbe

covertlyupgradedintoantimissileABMs?[

Thejargonphraseforthisproblemwas“SAM

Upgrade,”whichonewagsuggestedwasthenameofanewanalystonmystaff.]Laird,

PackardandGeneralWheeler,whilelukewarmaboutABM,werepassionatelyin

favorofMIRV.Theydemandedon‐siteinspectionasthepriceforMIRVlimitation

thoughtheywerelessclearaboutwhatwastobeinspectedandbywhom.Rogers

andSmithmaintainedtheirnowwell‐establishedpositionspressingforabanon

ABMsandasuspensionofMIR Vs.Sincetheissuesweredebatedintheabstract

andnotreduce dtodiscretenegotiatingchoices,aPresidentialdecisionwasnot

possible.



SomeoneleakedthePentagonpositiontoChalmersRobertsofthe

WashingtonPostonMarch27,tostirupapublicreaction.Sureenough,within

twoweeks,proponentsoftheStateDepartment andACDApointofviewhad

broughtaboutasense‐of‐the‐SenateresolutiononApril9,whichbythe

overwhelmingmarginof72‐6urgedthePresidenttoproposethatbothsides

“immediatelysuspenddeploymentofalloffensiveanddefensivenuclearstrategic

weapons.”TheresolutionwasinitiatedbyEdBrookeandJohnShermanCooper—

twoRepublicans;HenryJacksonsupportedit.SenatorEdmundMuskieadvocated

an“interimstrategicstandstill,”includinganendtoflighttestingofMIRV. It

wouldbea“negotiator’spause,”forwithoutit“allchancesofbanning MIRVsand

ABMsarelost,”hesaid.EvenSenateRepublicanLeaderHughScottcalledthe

resolution“ausefulandunrestrictiveguideline”forthePresident.



OntheeveoftheopeningofthenextroundofSALTtalksinVienna,

scheduledforApril16,therewasnoconsensus;therewasababbleofdiscordant

voices.SincethePresidenthadlefttheorderingofoptionsonSALTtome

(withouttellingtheotherprincipals),Idecidedthatitwasessential,first,to

combinethevariousopinionsintodistinctpackagessothatthePresidentcould

makeadecisionongeneralobjectivesratherthanonabstrusetechnical

problems.OnMarch27Iissuedadirectiveaskingtheagenciestoreducethe

chaostofouroptionsforPresident ialdecision.



Fouroptionsofincreasingcomprehensiveness—imaginativelylabeledA,B,

C,andD—werepresentedattheNSCmeetingofApril8,1970: 



•OptionAlimitedICBMsandSLBMstotheUStotalof1,710,andfrozethe

numbersofbombers(527fortheUSand195fortheSoviets).Itpermitted

a“Safeguard”‐levelABM(twelvesites).Inotherwords,itrequireda

reductionoftheSovietmissileforcewhileleavingourbomberforceand

ABMprogramuntouched.Theagencieshadnodifficultyagreeingonthis

option;theyleftittoGerrySmithtoconvincetheSovietUnion.



•OptionBofferedthesameoffensivelimitationsasOptionA.ButABM

underthisoptionwaslimitedtoNationalCommandAuthorities(NCA,that

is,WashingtonandMoscow)orelsebannedaltog e ther.



•OptionCincludedthesameoffensivelimitationsasOptionsAandB.Like

OptionBitlimitedABMtoNCAorzero.Butitaddeda banonMIRVs(not

coveredinthefirsttwooptions),providedtheSovietsagreedtoon‐site

inspection.



•OptionDwassomewhatdifferent.Itproposedmajorreductionsgoing

downfromourexistingtotalof1,710ICBMsandSLBMsby100peryear

untilbothsidesreachedalevelof1,000by1978.ABMwasbannedor

limitedtoNCA;therewasnobanonMIRVs...



TheseoptionsillustratedthequandaryinwhichtheExecutiveBranchfound

itself.Theagenciescouldagree ononlytwopositionswithrespecttoABM:either

theexisting“Safeguard”program(whichwealreadyknewevenpro‐ABM

Senatorswerenolongersupporting)oradefenseofWashington,D.C.,whichwas

contrarytowhatthePresidenthadalreadyrecommendedtotheCongress.

Moreover,allCongressionalexpertsagreedthatCongresswouldneverapprove

anABMaroundWashington.Andyetthisdoomedprogramwastheonlyprogram

onwhichallagenciescoulduniteforSALT.



InretrospectIfindithardtoexplainhowthisoptioncouldeverbe

considered,muchlessadopted.Theconsensusdemonstratestheextenttowhich

parochialbureaucraticconsiderationscanoverwhelmsubstance.ThePentagon

fearedacompletebanonABMsandthereforesupportedNCAbecausethiswould

atleastkeepABMtechnologyaliveandprovideabaseforfutureexpansion.State

andACDApreferrednoABMatall,buttheyacceptedNCAbecauseitwas

symmetricalwiththeprogramoftheSovietUnionandtherefore“negotiable.”

Evenmore,theyfavoredNCAbecauseitwouldalmostsurelyleadtotheir

preferredoptionofacompleteABMbanonoursidesinceCongresswouldkillit.

I,inturn,acquiesceddespitemybetterjudgme ntforthenotveryelevatedreason

thatoveranissuesotechnicalIknewthePresidentwouldbereluctanttodo

battlewiththeagenciesresponsibleforimplementingit.



NeverthelesstheproposalforNCAwasafirst‐classblunder;itmadeno

substantivesensewhatever.WewereproposingtotheSovietsaprogramwe

knewtheCongresswouldnotapproveandtotheCongressaprogramcontraryto

whatwewereofferingtotheSoviets.Luckilynopermanentdamageresulted.

ThankstoSovietgreediness ,wemanagedtoslideoffourerrorbeforewewere

committedtoahopelessquandary.



ThediscussionsofSALTattheNSCmeetingofApril8hadallthe

elusivenessofaKabukiplay.Eachdepartmentinvokedcomplicatedtechnical

argumentsinwhichthesamefactswereusedtoproduceradicallydifferent

conclusions.Eachoftheprincipalsputforwardtwopositions—onehebelievedin,

andatougheroneas anopenerthathecalculatedtheSovietUnionwouldreject.

Thushecouldprovehewasa“toughbargainer”andatthesametimehavehis

preferredproposalasthefallback.Allofthisfeintingandposturingwas

performedbeforeaPresidentboredtodistraction.Hisglazedexpressionshowed

thatheconsideredmostoftheargumentsesoteric rubbish;hewastryingto

calculatethepoliticalimpactandsalabilityofthevariousoptions,ofwhichonly

thebroadoutlinesinterestedhim.



GerrySmitharguedforOptionC—lowABMsandaMIRVban—buthewas

willingtoacceptthereductionoption,D.DavePackardandAdmiralMoorer,

representingDefenseandtheJointChiefsrespectively,preferredthesmallest

limitation(OptionA, limitingoffensiveweaponsbutpermitting“Safeguard”)asa

“goodstarting”point;asafallbackPackardsurprisinglyfavoredthereductions

schemeofOptionD(whichwouldsaveDefensetheyearlyappropriationshass le).

PaulNitzearguedthatevenwithnumbersfrozentheSovietswouldintimeenjoy

asuperioritybecauseoftheiredgeinmissilethrowweight.HefavoredOptionD,

thedeepreductions. HeopposedaMIRVbanonthegroundthatitwouldenable

theSovietstocatchupinoneofthefewareaswherewewereahead.John

McCloycommentedthatNitze’sapproachwas“crazy”butdidnotexplainhow he

hadreachedthisunfriendlyconclusion.Rogersfavoredthereductionoptionbut

waswillingtogoalongwithOptionA.



Thehappytaskofdistillingsomerecommendationsoutofthisconfusion

fellonme.IregrettoadmitthatindoingsoIwasswayedbybureaucraticand

politicalconsiderations morethaninanyothersetofdecisionsinmyperiodin

office.Basically,thesecurityadviseroughtnottoplaythisgame;heshould

submittothePresidenthisownbestjudgmentofthemeritsandleavepolitical

andbureaucraticconsiderationstothePresident.ButinthecaseofSALT,Iknew

thatmyrecommendationwouldcarryanunusualweight.Nixonsimplywouldnot

learnthetechnicaldetailswellenoughtochoosemeaningfully.WhileIwasquite

preparedtooverrulethedepartmentsonissuesthatthePresidentfollowed

closely,whereIwasineffectonmyownIfelthonorboundto exercisemy

mandateonlywithinthebroa dlimitssetbythegovernmentconsensus.



IconsideredOptionB—afreezeonoffensiveweaponsandanagreedlevel

ofABM—themostrealisticandmostconsistentwithourinterests.(Ifavored

substitutingtheexistingsitesforNCA.Thiswasinfactwhateventuallyemerged,

althoughitwasatfirstrecommendedbynoagency.)Thiswouldgiveusthe

greatestflexibilityformodernization.ItwouldarresttheSovietoffensivebuildup,

whichwasourmosturgentconcern.Itwouldprovideaceilingfromwhichlater

reductionscouldbenegotiated.WewouldfreezeourABM—whichCongresswas

intheprocessofkilling—inexchangeforaSovietfreezeonoffensiveweapons

thattheywerestillbuilding.



ButhadOptionBbeenputforwardasourpreferredposition,allhellwould

havebrokenloosebothintheCongressandinthebureaucracy.Itwouldhave

beenclaimedthatwehadnevereven“explored”abanonABMandMIRV.It

wouldhavehadatepidreceptioninthePentagon,which,whilenoteagertobuild

“Safeguard,”wasnotpreparedtoembodyitsconvictionsinanoffertolimitit.

TheDefenseDepartmentpreferredOptionA,whichconstrainedthoseoffensive

weaponsthattheSovietswerebuildingbutleftweaponsonwhichwewere

ahead(aswellasdefensiveones)unrestricted.ThoughOptionAwasanonstarter,

thefailuretoachieveitcouldalwaysbeblamedonthelackofvigilanceofour

negotiators.Inanyevent,thedomesticobstaclestoOpt ionAwereevenmore

seriousthanthosetoOptionB.



Asforthetwomore“comprehensive”options,Iwasconvincedthatthe

Sovietswouldneveragreetoa banonMIRVtechnologybeforetheyhadeven

testedtheirMIRVs,norwouldtheyaccepton‐siteinspection.AndIdidnot

believethattheSovietUnionwouldgoalongwiththemajorreductionof

offensivemissilescalledforinOptionD;theywereboundtoconsiderthisas

aimedatreversingtheirbuildupinmid‐coursewhileleavingourbomberforce

unconstrained.Ontheotherhand,eitheroftheseoptionswascompatiblewith

oursecurityandinmanywaysanimprovementoverwhatanarmsracewould

produce.



MysolutionwastorecommendtothePresidentthatwetakeOptionsC

andDasouropeningpositions.Thiswouldrespondto Congressionaland

bureaucraticsupportersofMIRVandABMbans;itwouldgiveusthepositive

publicpostureofhavingfavoredcomprehensivelimitations.IftheSoviets

acceptedtheproposals,wewouldhavemadeamajorstepforward.IftheSoviets

rejectedthem,asIfirmlyexpected,wecouldthenputforwardOptionBfroma

muchstrongerdomesticandbureaucraticposition.IftheSovietssurprisedusby

acceptingouroffer,theresultwouldbecompatiblewithoursecurity.The

Presidentagreed.OnApril10Iissuedinstructionsaccordingly.



DuringthistimeIhadkeptinloosetouchwithDobrynin.OnFebruary18he

hadaskedwhatpositionweintendedtotakeonABMandwhetherweprefe rred

alimitedoracomprehensiveagreement.WearrangedtomeetagainonMarch

10.IbroughtalongLarryLynn,mystaffexpertonsystemsanalysis,toexplainour

generalthinkingonABM.Dobrynin,however,putonlyafewperfuncto ry

questionsandthenaskedtoseemealone.InatonesuggestingthatIwasbeing

madeprivytosomeimportantnews,heindicatedthattheKremlinwasprepared

foreitheracomprehensiveoralimitedagreement;acomprehensiveapproach

mightbebetterbecauseitcouldleadtoasolutionofotherpoliticalproblemsas

well.Itwasallverytitillatingbutwithoutoperationalsignificance,forDobrynin

stilldidnotdefinewhattheSovietsunderstoodbyeither“comprehensive”or

“limited.”Irepliedthatourmainrequirementnowwastobeconcrete.



Dobrynin’sskillatputtinghisAmericaninterlocutoronthedefensivewas

infinite.OnApril7hecomplainedthatbothsideswereapproachingthe

resumptionofSALTtalkswithonlythemostminimalknowledgeofeachother’s

positions;hecouldrecallnonegotiationinwhichthetwosideshadbeenso

ignorantofoneanother’spurposes. Therewassomemerittohispoint.Buthe

seemedtoholduswhollyresponsibleforthisstateofaffairs;hewasnoteven

slightlyembarrassedbytheideathatnothingpreventedtheSovietUnionfrom

contributingtothegeneralenlightenment.ThroughouttheSALTnegotiations,

withoutanyexceptionthatIcanremember,theSovietproposalseitherwere

totallyself‐servingandpredictablyunacceptableorelsewerereactionstoour

own.



OnApril9(thinkingofOptionsCandD)ItoldDobrynin,withthe

President’sappro val,thatwewouldpresentseveralcomprehensiveproposalsat

Vienna.If,however ,theSovietsdecidedtheywereinterestedinamorelimited

agreementintheinterim,wewerepreparedtoexploreitaswell.Dobrynin

promisedareplyafterhereturnedfromMoscow,wherehewasgoingagainfor

consultation.



Asitturnedoutthereplycamenotfromhimbutinthecourseofthe

Viennatalksthemselves,whichreconvenedonApril16.AndwhattheSovietshad

inmind,asweshallsee,wasneitheracomprehensivenoralimitedstrategicarms

agreementbutapoliticalallianceagainstChina.



TheViennanegotiationsfellintothepatternwhichIhadanticipated.The

UnitedStatesdelegationexpectantlypresentedfirstOptionCandthenOptionD.

TheoffensivelimitationsinbothschemeswerequicklyrejectedbytheSoviet

negotiators.Ontheotherhand,theSovietsacceptedourproposalthatABMsbe

limitedtonationalcapitalswithamazingandtotallyunprecedentedspeed—

withinafewdays.TheSovietsknewagoodthingwhentheysawit.Theydidnot

mindkeepingwhattheyhadwhilenailingustowhatCongresswouldnever

approve.



Buttheywereplaguedbytheirtemptationtooverplaytheirhand.Instead

ofpullingtheteethoftheAmericanstrategicprogramthatconcernedthem

most—theABM—byputtingforwardareasonableproposalonoffensive

limitations,theSovietssuggestedaschemesoegregiouslyone‐sidedthateven

themostrabidproponentsoflimitationscouldnotacceptit.TheSovietposition

calledforaceilingontheaggregatenumberofICBMs,SLBMs,andheavy

bombers.Theyofferednonumbers,buttheyinsistedoncountingallsystems

capableofreachingtheUSSRbyvirtueoftheirgeographicaldeployment—in

otherwords,allourbombersinEuropeandonouraircraftcarriers.MIRV

deploymentandproductionwouldbebanned,butnotflighttesting.This,of

course,wasaneatdevicebywhichtheSovietswouldcontinuetheirown

developmentandflighttesting ofMIRVswhilefreezingourdeploymentsuntil

theycouldcatchup.Andtherewasnoreliablewaytomonitorabanon

production.



TheSovietsprovedflexibleonlywithrespecttotheinterestsoftheirallies.

ThegeneralfearoftheSALTdelegationthattheCambodianincursionwouldharm

thenegotiationprovedgroundless.Kosyginmerelymadeanellipticalcomplaintin

anewsconference;theSovietdelegation inViennaignoredCambodiaanddid

businessasusual.Andthatmeantendlessesotericdebate,foritwasbecoming

clearthattheSALTtalkshadboggeddown.



Ourofficialsweregrowingrestless,somebecausetheywantedfresh

instructionstobreakthedeadlock,othersbecausetheyfearedthem.GerrySmith,

leadingourdelegationinViennaandinconstantcommunicationwith

Washington,wasengagedwithmeininternalnegotiationsthatwerecomplex

becauseweunderstoodeachotherverywellindeed.HewantedafreerreinandI

wasdeterminedtopreventit.OnMay20Smithinformedmethatthedelegation

hadexhausteditsinstructionsandwouldneed“searchwarrants”beyondthe

“holywrit”oftheinstructions.I wasnotpreparedtoagreetosuchablankcheck.I

hadbecomeawareofthetendencyofsomeofthemorepassionatemembersof

thedelegationtoputpetschemesoftheirownto theSoviets.Whenone’s

Russiancounterpartdidnotrespond,eitheroutofbafflementorbecausehewas

withoutinstructions,thedelegationmemberwouldreporteagerlytoWashington

thattheRussian“didnotdisagree”or“showedgreatinterest,”implyingthathis

ownpreferencewasclearlythepreferencealsooftheRussians.Tocurbsuch

freewheelingIrequestedaspecificproposalfromSmith,aswellastheviewsof

theotheragencies.



Theresultwasthatalltheagencies,asIexpectedtheywould,were

beginningtoconvergeonOptionB(themissilefreezeandNCAlevelofABMs),

whichtheyhadignoredfourweeksearlier. Allagreedthatweshouldacceptan

offensiveceilingofabout2,000deliveryvehicles,withMIRVspermitted.The

DefenseexpertswerecommittedtoMIRVinordertocounterthegrowingSoviet

nuclearnumericalsuperiorityinlaunchersandto penetrateSovietABMdefenses.

(Inanyevent,everyoneagreedthattheSovietproposalbanningMIRVproduction

butpermittingMIRVtestingwastotallyunacceptable.)StateandACDAurgeda

totalbanonABM,whileDefensewantedtostaywithNCA(eventhoughin

practicethiswouldhavekilledABM).Themostinterestingsinglesubmissionwas

fromtheDepartmentofDefense.DeputySecretaryDavePackardinsistedthatan

earlyfreezeonoffensiveweaponswasimperativebecausethesqueezeonour

defensebudgetwouldmakeitnearlyimpossibletomaintainexistingstrategic

forces,muchlesstoincreasethem.

HeurgedrapidconclusionofaSALTtreaty

onthebasisofexisting numbers.



Inotherwords,Congressionalandotherpressureswerethreateningto

depriveusofanybargainingleverage;wewerebeingaskedtostoptheSoviet

buildupbythethreatofreducingourownforces.Thesecircumstanceswere

forgottenafterwehadachievedanagreementin1972andcriticismbecame

riskless.Thenthenumericallimits,whichwerealmostexactlythoseputforward

bythevariousdepartmentsin1970andurgentlyrequestedbythePentagon,

suddenlybecamecontroversial.StoppingtheSovietbuildupinreturnfor

maintainingourexisting program—whichwehadbarelybeenabletodointhe

faceofCongressionalandmediaassaults—wasrepresentedbysomeasa

“unilateralconcessio n”bytheUnitedStates.



WhatwewereupagainstwasshownbyavoteoftheSenateArmed

ServicesCommitteeonABM.Itapprovedthetwositesalreadyauthorized,but

onlytwoothersforMinutemandefense.ABMasanareadefensesystemwas

finished;indeed,therewasagravedangerthattheSenatewouldcutoutthetwo

siteswhentheauthorizationbillreachedtheSenatefloor.Wehadnowaprogram

insearchofarationale,andaSALTpositionrequiringustodismantlewhatwe

hadbuiltandtobuildsomethingwehadnotaskedfor.



MeanwhileinViennaSmithwaspressingforanewoption,whileSoviet

negotiatorVladimirSemenovwassuggestingarecess.IapproachedDobryninto

determineSovietintentions.Evenmoreimportantly,Nixonopenedhisthree‐

year‐longcontestwithSmithoverwhoshouldgetthecreditforSALTbyasking 

metoconveytoDobryninthataSALTsettlementshouldcomeatasummitand

notinVienna.



ImetwithDobryninintheMapRoomoftheWhiteHouseontheevening

ofJune23.Semenov’ssuggestionofanearlyrecess,Isaid,couldbegiventhree

interpretations.First,theSovietUniondidnotwantanagreementonSALTthis

yearatall;second,theSovietUnionwantedanagreementatViennaandwas

usingthisdevicetoelicitadifferentAmericanproposal;orthird,theSovietUnion

wantedanagreementbutnotatViennaandwasstalematingthetalksthereto

permitthetopleaderstosettle theissue.IwouldappreciateDobrynin’sguidance.

Dobryninrepliedthatthefirstinterpretationwasclearlyoutofthequestion.The

SovietUniondidwantanagreementonSALT,eventhoughourtwopositions

werenotyetcloseenoughtopredictadefinitedate.AsforVienna,itwasthe

SovietUnion’sjudgmentthatanagreementincludingoffensiveanddefensive

weaponscouldnotbenegotiatedinthetimeavailable.Hewaswithout

instructionsaboutasummitandhewouldhavetoinquireinMoscow.Hemadeit

clear,however,thatMoscowpreferredanagreementconfinedtolimitingABMs.

AtlastweknewhowtheSovietsdefinedalimitedagreement.



IleftwiththePresidentforSanClementeonthemorningofJune25.After

ourdeparture,Dobryninrepliedwithanaide‐mémoireineffectproposingtwo

immediateagreements:oneonlimitingABMsystemstoMoscowand

Washington,andasecondontheproblemof“reducingthedangerofmissile‐

nuclearwarbetweentheUSSRandtheUSresultingfromaccidentalor

unsanctioneduseofnuclearweapons.”Inotherwords,theSovietswantedto

stoptheonlystrategicprogramwewereactuallybuildingwhiletheyrejectedall

limitationsonoffensivemissiles,whichwereourownprincipalconcern.The

Sovietdelegation,Dobryninsaid,hadthenecessaryinstructionstoproceedinthis

fashion.



Asforthe“accidentalwar”agreement,ithadthemakingsofafirst‐class

boobytrap.Ifitsoughttosafeguardthesuperpowersagainstatechnical

malfunctionoftheirownweapons,itcouldbedealtwithbyestablishingrapid

communicationlinksandagreedproceduresforreacting.Butifthe

“unsanctioned”usereferredtotheweaponsofothernuclearpowers,wefaceda

majorpoliticalproblem.WewouldbecooperatingwiththeSovietUnionagainst

twoallies,theUnitedKingdomandFrance—andagainstthePeople’sRepublicof

China,withwhicheventhenweweretryingtoestablishcontact.Thatthiswas

whattheSovietshadinmindbecameapparentwhenonJune30,outoftheblue,

SemenovatViennastartedexpostulatingonthedangersofaccidentalor

unauthorizedmissilelaunches.AndonJuly2,Semenovsaidprivatelytooneof

ourdelegationthat“whatweneedtodoisjointlytakeastandthatthetwo

governmentsintendtoacttogethertopreventtheoutbreakofwarbyaccidental,

unauthorizedorprovocativeactionfromanyquarter. Weneedtoletthem[other

countries]knowthatwewouldacttogethertodealwithanyattempted

provocations.”ThiswasaviolationoftherulesofourChannel,whichwas

supposedtobelimitedtoexplorationsontheNixon‐Brezhnevlevel—perhaps 

explicablebytheSoviets’difficultyinfathominganExecutiveBranchthat

practicedtheseparationofpowerswithinitself.



AtanyrateonJuly4IsentDobrynin’sproposaltoGerrySmithforhis

comment.SmithrepliedonJuly5thatitseemed“toolimitedtobeintheUS

interest.AnyconstraintonUSABMshouldbematchedbyconstraintsonUSSR

offensiveweaponssystem.DesirabilityofpositiveViennaoutcomeshouldnot

leadustoprematurecommitmentofstrongestbargainingcounter.”



IagreedwithSmith,withoneproviso.TheproposalforanABMagreement

aloneIagreedwasmuchtoolimited;buttheofferwasmuchtoosweepingin

termsoftheintendedanti‐Chinacollusionreflectedintheaccidental‐warploy.I