Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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wouldbristle;theymightbargain;butifpermittedtosodo,theywouldwithdraw.

ItwasnoteasytoconvincethePresidentofthisstrategy;indeed,I neverreally

did;thefinalshowdownwastriggeredbyanaccident.



ApotentialCubancrisisduringanelectionstruckarawnerveinNixon.For

anyonewhoknewhimitwasoutofthequestionthathewouldtoleratethe

establishmentofaSovietnavalbaseinCubaforanylengthoftime.Toomuchof

hispoliticallifehadbeentiedupwithtakingatoughstanceonthisissue;his

friendshipwithCharles(Bebe)Rebozo,whohatedCastrowithafierceLatin

passion,guaranteedthathewouldbeconstantlyexposedtoargumentstotakea

hardline;hewouldneverwanttoappearweakbeforehisoldfriend.Sooneror

laterhewouldstrikeback,andhewouldthennotrestuntilhehadaccomplished

hisobjective.ButwewerenowinthemidstoftheJordancrisis;Syriantankshad

justcrossedintoJordan;forallNixonknew,thatcrisismighttriggerashowdown

withtheSovietUnion.ThePresidentfocusedonthemostimmediatechallenge.

AndNixonhadconvincedhimselfthatwhileVietnamunleashedmediaand

CongressionalassaultsonPresidentialcredibility,anewCubanmissilecrisisinan

electionyearwouldgenerateamassivepubliccynicism.Finally,Nixonwas

scheduledtoleaveonSeptember27forthetripto theMediterranean,onwhich

hehadsethisheart,especiallylookingforwardtoademonstrationoffirepower

bytheSixthFleet.Hedidnotseehowhecouldleavethecountryifwewereinthe

middleofaCubancrisis.Forallthesereasons,Nixon’spreferredstrategywasto

confronttheSovietsrightaftertheelection.Heacceptedmyanalysis,butforthe

interimhechoseRogers’spolicyofsoothingdelay.



Tobesure,hisinitialreactiontomymemorandumconveyingtheresultsof

theU‐2missionofSeptember16soundedtough.Hishandwrittennoteread:



Iwantareportonacrashbasison:(1)WhatCIAcandotosupportanykindofaction

whichwillirritateCastro;(2)Whatactionswecantakewhichwehavenotyettakentoboycott

nationsdealingwithCastro;(3)Mostimportant,whatactionswecantake,covertorovert,to

putmissilesinTurkey—orasubbaseintheBlackSea—anythingwhichwillgiveussometrading

stock.



Butoncloseexaminationthesewerealltime‐wastingoptions.Harassment

ofCastrohadbeentriedandfailedintheSixties;itwouldtakemonthsto

organize;“irritating”CastrowouldhavenoeffectontheSovietbase.Tightening

theboycottonCubawouldbeevenslower;itwouldruncountertotheprevalent

trendofourallies’policiesandittoowouldhavenoconceivableshort‐term

impact.PuttingmissilesinTurkeywhencetheyhadbeenremovedasaresultof

theCubanmissilecrisiswashardlyfeasiblerapidly.Andifwedidsucceed,it

wouldshakeourrelationswithTurkeyifitlearnedthatwewereusingthemonly

as“tradingstock.”



OnSeptember19,whenIreportedtoNixontheresultsoftheWSAG,he

urgedmetoplayitalldown.Hedidnot,hesaid,wantsome“clownSenator”

askingforaCubanblockadeinthemiddleofanelection(asRepublicanSenators

haddonein1962).Wewereinananomalousposition.ThePresidentwasheading

foraconfrontation,buthisdesiretodelaytheshowdownfortwomonthsgreatly

increaseditsrisks.



Wheneverpersonalpersuasionfailed,IappealedtoHaldeman,whowould

conveyone’sthoughtsfaithfullyandliterallywithoutinjectinghisownviews.It

wasriskytoapproachHaldeman,sincehewaslikelytointerpretanysubstantive

concernasasignofemotionalinstability;hehadaninvinciblefaiththattherewas

nodifficultythatcouldnotberectifiedbygoodpublicrelations.Buthewassure

tocommunicatemyuneasinesstoNixonevenifhetreateditasoverwrought.I

toldHaldemanthatthePresidentwasnotfocusingontherealissue.Iftherewere

acrisisinNovemberorDecemberwewouldhavegreatdifficultyexplaining why

wehaddonenothinginSeptember;theSovietsmightbemisledbysimultaneous

summitpreparationsintostepsthatcouldcausethesituationtogetoutof

control.



TheNSCmeetingofSeptember23helpedconcentratethemindsofsenior

officials.Someoftheintelligencepresentedindicatedthatwehadsometime;

someaddedtothesenseofurgency.OnthereassuringsidewasHelms’s

convictionthatiftheSovietsintendedtobaseballisticmissilesubmarinesinCuba

permanently,theywouldneedadditionalheavyequipment,particularlylarge

cranes.ThisequipmentwasnotyetinCienfuegos.Moreover,weknewofno

missile‐carryingsubmarineinthearea.Ontheotherhand,wehadother

intelligencesuggestingthatnuclearweaponsmightbeonboardoneoftheships.

Intheevent,thePresidentdecidedtoproceedalongthelineshehadalready

privatelyindicatedtome.Heaskedforcontingencyplansfortheminingof

Cienfuegos,theblockadeofCuba,thetailingofSovietships,andtheremovalof

allrestraintsontheCubanexilecommunity,tobeimplementedsometimeinthe

future.Intheinterval,heorderedaverylow‐keypublicposture,confinedsimply

tonotingthatwewereawareofwhatwashappeningandwerewatching.Mel

Lairdpointedoutthatthiswouldneverwork;toomanypeopleknewwhatwas

goingon;thestorywouldleak.



ItmustberememberedthatatthetimeoftheNSCmeetingonSeptember

23,wedidnotyetknowthattheSyriantankshadturnedaroundandthatthe

invasionofJordanwasover.ThePresident’sprocrastinationwastherefore

understandable.Nevertheless,Iwasextremelyuneasy.Ithoughttheproposed

policywaslikelytotempttheSovietstoescalatetheiractivityintheCaribbean;I

didnotseehowwecouldmovefromalow‐keypostureinSeptembertoa

confrontationinNovemberiftheinstallationsremainedthesame,orhowwe

wouldexplainashowdowniftheSovietspracticedacreepingexpansion.Ifinthe

meantimetheSovietsacceptedoursummit proposal,theproblemwouldbecome

nearlyunmanageable.Inshort,thelongerwewaitedthemoredifficultwouldbe

thedecisionsbothforusandfortheSovietswhenwechallengedthemandthe

harderitwouldbetocontaintheloomingcrisis.



IconvenedarestrictedmeetingoftheWSAGinthesituationRoomon

September24—thedayaftertheSyriantankshadturnedback—toimplement

thePresident’sCubandecisions,muchasIdisagreedwiththem.Thediscussion

dealtentirelywithpressguidanceshouldtheconstructioninCienfuegosbecome

publicwhilethePresidentwasinEurope.Itwasdecidedthatiftheissuecameup,

Defensewouldputoutthebare‐bonesfactsbutoffernocomment;Statewould

expresstheviewthattheintroductionofoffensiveweaponswouldberegarded

withconcern;andtheWhiteHousewouldconfineitselftostatingthatthe

Presidenthadbeeninformedandwasfollowingevents.Thedepartmentalpress

officersweregivenadetailedfactualdescription;itwasintendedfortheir

backgroundguidance,notforuseinbriefings.Wewereonthewayto

implementingthePresident’sdecisionwhenitwasmadeirrelevantbya

bureaucraticmix‐upofmonumentalproportions.



First,DobryninreturnedtoWashingtonafterhisabsenceofsevenweeks.

Exudinggoodwill,joshing thatIhadbrokenmypromisenottoorganizeacrisisin

hisabsence(referringtoJordan),hecalledontheeveningofSeptember24tosay

thathehadamessageconcerningJordanandthesummit;hewasinstructedto

deliveritpersonallytothePresident.IreportedthistoNixon,whowasunwilling

toseeDobrynin.HewasafraidtheSovietswereturningdownthesummitandhe

didnotwishtoreceivearebuffpersonally.ItoldhimthattheSovietswould

probablynotrebuffhimbutseektostringhimalonganddelaythesummituntil

1971.Webothagreed,however,thattohavekeptthePresidentwaitingforsix

weeksforananswertoasummitproposedinAugustforOctoberwasanactof

discourtesythatdidnotdeserveapersonalaudience. NordidNixonwanttosee

DobryninwithoutmentioningCuba,andhesawnowayofdiscussingCienfuegos

withouteitherstirringuptheunwantedcrisisorleavinganimpressionthatwe

wereacquiescing.ItwasfinallydecidedthatIwouldreceiveDobrynin’smessage;

itwasthebestsignalofcoolnesswecouldgivetheSoviets.WhenItoldhim,

Dobryninpretendedtohaveto checkwithMoscow.



DobryninandIfinallymetasusualintheMapRoomoftheWhiteHouseat

10:00a.m.onFriday,September25.Icutoffgeneraldiscussion,pleading

pressureoftimecausedbythePresident’simminentdepartureforEurope.

Dobrynin’smessagewaswhatIhadexpected:theSovietUnionagreedin

principletoasummit;theagendaoutlinedinourcommunicationofAugust24

wasacceptable.Dobrynindidnotexplainwhyithadtakensolongtoreachthis

profoundconclusion.However,theSovietgovernmentpreferredthatthesummit

takeplacein1971afterthePartyCongressinthespring,whichinpracticemeant

notbeforeJune.DobryninthenwonderedwhetherthePresidentwasthinkingof

Moscowasavenue.WhenIallowedfortheumpteenthtimethatthisthought

hadindeedcrossedthePresident’smind,Dobryninneverthelessstoppedwell

shortofanactualinvitation.Heleftthesiteanddatetofurtherdiscussion.He

alsoinformedmethatPremierKosyginwouldnotattendthetwenty‐fifth

anniversarycelebrationoftheUnitedNationsinOctober1970,thusclosingoff

thatopportunityforahigh‐levelmeetingbeforetheCongressionalelection.

DobryninalsobroughttheSovietleaders’reactiontothecrisisinJordan, whichI

havealreadydescribed.IrepliedcoollythatIwouldbeintouchwithhimlater.



BythetimeIreturnedtomyofficechaoshaderupted.Themorninghad

startedwithacolumnbyC.L.SulzbergerintheNewYorkTimes,which,underthe

headline“UglyCloudsintheSouth,”warnedofapossibleSovietsubmarinebase

inCienfuegos.Contrarytoourcarefullyplannedpressguidance,thespokesman

oftheDefenseDepartmenthadfilledineverydetailwhenaskedaquestionathis

morningbriefing.ItwasaWashingtonclassicofmisunderstoodinstructions.The

Pentagonbrieferhadseenthecontingencyguidancebutdidnotunderstandthat

hewastouseitonlyinanextremityandwasnottorefertothebackground

materialatall.Hethereforevolunteeredeverythingheknew,givingadetailed

accountofSovietconstructionandnavalmovementsofthepastfewmonths.



Thepressreactionwaspredictable.TheAssociatedPressledoffwith:“The

PentagonsaidtodayithasfirmindicationstheSovietUnionmaybeestablishinga

permanentsubmarinebaseinCuba.”UnitedPressInternationalreporte d:“The

DefenseDepartmentsaidtodayithasevidencethatRussiahasstarted

constructionofasubmarinebase inCuba.”Doubtlesstheeveningtelevisionnews

andthenextday’smorningpaperswoulddramatizeitallfurther.Itwas

inconceivablethatthePresidentcouldleavethecountrytwodayslaterwithout

someWhiteHousestatementonthenew“crisis.”ThoughMelLairdandDave

PackardcalledtoapologizefortheinadvertentPentagonbriefing,thefatwasin

thefire.LairdofferedtotakeahardlinesothattheWhiteHouse couldappear

conciliatory,butIwouldhavenoneofit:“Wecandownplayitandsayitis

perfectlynaturalsowecangoonthetrip,butthenhowcanweeverconfront

themonit,whichiswhatthePresidentwantstodo?”



YetwhenallwassaidanddonethePent agonblooperswereactuallyour

salvation.Thebare‐bonespressguidanceoriginallyplannedwassoreticentthatit

wouldsurelyhaveappearedtoMoscowasacquiescence;thePresident’sforeign

journeywouldhaveprovidedanopportunitytocompletetheconstructionofthe

base;andtheinevitablefinalconfrontationwouldhavebeenbothbitterandfar

morerisky.Now,however,wewouldbeforcedintomyownpreferredcourse.I

toldthePresidentthatwehadnochoicenowexcepttofacetheSovietsdown,

butweshoulddosoinamannerthatgavethemawayout.Iproposedtousea

briefingalreadysche duledthatafternoononNixon’sMediterraneantriptoissue

astrongwarningtotheSovietsagainstbuilding asubmarinebaseinCuba;Iwould

leaveopenwhetherthebasealreadyexisted,sothataclearlineofretreatwas

available.IwouldthencallinDobryninintheguiseofgivinghimananswertothe

summitproposalandconfronthimdirectly,tellinghimthatweconsidered

Cienfuegosanoffensivebaseandwould treatitaccordingly.Wewouldinsiston

itsdismantlement.ThePresident’stripwouldprovideaninterludeforthat

purpose.



Whenoptionswerestarklydefined,Nixonwasalwaysdecisive.He

understoodimmediatelythatwafflingcouldonlyincreaseourdangers.He

approvedmyrecommendationandsuggestedthatIaskAdmiralMoorertomove

adestroyernearCienfuegostoemphasizeourwarning.Withtheboldness that

washishallmarkinforeignpolicyNixonauthorizedachallengetotheSoviet

Unionontheeveofhisdepartureonanoverseastrip.Accordingly,Iwenttothe

EastRoomoftheWhiteHousetobrieftheWhiteHousepress—ostensiblyonthe

President’strip.WhenthepredictablequestiononCubacameup,Ireplied:



WithrespecttoSovietnavalactivityintheCaribbean,weare,ofcoursewatchingthe

developmentofSovietnavalactivityandofpossibleconstructionthere.Wearewatchingitvery

closely.TheSovietUnioncanbeundernodoubtthatwewouldviewtheestablishmentofa

strategicbaseintheCaribbeanwiththeutmostseriousness.



IwouldlikeperhapstocallattentiontoapressconferencestatementthatPresident

KennedymadeonNovember20,1962,inwhichhesaidthefollowing:



“Asforourpart,ifalloffensiveweaponsareremovedfromCubaandkeptoutofthe

Hemisphereinthefuture,underadequateverificationandsafeguards,andifCubaisnotused

fortheexportofaggressiveCommunistpurposes,therewillbepeaceintheCaribbean.”



Theoperativepart,ofcourse,ishere:“ifalloffensiveweaponsareremovedfromCuba

andkeptoutoftheHemisphereinthefuture.”



This,ofcourse,remainsthepolicyofthisGovernment.



LaterinthebriefingIwasaskedwhetherthiswasnotabadtimeforthe

Presidenttotakeatrip.Ireplied:



WearewatchingtheeventsinCuba.Wearenotatthismomentinapositiontosay

exactlywhattheymean.Wewillcontinuetoobservethemandattherightmomentwewill

taketheactionthatseemsindicated.Weareinexcellentcommunication.Nothingveryrapid

anddramaticislikelytooccur,andwearegoingtobeinveryclosetouchwiththesituation.



MybriefingonthePresident’stripwassubjecttoapressembargo—it

couldnotbeuseduntilSaturday,September26,fortheSundaypapers,thedayof

thePresident’sdeparture.ThejournalistspressedRonZieglertopermit

immediateuseofmyCubastatement.Weagreed.



Twohoursaftermybriefing,at5:30p.m.,ImetDobryninagainintheMap

Room.Ihadsummonedhimunderthepretextofgivinghimananswertohis

summitqueries;twocouldplaythegameofusingsummitdiscussionstotake

someoftheedgeoffconfrontation.I toldhimthatweacceptedtheprincipleofa

summitandsuggestedeitherJuneorSeptember1971,dependingonthestateof

ourpreparations.Moscowwasacceptableasthesite.



Ithenturnedtotheprincipalpurposeofthemeeting.Dobryninhadno

doubtseenthewirereportsofmybackgroundbriefingintheafternoon.My

wordshadbeencarefullychosentosuggestthattheUnitedStateshadnotyet

madeupitsmindabouttheprecisenatureofSovietactivitiesinCienfuegos.I

wantedhimtounderstandthatthiswassaidonlytogivehisgovernmenta

gracefulopportunity towithdrawwithoutapublicconfrontation.Weconsidered

theconstructionatCienfuegosunmistakablyasubmarinebase .Moscowshould

beundernoillusion;wewouldviewcontinuedconstructionwiththe“utmost

gravity”;thebasecouldnotremain.Wewouldnotshrinkfromothermeasures

includingpublicstepsifforcedintoit;iftheships—especiallythetender—left

Cienfuegos,wewouldconsideritatrainingexercise.



Dobryninwasathoroughgoingprofessional.Hewasusuallygenial,buthe

alsoknewwhencharmwaswastedandwhenhisusualrecoursetocataloguing

oursinswasoutofplace.Theissuenowwasatestbetweenmajorpowers

involvingimportantnationalinterests.Hewasthereforeallbusinessashesought

todeterminetheextentandthelimitsofourchallenge.Wereweclaimingthat

the1962understandinghadbeenviolated?Idismis sedthisasalegalisticquibble;

in1962Kennedyhadactedwithoutclaimingtheviolationofanunderstanding.

Cuba,tous,wasaplaceofextremesensitivity.Weconsideredthesequenceof

events,startingwithVorontsov’sdemarcheofAugust4,asactsofextremelybad

faith.Theinstallationshadbeencompletedwithmaximumdeception;theycould

notremain.Dobryninaskedwhetherweweregoingtostartabigpresscampaign

ontheissue,obviouslycalculatinghowmuchlossoffacewouldbeinvolvedina

retreat.Irepliedthatwehadnosuchintention;thePresidentwasleavingforten

daysinEuropeandtherewouldbenofurtherbriefingsonthesubjectduringthat

period.TheSovietsthushadanopportunitytoconsiderwhethertogotheroute

ofconciliationortherouteofconfrontation;wewerepreparedforeither.We

weredeterminedthattherewouldbenoSovietsubmarinebaseinCuba.

Whateverthephraseologyofthe1962understanding,itsintentcouldnothave

beentoreplaceland‐basedwithsea‐basedmissiles.Dobrynincoollysaidthathe

wouldreporttoMoscowandbeintouch.



Wekeptourword;therewasnogovernmentbriefing.RogersandLaird

werewiththePresidentonhistripsothatcoherentpresspolicywaseasierto

maintainthannormally.Thefactremainedthatlessthanforty‐eighthoursafter

theendoftheSyrianinvas ionofJordan,wewereclosetoanotherconfrontation,

thistimewithasuperpower.



<<Contents>>



****



ResolutionoftheCrisis



Ecouldnot,ofcourse,preventnewspaperorCongressionalspeculation

sparkedbythebriefingsthathadalreadytakenplace.TheWashingtonPost

headlinedthenextday:“U.S.WarnsRedsonCubaSubBase.”Butthefocus

remainedonthePresident’spendingdeparturefortheMediterranean.The

Cubanstorywasslowinbuilding,andtherewasnocriticismthatNixonwas

departinginthemidstofacrisis.SenatorBarryGoldwaterwasquotedinthe

WashingtonStarasconsideringthePentagondisclosureofapossibleSoviet

nuclearsubmarinebaseinCubaevidenceofa“seriousRussianbidforworld

domination.”SenatorMikeMansfieldwasquotedalso:“Idoviewitwithalarm.It

raisesthemostseriousquestioninlightofPresidentJohnF.Kennedy’sstatement

afterthe1962Cubanmissilecrisisthatoffensiveweaponsmustbekeptoutofthe

WesternHemispheretoassure‘peaceintheCaribbean.’“JamesReston’scolumn

ofSeptember27wasentitled“BacktoCubaandtheColdWar,”anditslead

paragraphran:“Somethingveryseriousanddangerousisnowhappening

betweentheleadersoftheU.S.andtheSovietUnion.Theyareclearlymisjudging

oneanotherinSouthEastAsia,theMiddleEastandCuba,andthiscouldbetragic

forthemandforthepeaceoftheworld.”



ButthiswastheeraofVietnam.Almostimmediatelytherewasasecond

waveofreactionsattackingtheAdministration.OnSunday,September27,

SenatorJ.WilliamFulbrightvoicedhisskepticismonthetelevisionshow“Issues

andAnswers,”helpfullyjust astheNixonpartydepartedfromWashington:

“NearlyeveryyearjustbeforewehaveanappropriationsbillintheSenate,we

getthesestories;soitmayormaynotbetrue.”Hesaidthatitwasa

“questionableproposition”thattheSovietshadnorighttobeinCuba.He

doubtedthatwecould“bluff”theSovietsoutofCuba,becausetheynowhada

“degreeofparity.”Skepticalopinionsinourbureaucracymadetheirwaytothe

frontpageoftheNewYorkTimesinaSeptember30storybyTadSzulc:



AmericanofficialssaidtodaythattheU.S.hadonlydubiousanddatedinformationto

indicatethattheSovietUnionmightbeplanningtobuildastrategicsubmarinebaseinCuba.

Forthisreason,theseofficials,whoincludemembersoftheintelligencecommunity,saidthey

wereatalosstoexplainwhytheWhiteHousechoselastweektowarnMoscowagainstthe

establishmentofsuchabase.



ThethemewaspickedupbySenatorFrankChurch,who,afteran

intelligencebriefing,remarkedonOctober1thatthepresentevidencedidnot

suggestareasonableconclusiononewayoranother.AndonOctober4,skeptical

commentsbyadifferentpartofourbureaucracywerereportedbyNeilSheehan

oftheNewYorkTimes:“Militaryanalystssaytheyarenotsurewhatthenew

constructionashoreatCienfuegossignifies,buttheysayitcouldbeasmallfacility

forsubmarine‐crewhousingandrecreation…Inshorttheanalyststhinkthe

RussiansdonotneedandmaynotwantanylargebaseatCienfuegosforthe

Yankee‐classboats.”ThiswasnottheviewoftheJointChiefs;itwasalsoclear

thatinactionwasthebestwaytoencouragetheSovietUniontobuildwhateverit

wantedandtoexpandwhateveritwasbuilding.



AndnoneofthecriticsnotedthattherewasnowordfromtheSoviet

Union,neitherdenialnoroutragedprotest.Inthewholeperiodtherewasonlya

single,ratherlamecomment,complainingabouthostilepropaganda.



TheSovietshadtakenusseriously.AssoonaswereturnedtoWashingt on

onOctober5,Dobryninrequestedanurgentappointment.Hecameinthenext

daywithtwomessages,thefirstaface‐savingone,tobeshowntoArabclients,

expressingsatisfactionatmyassuranceofSeptember25thatwewouldnot

interveneinJordanifothercountriesstayedout.TheKremlinchosetointerpret

thisreaffirmationofthepositionfromwhichwehadnevervariedasa

constructivecontribution,andperhapspresentedittoitsArabclientsashaving

beenexactedbySovietdiplomacy.Isawnopointindisputingthis;indiplomacy

onecollectsclaimsonfuturerestraintwhereonecan.



ThemoreimportantSovietmessageconcernedCienfuegos.Itbeganby

notingthereaffirmationofthe1962unde rstandinginthepreviousexchangesand

concludedwithaprecisecommitmentthatnobasewasbeingbuiltinCuba:



TheSovietsidehasnotdoneandisnotdoinginCubanow—thatincludestheareaof

theCienfuegosport—anythingofthekindthatwouldcontradictthatmentioned

understanding.



AfterrehashingthestandardSovietcomplaintaboutAmericanoverseas

bases,andnotingthattheSovietUnionhadproposedintheSALTtalkstolimit

operationalareasofballisticmissilesubmarines,thenoteconcluded:



Inanycase,wewouldliketoreaffirmoncemorethattheSovietsidestrictlyadheresto

itspartoftheunderstandingontheCubanquestionandwillcontinuetoadheretoitinthe

futureontheassumptionthattheAmericanside,asPresidentNixonhasreaffirmed,willalso

strictlyobserveitspartoftheunderstanding.



Orally,Dobryninaddedthatwhilehecouldnotmakeanagreementthat

SovietsubmarineswouldnevercallatCubanports,hewaspreparedonbehalfof

hisgovernmenttoaffirmthatballisticmissilesubmarineswouldnevercallthere

inanoperationalcapacity.Irepliedthatweshouldmakesurethatthetwo

governmentsunderstoodtheword“base”inthesamemanner.Iwouldbeback

tohimsoonwithsomeclarifyingunderstandings.



TheSoviets’replywasclearlypositiveintone,committingthemnotto

establishanavalbaseinCuba—evenifthedefinitionwasasyetvague—and

Sovietactionswereconsistentwithit:aftermypressstatement,constructionof

portfacilitieshadceased,thetenderhadbeenmovedtoapierratherthan

servingasafloatingrepairfacility,andthenextdaytwoshipsoftheflotillahad

departed.



OnOctober9IhandedDobryninawrittendefinitio nofanoperational

“base”workedoutwithCaptainRembrandtC.Robinson,mystaffliaisonwiththe

JointChiefs:



TheUSGovernmentunderstandsthattheUSSRwillnotestablish,utilize,orpermitthe

establishmentofanyfacilityinCubathatcanbeemployedtosupportorrepairSovietnaval

shipscapableofcarryingoffensiveweapons;i.e.submarinesorsurfaceshipsarmedwith

nuclear‐capable,surface‐to‐surfacemissiles.