Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Iwaspuzzledandsaidso.Iwasnot awareofanyspecialtensionoverCuba;

weweredoingnothing unusual;therewasnoobviousreasonwhytheSoviet

Unionshouldraisethequestion.Vorontsovwasblandlyreassuring.Therehad

beennewsstorie s,hesaid,aboutAmericanplanstostrengthenthedefenseof

GuantanamoNavalBaseandallegedSovietmilitaryactivitiesinCuba;hereadme

anotecomplainingaboutstepped‐upsubversiveactivitiesagainstCubabyexiles

operatingfromFlorida.IaskedinwhatwayMoscowwishedtoconfirmthe1962

understandingandwhatVorontsovthoughttheunderstandingwas.Hesaidan

oralstatementfrommewouldbeenough,andhetooktheunderstandingtobe

thatwewouldnotinvadeCubabymilitaryforce.IsaidIwouldhavetodiscussthe

matterwiththePresidentandlethimknow.

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IatonceaskedtheStateDepartmentforitsrecordsandinterpretationof

the1962understanding.AlexJohnsonsentoverexcerptsfrom theKennedy‐

Khrushchevcorrespondenceandasummaryofthesubsequentnegotiations

betweenJohnMcCloyandVasilyKuznetsovonthearrangementsunderwhichthe

Sovietmissilesandbomberswerewithdrawn.Itemergedthattherewasno

formalunderstandinginthesenseofanagreement,eitheroralorinwriting.The

exchangeswere,however,sufficientlylengthyanddetailedtoconstitutemutual

assurances,asIdescribedtothePresident:

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TheKhrushchev‐Kennedyexchangesindicateclearlythattherewasanimplicit

understandingthatwewouldagreetogiveassurancesagainstaninvasionofCubaiftheSoviet

UnionwouldremoveitsoffensivemissilesfromCubaunderUNobservationandwould

undertake,withsuitablesafeguards,tohaltthere‐introductionofsuchweaponssystemsinto

Cuba.However,theagreementwasneverexplicitlycompletedbecausetheSovietsdidnot

agreetoanacceptableverificationsystem(becauseofCastro’sopposition)andwenevermade

aformalnon‐invasionpledge.ThenegotiationsbetweenMcCloyandKuznetsov,whic hwere

designedtoworkoutasatisfactorymeansofformalizingtheKennedy‐Khrushchev

“understanding”eventuallyjustfizzledout.

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The“understanding”wehavewiththeSoviets,therefore,isanimplicitone,whichwas

neverformallybuttoneddown.Infact,theSovietsremovedtheirmissilesandthereisno

evidencethattheyhavere‐introducedthem;andwe,ofcourse,havenotinvadedCuba.

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TheUnitedStateshadalsoputitsviewontherecordinpublic,andithad

neverbeendisputed.Thequestionofanavalorsubmarinebasehadcomeup

onlybriefly.JohnMcCloyhadraisedtheissuewithKuznetsovonNovember5,

1962,statingthattheUnitedStatesobjectedtotheestablishmentofanySoviet

militarybaseinCuba.Kuznetsovsaidheunderstood.

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CubawasaneuralgicproblemforNixon.WhenheranforthePresidencyin1960,

itfeaturedinthefamoustelevisiondebateswithKennedy.Afewdaysbeforethe

debateofOctober21,1960,Kenne dyhadadvocatedinterventionbyAmerican

forcestotoppleFidelCastro;in thosedaysamuscularstancewasnotconsidered

incompatiblewithaliberalpoliticalphilosophy.Nixon,whowasawareofthe

planningforwhatturnedouttobetheabortiveBayofPigsinvasion,felt

constrainedtodisavowtheproposal.Whetherhispurposewastoprotectthe

covertplanning,asheclaimed,ortoasserthisownstatesmanshipincontrastto

Kennedy’s“inexperience,”helaterconvincedhimselfthathispatrioticself‐

restrainthadcontributedtohisdefeat.Inhismemoirs,Nixonrelatedwithsome

bitterness:“Inthatdebate,Kennedyconveyedtheimage—to60millionpeople—

thathewastougheronCastroandcommunismthanIwas.”

Nixonwas

determinedthatnoonewouldeverbeabletomakethischargeagain.

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NorwasNixondonewithCubain1960.In1962,whenhewasrunningfor

thegovernorshipofCalifornia,theCubanmissilecrisisdominatedthelastthree

weeksofthecampaign—theperiodNixonalwaysconsideredcrucialto the

outcome.Thoughhehadalreadyfallenbehindbythen,hewasconvincedthatthe

crisishaddeprivedhimoftheoppo rtunitytorecover.Heneverceasedbelieving

thatKennedyhadtimedtheshowdowntoenhanceDemocraticprospectsinthe

midtermelections.ForNixonthecoincidenceofCubawithanelectoralcampaign

setoffwavesofforebodingandresentment.Inhisview,nothingwasmoretobe

avoidedthanaCubancrisisinaCongressionalelectionyear.

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ButinthemiddleofAugustof1970nothingwasfurtherfromourminds.

NixonandIevenspeculatedthatthemessagedeliveredbyVorontsovmightbea

tokenofSovietgoodwilltoim provetheatmosphereforasummitinthefall.Our

complacencywasreflectedinourreactiontoanFBIreportwhich,aschance

wouldhaveit,reachedusonAugust5;itclaimedthattwoboatshiredbyexilesin

MiamiwouldtrytosinkaSoviettankerheadedforCuba.Nixon,whousually

sympathizedwiththeCubanexiles,immediatelyagreedthatweshouldassign

twoCoastGuardcutterstoshadowthetankerandtoprotectitifnecessary;an

attackonaSoviettankerbyboatscomingfromMiamiwouldhavebeendifficult

toexplaintoMoscowafteritsmessage.Asitturnedout,theattacknever

materialized.Wehadnootherreasonforspecialconcern.TheU‐2

reconnaissanceaircraftflyingperiodicphotographic missionshadnoticedan

increaseinSovietmilitaryactivityinandaroundCuba.Buttheyhaddetected

nothingthatwouldindicateaviolationofthe“understanding.”

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OnAugust7IgaveVorontsovourreply.Itnotedwithsatisfactionthe

assuranceoftheSovietgovernmentthattheunderstandingsof1962werestillin

fullforce.Wedefinedtheseasprohibitingtheemplacementofanyoffensive

weaponofanykindoranyoffensivedeliverysystemonCubanterritory.We

reaffirmedthatinreturnwewouldnotusemilitaryforcetobringaboutachange

inthegovernmentalstructureofCuba.Iaddedasa“personal”observationthat

therehadbeenSovietreconna issanceflightsoffourEastCoastbyconverted

bombersusingCubaasafinaldestination.Inourviewthiswasapproachingthe

outerlimitsoftheunderstanding.Reducingtheseflightstoanabsoluteminimum

wouldsurelyhelpourrelationship;itwouldsimilarlybenoticedifthegreatest

restraintwereexercisedwithrespecttoSovietnavaloperationsintheCaribbean.

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VorontsovexpressedhisappreciationforthegoodspiritinwhichIhad

madetheseobservations;hewascertainthattheKremlinwouldbehappyto

receiveourconfirmationoftheunderstandingsof1962.Herepeatedhisearlier

impressionthatourrelationshadtakenaclearturnforthebetter.

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Inthelightofevents,itishardtoimaginewhatVorontsovorhismasters

couldhavebeenthinking.Inforeignpolicycrudetricksarealmostalwaysself‐

defeating.EveninaMachiavellianperceptionofinternationalrelationsthe

resultinglossinconfidenceneedstobebalancedbysomedecisivebenefit.And

decisivetransformationsarehardtocomeby;certainlywhattheSovietswere

doinginCubainthelatesummerof1970involvedrisksthatwereoutof

proportiontotheprobablegains.

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<<Contents>>

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AFlotillaHeadsforCienfuegos

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nCuba’sSoutherncoastthereisaportnamedCienfuegos.Itsharborcanbe

reachedonlybyasinglechannelleadingtoabaydottedbyanumberof

smallislandsandsurroundedbysteephills.Ononeoftheseislands,calledCayo

Alcatraz,aU‐2onAugust26photographednewconstructionactivitythathadnot

beenevidentduringaflightelevendaysearlier.Itseemedtohavebeengoingon

forseveraldays;allthatcouldbedefinitelyidentifiedwasworkona wharfandon

somenewbarracks.Initselfthiswasnotunusual.Whatmadeitofmorethan

passingsignificancewasanotherpieceofintelligence:AflotillaofSovietshipswas

onacourseheadingtowardCuba;itconsistedofasubmarinetender,aguided‐

missilecruiser,aguided‐missiledestroyer,anocean‐goingsalvagetug,aheavy

salvageship,amerchanttanker,andanamphibiouslandingshipcarryingtwo

eighty‐footbarges.Thesubmarinetenderandthebargeswereofatypenormally

usedforservicingnuclearsubmarines.Thecompositionofthistaskforcewasso

unprecedentedthatsomethingmorethanacourtesyvisitseemedtobeinvolved.

Suddenly,asuccessionofeventsoverthebetterpartofayearbegantotakeona

newsignificance.

O



CastrohadconsideredKhrushchev’sconductintheCubanmissilecrisisan

abjectsurrender.RelationsbetweenMoscowandHavanahaddeteriorated

dramatically.In1967CastroevenwentsofarastoattacktheSovietspubliclyfor

theirfailuretogiveeffectiveassistancetotheirArabfriendsduringtheSixDay

War.HehadresistedSovieteffortstore adtheChineseoutoftheCommunist

movementandhadcontinuedradicalpoliciesof“exportingrevolution”inLatin

AmericawithoutSoviethelp.KosyginhadmetwithCastroin1967,butthat

November,atthetimeofthefiftiethanniversaryoftheSovietrevolution,the

CubanshadvirtuallyboycottedtheMoscowfestivitiesbysendingalow‐level

delegation,whichdepartedalmostimmediatelywithoutbeingreceivedbyany

prominentSovietleader.Relationsbegantoimprove,however,afterthedeathof

CheGuevarainOctober1967.Inthespringof1968anewtradeagreementwas

signed,includingaSovietcreditofover$300million.InAugust1968Cuba

endorsedtheinvasionofCzechoslovakia, thoughbelatedlyandwith

qualifications.Inearly1969theSovietsresumedregularshipmentsofmilitaryaid

forthefirsttimeinayear;theyalsorefinancedtheCubantradedeficitwiththe

USSR.BythetimeoftheJune1969ConferenceofCommunistPartiestheCuban

delegatesaidgrandiloquentlythatHavanawouldsupportMoscowincaseofa

“provocationoraggressionagainsttheSovietpeoplecomefromwhereitmay.”It

wasthefirsttimethatCubahadtakentheSovietsideintheSino‐Sovietdispute.



Thefollowingmonth,July1969,theSovietsundertooktheirfirstnavalvisit

toCuba.Sevenships,includingtwodiesel‐poweredandonenuclear‐powered

attacksubmarine,paidaportcallandthenconductedsomemaneuversinthe

GulfofMexico;thenavalforcelefttheareaaftervisitingMartiniqueand

Barbados.Simultaneously,anewSovietY‐classballisticmissilesubmarinebegan

itsfirstpatrolintheNorthAtlantic.



InNovember1969Soviet‐Cubanrelationsinthemilitaryfieldadvanced

anotherstep.TheSovietMinisterofDefense,MarshalAndreiGrechko,paida

highlypublicizedvisittoCuba,accompaniedbytheDeputyChiefoftheSoviet

NavalStaff.Aftertheevent,itseemslikelythatitwasthisvisitthatledtothe

eventsIamabouttodescribe.InthemonthsthatfollowedGrechko’svisit,atany

rate,SovietmilitaryactivityinandaroundCubagraduallyincreased—almost

certainlytogetusaccustomedtoaSovietnavalpresenceintheCaribbean.In

April1970theCubanDefenseMinister,RaulCastro,returnedGrechko’svisitwith

afive‐weeksojournintheSovietUnion,wherehemetwithLeonidBrezhnev.On

April22,inaLeninDayspeech,FidelCastroproclaimedhisreadinesstoestablish

closermilitarytieswiththeSovietUnion.Shortlyafterward,long‐range

reconnaissanceaircraftbegantoflyfromtheNorthernUSSR toCuba;thesewere

Tu‐95jetbombersequippedwithclearlyvisibleelectronicbubbles.Three

separateflightsprecededthesecondvisitbyaSovietnavaltaskforce,which

cameinAprilontheheelsofamajorSovietnavalexercise(“Okean”)intheNorth

Atlantic.Thistimesevenshipsarrivedforatwo‐weekvisittoCienfuegos.They

includedasubmarinetenderandanuclear‐poweredE‐II‐classsubmarinearmed

withshort‐rangecruisemissilesdesignedforuseagainstshipping.



NeithertheCIAnortheDefenseDepartmentraisedanywarningflagsatthe

time,buttheincreasingpaceofthisSovietairandnavalactivityconcernedme

sufficientlytosummarizeitforthePresidentonJune1,1970:



WhiletheSovietnavalvisitsmaybepartoftheoveralltrendinrecentyearstoward

increasedSovietnavalactivityeverfurtherfromSoviethomeports,theymayalsobeaneffort

to“accustom”WashingtontogreaterSovietuseofCubabyestablishinggraduallythe

precedentofvisitsandbunkeringofactiveSovietfleetandairunits.TheSovietscould

conceivablywishtomaintainSovietnavalunitsintheCaribbean‐SouthernAtlanticonamoreor

lesspermanentbasis,refuelingandresupplyingoutofCuba…Itwillbeimportanttokeepour

eyeonthissituation.



LaterinJunemyNSCstaffexpertinLatinAmericanaffairs,VironP.(Pete)

Vaky,calledmyattentiontoaCIAstudywhichsuggestedthattheSoviets,

howevercautiously,mightintendtoestablishanewfacilityinCuba,suchasan

installationforservicingeithershipsorreconnaissanceaircraft.



ThiswasthebackgroundagainstwhichwewatchedtheSovietflotillareach

CienfuegosonSeptember9.Onthefollowingdaythemerchanttankerjoined

them.DailyU‐2flightswereorderedtobeginonthefirstclearday,whichturned

outtobeSeptember14.



TheAdministration’sconcernatthatpointwastheflotillamuchmorethan

thenewshoreinstallations.Inanunusualgesture,MelLairdhadinvitedPentagon

reporterstohisprivatediningroomforcoffeeonSeptember2foranimpromptu

pressconference.Lairdrangedovera numberofissues,includingtheMiddleEast.

ItwashisremarksonCuba,ho wever,thatcaughttheheadlines.Hecalled

attentiontotheSovietshipsmovingtowardtheCaribbean,sayingthatnewsof

themshouldbemadepublicbecausetherewasevidencethattheSoviettask

forcehadweaponscapableofreachingtheUnitedStates.But,headded,“Idonot

seeacrisis”becauseAmericahadsufficientnuclearpowertodeterattack.

The

story,however,receivedlittlesustainedattentionfromthemedia.Cubawas

vastlyovershadowedbytheceasefireviolationsalongtheSuezCanalandthe

loomingcrisisinJordan—whic hmayhavebeenonereasonwhytheSovietswere

solittleeagerto helpcalmtheMiddleEast.Itwasameasureofthetimesthat,

whileJordanwasblowingupandtheSovietswerebuildingasubmarinebasein

Cuba,theSenatewasdebatingABMfromthepremisethatdefensiveAmerican

strategicdeploymentsweresomehowprovocative.



TheCubanreactiontoourdailyU‐2flightsshowedthatsomethingunusual

wasafoot.OurfirstflightonSeptember14hadtobeabortedbecauseMiG

fightersscrambledafterit.Anothermissionflyingaroundtheperipheryofthe

islandwasalso interceptedandforcedtoterminateitsmission.OnSeptember15

aUSNavyantisubmarineaircraftwasinterceptedandshadowedforsixtymiles

whiletheMiGmadeseveralstrafingpasses.Iwassufficientlyconcernedon

September16towarntheSovietUnionthatoperatingmissile‐carrying

submarinesornuclearweaponsfromCubaorservicingthemfromtherewould

havegraveconsequences.IusedthevehicleofabackgroundbriefinginChicago.

Sincewedidnotyethaveanyconcreteevidenceorasettledpolicy,Istoppedjust

shortofmakingadirectchargethattheSovietswereactuallydoingthesethings.

Itseemedbesttoleaveopenalineofretreatforthem.



Asithappened,conclusiveevidencewasbeingcollectedthatverydaybya

U‐2.WhatthephotographyshowedwasthatinlessthanthreeweekstheSoviet

Unionhadrushedtocompleteafairlysignificantshoreinstallation.Twonew

barracksandadministrativebuildingssuddenlystoodonCayoAlcatraz,whichhad 

beenbarrenonlyamonthearlier.Recreationfacilitieshadquicklyrisenonthe

island,includingabasketballcourtandasoccerfield.Inmyeyesthisstampedit

indeliblyasaRussianbase,sinceasanoldsoccerfanIknewCubansplayedno

soccer.Moreimportant,thesubmarinetenderwasmooredinpermanentfashion

tofourbuoysinthebay.Alongsidethetenderwerethetwosupportbarges,

whichhadbeenunloadedfromtheamphibiousship.Thetenderwasthusina

positiontoservicesubmarines.Antisubmarinenetsguardedtheentrancetothe

harbor.Onthemainland,afewmilesfromthetownofCienfuegos,therehad

arisenanewdock,afuelstoragedepot,andtheearlystagesofamajor

communicationsfacility,undo ubtedlytheradiolinktoMoscow,guardedby

antiaircraftmissilesandsurveillancera dar.Whatwesaw,inshort,hadallthe

earmarksofapermanentSovietnavalbase.



IcompiledtheinformationforNixoninamemorandumofSeptember18,

alongwitharecapitulationofmyexchangeswithVorontsov.Iconcluded:



Today’sphotographyreadoutconfirmsthatdespitetheexchangebetweenVorontsov

andmyselftheSovietshavemovedprecipitouslytoestablishaninstallationinCienfuegosBay

whichisprobablydesignedtoserveasasubmarinestagingbaseintheCaribbean.Becauseof

theseriousnessofthissituationIhaveaskedCIAtoprovidemewithabriefingat12:30todayat

whichtimewewillcarefullyevaluatethefullrangeofphotographicevidencenowheldinan

efforttodeterminemorepreciselythefullscopeofSovietactivityinCuba.Iamalsoinitiating,

onanurgentbasis,adetailedanalysisofthestrategicimplicationsofthisdevelopment.



TheintelligenceanalysisthatIreceivedlaterinthedayconcludedthatthe

Sovietswere“establishingasupportfacility[inCienfuegos]fornavaloperationsin

theCaribbeanandtheAtlantic.”Itaddedominously that“Sovietnavalunits,

includingnuclearpoweredsubmarines,maysoonbeoperatingregularlyoutof

theCubanportofCienfuegos.”Ournavalexpertspointedoutthatapermanent

facilityinCubawouldsharplyreducethetimeSovietsubmarineslostinmaking

longtransitstooperatingareasintheAtlantic.Theresultwouldbetoincreaseby

approximatelyone‐thirdthetimethatSovietballisticmissilesubmarinescouldbe

onstationinrangeoftheUnitedStates,ortoincrease,alsobyapproximately

one‐third,thenumberofsubmarinesonstationatanyonetime.Thiswouldbea

quantumleapinthestrategiccapabilityoftheSovietUnionagainsttheUnited

States.



<<Contents>>



****



TheShowdown



videnceoftheSovietnavalbaseinCubareacheduswhilewewere

negotiatingthereleaseofthehostagesheldinAmman,whileHussein’stroops

wereslowlyadvancingagainstthefedayeen,whileAmericanforceswereeither

beingrushedtotheMediterraneanormobilized,whilethecease‐fireviolations

alongtheSuezCanalcontinued,andwhileweweretryingtodesignaresponseto

Allende’spluralityinChile.Wewerefacingthatnightmareofpolicymakers:

simultaneouscrisesinwidelyseparatedpartsoftheglobe.



Thereactionofseniorofficialsreflectedthis.SecretaryRogerstoldmeon

September18—thedaytheintelligenceaboutCienfuegoswasconfirmedin

Washington—thatwehadtoguardagainst“high‐leveltension.”Hewantedany

paperworkrestrictedtoaminimumsothatwedidnot“createacrisisinthe

publicmind.”Thekeyissue,ofcourse,wasnotwhethertherewasacrisisinthe

publicmindbutwhetherthereexistedacrisisobjectively,whetherwecould

acceptapermanentSovietnavalbaseinCuba,whateveritsimmediatemilitary

significance,ontopofthedispatchofSovietmilitarypersonneltoEgypt.Itold

RogersthatIwouldschedulearestrictedmeetingoftheWSAGthenextday,

givingusanopportunitytocollectourthoughtsaswellasanyadditional

intelligence.



TheWashingtonSpecialActionsGroupmetasscheduledonSeptember19,

whichcoincidedwiththelullinthefightinginJordanjustbeforetheSyrian

invasion.BecausetheinformationaboutCienfuegoshadbeenrestricted,there

wasnorealstaffpreparation.Opinionsthereforegyratedrandomlyina

conversationalstyle.Therewasnodisputeaboutthefacts;allagreedthatabase

capableofservicingnuclearsubmarineswasbeingbuiltandthattheSovietswere

seekingtoskirttheKennedy‐Khrushchevunderstandingbyplacingmostofthe

facilitiesoffshore.TherewassomedisputeaboutwhetherSovietactivities

violatedthe“understanding”;Iremindedthegroupthatin1962President

KennedyhadreactednotbecausethedeploymentofSovietmissilestoCubahad

been“illegal”—itwas,infact,thentechnically“legal”—butbecausehe

considereditathreattothesecurityoftheUnitedStates.Thegroupthentriedto

gaugepreciselythedegreeto whichafullyoperationalbasewouldaffectthe

strategicbalance(anissuethathadalsobeendebatedduringthe1962missile

crisis).



ThesereactionsreflectedthedifficultyAmericanshaveindealingwiththe

Sovietstrategyofambiguity.Wewereclearlyfacinganewnavalfacility.Ithad

beenbuiltdeceptivelyinlessthanthreeweeks.Evenifnofurtherfacilitieswere

added,itwouldincreasetheSovietcapacitytokeepballisticmissilesubmarinesat

combatstations.Ifexpanded,itmighteffectivelydoubletheSoviets’sea‐based

missileforceagainstus.IftheSovietsproceededintheirusualfashion,thefirst

deployments,ifnotresisted,wouldbefollowedbyafurtherrapidincrease.The

experienceofthemissilebuildupalongtheSuezCanalwouldberepeated,this

timeagainstus.Ifweacquiescedintheoriginalinstallation,wewouldhave

difficultyinresistingitsexpansion.Butasyetourgovernmentcouldnotbequite

surewhattheSovietswereupto,andthuswehesitatedoverourresponse.Since

boththePresidentandtheSecretaryofStatewishedtoavoidacrisisatmosphere

untilwehadsetourcourse,IaskedeachagencyrepresentedattheWSAGto

submititsassessmentandrecommendationsonaveryrestrictedbasisby

September21.TheStateDepartment,inparticular,wastosolicittheviewsof

AmbassadorLlewellynThompson,thenourleadingSovietexpert.



LlewellynThompsonrespondedthattheSovietmovewaslargelysymbolic;

itwasasymptomoftheirinferioritycomplex. Despiteallideologicalinvective,we

werethemodelofagreatpowerthattheSovietUnionsoughttoemulate,lagging

somefifteenyearsbehindusinitsevolution.Inotherwords,Thompson

suggested,theSovietswerenowdevelopingoverseasnavalbasesinimitationof

oureffortsofadecadeandahalfbefo re.TheremedyStateproposedwasaquiet

talkbetweenRogersandGromykoinNewYork,whentheywouldmeetnormally

attheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyaboutamonthhence.Rogerscouldthen

pointoutourconcern. Thompsonofferednosuggestionasto whatweshoulddo

ifGromykostonewalled—whichwasalmostcertain.



TheestimateoftheDefenseDepartmentandJointChiefsofStaffwas

diametricallytheopposite.TheyconsideredasubmarinebaseatCienfuegosa

strategicthreattotheUnitedStates;intheirviewitwouldenableSoviet

submarinestoextendtheiroperationaltimeatseaandenhancetheabilityofthe

SovietunderseafleettooperateintheGulfofMexico,thusexposingadditional

areasoftheUnitedStatestoballisticmissileattack.TheDefenseDepartmentand

theJCSexplainedintechnicaltermshowsuchabasewouldoperate.Naturally,

theyrecommendedremovalofthebasebut,assomanymilitaryplanningpapers

did,leftittothepoliticalleadershiptofigureouthowtoaccomplishsucha

sweepingobjective.Onestepproposedwastodelaytheretirementofsomeof

ouroldernavalships;howthiswouldsignalourresolutionorremovetheSoviets

fromCubawaslefttotheimagination.Anotherperceptivesuggestioninthefall

of1970—sixweeksafterCambodia—wasthecall‐upofreserves.



IsawtheSovietmoveasgoingbeyonditsmilitaryimplications;itwasapart

ofaprocessoftestingunderwayindifferentpartsoftheworld.TheKremlinhad

perhapsbeenemboldenedwhenwereactedtothedispatchofcombattroopsto 

theMiddleEastbypressingIsraelforacease‐fire.Istronglyfavoredfacingthe

challengeimmediatelylesttheSovietsmisunderstandourpermissivenessand

escalatetheirinvolvementtoapointwhereonlyamajorcrisiscouldremovethe

base.Iopposedtime‐wastingmovessuchaswaitingforaGromyko‐Rogers

conversationinamonth’stime.TheSovietsknewthatwewerephotographing

Cienfuegosalmostdaily;ifwedidnothingtheyhadtoassumethatwewere

acquiescing.Ifwethensuddenlyconfrontedthem,theymighthaverunoutof

maneuveringroom;theconsequentcrisismightwellbesharpenedbytheirbelief

thattheyhadbeensetupforhumiliation.Moreover,wewereexpectingan

imminentreplytooursuggestionofasummit.IftheSoviets’answerwaspositive,

wewouldfaceadditionalobstaclesinconfrontingthem,andifwedidso,we

wouldhavetodoitabruptlyandatalevelthatwouldstaketheprestigeofthe

topleadersonbothsides,makingitevenmoredifficulttocontainthecrisis.



Thefactthatsomuchoftheequipmentwasseaborneindicatedtome,

however,thattheSovietshadleftthemselvesawayout.Ifchallenged,they