Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Thenotethenspelledoutfiveactivities,inparticular,whichaccordingto

theunderstandingwouldnotbeundertaken.Inordertoemphasizeour

determination,weheadedit“President’sNote.”

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Dobryninacceptedthedocumentandsaidthathewouldhavetoawait

instructionsfromMoscow.However,hecouldtellmenowthatTASSwouldsoon

publishaformalstatement.ItappearedonOctober13,andrepeatedtheessence

oftheSovietmessageofOctober6.ThespokesmanoftheDepartmentofState

describeditas“positive.”Andsoitwas;submarinesandoffensivemissileson

navalvesselswerenowforthefirsttimeincorporatedintothe1962

understandings.

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AninterestinginsightintotheworkingsoftheSovietmindwasgivenustwo

weekslater.SovietForeignMinisterGromyko,intheUnitedStatesfortheUN

GeneralAssembly,sawthePresidentonOctober22.OnOctober23Ispokewith

DobryninattheSovietmissioninNewYorkbecauseNixonhad notyetgivenup

theefforttoextractsomesummitannouncementbeforetheelection,an

endeavordoomed—luckilyforus—todisappointment.Dobryninbroughtup

Cuba.HesaidthatGromykohadbeenamazedbecausethePresident,after

alludingtoitbriefly,hadneverreturnedtothesubj ect.Naturally,Gromyko

wonderedaboutthereason.Couldwebeplanninganythingnew?Tothe

convoluted,ever‐suspiciousSovietmindthePresident’somissionhadprofoundly

sinisterconnotations.Infact,Nixonhadnotpursuedthesubjectbecausehedid

notwishtogetintothesensitiveKissinger‐Dobryninexchangesinthepresenceof

hisSecretaryofState.IaskedDobryninwhatGromykowouldhaverepliedhad

thePresidentpursuedthesubject.DobryninsaidthatGromykohadbeen

instructedtosaythefollowing:“WedonothaveasubmarinebaseinCubanor

arewebuildingamilitarynavalfacility.Wedonotintendtohaveamilitarynaval

facility,andwewillabidestrictlybyourunderstandingsof1962.Wearealso

makingtheexchangesfromAugustonwardpartoftheunderstandingof1962.”

Dobryninaddedthatourlistofexcludedactivitiescouldnotbeaformal

agreementbecauseitlackedreciprocity,buttheSovietUnionundersto odwhat

wemeantbyabase.Inotherwords,the“President’sNote”becamepartofthe

understanding.

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ButnothingwiththeSovietseverworksthissimply.TheSovietsubmarine

tenderandsalvagetug,accompaniedbyfourmerchantshipsandfiveCuban

patrolcraft,indeedleftCienfuegosonOctober10.OnOctober15,however,they

turnedinattheCubanportofMariel,ontheNortherncoastofCuba.Theydid

notdepartfromMarieluntilOctober31;then,afterheadinginanEasterly

direction,theyroundedtheislandagainandarrivedonceagaininCienfuegoson

November7.

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IprotestedangrilytoDobryninonNovember14.OnNovember24the

ubiquitousVorontsovtoldajournalistthatitwasthetaskofatendertotend

submarines,andthiswaswhatitwoulddo,thoughatsea.OnDecember22Itold

DobryninthatservicingsubmarinesinorfromCubanportswould“leadtothe

mostgravesituationbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.”On

January4,1971,thePresidentreinforcedthisbystatinginatelevisioninterview:

“IntheeventthatnuclearsubmarineswereservicedeitherinCubaorfromCuba,

thatwouldbeaviol ationoftheunderstanding.”OnJanuary5theWhiteHouse

elaboratedonthisstatement,stressingthatservicingofsubmarines“anywhereat

sea”fromtendersoperatingfromCubawasbarred.

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ThetenderquittheCaribbeanonJanuary3,1971—onlytobereplacedbya

secondtenderthatarrivedinCubaonFebruary14withanotherSovietnavaltask

force,includinganuclear‐poweredattacksubmarine.IprotestedthistoDobrynin

onthreeoccasionsand,afteraWSAGmeeting,handedhimanoteonFebruary22

sayingthatthepresenceofatenderinCienfuegosfor125ofthelast166days

wasinconsistentwiththeunderstanding.Thetenderandsubmarineleft.Butyet

anotherSovietflotillareturnedinMay,thistimewithatenderandanuclear‐

poweredcruise‐missilesubmarineona“trainingvoyage,”makinga“briefrest”

visit.ObviouslytheSovietsthoughttherewasaloopholeinportvisits,andwere

exploitingitmercilessly.Everyconceivablecombinationwasbeing tried—except

themostimportantone,thepresenceofatenderinconjunctionwithanuclear‐

poweredballisticmissilesubmarine.



Welodgedanothersharpprotest.Thetenderleftoncemore.

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Allthis,itmustberemembered,washandledalmostentirelybyprivate

diplomacy.TheprocesswasessentiallyaseriesofmessagesinthePresidential

Channel,backstoppedbyinteragencycoordinationintheWSAG.Ratherthana

dramaticconfrontationontheorderof1962,weconsideredthatquietdiplomacy

wasbestsuitedtogivingtheUSSRanopportunitytowithdrawwithout

humiliation.Bygreatfirmnessintheearlystagesofconstruction,weavoideda

majorcrisis,yetweachievedourobjective.Militaryconstructionwashalted;the

antiaircraftemplacementsweredismantled;thecommunicationfacilitynever

becameoperational.AdmiralThomasMoorer,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsof

Staff,wasabletotelltheEconomicClubofDetroitonNovember9,1970,thatthe

SovietUniondidnothaveasubmarinebaseinCuba.

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Tobesure,theSovietsharassedusforawhilelongerthroughtheloo phole

ofportvisits.Butwithoutshorefacilities,portcallsarestrategicallyineffective.

Andformallyproscribingportcallswouldhavewidespreadramificationsforthe

movementoftheUSNavyandourprincipleoffreedomoftheseas.What

concernedusinCubain1970wasanexpansionoftheSovietUnion’sballistic 

missilesubmarinecapabilityagainsttheUnitedStatesbyvirtueofabaseinthe

Caribbean.Thiswasprevented.

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Wecouldnotforget,ofcourse,thedeceptionthathadbeenattempted.

NorwouldwebeoblivioustotherealitythatSovietrestraint,whenitwas

achieved,resultedonlyfromourforcingoftheissueanddeterminedpersistence.

TheNixonAdministrationhadtoldMoscowmanytimesthatwewereprepared

foraperiodofmutualrestra intandconciliation. Intheautumnof1970Moscow

chosetotestwhetherthiswillingnessreflectedindecision,domesticweakness

duetoVietnam,orthestrategyofaseriousgovernment.Havingbeengiventhe

answer,MoscowpermittedCienfuegostorecedeoncemoreintowell‐deserved

obscurity.

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<<Contents>>

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XVII

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TheAutumnofCrises:Chile

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nSeptember4,1970,SalvadorAllendeGossensachievedapluralityinthe

Chileanpresidentialelection,withabare36.2percentofthepopular

vote,leadingthenextcandidateinathree‐manfieldby39,000votes.

Ironically,thiswasadeclinefromthe38.9percenthehadreceivedinthe1964

electionswhenhehadlosttoEduardoFreiMontalva. Butin1970thepopularFrei

wasbarredbylawfromsucceedinghimself,andtheevenhigheranti‐Allendevote

(62.7percent)wassplitbetwe entwocandidates.TheChileanCongresswould

holdarunoffvoteasrequiredwhennocandidate receivedanelectoralmajority.

Traditionally,itbackedthecandidatewhoreceivedtheplurality;itwasexpected

todosointhiscaseandnameSalvadorAllendePresidentofChile.



EdwardKorry,ourAmbassadorinChilesince1967andoriginallyaKennedy

appointee,reported:



ChilevotedcalmlytohaveaMarxist‐Leniniststate,thefirstnationintheworldtomake

thischoicefreelyandknowingly…Hismarginisonlyaboutonepercentbutitislargeenoughin

theChileanconstitutionalframeworktonaildownhistriumphasfinal.Thereisnoreasonto

believethattheChileanarmedforceswillunleashacivilwarorthatanyotherintervening

miraclewillundohisvictory.ItisasadfactthatChilehastakenthepathtocommunismwith

onlyalittlemorethanathird(36percent)ofthenationapprovingthischoice,butitisan

immutablefact.Itwillhavethe mostprofoundeffectonLatinAmericaandbeyond;wehave

sufferedagrievousdefeat;theconsequenceswillbedomesticandinternational;the

repercussionswillhaveimmediateimpactinsomelandsanddelayedeffectinothers.



TheitalicizedsentenceswereunderlinedbyNixonwhenIsenthimKorry’s

report.Korrywasconvincedthat“ChilealoneintheWesternanddemocratic

worldhadtheobjectiveconditions topermitauniqueconstitutionaltransitionto

acommuniststatebyanAllendegovernment.”Hecitedthestrengthand

organizationoftheMarxistparties,theextensivepowersofthepresidencyin

Chile,thealreadyadvancedandgrowingtrendtowardstateinterventioninthe

economicsector,andthedisarrayamongthedemocraticforcesinChile.



TheChileanelectionresultscameinjustasMoscowandCairowere

rejectingourprotestsofMiddleEastcease‐fireviolations;Jordanfearedan

imminentmovebyIraqitroopsagainsttheKing;aSovietnavalforcewas

steamingtowardCuba.BySeptember8,thedaytheChileandevelopmentswere

firstdiscussedbyaninteragencycommittee,severalairplaneshadjustbeen

hijackedintheMiddleEastandtheSovietflotillawasnearingtheportof

Cienfuegos.Sixdayslater,onSe ptember14,whenChilewasnextconsidered,the

Jordansituationhaddeteriorated,andCubanMiGsinterceptedaU‐2flight

seekingtophotographCienfuegosandthemissionhadtobeaborted.Inthe

weeksthatfollowed,ourgovernmentponderedChileaneventsnotinisolation

butagainstthebackdro poftheSyrianinvasionofJordanandourefforttoforce

theSovietUniontodismantle itsinstallationforservicingnuclearsubmarinesin

theCaribbean.Thereactionmustbeseeninthatcontext.



Inanycircumstances,Allende’selectionwasachallengetoournational

interest.WedidnotfinditeasytoreconcileourselvestoasecondCommunist

stateintheWesternHemisphere.Wewerepersuadedthatitwouldsoonbe

incitinganti‐Americanpolicies,attackinghemispheresolidarity,makingcommon

causewithCuba,andsoonerorlaterestablishingcloserelationswiththeSoviet

Union.AndthiswasallthemorepainfulbecauseAllenderepresentedabreak

withChile’slongdemocratichistoryandwouldbecomePresidentnotthroughan

authenticexpressionofmajoritywillbutthroughaflukeoftheChileanpolitical

system.Thirty‐sixpercentofthepopularvotewashardlyamandateforthe

irreversibletransformationofChile’spoliticalandeconomicinstitutionsthat

Allendewasdeterminedtoeffect.



TwopreviousAmericanadministrationshadcometothesameconclusion.

TwoadministrationshadjudgedthatanAllendegovernmentinChilewouldbe

againstfundamentalAmericannationalinterests.Ourconclusionin1970was

substantiallythesame.



<<Contents>>



****



SalvadorAllende



llende’slatermartyrdomhasobscuredhispolitics.Socialistthoughhemay

haveproclaimedhimself,hisgoalsandhisphilosophyborenoresemblance

toEuropeansocialdemocracy.AllendehadfoundedtheSocialistPartyofChile,

whichsetitselfapartfromtheCommunistPartybybeingmoreradicalinits

programandnomoredemocraticinitsphilosophy.Hewaswillingenoughto

cometopowerbyanelectionbeforeundertakingtherevo lution;butthesocial

andpoliticaltransformationhepromisedafterwarddidnotdiffersignificantly

fromtheCommunistplatform.Itwasacentraltenetoftheparty’sprogramthat

“bourgeois”democraticpracticeswouldbemadeirrelevant;bydefinitionhis

wouldbethelastdemocraticelection.



Inanycase,AllendewasthecandidateofacoalitionoftheCommunist 

PartyandhisownSocialistParty,calledPopularUnity;itwasjoinedbyother

radicalsplinterparties.TheprogramofPopularUnitypledgedtodestroythe

presentsystemandbringabout“revolutionary”and“profound”changes;it

denounced“imperialistexploitation”andthe“Americanmonopolies.”Itcalledfor

wholesaleexpropriationofland,basicindustries,andthecommercialandbanking

system,andfora“radicallytransformed”educationalsystemanda“national

systemtopromotepopularculture.”MajorportionsofthePopularUnityprogram

weredrawnverbatimfromtheplatformoftheChileanCommunistParty,

whose

subserviencetotheMoscowlinewasshownbythefactthatitwasoneofthefew

CommunistpartiesoutsideofEasternEuropetowelcometheSovietinvasionof

Czechoslovakia.AmongtheplanksborrowedfromtheCommunistswasone

callingforaunicamerallegislatureandforsubordinationofthejudiciarytothis

“PopularAssembly”;thepurposewastobreakdownthetraditiona lchecksand

balancesandseparationofpowersprovidedbytheChileanconstitution’s

bicamerallegislatureandindependentjudiciary. TheSocialistParty’scontribution

totheprogramofthePopularUnityincludedthepassagesopposing

“imperialism,”condemningAmerican“aggression”inVietnam,callingfor“active

solidarity”withNorthVietnam,anddeclaring“solidaritywiththeCuban

Revolution,whichisthevanguardofrevolutionandconstructionofsocialismin

LatinAmerica.”AnothernotablepassagedenouncedtheOrganizationof

AmericanStatesasan“agentandtoolofAmericanimperialism.”



In1967AllendehadbeenoneofthefoundersoftheOrganizationofLatin

AmericanSolidarity,aHavana‐basedgroupwhosepoliticalcreed,inthewordsof

RégisDebray,anidolatrouschroniclerofrevolutions,was“basedonthe

conceptionofcontinentalarmedstruggleagainstNorthAmericanimperialism.Its

basicfunctionsaresolidaritywith,coordinationof,andsupportfornational

liberationstrugglesthroughoutthecontinent.Thedeclarationoftheclosing

sessionoftheconferencemadeafrontalattackonthereformistpositionsof

someoftheleft‐wingpartiesinLatinAmerica,pointingoutthat‘therevolutionary

armedstruggleconstitutesthefundamentallinefortheLatinAmerican

revolution.’“

Duringtheelectioncampaignof1970,Allendestatedashis

personalconviction:“CubaintheCaribbeanandaSocialistChileintheSouthern

conewillmaketherevolutioninLatinAmerica.”



Indeed,thereisnoepithetthatAllendewouldhaverejectedmore

indignantlythanthenotionthathewasademocraticreformer.Oneshouldnot

needlesslyinsulttheintegrityofamanwhospenthislifededicatedtorevolution

byclaiminghimtobesomethinghealwaysemphaticallydenied.Inhis1971

conversationswithRégisDebray—atatimewhenhewas,infact,the

constitutionalPresidentofChile—heinsistedthatthedemocraticguaranteesto

whichhehadagreedin1970inordertopersuadetheChileanCongresstoratify

hiselectionandthemilitarytoaccepthisaccessiontoofficewerea“tactical

necessity”

thatdidnotaffecthisbasiccommitmenttoarevolutionaryupheaval:

“AtthetimetheimportantthingwastotakecontrolofGovernment,”

Allende

pointedout.HecomparedthistacticwithMaoTse‐tung’sdecisiontopermit

privateenterpriseforafewyearsaftertheChineseCommuniststookpowerin

1949orwithFidelCastro’srestraintwithrespecttoGuantanamo.



TheonlyinferenceonecandrawisthatthedemocraticguaranteesAllende

acceptedreluctantlyand,byhisownaccount,forthesakeoftemporary

expediencywouldbedismantledatthefirstopportunity.Heexplicitly

distinguishedhisgovernmentfromtheearlierPopularFrontgovernmentinChile

(likethoseinEuropeinthe1930s),whichhadincludeddemocraticparties;these

hedisparagedas“bourgeois.”

“InthePopularFront,Regis,”hesaidtoDebrayin

1971,“therewasadominantParty,amajorityparty,thepartyofthebourgeoisie,

theRadicalParty.Today,thereisnodominantpartyinthePopularUnity,but

therearetwopartiesoftheworkingclass,revolut ionaryparties,Marxistparties.

Finallycomrade,thePresidentoftheRepublicisasocialist.Thingsaredifferent,

then,andIhavereachedthisofficeinordertobringabouttheeconomicand

socialtransformationofChile,toopenuptheroadtosocialism.Ourobjectiveis

total,scientific,Marxistsocialism.”



Debray,stillunconvinced,asked,“Whoisusingwho?Whoistakingwhofor

aride?”Allendereplied:“Theansweristheproletariat.Ifitwasn’tso,Iwouldn’t

behere.”

AtanotherpointAllendeexpostulated:“AsforthebourgeoisStateat

thepresentmoment,weareseekingtoovercomeit.Tooverthrowit!”



WhatworriedusaboutAllendewashisproclaimedhostilitytotheUnited

StatesandhispatentintentiontocreateineffectanotherCuba.Itwashisexplicit

programandindeedlong‐standinggoaltoestablishanirreversibledictatorship

andapermanentchallengetoourpositionintheWesternHemisphere.Andin

themonthofCienfuegositwasnotabsurdtotakeseriouslythemilitary

implicationsofanotherSovietallyinLatinAmerica.OurconcernwithAllendewas

basedonnationalsecurity,notoneconomics.



NationalizationofAmerican‐ownedpropertywasnottheissue.Wenever

challengedtheprincipleofinternationallawthatpermitsnationalizationfor

publicpurposes,althoughwedidemphasizeourinterestinprompt,adequate,

andeffectivecompensation(alsorequiredbyinternationallaw).Everypostwar

administrationintheUnitedStateshadsoughttodiscouragetheexpropriationof

foreigncompaniesbythedevelopingnationsand,wherenationalizationwas

unavoidable,toencourageitsbeingdoneinawaythatlimitedtheadverseim pact

onthegeneralinvestmentclimate.ThereexistedaCongressionalmandate,

moreover,toterminateeconomicassistanceundertheForeignAssistanceActof

1961ifAmericanpropertywasexpropriatedwithoutcompensation(the

HickenlooperAmendment).



Butwehadtakengreatpainsnottolettheexpropriationissueinterfere

withtheforeignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStates.Thus,inChilein1969,

beforeAllende,AmbassadorKorryhadcooperatedinwhatamountedtothe

negotiatednationalizationoftheAnacondaCompany.AndwithPeruthatsame

year,theNixonAdministrationstretchedourlegislationalmosttothebreaking

pointtoreachanequita blesettlementofthenationalizationoftheInternational

PetroleumCompany’smining operationswithouthavingtoinvokerestrictive

legislation.Werepe atedlysought pretextstopostponeapplicationofthe

HickenlooperAmendmentandmadeclearthatwewerepreparedtoaccepta

compensatorypaymentforIPCoflessthanfullvalue,soastomaintainfriendly

relationswithanimportantcountry—eventhoughPeruwasgoverne dbyaleft‐

wingmilitaryjuntathatwasaggressivelynationalist icandleaningtowardthe

moreradicalelementsoftheThirdWorld.Afterpa tientandsustainedefforts,we

workedoutamodusvivendiwiththePeruviangovernment.



ThechallengetoourpolicyandinterestsposedbyAllendewas

fundamentallydifferent.Hewasnotjustnationalizingproperty;heavowedhis

dedicationtototalitarianMarxism‐Leninism.HewasanadmireroftheCuban

dictatorshipandaresoluteopponent of“Americanimperialism.”Hisstatedgoal

foroveradecadebeforehebecamePresidenthadbeentoundermineour

positionintheentireWesternHemispherebyviolenceifnecessary.Beca useit

wasacontinentalcountry,Chile’scapacityfordoingsowasgreaterbyfarthan

Cuba’s,andCubahadalreadyposedasubstantialchallenge;infact,wewerein

themidstoftheconfrontationoverCienfuegoswhenAllendewaselected.Chile

borderedArgentina,Peru,andBolivia,allplaguedbyradicalmovements.

Allende’ssuccesswouldhavehadimplicationsalsoforthefutureofCommunist

partiesinWesternEurope,whosepolicieswouldinevitablyunderminethe

WesternAlliancewhatevertheirfluctuatingclaimsofrespectability.No

responsiblePresidentcouldlookatAllende’saccessiontopowerwithanything

butdisquiet.



TherewasnodisputeinourgovernmentaboutwhatAllendestoodfor.No

onechallengedKorry’sfirstcablepredictingtheconsequencesofAllende’s

election.Theonlydisagreementconcerne dAllende’scapacitytoachievehisaims

inthefaceofindigenousresistance,andwhattheUnitedStatescoulddoaboutit

ifKorry’spredictioncametrue.



<<Contents>>



****



InfluenceandIntervention:The40Committee



hetherandtowhatextenttheUnitedStatesshouldseektoaffectdomestic

developmentsinothercountriesisacomplicatedquestion,theanswerto

whichdependsonavarietyofelements,includingone’sconceptionofthe

nationalinterest.Presidentsofbothpart ieshavefelttheneedforcovert

operationsinthegrayareabetweenformaldiplomacyandmilitaryintervention

throughoutthepos twarperiod.Ifinditdistastefultodiscusscovertoperationsin

print.ButthematerialhasalreadybeenpublishedbytheSenateSelect

CommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligence

Activities(theso‐calledChurchCommittee)inatendentiousreportin1975on

Chile.Thereisnoevidencethattheauthorsofthereporttriedtoweighthe

concernsaboutanAllendevictorythatwefeltsoacutelyatthetime.



Itisironicalthatsomeofthosewhowerevociferousincondemningwhat

theycalled“intervention”inChilehavebeenmostinsistentongovernmental

pressureagainstAllende’ssuccessors.TherestrictionsonAmericanaidtoChile

havebeenfarmoresevereagainstthepost‐Allendegovernmentthanduring

Allende’stermofoffice.Themeasureshaveadmittedlybeenovertbutovertness

doesnotchangetheinconsistencywiththeprincipleagainstoutsideintervention

onwhichatleastpartoftheassaultoncovertoperationswasbased.

Paradoxically,Americaninterventioninthedomesticaffairsofothercountrieshas

multipliedandbecomelessdiscriminatingsincethecovertoperationsoftheCIA

havecomeunderattack.Theearlier“ColdWar”periodofCIAactivitiesobserved

certainlimits:Itscriteriawereforeignpolicyandnationalsecuritydangerstothe

UnitedStates,ofwhichtherewerenotthatmany.Thenewdoctrinejustifies

unlimitedinterventiontopromoteinternalchangeincountriesthatareboth

friendandfoe;ithasbeendirectedagainstcountriesthatdonotthreatenour

nationalsecurityandthatmayindeedbealliesoftheUnitedStates.



Ofcourse,covertoperationshavetheirphilosophicalandpractical

difficultiesandespeciallyforAmerica.Ournationaltemperamentandtradition

areunsuitedtothem.Oursystemofgovernmentdoesnotlenditself

spontaneouslytoeitherthesecrecyorsubtletythatisrequired.Welack the

elaborateconspiratorialapparatusofouradversaries.Thoseeagertodis mantle

ourintelligenceapparatuswillhavelittle difficultyfindingexamplesofactions

thatwereamateurishortransparent.Butthemenandwomenwhohavebeen

preparedtocarryoutassignmentsinsecret,withresourcesusuallyridiculously

inferiortothoseofouradversaries,underinhibitingrestrictions,deservebetterof

theircountrythanthemercilessassaulttowhichtheyhavebeenexposed—

assaultsthatthreatentoleaveusnakedinavitalareaofournationalsecurity.For

wefaceanunprecedentedproblem.Weliveinanageofideological