Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Despitetheoptimisticpolls—whichattheJune27meetingstillweresaidto

showacomfortablemarginforAlessandri—Iwasbecomingincreasinglyuneasy.

Accordingly,inlateJulyIissuedadirectivetoanalyzeouroptionsincaseAllende

wonindefianceofallpredictions.Irequestedurgentanswerstothefollowing

questions:



1. WhatpoliciesandgoalsisanAllendeadministrationlikelytoespouse?What

probablealternativecoursesaredevelopmentsinChilelikelytotakeunderan

Allendegovernment?



2. WhatisthenatureanddegreeofthreattoU.S.interestsofthesealternatives,both

inimmediatetermsandintermsofimpactonourlong‐rangegoalsandposition?



3. WhatoptionsareopentotheU.S.tomeettheseproblems?



Meanwhile,the40CommitteemetagainonAugust7toreviewChilean

developmentsandreaffirmeditsdecisionofJune27.Itwasnowtooclosetothe

electionforanydecisiontomakeadifference.Theonlyissuewaswhether

exploratorycontactswiththeChileanCongressshouldbeauthorizedincase

PhaseIIwasrequired.Therisk sofexposureseemedtooutweighthemarginal

benefitsandthedecisionwasheldinabeyance.



Sincemypolicyquestionsdidnotinvolvecovertoperations,theywere

consideredbytheSeniorReviewGroup,whichasIhavealreadypointedouthad

thesamemembershipasthe40CommitteeexceptfortheAttorneyGeneral.Staff

memberswerepermittedtoattendandpapersweremuchmorewidely

circulated.Theresponseto myrequestwasapaperpreparedbyaninteragency

groupchairedbytheDepartmentofState.Itsconclusionsreflectedastrange

ambivalence.Ontheonehand, itstatedthattheUnitedStateshadnovital

nationalinterests“withinChile.”Themeaningof“withinChile,”however,wasnot

otherwiseexplained;norwastheconclusionsupportedbythesubsequent

analysis.ForinansweringmyquestionofwhatthreatAllende’saccessionmight

posetoAmericaninterestsinthehemisphere,theinteragencygroupcameup

withaconclusionwhichassummarizedbymystaffmadeitdifficulttounde rstand

howournationalinterestwasnotaffected:



AnentrenchedAllendeGovernmentwouldcreateconsiderablepolitical

andpsychologicallossestotheU.S.:



(a)hemisphericcohesionwouldbethreatened;



(b)asourceofanti‐U.S.policywouldbeconsolidatedinthehemisphere;



(c)U.S.prestigeandinfluencewouldbesetbackwithacorrespondingboostforthe

USSRandMarxism.[AmbassadorKorryhadnoillusionsabouttheconsequencesofan

Allendevictory.Respondingtoaquerywhetheramodusvivendimightprovepossible,

hereplied:“Aconsciousefforttoworkoutmodusvivendiisatheoreticalhypothesis

withoutrelationtoreality.WhileAllendegovernmentwouldmoveinternallywithinitial

prudencetoseektomaintainaframeworkofconstitutionalityandlegality,itwouldbe

committed,asAllendehasstated,topoliciesthattreatedUSimperialismas‘public

enemynumberone’inthehemisphere.Asidefrom[specificactionsincluding

nationalizationofUSindustries,recognitionofCuba,NorthVietnam,etc.]whichin

themselveswouldmakeamodusvivendiapracticalimpossibilityfortheUS,the

profoundchangesinthestructureofChilewouldprobablynecessitateanexternal

‘enemy’tojustifyanacceleratingrevolution…TheAllendeforcescannotescapethe

conclusionthatifheisinauguratedtheUnitedStateshasadmitteditsimpotence.”]



TheSeniorReviewGroupmetonAugust19,butnoconclusionswere

reachedorindeedcouldbereacheduntiltheelectionofSeptember4.Wecould

onlywaitwithgrowingforebodingfortheChileanvoterstogotothepolls.



Ihavediscussedourgovernment’sdeliberationsatsuchlengthbecause

theyhavebeensubstantiallyneglectedinpreviousinvestigationsofthesubject—

perhapsbecausetheyrunsocountertopreconceivedconclusions.Theyleaveno

doubtthattheUnitedStatesactedinonlythemostminimalandineffectual

fashionpriortotheChileanelection.Notonlywerethefundsinsufficienttohave

anysignificantimpact,theinsistenceonnotsupportingthesolecandidatewitha

chanceofdefeatingAllendecausedustodividetheresourcesinawaythat

probablyincreasedthefragmentationoftheanti‐Allendevote.Therewas

reluctancetobecomeinvolvedandevengreaterresistancetothepossibilityof

beingidentifiedwithacandidateofimpeccabledemocraticantecedentswhose

principalliabilityintheeyesofourbureaucracywasthathewasconservative.

(Thatthisopinioncouldbeheldatall—muchlesspreva il—inaNixon

AdministrationshowsonceagainhowdifficultitisevenforaPresidenttoimpose

hisviewsontheentrenchedbureaucracy.)



Bythetimeoftheelection,IhadcometotheviewthatI hadbeen

maneuveredintoapositionincompatiblewithmyconvictions—and,more

important,thoseofNixon.HadIbelievedinthespringandsummerof1970that

therewasasignificantlikelihoodofanAllendevictory,Iwouldhavehadan

obligationtothePresidenttogivehimanopportunitytoconsideracovert

programof1964proportions,includingthebackingofasinglecandidate.Iwas

resentfulthatthisoptionhadbeenforeclosedwithoutevenbeingdiscussed,first

withtheargumentthatasubstantialprogramwasunnecessaryandlaterbecause

itwasthentoolate.IftheunanimousanalysissubmittedtotheSeniorReview

GrouponAugust19spellingouttheimplicationsofanAllendevictorywaseven

partiallycorrect,thefailure toexamineotheroptionsearlierwasinexcusable.The

philosophicalbiasofourbureaucracy,theconfusionbetweeneconomic

developmentandforeignpolicyobjectives,hadproducedparalysis.Theprevalent

viewinourgovernmentwasapparentlythatitwasacceptableforaradical

candidatetoreceivesubstantialfundsfromCubaandotherCommunistsources,

butimproperfortheUnitedStatestoassistthedemocraticcandidatewiththe

bestchanceofsuccess,evenifhisprogramwaslessreformistthanso memight

havewished.AsIlatersummedupforthePresident:



TheneteffectoftheStateDepartment’spositionwasthatnothingcouldbedoneto

stopAllendeifitmeantstrengtheningAlessandri.Inviewofthefactthattheelectioncame

downtoaverycloseracebetweenAllendeandAlessandri,withtheChristianDemocratTomic

trailingfarbehind,theStatepositionagainststrengtheningAlessandrineutralizedus.Whileitis

notcertainthatalesscircumscribedcovertactionprogramwouldhavegiventhemarginalvic‐

torytoAlessandri,Helmsfeelstheoddsforsuccessofanexpandedprogramwouldhavebeen

reasonablyfavorable.AnAlessandrivictorymighthavepresentedsomeproblemsforus,butit

clearlywouldnothavebeenasthreateningtoourinterestsasAllende’svictory;ataminimum,

theseriousproblemswenowfaceindealingwithaMarxistGovernmentinChilecouldhave

beenpostponedforperhapssixyears.



AnyfairassessmentofourlaterconductregardingChilemuststartwith

thisprologue.



<<Contents>>

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****



TheCoupThatNeverWas



ntheelectionofSeptember4,1970,asalreadynoted,Allende’spercentage

wasadeclinefromthepercentagehehadreceivedin1964whenhelosttoFrei,

exceptthatin1970theevenhigheranti‐Allendevotewashopelesslysplit.

AccordingtoChile’sconstitution,sincenocandidatehadreceivedamajority,the

Congressinjointsessionwoulddecidebetweenthetoptwocandidatesfiftydays

later,onOctober24.



Maneuveringforthecongressionalrunoffbeganimmediately.On

September5,Allendeatapressconferencehailedhisvictoryandpledgedto

enacttheradicalPopularUnityprogramonwhichhehadcampaigned.Butto

easecongressionalfearshebegantotrimsomeofhispledges.Heasserte dthat

hewould“never”favoraone‐partysysteminChile;hesaidhewouldretain

ChileanmembershipintheOAS(despitethecommitment inthePopularUnity

programto“denounce”theorganization);healsoannouncedhewouldaskfora

reschedulingofChile’soutstandingdebtof$800milliontotheUnitedStates.(He

explainedlatertoRégisDebraythathestayedintheOAStoneutralizeAmerican

reactionswhilehisrealconvictionslaywiththerevolutionaryHavana‐based

OrganizationofLatinAmericanSolidarity,whichhehadhelpedfound.)

Nextday

Alessandri’ssupportersindicatedthattheywouldnotaccepttheAllendevictory;

buttheirstatementwasnotsignedbyAlessandri,whohaddeclaredduringthe

campaignthathewouldrecognizethecandidatewinningthemostvotes.On

September7,Allendemetwith PresidentFrei,whoagreedtosetupa

consultationarrangementwithAllende(ashedidalsowithAlessandri)on

economicmatters.WhilerefusingAllende’srequestforasimilarliaisonon

politicalmatters,Freididagreetotakemeasuresaimedatpreventingeconomic

panicinChile.



ThereactioninWashington,whereduringthesummereveryonehadtaken

refugeinconsolingpolls,wasstunnedsurprise.Officialstendtoreactto

unpleasantprospectsbyignoringtheminthehopethattheywillgoaway.And

frequentlytheydo;notallcatastrophespredicteddoinfactoccur.Butwhen

conventionalwisdomencouragesinaction,itleavesnomarginfortheirrevocable.

AnditwastheirrevocablethatloomedbeforeussounexpectedlyinSeptember

1970.



Nixonwasbesidehimself.ForoveradecadehehadlambastedDemocratic

administrationsforpermittingtheestablishmentofCommunistpowerinCuba.

Andnowwhatheperceived—notwrongly—asanotherCubahadcomeintobeing

duringhisownAdministrationwithouthishavingbeengiventheopportunityto

makeadecision.Thisexplainsthevirulenceofhisreactionandhisinsistenceon

doingsomething,anything,thatwouldreversethepreviousneglect. Sincehe

blamedtheStateDepartmentandtheAmbassador(incorrectlyinthelattercase)

fortheexistingstateofaffairs,hesoughtasmuchaspossibletocircumventthe

bureaucracy.Thatattitudewas,infact,quiteunnecessary.For nowthatitwas

nearlytoolate,allagenciesthrewthemselvesintoafrenziedreassessment.Some

feltrathersheepishabouttheirearliersanguineevaluationsorprocrastinations;

allfeltfrustrated;nowatlasttherewasunanimitythatsomethingshouldbe

done—spurredonbyalikewisedeterminedPresident.Unfortunately,itwasnow

verylate.AfractionoftheeffortbehindonecandidatebeforeSeptember4might

wellhavepreventedthenewsituation.Nowwewereforcedtoimprovisewhile

beingconfrontedbyatightdeadlineandwithnorealpreparations.Withtime

runningoutouractionswereinevitablyfrantic.[

MyinteresthereisindiscussingWhite

Houseknowledge,attitudes,decisions,andparticipations—nottogiveacompleteaccountof

alltheCIAcommunications.Ifindpublicationofthe40Committeedeliberationsagainstthe

publicinterest.Unfortunately,allthe40Committeedocumentsreferredtoherehavealready

beenpublishedbytheChurchCommittee.]



Whenthe40CommitteemetonSeptember8toconsiderChile,itwas

apparentthatacongressionaldecisionagainstAllendewasunlikely—afterall,we

hadbeenconcernedonlyfourweeksbeforethattheCongressmightvotefor

AllendeevenifAless andrigainedaplurality.Itwasnotabsurdtohopethatthe

ChileanCongressmightexerciseitsindependentchoiceanddenythepresidency

toaminoritycandidatewitharadical,almostcertainlyantidemocratic,program

whentherewasstillanoverwhelmingmoderatemajorityinthecountr y. Butwe

knewthistobeunlikely.Withoutrealconvictionwedecidedtoinstruct

AmbassadorKorrytopreparea“cold‐bloodedassessme nt” ofthelikelihoodand

feasibilityofamilitarycoupandoftheprosandconsinvolvedin“organizingan

effectivefutureChileanoppositiontoAllende.”



ThepossibilitythatAllendecouldbestoppedreceivednewlifewhenon

September9Alessandriannouncedthathewouldnotwithdrawfromthe

congressionalraceafterall.HeannouncedthatifelectedbytheCongress,he

wouldresignandforcenewelections,whichcouldthenrepeatthe1964contest

betweenFreiandAllende.Anotherpresidencyhavingintervened,however

briefly,Freiwouldbeconstitutionallyeligibletorun.Hewouldalmost certainly

win.Asforthemilitary,onSeptember10thearmyCommander‐in‐Chief,General

ReneSchneider,reportedlytoldagroupofChileanofficersthatthearmywould

notinterveneintheelectoralprocess.Thearmywould,however,demand

“guarantees”fromAllendethatitwouldremainafullyprofessionalinstitution

andnotbepoliticized.AmbassadorKorryreportedhisownconvictionthatsuch

guaranteeswouldbevirtuallyworthless.



Ihadscheduleda40CommitteemeetingforSeptember14.OnSeptember

12,atthePresident’srequest,IsolicitedbybackchannelKorry’scandid

recommendationsasto“feasiblecoursesofaction availabletotheUSinthe

presentcircumstances.”Nixonwasincreasinglyrestiveaboutwhatheconsidered

bureaucraticfoot‐draggingandaStateDepartmentpropensitytodobusinessas

usual,whichremindedhimofwhathealwaysconsideredourearlycomplacency

towardCastro.(Thiswasinfactunjust.WhatevertheStateDepartment’s

procrastinationbeforetheChileanelection,itstronglysupportedandactively

implementedeachsubsequent40Committeedecision.)Korryresponded

hopefully.FreiwasreportedtobealarmedbytheprospectofanAllendetakeover

andinterestedinpossiblewaystoavertit.[

Freihassinceemphaticallydeniedthathe

wouldhavelenthimselftoanycircumventionoftheChileanconstitution.Korry’sinformation

camefromFrei’slieutenants,whomaywellhaveactedontheirownauthority.Weatanyrate

hadtoactonthebasisofwhatourEmbassyconsideredtobethefacts.]AmbassadorKorry

suggestedtomeadeepbackgrounderbyahighofficialinWashingtontobring

thefactsonChiletotheAmericanpublicandtoconveytohesitantChileansthe

depthofourconcern.



OnSeptember14the40Committeeconsideredwhatwehadbynow

nicknamedthe“RubeGoldberg” gambit:theelectionandsubsequentresignation

ofAlessandri,leavingFreiconstitutionallyfreetorunagaininanimmediate

specialelection.ItwasagreedtoauthorizeKorrytoexplorethispossibilityandto

setaside$250,000forprojectsinsupportofit.OnSeptember15Korrywastold

ofthisdecisionbycablefromUnderSecretaryofStateAlexisJohnson;hewas

alsoaskedtointensifycontactsbyallappropriatemembersofhisEmbassywith

theChileanmilitary“forthepurposeofassuringourselvesthatwehavetherequi‐

siteintelligencetoenableindependentassessmentofthemilitarydetermination

tobacktheFreireelectiongambit.”



OnSeptember16—thedayonwhichwewereinformedthatKingHussein

wasabouttoinitiateashowdownwiththefedayeenandonwhichitwas

becomingclearthatCienfuegoswasbeingturnedintoasubmarinebase—Igavea

backgroundbriefingtoagroupofMidWesteditorsandbroadcastersinChicagoto 

putonrecord,amongothersubjects,ourviewofAllende’saccessiontopoweras

Korryhadrequested:



TheelectioninChilebroughtaboutaresultinwhichthemanbackedbythe

Communists,andprobablyaCommunisthimself,hadthelargestnumberofvotesby30,000

overthenextman,whowasaconservative.Hehadabout36.1percentofthevotes.Sohehad

aplurality.



Thetwonon‐Communistpartiesbetweenthemhad,ofcourse,64percentofthevotes,

sothereisanon‐Communistmajority,butaCommunistplurality.Isaythatjusttogetthe

picturestraight....



Now,itisfairlyeasyforonetopredictthatifAllendewins,thereisagoodchancethat

hewillestablishoveraperiodofyearssomesortofCommunistgovernment.Inthatcaseyou

wouldhaveonenotonanislandoffthecoastwhichhasnotatraditionalrelationshipand

impactonLatinAmerica,butinamajorLatinAmericancountryyouwouldhaveaCommunist

government,[ad]joining,forexample,Argentina,whichisalreadydeeplydivided,alongalong

frontier,[ad]joiningPeru,whichhasalreadybeenheadingindirectionsthathavebeendifficult

todealwith,and[ad]joiningBolivia,whichhasalsogoneinamoreleftist,anti‐U.S.direction,

evenwithoutanyofthesedevelopments.



SoIdon’tthinkweshoulddeludeourselvesthatanAllendetake‐overinChilewouldnot

presentmassiveproblemsforus,andfordemocraticforcesandforpro‐U.S.forcesinLatin

America,andindeedtothewholeWesternHemisphere.



BythenNixonhadtakenapersonalrole.Hehadbeentriggeredintoaction

onSeptember14byAugustinEdwards,thepublisherofElMercuricthemost

respectedChileandailynewspaper,whohadcometoWashingtontowarnofthe

consequencesofanAllendetakeover.EdwardswasstayingatthehouseofDon

Kendall,thechiefexecutiveofficerofPepsi‐Cola,whobychancewasbringinghis

fathertoseeNixonthatveryday.(ImetwithEdwardsandMitchellforbreakfast

andhadaskedHelmstoseeEdwardsforwhateverinsighthemighthav e.) 



AftermeetingKendall,NixonaskedHelms,Mitchell,andmetohisofficein

theearlyafternoonofSeptember15.Inaconversationlastinglessthanfifteen

minutesNixontoldHelmsthathewantedamajorefforttoseewhatcouldbe

donetopreventAllende’saccessiontopower:Iftherewereonechanceintenof

gettingridofAllendeweshouldtryit;ifHelmsneeded$10millionhewould

approveit.AidprogramstoChileshouldbecut;itseconomyshouldbesqueezed

untilit“screamed.”HelmsshouldbypassKorryandreportdirectlytotheWhite

House,whichwouldmakethefinaldecisions.Theoperationalobjectiveatthe

timewasstillthe“RubeGoldberg”scheme.Nixondidnotinfactputforwarda 

concretescheme,onlyapassionatedesire,unfocusedandbornoffrustration,to

do“something.”



Thisconversationisnowtreatedastheinceptionofwhatwaslatercalled

TrackII—asopposedtotheformal40Committeedecisions,whichinretrospect

becameTrackI—sogleefullyexposedbyCongressionalcommittees.Butthere

wasalwayslesstoTrackIIthanmettheeye.AsIhaveshownmanytimesinthis

book,Nixonwasgiventograndiloquentstatementsonwhichhedidnotinsist

oncetheirimplicationsbecamecleartohim.Thefearthatunwaryvisitorswould

takethePresidentliterallywas,indeed,oneofthereasonswhyHaldeman

controlledaccesstohimsosolicitously.In thecaseofTrackII,forexample,not

onlywastherenoexpenditureof$10million;nospecificsumwaseversetaside.

Theexpenditures,ifany,couldnothaveamountedtomorethanafewthousand

dollars.Itwasnevermorethanaprobeandanexplorationofpossibilities,evenin

Helms’sperception.



Moreover,whilethePresidentialoutburstundoubtedlygaveimpetusand

urgencytoapproachesto themilitaryaswellastothe“Rube Goldberg”scheme,

itonlyparalleledconclusions towardwhichthedepartmentswerecomingon

theirown.Throughtheregularmachineryofthe40Committee(TrackI),the

EmbassyreceivedinstructionscloselyparallelingtheCIAactivitiesgrowingoutof

Helms’sconversationwithNixon.TrackIIwasanexpressionofNixon’sprofound

distrustofStateDepartmentmachinery,whichhesuspectedwouldfoil

considerationofhiswishes.Inthiscasehewaswrong,becauseafterAllende’s

electiontherewasnosignificantdifferencebetweentheagencies.



NixonwasbriefedatvarioustimesonTrackIIbyTomKaramessines,head

ofCIA’scovertoperations,alwayspe ssimistically.AlltheCIAreportstoHaigand

meweresimilarlynegative.TheeffortwasterminatedbymeonOctober15,asI

shallshow,afteronemonth;Nixonapproved.TrackI,withfullStateDepartment

backing,soughttoencourageamilitarymovetoproduceanewelectionvery

muchalongthelinesdesiredbythePresident.Itwassimilarlyunsuccessfuland

abandonedatthesamepoint—thistimebythe40Committee.



Whateverthefocus,whetherTrackI(theformal40Committeeapproach)

orTrackII(theunilateralCIAapproach),deliberationswereturningincreasinglyto

theroleoftheChileanmilitary.BySeptem ber21itwasbecomingclearthatFrei

wasnotpursuinganyschemethatwouldresultinhisownreelection.Korry’s

fertilemindnowturnedtoamaneuver—apparentlyclearedbyassociatesof

Frei—wherebykeyCabinetmemberswouldresignandinducetheircolleaguesto

followsuit.ThiswouldgiveFrei,ifhewerewilling,apretexttoreplacethemwith

militaryofficers.Inotherwords,Freiwastobegiventhemeanstotriggera

constitutionalcrisis—designed,asineveryotherscheme,toleadtoanother

electionsothatthecountrycouldchoosebetweenFreiandAllende,between

democracyandpotentialdictatorship.TherewasdoubtaboutFrei’swillingnessto

dothis.Theprincipalobstacle,however,wasperceivedtobetheCommander‐in‐

ChiefoftheArmy,GeneralSchneider,whotookthepositionthatthepoliticians

havingputChileinto thismess,itbehoovedthemtoextricateher.Another

stumblingblockwasreportedtobethefearoftheChileanmilitarythatifthey

actedtheywouldbetreatedliketheGreekjunta—thatistosay,deprivedof

militaryaidbytheUnitedStatesandharassedbytheleftglobally.



The40CommitteethereforeauthorizedKorrytoapproachselectedmilitary

leaders.Theywouldbegiventounderstandthattheirinvolvementwouldnot

jeopardizeAmericanmilitaryassistance;Icannotdeterminefrommyrecords

whether,when,ortowhomthesemessageswerepassed.



FromSeptember26toOctober5IwasabsentfromWashington,goingfirst

toParistomeetwithSouthVietnameseVicePresidentNguyenCaoKyanda

secretmeetingwiththeNorthVietnamese,andthenjoiningNixoninRomeforhis

triptoMediterraneancountriesontheeveningofSeptember27.Atevery

opportunityNixonencouragedfriendlygovernme ntstousetheirinfluencein

ChiletopreventtheaccessionofAllendeoratleastnottotreathisvictoryas

foreordained.Hefoundhewasnot aloneinhisconcernaboutChile’sfuture.



OnSeptember29the40Committeemet,inmyabsence,underthe

chairmanshipofUnderSecretaryofStateJohnsonandconcludedthattheChilean

militarywouldmovetowardanewelectiononlyiftheyfearedaneconomiccrisis

andthecutoffofUnitedStatesmilitaryaidiftheydidnotmove. Stepstoinform

theChileanmilitarythattheseriskswererealwereapprovedinmyabsence;to

lendemphasis,pipelineshipmentsofmilitaryaidwereinterrupted.Afterthe

President’sreturn,a40CommitteemeetingonOctober6leftuswithexactlythe

perplexitiesthathadexistedbeforeourdeparture.Freinotonlydidnotmove;he

didnothingtopreventtheChristianDemocraticPartycongressonOctober5from

conditionallyendorsingAllende’selectionbytheChileanCongress.The“Rube

Goldberg”gambitwasnowdefinitelydead;theCongresswouldsurelyvotefor

Allende.TimewasalsorunningoutontheCabinetresignationroutetoa

constitutionalcrisis.Thesoleremainingpossibilityforforestallingtheaccessionof

Allendewasamilitarytakeoverasapreludetonewelections.Reflectingthe

consensus,AlexJohnsonandIsentajointbackchanneltoKorry—inTrackI—

askinghimtoreinforcewiththemilitarytheseriousconsequencesofanAllende

presidencyandauthorizing himtoreiteratetheassurancesof continuedAmerican

militaryassistanceiftheymoved.



TrackIandTrackIIwere,infact,merging.OnOctober10theCentral

IntelligenceAgencyreportedtoGeneralHaig—aspartofTrackII—thatthe

prospectsforamilitarycoupwereevendimmerthanbefore.OnOctober14the

CIArepresentative,TomKaramessines,reportedtothe40Committee—aspartof

TrackI—that“acoupclimatedoesnotpresentlyexist.”Iobservedtothegroup

thatthereappearedtobelittlethatwecoulddotoinfluencetheChileansituation

onewayoranother.OnOctober15Ireceivedasimilarbriefingfrom

KaramessinesaspartofTrackII.Theonlyremainingpossibilitywasanamateurish

plotorganizedbyaGeneralRobertoViauxtokidnapGeneralSchneiderandtake

himtoArgentina.IreportedtoNixon:“IsawKaramessinestoday.Thatlooks

hopeless.Iturneditoff.Nothingwouldbeworsethananabortivecoup.”Nixon

agreed.HewasnowresignedtoanAllendepresidency.Hismajorconcernwasto

keepStatefrompressuringhimtoresumeaidrelationshipswithanAllende

government;ifAllendeexpropriatedAmericanproperty,theHickenlooper

Amendmentshouldbeappliedimmediately,heordered.



KaramessinescarriedfromhisOctober15meetingwithmeaninstruction

toturnoffGeneralViaux’scoupplotandageneralmandateto“preserveour

assets”inChileonthe(clearlyremote)chancethatsome otheropportunitymight

develop.TheCIApassedthisinstructiontotheViauxgrouponOctober17;our

stationinSantiagoadvisedthemthattheirschemewouldfail,wouldthus

backfire,andshouldnotbecarriedout.

