Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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PalestinianguerrillasoccupiedtheJordanValley.ButtobejoinedbyIsraeliarmed

forcesinhisconflictwasnotrivialmatterfortheKing.Indefendinghispolitical

independencehehadnoincentivetodestroyhismoralpos itionintheArab

world.ThequestionaboutIsraeliintentionswasnotnew.Ithadfirstbeenposed

onbehalfofHusseinonAugust4whentheIraqitroopsstationedinEastern

Jordanasaformofblackmailhadrefusedtoterminatetheirmaneuverson

schedule.OurAmbassadorinIsraelhadthenreportedtoWashingtonthe

possibilitythatIsraelwouldattackifIraqitroopsmovedWestward;hedidnot

raisetheissuewiththeIsraeligovernment.TheNearEasternBureauatStatewas

soskittishaboutthissubjectthatnoreplywasreturnedtotheJordanianqueryat

thattime.Theneedforittemporarilydisappearedasthesituationeased.



BySeptembertheproblemhad returned,asisthewontofunresolved

issues,andwithittheneedtodetermineIsraelireaction.TheStateDepartment

adopteditsnotuncommonpracticeofprocrastination,probablybecauseitdid

notwanttocomplicatetheeffortstodealwithEgyptian‐Israelicease‐fire

violationsevenfurther.OnSeptember2ourAmbassadorJacobBeaminMoscow

calledonSovietDeputyForeignMinisterSergeiVinogradovandinhislow‐key

mannersoughttheSoviets’influenceinrestrainingtheirIraqifriends.Vinogradov

affectedavuncularconcern.TheSovietUnionwasinterestedinpreserving

favorableconditionsforpeacetalksbutknewnothing,hesaid,aboutanyIraqi

ultimatum;itwasthusdifficultforMosco w totakeanofficialposition.

VinogradovofferedhispersonalopinionthatIraqwouldnot intervenein

Jordanianaffairs—but,thenagain,hesaid,noonecouldpredictwhatwould

happenintheMiddleEast.Moscow,inshort,waskeepingitsoptionsopen.The

factthatAnatolyDobryninwasremaininginMoscowthroughoutthelatesummer

leftnodoubtthattheSovietswerenotreadytospendanycapitaloncalmingthe

situation.Thematterwouldthushavetobesettledontheground.



InAmman,onSeptember2,ZaidRifaireportedtoourEmbassythatthe

Iraqishadnotimplementedtheirthreat.Threedayslater,hereaffirmedinterest

inabig‐powerstatementurgingrestraint.Reflecting theStateDepartment

attitude,ourchargerespondedtorenewedJorda nianqueriesabout Israeli

intentionswiththeextraordinarystatementthathecouldnotimagineJordan’s

acceptinghelpfromitsenemyIsraelagainstafellowArabcountry.TheKingwas,

ofcourse,muchtoosubtletoputtheissuethiswayandmuchtoointelligentto

requirelecturesbyAmericanofficialsontheimplicationsofhisownquery.



Meanwhile,thesituationinAmmancontinuedtoimprove;talksbegan

betweentheJordaniangovernmentandmoderatefedayeenleaders.On

September3,BeaminMoscowpresentedourprotestofcease‐fireviolations

alongtheSuezCanal.InthecourseofthatconversationVinogradovdescribed

thingsinJordanasnoworseandnobetter;hemadenoreferencetoanySoviet

intercessionwithIraq.Tounderscoretheimportanceweattachedto

developmentsinJordan,NixononSeptember4receivedournewAmbassadorto

Amman,DeanBrown,inSanClemente.



BySeptember5thecrisisseemedtohaveabated.Onemoresignwasthe

suddenSovietwarningtousagainstanIsraelicrossingoftheCanal,whichthey

claimedwasimminent.(Asalreadydescribed,thisalsohadthefunctionof

deflectingattentionfromEgyptianandSovietcease‐fireviolations.)Itisa

stereotypedSoviettactictofireoffathreatasacrisisinwhichtheyhavebeen

reluctanttointervenewindsdown;evidentlytheyhopetoinspiretheimpression

aftertheeventofhavingbeentheprincipalfactorinresolvingtheissueandthus

establishaclaimforcompensation.(Forexample,in1956theSovietshadsenta 

sternwarningtoLondonandParistodesistfromtheSuezinvasionwhenthe

decisiontowithdrawwasalreadyapparent.)Whilethefedayeenhadbeen

preventedfromtakingover,theKing’spowerwasfarfromrestored.Iraq’s

maneuveringremainedanuneasyreminderofhiswaningauthorityinhisow n

country.TheAmericanattitude—limitedtonervo uslecturing—hadbeen

ambiguous,fallingfarshortofanyactionthatcouldaffectthesituation

concretely,muchlessdominateit.Thecalmwasdeceptive,however.Eventsin

factwerenowheadingoutofcontrol.



<<Contents>>

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****



HijackingCrisis



T

herehasneverbeenasatisfactoryexplanationofwhythefedayeenactedas

theydidduringtheperiodtheythemselveslaterdescribedas“Black

September.”AtthebeginningofthemonthNasserandtheSovietshad

successfullymovedtheirmissilesystemuptotheCanal.TheUnitedStateswas

gettingreadytopressIsraelfo rnegotiationsinwhichJordanwasslatedto 

participate,lookingtowardwithdrawalfromtheWestBank.Ifleftundisturbed,

theprocesshadmanyhopefulelementsfortheArabs.Israel’smilitary

predominancealongtheCanalhadbeenbroken;pressuresonIsraelwerecertain

tomultiplyoncenegotiationsstarted.Buttheextremistsamongthefedayeenhad

theireyeselsewhere;theirgoalwasnotpeacewithIsraelbutitsdestruction.

Theywereasyetunrecognizedasapoliticalentity—treatedasrefugeesin‐

ternationally,asobjectsofmixedfearandadulationintheArabworld,asterrorist

criminalsbyIsrael.Theydidnotaspiretoapoliticalsettlementinwhichtheir

demandswouldbecompromised;theysoughtabaseundertheircontrolfrom

whichtheycouldmountthedecisiveattackonIsraelanddestroyit.Inthissense

theirattempttothwartdiplomaticprogresshadarationalbasis.Ontheother

hand,thePalestinianswerealsograduallygaininggroundinJordan.Theywere

approachingautonomy;byoverplayingtheirhand,theydestroyedtheirown

prospectsandendedupexpelledtoLebanon.Andthecrisistheyproduced,

ironicallyenoug h,handedtheUnitedStatestheopportunitytorecoupmuchof

whathadbeenlostinthehesitationsofthepreviousmonth,andsoopenedthe

roadforthediplomacyoftheyearsthatfollowed.



ThecrisiseruptedonSeptember6whenmembersoftheMarxistPopular

FrontfortheLiberationofPalestine(PFLP),themostextremistwingofthe

fedayeenmovement,hijackedseveralaircraft.APanAmerican747jumbojetwas

flowntoCairoairport,itspassengersreleased,andtheplaneblownupshortly

afterlanding.AnAmericanTWA707andaSwissairDC‐8wereflownbyfedayeen

toDawsonField,adirt stripsomethirtymilesfromAmman.OnSeptember9a

BritishVC‐10wasalsohijackedandjoinedtheothersatDawsonField.The

hijackingofanIsraeliplanewasabortedbyitssecuritypersonnel.



Altogetherthesehijackingsinvolvedseveralhundredpassengers,including

Swiss,German,British,French,Americans,andothers.Themostvulnerable group

weretheIsraelisanddual‐nationals—thatis,thoseholdingbothIsraeliand

Americanpassports.OnSeptember7,thePFLPofferedtoreleaseallpassengers

exceptIsraelisanddual‐nationalsinreturnforthereleaseofallfedayeenheldin

Swiss,German,andBritishjails.Israelianddual‐nationalpassengersweretobe

heldinreturnforguerrillasinIsraelijails.Theygaveadeadlineofseventy‐two

hours.



OurimmediateconcernwastopreventtheretentionofAmericancitizens,

alongwithIsraelis,aftertheotherhostageshadbeenreleased.Norcouldwe

accepthierarchiesestablishedbyforeigners amongAmericancitizens.Weknew

thatIsraelhadapolicyofneveryieldingtoblackmail.Itfearedthatifitever

yielded,noguerrillascouldbeheldcaptive;terrorismwouldbeencouraged.Our

ownviewwasroughlythesame.TheEuropeancountriesinvolveddidnotbelieve

thattheycouldadoptsuchanuncompromisingposition.Weurgedthem,ata

minimum,tonegotiateasa group.



OnSeptember8,RogerscalledamorningmeetinginhisofficeatState;

Laird,Helms,AlexisJohnson,JoeSisco,andIattended.



Allegationsofa“SituationRoomsyndrome,”discussedalreadyinChapter

IXwithrespecttotheEC‐121shootdown,sometimesinclude theaccusationthat

officialsmanufacturecrisesinordertofulfillromanticnotionsofmilitaryprowess

andmachismo.Thisisnonsense.Foronething,theSituationRoomis

uncomfortable,unaesthetic,andessentia llyoppressive,asIhavealready

described.Foranother,discussionsthereareusuallyhighlytechnical.Becauseof

theproximityofthemostadvancedcommunicationsequipment,those

deliberatingintheSituationRoomhaveinstantaccesstothelatestinformation.

Sincetheyareusuallysub‐Cabinetofficers,thereisagoodchancethatdecisions

willbetakensystematicallythroughanalysisandreferre dtohigherlevelsfor

review.



TheriskofrashdecisionsliesnottherebutinadhocmeetingsintheOval

Office,theCabinetRoom,orthepersonalofficesofCabinetmembers.Therethe

dangerisrealthatplausibilityisconfusedwithtruthandverbalfluency

overwhelmscoolanalysis.Itistherethatintheabsenceofstaffwork,decisions

maybemadewhichthefactsdonotsupport,where individualstalktoimpress

andnottoelucidateata timewhenprecisioniscrucial.Thetemptationthereis

muchgreaterthanintheSituationRoomto allowafleetingandsuperficial

consensustoratifyunexaminedassumptions.Therearethesimultaneousrisksof

paralysisandrecklessness.Principalscannotreallyknowtheconsequencesof

theirrecommendationsunlessthoserecommendationshavebeentranslatedinto

specificoperationalterms.



SoitwasatthemeetinginRogers’soffic e.Wildideasdominateddesultory

discussion.Forexample,considerabletimewasdevotedtothepossibleuse

againstthehijackersofsomenervegasthatparalyzedvictimswithouttheir

knowledge.Thelackofknowledgeofwhethera suitablegasexistedinourarsenal

impededthediscussionnomorethanthe absenceofaconceptofhowitwasto

bedelivered,indeed,howanymilitaryactionwastobeorganizedorsustained.

Rogersconcludedwiththeconvictionwithwhichhehadstartedthemeeting—

nothingcouldbedone.TheuseofAmericantroopswasmilitarilyimpractical;

HusseinwouldnotmoveagainstthePalestinians;andIsraeliinterventionmight

behisdeathwarrant .



Thesameargumentswererepeatedintheafternooninameetingwiththe

President.Laird,Rogers,Johnson,Sisco,andIwerepresent,alongwithJ.Edgar

HooverandJohnMitchell,whodealtwiththedomesticimplicationsofhijacking.

ThePresidentmadenodecision.Hehadearliertoldmeprivatelythatthe

hijackingshouldbeusedasapretexttocrushthefedayeen;inthemeetinghe

madenosuchcomment.HedidsaythatinanextremityhepreferredAmericanto

Israelimilitaryintervention.Rogersdemurred,sayingthatwewouldpayan

enormouspriceforanessentiallyuselessact.



ThePresidentturnedtome.Irepliedthatwefacedtwoproblems,the

safetyofthehostagesandthefutureofJordan.IfthefedayeencoulduseJordan

astheirprincipalbaseandintheprocessdestroytheauthorityoftheKing—one

ofthefewrulersintheregiondistinguishedbymoderatio nandpro‐Western

sympathies—theentireMiddleEastwouldberevolutionized.Twomonthsafter

ourpeaceinitiativethemilitarybalancealongtheCanalwouldhavebeenaltered

bycheatingattheverymomentthatthepoliticalbalancealongtheJordanfront

wouldhavebeendestroyedbyforce.Wecouldnotacquiesceinthisbydithering

onthesidelines,wringingourhands,urgingtheresumptionofpeacetalks,and

thenproclaimingourimpotence.



Sincenoonewaseagertofacetheimplicationsofthisanalysis,the

discussionturnedtothepreventionofhijacking.MelLairdtalkedaboutelectronic

devicesforairportsecurityinthefuture.ThePresidentdecidedhefavoredboth

armedguardsandelectronicdevices;heturnedtometo“coordinate”thiseffort

andaskedLairdtotakethe“leadresponsibility.”HeinstructedRogerstopress

diplomaticinitiatives.Myconfusionastowhatallthismeantwasnotclearedup

whenthePresidentwanderedintomyofficetenminutesafterthemeetingand

saidherecognizedwehada“terriblebureaucraticproblem”;theCabinetofficers

allwantedto“dosomething”;hehadgiventhemeachsomethingtodo;Ishould

sortitout.Hedidnotsayhow,orevenexactlywhatheintended.



Meanwhile,wewerereceivingdisturbingaccountsfromAmman.The

Jordanianarmywasreportedtobeinvirtualmutinybecauseofwhatthey

consideredinsultsandprovocationsbyfedayeen.LoyaltotheKingbutrefusing

anyfurthercompromise,theythreatenedtotakemattersintotheirownhands

fortheKing’sowngood.PressurewasmountingonHusseinforforcefulaction.



WiththePresident’sapproval,andtoput anendtothebureaucratic

confusion,IactivatedtheNSCcrisismachineryonSeptember9.Forseventeen

daysthereafter,theWSAGwouldmeetatleastonceadayvirtuallyeverydayto

discussoptions,preparecontingencyplans,andimplementdecisionsona

coordinatedbasis.Thiswasmorethanaproceduralstep;itwasawarningtothe

bureaucracythatthevacillat ionoverthestandstillviolationswouldnotbe

repeatedifJordandeteriorated.MychairmanshipofWSAGimpliedthethreat

thatanyunresolvedissueswouldbepassedontoNixon.



ThePresidentiscrucialinacrisis.Hemustbecloseenoughtotheprocess

togiveimpetustotheultimatedecisions;yetheshouldnotbecomesoinvolved

inthedetailsthatheprecludesathoroughexaminationofalternatives.Kennedy

wiselyexcludedhimselffrompreliminarydiscussionsduringtheCubanmissile

crisisof1962.Nixonfollowe dthesameprocedureduringtheJordancrisisof1970

andalmostallothercrisesofhisPresidency.Hewas,infact,athisbestin such

situations.Hedidnotpretendthathewasexercisinghisresponsibilitiesas

Commander‐in‐Chiefbynervousmeddlingwithtacticaldetailsorformative

deliberations;helefttheshapingofthosetothegovernmentalmachineryunder

mysupervision.Hewouldhesitatebeforecommittinghimself,sometimesin

maddeningways.Buthehadagreatsenseoftiming;heinst inctivelyknewwhen

themomentfordecisionhadarrived;andhewouldthenactresolutely,especially

ifhecouldinsulatehimselffromtoomuchpersonalcontroversy.



InthepreliminaryphaseoftheJordancrisisIsubmitteddailyatleasttwo,

andonoccasionthree,situationreportstothePresident.Theseinformedhimof

WSAGrecommendations,eventsinAmman,andtheprogressofnegotiationsfor

thereleaseofhostages.Sinceallrelevantagencieswererepresentedonthe

WSAG,itcouldbeassumedthatfullreportsreachedtheappropriateCabinet

officers,whoofcoursehadtheopportunitytoappe alanydisagreementtothe

President.Duringacutephasesofthecrisis—especiallyitslastthreedays—Nixon

calleddailymeetingsoftheprincipalstoreviewWS AGrecommendations.



OnSeptember9,theprimaryproblemwastosetacourse.Inmyview

successfulpolicymusthaveatleastthreecomponents:acarefulanalysisto

determinetherealisticrangeofchoice,meticulouspreparation,andearlyseizing

oftheinitiative.Passivityinacrisisleadstomountingimpotence;oneisforcedto

reactonissuesandincontextscontrivedtoone’smaximumdisadvantage.By

contrast,thesidethathastheinitiativecanoccupyitsopponent’senergiesin

analysis.Andsincetheopponentwillalwaysassumetheworstcontingency,even

relativelyminormovescanhavea majorcautionaryeffect,unlesstheyareso

palpablybluffingastoencouragecontempt.Formaximumeffectivenessone’s

actionsmustbesustained;theymustappearrelentless,inexorable;hesitationor

gradualisminvitesanattempttotestone’sresolutionbymatchingthe

commitment.



OnSeptember9,theWSAGmetintheWhiteHouseSituationRoomforan

hour,startingat11:30a.m.Theintelligencebriefingrevealedthatthedeadline

forthehostageshadbeenextended;wedidnotknowforhowlong.Weagreed

thatAmericanpressurehadtobeexertedtopreventtheEuropeancountries

fromattemptingseparatedealsthatwouldleavethemnochoiceexcepttoyield

tothehijackers.ThatwouldleavetheUnitedStatesisolated,withnorecourseto

freeourcitizensexceptbypressuringIsrael,whichbelieved—asdidwe—that

surrendertoterroristblackmailwasoutofthequestion.Indeed,ourviewwas

sharedbytheablerepresentativeoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed

Cross,AndréRochat,whowasconductingthenegotiationswiththePale stinians.

Hesentanoteto thegovernmentsconcerned:“Incaseofa non‐coordinated

liberationofPalestinians,theCommitteewouldbeobligedtorenouncethe

mandatewhichhasbeenconfidedtoit.”



Butifwewantedtopreventthenegotiationsfromdraggingonendlessly,

wehad,inmyview,tobeginconveyingdeterminationandstartexerting

pressure.Anattitudeofimpotentscoldingwouldonlyprolongouragony.

Americanresolutionwasalikecrucialforthefateofthehostagesandforthe

survivaloftheKing.Indeed,inacuriouswaythefutureoftheKingandofthe

hostageshadbeguntomerge.Ifhundredsofhostageswerekilledonhissoil,the

collapseofroyalauthorityinJordanwouldbeplainforalltheworldtosee.Each

successiveinconclusivecrisishadweakenedHusseinalittlefurther;matterswere

driftingtowardshowdown.EitherHusseinindesperationwouldmoveagainstthe

fedayeenorthefedayeenwouldoverthrowhim.



Untilthatchallengewasresolvednopeaceinitiativehadanychance;Israel

wouldneverdiscussnewborderswithagovernmentnotincontrolofitsown

country.Sinceeveryoneagreedthatarescueoperationwasonlyalastresort,I

listedthreecontingenciesforwhichitwasnecessarytoprepare:afedayeen

attackonthehostages,requiringemergencyrescue;abreakdownoforderin

Amman,requiringtheevacuationofAmericans;ashowdownbetweenHussein

andthefedayeen,involvingperhapsSyriaandIraq.Ananalysisofourcapabilities

indicatedthatwehadonlyfourbrigadescapableofreaching Jordanquickly,and

suchanoperationwouldenlistourentirestrategicreserve.Itwouldtakeforty‐

eighthourstocommitthebrigadeinGermany,seventy‐twohourstocommitthe

82ndAirborneDivisionfromtheUnitedStates.Interventionoftheseforceswould

requireoverflightrightsorgroundaccessthroughneighboringcountries.I

requestedtheJointChiefsofStafftosubmitwithintwenty‐fourhoursproposals

toheightenthealertstatusofforcesinEurope;astudyoftheoperational

consequencesofprotractedAmericanmilitaryengagementinJordan;theforces

requiredforeachofthecontingencies;andtherelateddeploymentsneededto

deterSovietintervention.



Inthemeantimeitwasessentialtoconveytoallpartiesthatwewere

gettingserious.ThePresidentorderedtheSixthFleetaircraftcarrier

IndependencebemovedEasttojustoffthecoastofLebanon,accompaniedby

fourdestroyersandjoinedwithintwenty‐fourhoursbytwomoredestroyers.Six

C‐130sweretobepositionedatIncirlikairbaseinTurkeyforuseintheevacuation

ofAmericans.Thesestepsweretobetakenwithoutannouncement.I wascertain

thatSovietintelligence,probablyaidedbythenormalprocessofPentagon

leaking,wouldcausethemtobecomepublic.Oursilencewouldgivetheman

ominousquality.



TheissuebecamemorecomplicatedwhentheWSAGconsideredunder

whatcircumstancestheseforcesweretobeused.Nobodyrelishedanother

militaryinvolvementwhileseveralhundredthousandAmericanswerestill

fightinginSouthEastAsia.Wewouldhavetocommitourentirestrategicreserve

andsupplyitbyair;wewouldbecomevulnerabletoaSovietthrustelsewhere.

Operationswouldbedifficulttosustain;oursupplylinesweretenuousandwould

havetocrossseveralforeigncountries.Thelongerthewarcontinued,themore

complicatedourpositionwouldbecome.IfIsraelintervenedinJordanonitsown,

wewouldbeconductingparallelmilitaryoperationsfordifferentobjectives.Even

worseforourpositionintheArabworldandourprestige,ifwegotinto

difficultieswemighthavetoaskIsraeltobailusout.



ForallthesereasonsIthoughtitdesirableforourlong‐termintereststo

separateourmilitaryactionsfromthoseofIsrael.MyviewwasthatAmerican

forcesshouldbeusedfortheevacuationofAmericansbecausethiscouldbedone

quicklyandrepresentedanimmediateAmericaninterest;butincaseofamajor

conflictprovokedbyanIraqiorSyrianmove,Ifavoredlettingthecountriesmost

immediatelyconcernedtaketheprincipalresponsibility.SinceIconsideredan

IsraeliresponsetoanIraqiorSyrianmovealmostcertain,Ithoughtthebestuse

ofourpowerinthatcontingencywastodeterSovietinterventionagainstIsrael.A

consensusdevelopedaroundthesepropositions.



IinformedNixon.Hestillheldtohisearlierviewthatanymilitary

operationsbeAmericanonly;hewantedustomovealoneagainstIraqiorSyrian

interventionorfedayeenupheavalsandkeepIsraelout.



ThepositionofthesecurityadviserwhenhedisagreeswiththePresidentis

extremelydelicate.ThePresidentmusthavetheassurancethathisadviserwill

actashisextensionandwillseetoitthathiswishes arecarriedoutbythe

departments.Ontheotherhand,thePresidentmustbeabletocountonbeing

warnedifhisordersaredangerous.ThiswasespeciallyimportantforNixon,given

histendencytowardimpetuousdeclarationsthatheneverexpectedto see

implemented.IntheJordancrisisIsolvedtheproblembyhavingtwocontingency

planspreparedsimultaneously:oneembodyingthePresident’spreferencefor

unilateralAmericanaction;theotherreflectingtheWSAGconsensusforthe

UnitedStatestoholdtheringagainstoutsideintervention.ThePresidentwould

thenbeabletochoose whenthemomentfordecisionarrived.



OnSeptember9,SovietchargeYuliM.Vorontsovinformedus(viaSisco)

thattheSovietshadurgedrestraint inbothJordanandIraq.However,the

languageoftheSovietadmonitionwashardlycalculatedtodouseanyfires.

MoscowhadtoldtheArabsthatmoderationwasdesirablebecauseconflict

amongthemwouldonlyhelptheirenemies,specifically“theIsraeliaggressors

andtheimperialistfo rcesbehindthem”—a crudeslapatus.Inmyview,the

KremlinwasplayingtheJordancrisisasithadthecease‐fire.Itmadeformally

correctnoisesbutdidnot hingconstructivetoreversethedrifttowardcrisis.By

informingJordanthatitconsideredusanenemyoftheArabs,theSovietUnion

wasassaultingtheveryfoundationofJordan’straditionalpolicy.Sendingthetext

ofthisdemarchetotheStateDepartmentwithoutattemptingtosoftenits

languagewasalsoprovocative;Moscowobviouslydidnotyetbelievethatitwas

runningaseriousrisk.



TheWSAGmetagainontheafternoonofSeptember10.Bythattimethe

Palestinianshadchangedtheir,demands,partlyasaresultoftheunitedfront

thatwehadmanagedtoholdtogether.TheBritish,Swiss,andGermanshad

agreedtohandoverthefedayeenprisonersintheircustodyonlyafterall

hostageswerereleased.ThePalestiniansthenproposedtheexchangeofall

women,children,andsickpassengersforthefedayeenheldinEurope;allthe

menwouldberansomedforallthefedayeenheldbyIsrael.



Weacceleratedourcontingencyplanning.Oncethedepartments

understandthattheWhiteHouseisserious,theyfrequentlydiscoverpossibilities

foractionunimaginedwhentheybelievethecourseisoneofminimumrisk.At

theSeptember10WSAGmeetingAdmiralMoorerreportedthatpreviously

agreedalertmeasureshadreducedthereactiontimeofourforcesinEuropeby

nearlyhalf.HehadfoundtwosubmarinestosendtotheMediterraneantokeep

trackoftheSovietfleet.AnamphibiousmaneuveroffCretewasduetoend

September14;theforcesinit,containingaMarinelandingteam,couldbekept

offthecoastofLebanonifthecrisiscontinued.IaskedtheJointChiefstostudy

whetherandhowtheUnitedStatescouldsustainmilitaryoperationsinJordanif

thePresidentshouldfollowhispreferenceofunilateralAmericanaction.Iknew

thatthegroupwasopposedtosuchacourse,butIdidnotwanttobeina

positionwherethePresidentorderedsomething“withoutourknowingwhatwe

mustdo…”HelmsexpressedtheviewthatHusseinwouldprobablyseektoavoid

ashowdownwiththefedayeenforfearofinterventionbySyriaorIraq.I