Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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At11:15p.m.IcalledPrimeMinisterHeath’sprivat esecretaryonthe

securelinetoreadhimtheKing’smessage,toinformhimthatwehadbeenin

touchwiththeIsraeliAmbassadorandthatIsraelwouldflyreconnaissancewhich

woulddetermineitsnextmove.NixonsuggestedIstopusingthesecurephone

sincemorepeopleonPennsylvaniaAvenuecouldhearmyshoutingthanwould

belikelytointerceptaconversationontheopenline.



At11:30p.m.,RabincalledbackwithMrs.Meir’sanswer.Israelwouldfly

reconnaissanceatfirstlight.ThesituationaroundIrbidwas“quiteunpleasant”;

Israelimilitaryleaderswerenotconvincedthatairoperations wouldbeenough.

Israelwouldpassitsjudgme ntsontoWashingtonafterstudyingtheresultsofthe

reconnaissance,butwouldtakenoactionwithoutfurtherconsultation.Nixon

heardmyendofthisconversationaswellbutmadenocomment.Hethenleftmy

office.



Atmidnight,theWSAGconvenedagainintheSituationRoom.Ibriefed

themaboutwhathadtranspiredsincethelastmeeting.Wediscussedwhattodo

ifIsraelstruckduringthenexttwenty‐fourhours.Irequestedurgentstudies

duringthenightonfourtopics:contingencyplansagainstpossibleSovietmoves;

assistancepackagesforIsraelandJordantomakeuplosses;ascenariofor

Congressionalbriefings;andadiplomaticplantobriefalliesandurgetheSoviets

tostayout.WithrespecttotheSoviets,Istressed:“Wehavetwoobjectives:one,

togetthemtousetheirinfluencewiththeSyrianstogetthemtowithdraw;two,

tomakesuretheydonotbelievetheycanescapethedilemmaofanIsraelimove

byputtingthesqueezeonIsrael…Ithinkwafflingnowwillgiveusmoreproblems

later.”



At12:45a.m.IcalledRogersathometotellhimoftheRabinconversation

andtheWSAGmeeting.Iinquiredwhetherhehadanyproblems.Therewere

none.Foronceourseniorpeoplewereunited.Atabout1:00a.m. IcalledNixon

togivehimabriefreportontheWSAG.Helistenedtomysummaryofthevarious

agencypredictionsaboutSovietreactions.HesnortedwhenItoldhimofa

DefenseDepartmentfearthattheSovietsmightlaunchairstrikesagainstIsraelin

retaliation:“Idon’tbelieveit.”



Iwenthomeandtobed.Itwas2:00a.m.,earlyMonday,September21.



At5:15a.m.IwasawakenedbyAlHaig,whohadjustreceivedacallfrom

Rabin.Thoughnoreportofreconnaissancewasyetavailable,Rabinsaidthe

Israelisdidnotconsiderairstrikesaloneadequate;groundactionmightalsobe

necessary.IsraelwouldappreciatetheAmericanviewwithintwoorthreehours.



At5:35a.m.,IphonedandawakenedthePresidenttotellhimofRabin’s

preliminaryresponse.Iurgedhimtodefer adecisionandtocallameetingofhis

senioradvisersfor7:30inthemorning.ButNixonknewthatarequestforIsraeli

groundactionwouldproduceseriouscontroversy,andhewouldhavenoneofit.

“Wewillmake[thedecision]now,”hesaid.Hereviewedtheprosandconsofan

Israeligroundattackwithmeforafewmoments.HeaskedmetocallSiscoforhis

view.



IbegandiscussingwithHaigthewisdomofcallingSisco withoutinvolving

Rogers,andIhadjustconcludedthatImusttalktoRogerswhenNixoncalled

back.HehaddecidedtoapproveIsraeligroundactionanddictatedathoughtful

messagetoconveytoRabin.Hesaid:“Ihavedecidedit.Don’taskanybodyelse.

Tellhim[Rabin]‘go.’“



IwasnotabouttoletthePresidentruntheriskofamajorconfronta tion

withtheSovietUnionwithoutconsultinghissenioradvisers.AnIsraeliground

operationcouldproduceaMidEastwar.IowedittoNixontocheckwithRogers

andLaird.Norwastherethatmuchurgency.Israelwouldsurelynotmoveonland

withoutmobilization.IcalledSisco,whosaidheagreedwiththePresident’s

decision.InextcalledRogers,whohadseriousreservations,especia llyinthe

absenceofaformalJordanianrequestforgroundsupport.Lairdwasambiguous;

hewantedtoconsidertheintelligence.Betweenallthesecalls—which wereall

madefrommyhome—thePresidentcalledmefrequentlytoaddrefinementsto

hisdecision. At7:10a.m.Iurgedhimagaintocallameetingofhissenioradvisers

inviewofthedifferencesofopinionamongthem.Henowreluctantlyagreed.

HaiginformedRabinthatthere wouldnotbeanAmericanansweruntil

midmorning.



Fromhereonanhour‐by‐houraccountisnolongernecessary,themain

issueshavingbecomedefinedduringthenight’sevents.Ourgovernmentwas

unitedonapprovingIsraeliairattacks;therewasadifferenceofopinionasto

Israeligroundoperations.Ididnotthinktheissuerequiredanimmediate

resolutionbecausetheIsraelireply,whileaddingthecomplicatingthreatofa

groundwar,alsoprovidedapoliticalopportunity.IfIsraelconsideredaground

actionessential,itwouldhavetomobilize.Mobilizationwouldtakeatleastforty‐

eighthours.AndIsraelcouldnotaffordnottomobilizebecauseitcouldnot

permitaSyrianvictory,whateverourultimatereaction.Thuswehadabreathing

space—iftheKingcouldholdon—duringwhichpressuresonSyriawouldmount

andperhapstothepointwherethecrisisresolveditselfwithoutwar.AsSyriasaw

theincreaseinIsraeliforcesontheGolanHeightsontheflankofitsthrustinto

Jordan,itwasboundtobecomeextremelyuneasy.Nasserwaslikelytopressfor

anendtooperationsthatmightsoonfacehimwith theimpossibledilemmathat

hadledtothedisasterof1967:eitherbreakingArabsolidaritybystandingaside

orriskinganotherhumiliatingdefeatbyintervening.Andthesameconsiderations

werecertaintopressontheSoviets.Inshort,Israelimobilization,addedto our

owndeployments,could“spook”allouradversariesandyetprovidetimefora

solutionshortofwar.



TheNationalSecurityCouncilmetat8:45a.m.,Monday,September21.

Thoughthediscussionconcernedmainlytheeminentlypracticalissueofhow to

respondtotheIsraeliqueryofourattitudetowardgroundoperations,itreally

camedownagaintoaphilosophical debateonhowtohandle crises.Rogers

believedinveryslowandmeasuredescalation,ifany.Nixon,aswellasI,believed

thatthiswasthemostlikelywayforacrisistobecomeunmanageable.Rogers

wasbasicallyopposedtoIsraeligroundinvolvementformanyreasons,including

fearofaconfrontationwiththeSoviets.NixonandIheldthatifwewishedto

avoidconfrontationwiththeSovietswehadtocreaterapidlyacalculusofrisks

theywouldbeunwillingtoconfront ,ratherthanletthemslideintothe

temptationtomatchourgradualmoves.Rogerswantedtomaketheultimate

decisiondependonwhethertheSyriansmovedSouthfromIrbid;inmyviewthe

crisiscouldbeendedonlybyfullSyrianwithdrawalfromits“liberatedzone”in

NorthernJordan.NixonfinallydecidedthatSiscocouldinformIsraelthat the

UnitedStatesagreedtoIsraeligroundactioninprinciple,subjecttodetermining

theKing’sviewandconsultationpriortoafinaldecision.



IhadmydoubtsaboutaskingHussein.SinceinmyviewIsraelshould

interveneonlyiftheJordanianswerenearcollapse,weshouldnotmortgagethe

King’salreadyprecariouspositionintheArabworldbyaskinghimquestionshe

couldnotaffordtoanswer.Husseinmightwellacquiesceinwhathecouldnever

request.Butfortheimmediatemanagementofthecrisisitmadenodifference.

Israelimobilizationhadalreadyquietlybegun;whenaddedtoourown

deployment,itwouldcreateitsownmenaceanditsownreality.



HadtheIsraeligovernmentbeeneagertostrike,ourqualifiedresponse

mighthavecreateddoubtsthatcouldhavetransmittedthemselvestoour

opponents.Fortunately,Israelhaditsownstrategicassessment,whichcausedit

tomobilizewithoutaskingfora finalanswerandthustopursuepreciselyour

preferredpace.Insatiableinitsquestforreassurance,indeedshowing

remarkablecaution,theIsraeligovernment submittedasetofquestionsabout

Americanpolicyinthecaseofhostilities.Thepreparationoftheanswerstookthe

betterpartoftheday.Noformaldecisionaboutgroundactionneededtobe

takenduringthattime.Inthemeantime ,twoIsraelibrigadesweremovingonto

theGolanHeights,threateningtheflankoftheSyrianforcesinJordan.



DuringthemorningamessagewasreceivedfromFrenchPresident

Pompidouexpressinghis“greatconcern”aboutpossibleAmericanintervention

andurgingNixontoweighhisdecisionswithcare.Themessagewasnotespecially

helpful,nordidwefailtonoticeFrance’sattempttodissociatefromusinthe

midstofacrisis.Ithadtheredeemingvirtue,however,ofshowingthatour

deploymentswerebeingnoted. WhatworriedPariscouldalsodisquietMoscow

andDamascus.



TherestofMonday,September21,wasdevotedtoWSAGmeetingsto

improveourmilitaryreadinessandtodraftareplytotheIsraeliquestionsina

mannerthatwouldnotgiveIsraelavetooverourrelationswiththirdcountries.



Themostsignificanteventoccurredlateintheday.SovietchargeYuli

VorontsovcalledonSiscowithareplytoourmessageofthedaybeforethathad

demandedimmediateSyrianwithdrawal.Thespeedofthereply—twenty‐four

hourscomparedtotheweek‐longdelaysinrespondingtoourcomplaintsabout

cease‐fireviolations—showedthattheKremlinwasworriedindeed.Thetoneof

themessagewasremarkablymild,considering themenacing,almostflaunting

opennessofourdeployments.TheSovietgovernmentnotedthatweseemedto

shareitsconcernabouttheaggravationofthesituationinJordanandthatwe

“also”(sic)consideredinterventionintotheaffairsofJordanbyotherstatestobe

unacceptable.HavingthusobliquelyarrayedthemselvesagainstSyrian

intervention,theSovietsexpressedthe“hope”—averygentlediplomaticterm—

thatwetoowouldurgesuchacourseonIsrael.Toleavenoambiguitythatitwas

pressingSyriatowithdraw,theSovietnoteadded:“TheSovietgovernment

adherestothesamelineinitscontactswiththegovernmentofSyria.”



SiscoskillfullycompoundedSovietpremonitions,followingourstrategyof

creatingmaximumfearofapossibleAmericanmove.WhenVorontsovasked

whetherJordanhadaskedforourassistance,Siscorepliedthathewasnot

authorizedtodiscussourexchangeswiththeKing.WhenVorontsovinquiredinto

thepurposeofthemovementsoftheSixthFleet,Joesimplytooknoteofthe

question.Altogether,IfoundVorontsov’sdémarcheencouraging.Unlessthe

Sovietsweretrickingus,theyweresayingthattheywerepressingtheradical

governmentinSyriatohaltitsinvasion.Andtrickinguswhileourstrengthinthe

MediterraneanwasgrowingdailyandIsraelwasmobilizingwouldhavebeen

extremelyfoolhardy.



Thiswastheconsensus,too,ofanotherNationalSecurityCouncilmeeting

assembledat6:00p.m.Itconfineditselftofactualbriefingsandconcludedthat

nodecisionwasneededuntilsometimethenextday.



Ithadbeenatensebutpotentiallydecisivetwenty‐fourhours.What

startedoutasanimminentJordaniancollapsewasbeginningtoreverseitself.

ThiswasaboveallDuctothecourageoftheKingandhisloyalarmy.Butitwas

alsobecauseourdeploymentsandassuranceofmaterialsupportwere

strengtheninghisdeterminationwhileinspiringdoubtandthereforehesitation

amonghisadversaries.IwassufficientlyconfidenttotellthePresident,intwo

phoneconversationsashewasretiring,nottocancelatriptotheMediterranean

scheduledtostartthefollowingSunday,September27:“IftheIsraelisdon’tmove

byThursdaythethingwillsettledown.”



TheWSAGmeetingat8:30thenextmorning,Tuesday,September22,

receivedgoodnews.TheJordanians,emboldenedbyourmovesandbythefact

thattheSyrianairforce(underageneralnamedHafezAsad)pointedlystayedout

ofcombat,werebeginningtoattackSyriantanksaroundIrbidfromtheair.The

estimatewasthatSyriahadlost120tanks,60to90toJordanianarms,therestto

technicalmalfunctions.TheIraqiforces— whichhadbeenouroriginalconcern—

stillremainedinactive.EgyptinformedusthattheSovietshadmadeaserious

efforttogetSyriatoreconsideritscourseinJordan.IsraeliforcesontheGolan

Heightscontinuedtoincrease.Withthemilitarysituation stabilizing,SiscoandI

agreedthatweshouldaskRabinonceagainthattherebenoIsraelimilitarymove

withoutpriorconsultation.Atthesametime,tomaintainthepressure,we

increasedourownreadinessfurther.Additionalaircraft,bothfightersand

transports,wereflowntoEurope.Allunifiedcommandswereputonincreased

intelligencealert.Twobattalionsofthe82ndAirborneDivisionwereplacedon

specialsix‐houralert.



MycalendarshowsrepeatedmeetingswiththePresident.AnNSCmeeting

atnoonlastedonlyahalfhourandconcludedwithaPresidentialdecisiontosend

amessageofencouragementandsupporttoHussein.Basically,asItold the

President,wehadreachedthepointwherewehaddoneallthatwaspossible;our

contingencyplanningwasessentiallycompletedforwhateveroptionhechose.

Themaximumpressuresavailable hadbeenassembled;thefinaldecisionwould

dependonhowothersassessedthemandresponded.



Inthecourseoftheafternoonwereceivedtwoanswers,onefromJordan, 

theotherfromIsrael.TheKingwasambivalentaboutIsraeliairstrikesand

negativeaboutIsraeligroundsupport.TheIsraelisinformedusthattheirground

action,ifittookplace,wouldbeconfinedtoJordan(thatis,theywouldnotattack

Syria).Israelalsowantedfurtherclarificationofourintentions—whichreassured

usthatIsraelwasfarfromeagertojumpin.Thetwomessagestendedtocancel

eachotherout.ButbythenthefinalchoicesthatDamascusandMoscowwould

makedependedondeve lopmentsthathadalreadyoccurred—ouraugmentation

andIsraelimobilization.



MyoptimismwasreinforcedbyaconversationwiththeSovietcharge.

Contrarytomyusualpracticeofneverattendingembassyreceptions,Idecidedto

stopbyapartyattheEgyptianmissionontheeveningofSeptember22toshow

thatourpolicywasnotanti‐Arab.Vorontsovexcitedlystoppedmeinfullviewof

manyotherguestsandaskedwhywehadnotrepliedtotheSovietnoteofthe

previousday.I saidthattherewasnothingwecouldaddtowhatwehad

requestedonSunday;Syriantroopswouldhavetowithdraw.Vorontsovaskedif

wewouldconsideritsufficientiftheSyriansstoppedwheretheywere.Iinsisted

ontheirreturntoSyria.Vorontsovthenaffectedtobeconcernedaboutourwell‐

being.Jordan,heaverred,wasnotavitalSovietinterest,butAmerican

interventionwouldcausetheUnitedStatesterribledifficultiesthroughoutthe

Arabworld.“Inthatcase,”Icracked,“youshouldrelaxbecauseyouwineither

way.”



Allthisoccurredwithinthepotentialhearingofotherguests,including

reporters.Obviously, Vorontsovwaseagerforhisviewtobecomeknown.George

ShermanoftheWashingtonStarwrotethenextday:



VorontsovwasunusuallycandidabouttheSovietdesiretohaveSyrianintervention

ended.



HesaidthatSovietcontactswithSyriaarestillnotconcluded.Andunderquestioninghe

pointedlyincludedSyria,aswellasIsraelandtheUnitedStates,inageneralstatementthat“we

believethatthereshouldbenooutsideinterventionofanykind.”



Sovietdiplomatsaroundtheworldweremakingsimilarcomments.The

unsettledquestionwaswhetherthesepressureswouldoperateonDamascus

beforeeventsinJordanimposedtheirownpace.



Inmanagingtheconclusionofanycrisis theproblemisto calibrate

pressurestoproducethemaximumincentiveforsettlementwithoutgivingthe

othersidetheimpressionthatithasnowayofavoidingaconfrontation.

Paradoxically,perhapsthemostcriticalmomentoccurswhentheopponent

appearsreadytosettle;thenitisthenaturaltemptationtorelaxandperhapsto

easetheprocessbyagestureofgoodwill.Thisisalmostalwaysa mistake;the

timeforconciliation isafterthecrisisissurmountedandasettlementormodus

vivendihasinfactbeenreached.Thenmoderationcanbeascribedtogenerosity

andgoodwill;before,itmayabortthehopefulprospectsbyraisinglast‐minute

doubtsastowhetherthecostofsettlementneedinfactbepaid.Stoppingour

militaryactionsinKoreain1951whencease‐firetalksstartedalmostsurely

prolongedthetalks;inret rospectIwouldmakethesameargumentaboutthe

Vietnambombinghaltin1968,thoughIheldadifferentviewatthetime.



ThatiswhyonWednesday,September23,eventhoughaSyrian

withdrawalwasprobable,Ipressedforanaugmentationofourforcesinthe

Mediterranean.September23wouldbecritical.IftheSyrianforcesdidnot

withdraw—if,forexample,theysimplydugin—thepointofmaximumpressure

wouldpass.Israelwouldeitherintervenewiththeattendantconsequencesorwe

wouldbeseentobebluffing.Thenthewarmightstartupagain—orelsethe

Syrianswouldmaintaina“liberatedzone” inJordan,mortgagingtheKing’s

survival.Ithoughtitwisesttostrengthenthebalanceofincentivesuntilweknew

infactthattheSyrianforceshadwithdrawn.Letting upnowwouldsurelyleak

andcouldconveythewrongsignalatacriticalmoment.Fourmoredestroyers

werethereforeauthorizedtoleavetheUnitedStatesfortheMediterranean;two

attacksubmarineswereslatedtopassthroughtheStraitofGibraltaron

September25andSeptember29.ContingencyplanningagainstSoviet

interventioncontinuedattheWSAGmeetinginthemorning.



ThiswastheessenceofadisagreementbetweenRogersandmeatthe

NationalSecurityCouncilmeetinglaterthatmorning.Rogers,withthecrisison

thewaytoresolution,suddenlydiscoveredthatthepledgesofsupportforIsraeli

actionthatthePre sidenthadapprovedtwodaysearlierinhispresencewere

open‐endedcommitmentsandaskedthattheybeformallyrevoked.Itseemedto

methatthiswasnotthetimetogenerateadisputethatwouldsurelyleakand

inevitablyraisequestionsaboutourresolutioninIsraeli,Soviet,andSyrianminds.

TherewastimeenoughtocleartherecordafterwewerecertainthattheSyrian

tankshadwithdrawn.Moreover,wehadindicatedthepreviousdaythatwedid

notfavorunilateralIsraeliaction,andIsraelhadshownnosignofanythingexcept

greatcaution.ThePresidentsupportedmyviewbutaskedSiscotoreiterateour

requesttoRabinnotto actwithoutconsultation.Israelgavethisassurancelater

inthedaywithoutanyqualification.



MyrecordsshowthatthePresidentandImetfivetimesalonebetweenthe

9:30a.m.NSCmeetingand2:50p.m.,themomentwhenwereceivedconclusive

wordthatSyriantankswerewithdrawingfromJordan.



Thereremainedonlythepleasantaftermathofsuccess.Icalledeachofthe

membersoftheWashingtonSpecialActionsGrouptothankthemfortheirsuperb

support.IwasespeciallyappreciativeofJoeSisco’scontribution.Hehadbeenan

indispensablelinkbetweentheStateDepartmentandtheWhiteHouse,in

additiontohandlingthediplomaticmoveswithefficiencyanddispatch.King

HusseinwiredhisgratitudeandadmirationtothePresident.Congressionaland

pressbriefingswerearranged.



EvenAnatolyDobryninshowedupagaininWashingtononThursday,

September24,asiftounderlinethatnormalityhadreturned.Hecalledonmeon

September25,expressingpainthatwehadneverrepliedtotheSovietnoteof

September21.IpointedoutthatduringthecourseoftheyeareverySovietnote

hadbeenfollowedbyanunfriendlyactionincompatiblewithit;hence,wesimply

awaitedevents.DobryninassuredmethattheSovietUnionhadnotknownofthe

SyrianplantoinvadeJordan.Heweakenedhiscaseconsiderablybyreassuringme

thatSovietadvisershadlefttheirSyrianunitsbeforethelatt ercrossedthe

frontier!HesaidpleasantlythattheKremlinwaswillingtoletbygonesbebygones

andwantedtoconsultaboutMiddleEastissues.IevadedthisbysayingIwould

takeitupwiththePresident;inthemeantimeIcouldassurehimthattheUnited

StateswouldnotundertakemilitaryactioninJordanunlessotheroutsideforces

intervened.



Onthatday,too,wesentthefollowingmessagetoIsrael:



Accordingtothelatestavailableinformation,theforceswhichinvadedJordanhave

withdrawntoSyria.WebelievethatthestepsIsraeltookhavecontributedmeasurablytothat

withdrawal.WeappreciatethepromptandpositiveIsraeliresponsetoourapproach.Because

circumstanceswillbedifferentifthereisanotherattack,weconsiderthatallaspectsofthe

exchangesbetweenuswithregardtothisSyrianinvasionofJordanarenolongerapplicable,

andweunderstandthatIsraelagrees.Ifanewsituationarises,therewillhavetobeafresh

exchange.



TheforcesofmoderationintheMiddleEasthadbeenpreserved.TheKing

hadprevailedbyhisowncourageanddecisiveness.Yetthesewouldhavebeenin

vainbutforhisfriendshipwiththeUnitedStates.TheSovietshadbackedoff,

raisingbyanothernotchthegrowingArabdisenchantmentwithMoscow.



TheJordancrisiswasover.Butthereposewasnottolastlong.Within 

forty‐eighthoursofthewithdrawalofSyriantankswefacedanothercrisis—this

timeoveraSovietnavalbaseinCuba.



<<Contents>>



****



XVI



TheAutumnofCrises:

SovietSubmarineBase

AtCienfuegos



AMessagefromMoscow



hroughoutmostofthatcriticalautumnof1970theSovietUnionwas

representedinWashingtonbyaclever,amiable,anddiscreetbutquite

powerlesschargéd’affaires,YuliM.Vorontsov.AmbassadorAnatoly

Dobryninhadbeenrecalledforconsultations.IlearnedlaterthatDobrynin’s

absenceoftenreflectedtheKremlin’sdesirethatnoserioustalkstakeplace—in

thiscaseeven,orperhapsespecially,aboutthesummitwithwhichwewere

toying.Vorontsov’srankwasquitehighbutsuchSovietdiplomatshavelittle

discretion;theyusuallydelivertheirmessageswoodenlyandthencarefullynote

thereply,limitingdiscussiontoafewobviousquestionsandnotventuringto

pretendthattheyhaveanyopinionsoftheirown.ThuswhenVorontsovwas

jovial,onecouldbecertainitwasoninstructions;whenhewasstern,itwasthe

Kremlinthatwasfrowning.

T



AttheendofJulyinSanClementeIreceivedacallfromVorontsov,who

saidhehadamessageformeassoonaspossibleaftermyreturntoWashington;I

assumeditconcernedSovietagreementtothesummit.WemetonAugust4in

myWhiteHouseofficeandVorontsovwasbubblingwithjoviality.Hehadno

wordfromMoscowaboutasummit,whichheknewwasbeingactivelyand

favorablyconsidered;relation sbetweenourcountries,hethought, hadtakena

“goodturn.”Whathehadcometoconveywashisgovernment’sdesireto

reaffirmtheKennedy‐Khrushchevunderstandingof1962withrespecttoCuba:

“WewouldliketostressthatintheCubanquestionweproc eedasbeforefrom

theunderstandingonthisquestionreachedinthepastandweexpectthatthe

Americansidewillalsostrictlyadheretothisunderstanding.”