Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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meetings—withoutresult,true,butalsowithoutdebacleorcontroversy.Nixon,

likeme,whilenotindifferenttothehallowedagenda,sawanopportunityin

WarsawtoconveyanewandmoresignificantmessagetoChina.Noneofthe

agendasubjectswascapableofbeingdefined,muchlesssolved,solongasPeking

consideredtheUnitedStatesitsprincipalforeignenemyandWashingtonviewed

ChinaasthefountofallaggressionandrevolutionaryactivityinAsia,includingin

Vietnam.



FortwentyyearsUSpolicymakersconsideredChinaasabrooding,chaotic,

fanatical,andalienrealmdifficulttocomprehendandimpossibletosway.They

hadbeenconvincedthattheVietnamwarwasareflectionofChinese

expansionism,andthattheCulturalRevolutionderivedfromanobsessionwith

ideologicalpurityalien,andnotalittlefrightening,totheAmerican

temperament.TheChinese,fortheirpart,sawthescaleofoureffortinVietnam

asdisproportionatetoanyobjectivetobeachieved,andhencebelieveditsonly

rationalpurposecouldbetoturnIndochinaintoaspringboardforaneventual

assaultonChina.Thesetwentyyearsofdeadlock—reflectingsincerelyheld

views—hadblindedourexperts,andnodoubttheiroppositenumbersinthe

People’sRepublic,toavitalchange:anemerging,stillonlydimlyperceived

communityofinterestbetweentheUnitedStatesandChina.Theleadersintwo

countrieshadbegun,forthefirsttimeinageneration,toregardeachotherin

geopoliticalratherthanideologicalterms.



ImpelledbytheobviousmenaceoftheSovietbuilduponthe4,000‐mile

commonborder,Chinawantedtoreducethenumberofitsadversariesandto

obtainanothercounterweighttoSovietpressure.Burdenedbythetraumasof

Vietnam,yetdeterminedtoshapeaneweraofinternationalrelations,theNixon

Administrationwasconvincedthatcontactwiththisonequarterofhumanity

couldrestorenewperspectivetoourdiplomacy.Bothpartieshadtotreadwarily,

feelingtheirwaytowardeachotherwithsignificantbuttenuousmessagesand

gestures,whichcouldbedisavowedifrejected.Itwasperhapsnotsurprisingthat

thesubtlechangesbywhichtheChinesesignaledtheirwillingnesstoaltercourse

hadbeenoverlookedbyourexperts;andtheissuehadbeenconfusedbythe

well‐meaningbutwoollyeffortsof“Chinesefriendship”groupsinAmerica.



Toomanyofthembasedtheirviewsonabstractnotionsofpersonal

“goodwill,”orevenhistoricalguilt,difficultforpolicymakerstoreconcilewiththe

realitiesoftheAmericannationalinterest—orofthenewChina.Whatthe

Chinesewantedwasnotvacuousbenevolence,oreventhepracticalstepsthat

hadbeentheessenceofthepreviousdialogue,suchasrecognition,UN

membership,claims,exchanges.Theywantedstrategicreassurance,someeasing

oftheirnightmareofhostileencirclement.ThisthenewAdministrationwas

preparedtoprovide,anditsmuchdecriedunsentimentalitywasapositiveasset

becauseitwasintunewithChina’shardheadedneeds.Butwehadtoovercome

thepreconceptionsoftwodecades,theparalyzinggripofexpertsbroughtupon

differentprecepts,andthebizarrerivalrieswithintheAdministration.Ithought

wecoulddononeofthisunlesswebrokeoutofthestagnatingritualofWarsaw

and,specifically,until wearrangedhigh‐leveltalksamongspecialemissariesin

oneofthecapitals,probablyPeking.



AmericanambassadorstoWarsawweregenerallynotselectedfortheir

expertiseonChineseaffairs.Foreachmeeting,therefore,amiddle‐levelofficial

hadtobeflowninwiththetextofastatementthathadbeenpainfullycleared

throughthebureaucracyandamongfriendlycountries. OurAmbassado rwould

thenreadhisstatement;hereceivedareplynodoubtpro ducedbyanalogous

procedures.Theambassadors’permitteddiscretiondidnotgobeyondafew

clarifyingquestions.Atthenextsessiontheyreadoutaresponseponderously

preparedanewintherespectivecapitals.Italltooktimeandgotnowhere.Inthe

prevailingatmosphereofdistrust,neithersidecouldbesurewhatusewouldbe

madeofacandidpre sentationofrealaimsorviews.Andthedistrustcouldnotbe

dispelledwithoutanunconstraineddiscussion.Iconsidereditessentialtomove

thedialoguetoalevelwherethenegotiatorscouldengageinsomegive‐and‐take

andweresufficientlyfamiliarwiththethinkingoftheirleaderstograspthe

underlyingstrategy.IwantedtousetheJanuary20meetingtoindicateour

willingnesstosendanemissarytoPeking,andIsuggestedtothePresidentthatit

didnotmatterwhatelsewassaidsolongasitincludedourbasicthemes:thatwe

wantedtomakeafreshstart;thatwewouldnotparticipateinaSoviet‐American

condominium;thatwewouldproceednotonthebasisofideologybutonan

assessmentofmutualinterest.



NoneofthiswasacceptabletothosewhohadmadeChinapolicyuptothat

time.Eachofthesethemeswasfiercelyresistedwhenitcametodraftinga

statementforAmbassadorStoesseltoreadonJanuary20.TheAsianexpertsdid

notshareourhopesforanewbeginning(partlybecausetheydidnotknowwhat

waspassinginsecretchannels);theSovietexpertswereuneasylesttheSoviet

Unionbeantagonizedbythemerefactofthetalks,andstillmorebyourincluding

reassurancesaboutcondominium.Progresswasidentifiedwitharenunciationof

forceintheTaiwanStrait,participationinarmscontrolnegotiations,or

assurancesofpeacefulconductinAsia—noneofwhichPekingwouldeven

considerexceptinawidercontext.Asforsendinganemissaryto Peking,the

merementionsentshiversdownofficialspines,fortheconductofsuchtalkswas

likelytobedrawnintotheWhiteHouseandoutofthehandsoftheState

Department.



Thebureaucraticfightwassettledbycompro miseinthetraditional

bureaucraticway:IconcededallState’spetprojects—referenc estoTaiwan,arms

control,claims/assets,prisoners,andsoon—inreturnforthethemesIconsidered

essential.Stoessel’sinstructionsasfinallydraftedwerestillmore mutedthanI

wouldhavewished,butwhenIgottoknowtheChinesebetterI cametorealize

thatunderstatement,fromwhatevermotive,almostalwaysimpressedthem.The

Chinese,havingmanipulatedforeignersforthreethousandyears—andnot

withoutsuccess—tendtoconsiderinsistentreiterationareflectionontheir

subtlety.



Asithappened,theChinesehadbeenthinkingalongparallellines.Atthe

January20meeting,StoesselreadastatementthatrepeatedthattheUnited

Statesdidnotseekto“joininanycondominiumwiththeSovietUniondirected

againstChina.”Headdedasentencewhosematter‐of‐factnessobscuredthe

bureaucraticbloodthathadbeenspilled:TheUnitedStates“wouldbeprepared

toconsidersendingarepresentativetoPekingfordirectdiscussionswithyour

officialsorreceivingarepresentativefromyourgovernmentinWashingtonfor

morethoroughexplorationofanyofthesubjectsIhavementionedinmyremarks

todayorothermattersonwhichwemightagree.”



LeiYang,theChinesechargéd’affaires,didnot,ofcourse,respondtothis 

startlingdeparture,buthereadastatementnotablefortheconciliator ytoneof

itsotherwiseconventionalrhetoriconTaiwan,andfortwopregnantsentences

hiddenamidstfamiliarverbiage:



WearewillingtoconsideranddiscusswhateverideasandsuggestionstheU.S.

Governmentmightputforwardinaccordancewiththefiveprinciplesofpeacefulcoexistence,

thereforereallyhelpingtoreducetensionsbetweenChinaandtheU.S.andfundamentally

improverelationsbetweenChinaandtheU.S.Thesetalksmayeithercontinuetobeconducted

attheambassadoriallevelormaybeconductedatahigherlevelorthroughotherchannels

acceptabletobothsides.



Twoformalspeechesdraftedincapitalstwelvethousandmilesaparthad

madeineffectthesameproposal.ButthenatureoftheWarsawmeetingsmeant

wehadtowaitamonthbeforeseeingwhethertheideacouldbemovedforward

atthenextmeeting.



IwasencouragedinlateJanuarywhenIreadareportofaconversation

betweenChinesePremierChouEn‐laiandthePakistaniAmbassadorinPeking.

TheAmbassadorfoundChouEn‐laiprimarilyconcernedabouttheSovietUnion,

secondarilyabouttherevivalofJapanesemilitarism.AsfortheUnitedStates,

Chouclearlyconsidereditalesserthreat;heseemedquitepreparedforhigh‐level

talkswiththeUnitedStates,providedwetooktheinitiative.Infact,accordingto

thisreport,ChouEn‐laihadmusedaboutourapparentunwillingness“totakea

steplikeKosygin”—inotherwords,tosendahighofficialtoPeking.



Throughout,theSovietswerecharacteristicallyheavy‐handed.Theday

aftertheWarsawmeetingDobryninappearedatmyoffice,seekinga briefing,

undeterredbythefactthatthiswasafavorMoscownevervouchsafedtouson

anytopic.WhenIevadedhisrequest,hesaidthathehopedthatwewerenot

thinkingof“using”Chinaasamilitarythreat,apropositionsogrotesquewhenall

thathappenedwasoneset‐piecespeechbyeachambassadorthatIsimply

laugheditoff.ButotherSovietEmbassypersonnelmadesimilarinquiriesatother

levels;clearly,Pekingwasa“neuralgic”point.



WhilewewaitedforWarsawmeeting136,weredoubledoursearchforless

constrainedchannels.Oneofthepenaltiesoftwentyyearsofisolationwasthat

wehadnoideahow toapproachtheChineseleaders.HenryCabotLodge

introducedmetoafriendofhis,thechargéd’affairesofaWestEuropeancountry

inPekingwhoclaimedaccesstotheChineseleadership.WithNixon’sapprovalI

gavethisdiplomatamessagepointingoutthedifficultyofconductingserious

talksinWarsawandsuggestinganotherchannelthroughourmilitaryattachéin

Paris,GeneralVernonWalters(whohadprovedsoadeptatarrangingmysecret

meetingswithLeDucTho).Lodge’sfriendtookthemessageandthenreported

faithfullyeveryfewweeksthereafterthathehadnotyethadanopportunityto

deliverit.Finally,tenmonthslater,onDecember1,1970,heinformedusthathe

wasabouttodoso—whatgavehimthisconfidenceIcannotimagine—butby

thenwehadalreadyestablishedanalternatechannel.



Warsawmeeting136,plannedforFebruary20,1970,producedanother

tug‐of‐warbetweentheWhiteHouseandtheStateDepartment.Wewerefaced

withthequestionofhowtoreactif,asseemedlikely,theChineseacceptedour

proposaltosendanemissarytoPekingorreceivetheirsinWashington.Iwanted

StoesseltoindicateagreementinprincipleandreferthemattertoWashington

foradetailedreply.TheStateDepartmentmade theextraordinary

recommendationthatwepullbackfromourowninitiativeandsimplynotethe

Chinesereplywithoutcomment.Apartfromthelossofcontrol—andnothing

makesthebureaucraticadrenalinflowlikethedefenseofimperiled

prerogatives—Statewasdecidedlyreluctanttohavetoexplainanewvenueto

suspiciousallies,insistentneutrals,andaquerulousSovietUnion,nottospeakof

themedia.



Iprevailed.NixonorderedmetoinstructStoesseltorespondpositively,

without,ofcourse,neglectingtorecitethelitanyofbilateralissues(Taiwan,

claims,assets,prisoners,andsoon)thathadsustainedtheprevious135

meetings.TomakesuretheChineseunderstoodourchangedattitude,wespoke

ofChinawithunprecedentedmatter‐of‐factnessinthePresident’sForeignPolicy

Report,whichwaspublishedtwodaysbeforetheFebruaryWarsawmeeting:

“TheChineseareagreatandvitalpeoplewhoshouldnotremainisolatedfrom

theinternationalcommunity.Inthelongrun,nostableandenduring

internationalorderisconceivablewithoutthecontributionofthisnationofmore

than700millionpeople.”Westressedthatwewereconcernednotwithrhetoric

butwithpracticalpolicy.Thekeytoourrelationswouldbetheactionsofeach

towardtheother.Thereportexplicitlyrejectedanydesiretotakesidesinthe

Sino‐Sovietconflictandhenceanyideaofcondominium:



Ourdesireforimprovedrelationsisnotatacticalmeansofexploitingtheclashbetween

ChinaandtheSovietUnion.Weseenobenefittousintheintensificationofthatconflict,and

wehavenointentionoftakingsides.NoristheUnitedStatesinterestedinjoiningany

condominiumorhostilecoalitionofgreatpowersagainsteitherofthelargeCommunist

countries.Ourattitudeisclear‐cut—alastingpeacewillbeimpossiblesolongassomenations

considerthemselvesthepermanentenemiesofothers.



Forgoodmeasurethepartofthereportdealingwithdefensepolicy,asI

havementioned,emphasizedthatwenolongerconsideredtheSovietUnionand

thePeople’sRepublicasingleadversary.Henceforth,ourwarplanningwouldbe

basedontheassumptionthatjointSino‐Sovietaggressionagainstushadceased

tobeanimminentcontingency.Wewoulddealwitheachcountryseparatelyon

thebasisofitsconducttowardus.



Themessageswerereceivedandunderstood.Atthe136thmeetingLei

Yangmadeanextraordinarilyconciliatorystatement—andacceptedourproposal

tosendanemissarytoPeking.Weseemedonthevergeofabreakthrough.Ifwe

signaledourchangedattitudebeforetheWarsawmeeting,theChinesedidso

immediatelyafter.OnFebruary22wereceivedacommunicationfromPakistani

AmbassadorHilalythathisPresident,YahyaKhan,believedourinitiativeshad

encouragedtheChinese.ThiscircumlocutionundoubtedlymeantthatYahyahad

informationfromtheChinese,whopreferredasyettodealindirectlywithus.

AccordingtoYahya,theChinesewerenowmuchlessworriedaboutUS‐Soviet

collusion.Theywould,however,beupsetiftheUnitedStatesweretogivethe

impressionthatChineseoverturesderivedfromweaknessorfromfear.Prospects

forgradualprogresswerefavorable,especiallysince“thepossibilityofexpansion

oftheVietnamwarisseenashavinglessened.AwarbetweenChinaandtheUSis

seennowasaveryremotepossibility.”Inotherwords,ChouEn‐laihad

understoodus.Hehadevengraspedbyearly1970whatsomanydomesticcritics

hadfailedtoacknowledge:thatwewereonthewayoutofVietnam.Andhe

coupledthiswithanunmistakablehintthatChinahadnointentionofentering

theVietnamwaror,forthatmatter,ofattackinganyothervitalAmerican

interest.



IrepliedimmediatelytoHilalythatwecouldnotcontrolpressspeculation,

buttheWhiteHousewouldscrupulouslyavoidanycommentsthatmightimpugn

China’smotivesorstrength.Isuggestedagainthatweopenachannelmore

suitableforconfidentialexchangesthantheWarsawtalks.Nixonwrote“Good”

onmymemorandumreportingtheconversation.TheroadtoPekingwasopenif

wewerepreparedtotravelitwithskillanddelicacy.



Buttheencrustedsuspicionoftwodecadesisnoteasilyovercome.Now

thatwewerefacedwithaChineseacceptanceofourownproposal,allthelatent

uneasinessinourgovernmentsurfacedagain.AtthenextWarsawmeetingwe

couldnotevadetheissuemerelybyfillingtheagendawitheverybody’sfavorite

project;eventhemostartfuldraftingofStoessel’sinstructionscouldnotobscure

therealitythatwenowhadtorespondtoaChineseinvitationtocometoPeking.



TheviewinState’sEastAsianBureauwasthatatriptoPeking,without

priorprogressonbilateralissuesdiscussedforfifteenyears,impliedaconcession

totheChineseandriskedmisunderstandingbyallies,nottospeakofhostilityin

Moscow.TheBureauwantedtheChinesetoconcedeusourprincipalAsian

concernsasanadmissionpricetohigh‐leveltalks.Myviewwasthatthebilateral

issueswereperipheraltotheimperativesnowdrivingtheChinese.Only

extraordinaryconcernaboutSovietpurposescouldexplaintheChinesewishtosit

downwiththenationheretoforevilifiedasthearchenemy.IfIwascorrect,what

theChinesereallywantedtodiscusswastheglobalbalanceofpower.I wasnot

concernedaboutState’sfearthattheChinesemightwanttobogusdownin

protracted,humiliatingnegotiationsinPeking;theycouldnotpossiblybewanting

tohumiliateus;thePekinginvitationmadesenseonlyiftheChinesewereseeking

toreducethenumberoftheirenemies. Themereopeningof talkswould

revolutionizeinternationalrelationshipsbydemonstratingthatwehadoptions

previouslythoughtunavailable,andthatwewerecapableoftakingbold

initiativesevenunderthepressureofthewarinVietnam.



TheStateDepartmentviewwassummedupinamemorandumfrom

RogerstothePresidentonMarch10,proposingMarch19asthedateforthenext

Warsawambassadorialme eting.Ifweallowedforty‐eighthoursforPresidential

consideration,thememorandumwasclearlytimedwithdelayinmind.The

Chinesecouldnotprepareforameetingonsuchshortnot ice.Andthesuggested

agendamadeafruitfulmeetingunlikely:agreementinprincipletopeaceful

settlementoftheTaiwanproblemandexpansionoftradeand mutualcontacts;

someunilateralChinesegestureofgoodwill,suchasthereleaseofAmericansor

theexpansionoftravel.OnlyaftertheChinesehadyieldedonthesepoints,which

Rogersoptimisticallyexpectedwouldtake“several”moreWarsawmeetings,

woulditbesafetodiscusseventhemodalitiesofahigher‐levelemissaryto

Peking.



OnMarch17IhadalonglunchintheSituationRoomwithMarshallGreen,

theAssistantSecretaryofState forEastAsianandPacificAffairs,inwhichhe

pressedagainforsomepriorindicationofChinesewillingnesstomeetour

concernsonbilateralmatters. Afterward,hewrotemeapersonalnote

summarizinghisanxieties:



TogotoPekingwithoutsuchclarificationposesseriousriskofourbeingusedbyPeking

foritsownpurposesinitsrelationswiththeSovietswithoutanycompensatinggainseitherin

termsofourbilateralrelationswiththeChineseorinprogresstowardarelaxationoftensions

elsewhere,particularlyinSouthEastAsia.Forthesamereason,Ithinkweshouldnotofferto

discusswiththeChinesemodalitiesofameetingsuchascommunications,personnel,timing,

security,etc.,unlesswehavemadeafirmandfinaldecisiontogoaheadwithsuchameeting.

Ourdiscussionofsuchmodalitieswill beinterpretedasafirmcommitmenttoahigher‐level

meetingbyPeking,andmayreinforcetheChinesebelieftheyneednotdiscuss“substance”

withusuntilsuchameetingtakesplace.Tomakesuchacommitmentatthispointwouldthus

weakenourabilitytopresstheChinesenowtocommitthemselvesfurtherontheirown

intentionsandnegotiatingpositionatahigher‐levelmeeting.



Idisagreed.Thevisit ofanAmericanemissarytoPekingwasboundtospark

ageopoliticalrevolution;theeffectonHanoialonewouldbetraumatic.These

wereoverwhelming“compensatinggains.”AtthesametimeIcouldnotconceive

thatinWarsawtheChinesewouldpubliclyconcedeprinciplesreversingtheir

wholepolicyinAsiawithouthavinganyideaofouroverallapproach.Wewould

encounter,tobesure,seriouscomplicationsinrelationswithourAsianfriends,

butwewouldfacemostoftheseanywayasChinaemerged,asitwasbound

eventuallytodo,fromitsself‐imposedisolation. TheUnitedStatesshouldchoose

tobenotanimpotentbystanderbutratherthepurposefulshaperofevents.



Nixonsharedmyview.Inseveralconversationshestressedhisdesireto

movethevenuetoPekingandtosendaspecialPresidentialenvoyratherthana

conventionalambassador.Thiswas,ofcourse,exactlywhyStatewassoskittish

abouttheenterprise.NixonsuggestedthatIcircumventthebureaucracyby

lettingLodge’sfriend,theEuropeanchargeinPeking,informtheChineseleaders

ofouragreementinprincipletosendaPresidentialemissary.Wedidnotyet

knowthatthiswould‐bematchmakerhadwildlyoverstatedhisaccessto the

Chineseleaders,butashehadnotyetdeliveredhisoriginalmessageIsawno

pointinbotheringhimwithsomethingsostartling.



Thisinternalwranglinglastedaweekbeyondthedateoriginallyintended

fortheWarsawmeetingitself.Tobringmatterstoa headIsentamemorandum

toStateonMarch20proposinganimmediateWarsawmeetingandurgingthat

Stoessel’sinstructionsreflecta“positive”approachtotheidea ofhigher‐level

talks;weshouldalsotakeupLeiYang’shintsthatgeneralFarEasternproblems

couldbediscussed,andnotonlythetraditionalSino‐Americanbilateralissues.

Staterepliedthattheearliestdateatwhichitcouldpreparea“cleared”

statementwasApril8(raisingsome questioninmymindwhetheritwouldhave

presentedanunclearedstatementhadweapprovedMarch19).ThisIaccepted.

PekingcamebackwithApril15,thoughwhetherthiswasfortacticaloritsown

bureaucraticreasonswasunrevealed.[

MaolaterexplainedtoNixoninFebruary1972

thattherehadbeensomebureaucraticresistanceoratleastlassitudeonthe Chinese side.]

ThedelayenabledStatetothinkupyetanotherreasonforpostponement.Chiang

Ching‐kuo,VicePremieroftheRepublicofChina(Taiwan)andsonofChiangKai‐

shek,wasduetovisitWashingtononApril22.TheEastAsianBureauconsideredit

unwisetoscheduletalkswithPekinginWarsawwithintwoweeksbeforeorten

daysafterthetrip(theyneversharedwithmehowthesefigureswerearrivedat).

OnApril1,therefore,theUnitedStatesproposedtotheChineseApril30orany

datethereafter.TheChinese,clearlyirritatedbynow,decidedtoplayat

procrastinationthemselves.Theywaitedforfourweeksbeforereplying.OnApril

28theysuggestedMay20andweaccepted.



Itwasextraordinarythatwereceivedanyreplyatall.ByApril28Sihanouk,

inPeking,hadestablishedhisCambodiangovernmentinexileandliberation

army.ChouEn‐laihadpassionatelyespousedhiscause.SouthVietnameseforces

wereenteringtheParrot’sBeak.Ourtroopswerepoisedtomoveinto the

sanctuaries.Inthefa ceofallthis,Chinaacceptedfurthertalks,thepurposeof

whichwastoarrangethevisitofarepresentativeoftheimperialistenemyto

Peking.NotuntilMay18,nearlythreeweeksafterthestartofouroperationsin

Cambodia,didtheChineseputoutthroughtheNewChinaNewsAgencyaterse

statementthatinviewofthe“brazen”invasionofCambodia,“theChinese 

governmentdeemsitnolongersuitableforthe137thmeetingoftheSino‐US

ambassadorialtalkstobeheldonMay20asoriginallyscheduled.Astowhenthe

meetingwillbeheldinthefuture,itwillbedecideduponlaterthrough

consultationbytheliaisonpersonnelofthetwosides.”



Itwasjustaswell.Chinacouldhardlyhaveattendedsuchameeting

withoutharanguingusharshlyaboutIndochina.Acrimonywouldhavebeen

unavoidable.Instead,thecancellationwasaccomplishedinthemostrestrained

matterconceivable.Onlythetiming,notthefact,ofameetingwasdeemed

“unsuitable”;Chinamadeclearitswillingnesstocontinueconversationsandeven

suggestedaprocedureforaccomplishingit.Thereweretobeotherinterruptions

duetoeventsbeyondthecontrolofeitherside,butthereafterChinaandthe

UnitedStatesneverstayedlongoutoftouch.



TheMay20cancellationwasprovidentialforanotherreason.Our

governmentwassimplynotreadytospeakwithasinglevoice.Tobesure,after

mucheffortIhadsucceededinhavingtheMay20instructionsmodifiedto

includeadiscussionoftechnicalaspectsofanemissary’svisit,andtoauthorize

Stoesseltotalkaboutbroaderrelationships,especiallyintheFarEast.Butthe

changeswereaccomplishedsogrudginglyandenvelopedsoostentatiouslyin

conventionalrhetoricthatWarsawclearlywouldnotdoasthesiteofaserious

discussion.TheWhiteHouse’sinterestintalkingtoPekingaboutcommon

geopoliticalconcernscouldnotbedealtwith—orperhapsevenunderstood—

there.TheWarsawtalksneverresumed.Whenwereestablishedcontactlaterin

theyear,itwasinadifferentchannel,withasharperfocus.



<<Contents>>



****



TriangularRelationships



hedisagreementswithinourgovernmentonthestrategyfortheWarsawtalks

wereserious,buttherewasnoneaboutthegeneraldesirabilityofcontinuing 

tosignalourconciliatoryattitudetoPeking.TheStateDepartmentskillfully

dismantledvariousobstaclestotradeandcontactsestablishedduringtheKorean

war.OnMarch16travelrestrictionstoNorthVietnam,Cuba,NorthKorea,and

whatwasthencalledMainlandChinawereformallyextendedforanothersix

months.ButineffectapartialexceptionwasmadeforChina.Itwasannounced

thathenceforthAmericanpassportswouldbevalidatedfortravelthereforany

“legitimate”purpose.OnApril29American‐madecomponentsandspareparts

fornonstrategicgoodsmanufacturedinothercountrieswerefreedforexportto

China.Thepracticalobjectwastoreducedisputeswithfriendlynationsoverthe

extraterritorialreachofourcontrols;thefundamentalpurposewasapolitical

gesturethatPekingcouldhardlymisunderstand.

T

