Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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interagencystudiesinourgovernment;itfounditswayalmostunchangedinto

theShanghaiCommuniquéthatendedNixon’svisitoverfourteenmonthslater.)

Ourmessageproposedameetingoflower‐levelofficialstoworkout

arrangementsforavisitbyanemissary.Thetwosideshadineffectagreedona

meetinginPeking.



Oncelaunchedonthiscourse,theChinesemultipliedtheirsignals.On

December18MaoreceivedEdgarSnowforalonginterview,anactionthat,

however,onceagainoverestimatedoursubtletyandourintelligencecapabilities.

WhereasNixonhadfirstpubliclyexpressedhiswishtovisitChinainaTime

interviewinOctober,Maofirstexpressedwillingness towelcomeNixoninwhat

wouldlaterbeaLifeinterview(undoubtedlydrivingthesoulofHenryLuceintoa

stateoftorment).MaoobserveddrylytoSnowthat“atpresent,theproblems

betweenChinaandtheU.S.A.wouldhavetobesolvedwithNixon.”Therefore,

Mao“wouldbehappytotalkwithhim,eitherasatouristorasPresident.”Ina

subtlemaneuverSnowwasgiveninterpreterNancyT’ang’snotesofthe

conversationbutwasnotpermittedtopublishhisarticleforseveralmonths.The

Chinesesurelycalculatedthatwewouldlearnoftheinterviewandthatthe

handingoverofaverbatimtranscriptcoupledwiththerefusa ltopermitits

publicationwouldheightenitsauthenticity.Ifso,theyweredisappointed.Wedid

notlearnoftheinterviewuntilseveralmonthslaterandbythattimewehadhad

communicationsfromChouEn ‐laisufficientlyexplicitforourlesssupplemindsto

grasp.



Nevertheless,Snow’sinterviewwithMaoisinterestingforwhatittellsus

aboutthestateofmindofChina’sleadersinDecember1970.Itshowsthatthey

wereconsideringaPresidentialvisitatthatearlydate,anideanotyetbroached

officiallyinanyofourcommunications.ItrevealsthattheChinesehadtakennote

ofalltheunilateralAmericansteps.SnowquotedaseniorChinesediplomatas

saying:“NixonisgettingoutofVietnam.”Understandingofthedirectionofour

VietnampolicyseemstohavebeengreaterinTienAnMenSquarethanin

HarvardSquare.Tobesure,Snowdidsuggestthatitwasoursidethataskedto

sendanemissarytoPeking.Therecordissomewhatdifferent.Bothsides

proposedhigher‐levelmeetingsatthesameWarsawsessionofJanuary20.Until

wereceivedtheformalChineseinvitation,wehadkeptopenthepossibilitythat

Washingtonmightbethevenue.TheSnowarticlealsoimpliedthatthePresident

hadinvitedhimselftoPeking.Infact,whileNixonexpressedanabstractdesireto

visitChinainhisOctober1970Timeinterview,thefirstreferencetoaPresidential

visitinanyofourexchangescameinacommentbyChouEn‐laiconveyedon

January11,1971.PerhapstheChineseretainedtheirtraditionalself‐imageof

beingtheMiddleKingdomtowhichbarbarianscametopaytribute;Chinaisnot

aloneamongmajorcountries, infact,innotlikingtoappearthesupplicant.



OnDecember23,JeanSaintenysawChineseAmbassadorHuangChenin

Paris,andtheAmbassadorsaidhehadpassedontohisleadersmymessage

(whichIhadgivenSaintenyinSeptember)indicatingourdesiretosetupasecure

channel.ItwasPeking’swayofvalidatingtheotherapproaches.



As1971opened,theChinesesentusanotherimportantmessage,thistime

throughRomania.Obviously,theChinesewerenomorecertainhow to

communicatewithusthanwewiththem.RomanianAmbassadorCorneliu

BogdancalledonmeattheWhiteHouseonJanuary11withamessagegivento

VicePremierGheorgheRadulescuonavisittoPekinginlateNovember.(Again,

therewasnoexplanationforthelongdelayindeliveringit.)Wewerereada

writtenmessagefromChouEn ‐laialmostidenticalwiththeonepassedthrough

Yahya;thismessage,too,weweretoldhadbeen“reviewedbyChairmanMao

andLinPiao.”Taiwanwassaidtobethe“oneoutstandingissue”betweenthe

UnitedStatesandChina;iftheUnitedStateswerepreparedtosettlethis,an

AmericanspecialenvoywouldbewelcomeinPeking.Therewas,however,an

entirelynovelandstartlingcommentbyChouEn‐lai.Choudisarminglysuggested

thatsincePresidentNixonhadalreadyvisitedBucharestandBelgrade,hewould

alsobewelcomeinPeking.



ThuswasaPresidentialvisittoChinabroachedforthefirsttime.Andby

bracketingPekingwithBucharestandBelgrade—twocapitalswehadvisited

preciselybecauseoftheirindependencefromMoscow—Choumadeclearthat

whateverwassaidformallyaboutTaiwan,hewasinterestedaboveallinthe

Sovietchallenge.NeitherChinesenotemadeanyreferencetoIndochina.Thewar

inVietnammightimpededomestictranquillityinAmerica;itwasnoobstacleto

reconciliationwiththePeople’sRepublicofChina,theavowedlyrevolutionary

stateontheborderofwhichthewarwasragingandwhichfouryearsearlierhad

beenconsideredtheinstigatoroftheconflict.Imadethesepointsina

memorandumtoNixon.Henotedonitthatweshouldnotappeartooeagerto

respond.



Accordingly,IwaiteduntilJanuary29to replytotheRomanian

Ambassador.HewasreturningtoBucharestforconsultation,andwouldhave

considereditoddifIlettheoccasionpasswithouta referencetoChouEn‐lai’s

communication.Inordertoavoidanymisunderstandingsoranexegesisofthe

significanceofdifferentformulations,IgaveBogdanamessagewhichwas

verbatimthatgiventoHilalyoveramonthearlier:Wewerepreparedtotalk

aboutthewholerangeofinternationalissues,includingTaiwan.Theonly

differencewasthatthemessagewasoralandnottyped,indicatingourslight

preferenceforthePakistanichannel;wereasonedthatPakistan’spositionvis‐à‐

visChinaandtheSovietUnionwaslesscomplicatedthanRomania’s.(Itwouldbe

difficultforBucharesttoavoidbriefingMoscow.)Imadenoreferencetoa

Presidentialvisit.Untilwehadhadareplytoourearliermessageregardingthe

agenda,suchanoverturewasprematureandpotentiallyembarrassing.



Therewasagainnothingtodobutwait.Iusedtheintervaltotrytoeducate

myselfonChina.BetweenthemiddleofDecemberandearlyAprilImetthree

timeswithgroupsofacademicexpertsonChinafromvariouseminentinstitutions

ofhigherlearning.Itwouldbesatisfyingtoreportthatmyformercolleagues

conveyedtomeflashesofilluminatinginsight. Outsideadvisers,asIshouldhave

remembered,laborunderdifficultiesdespitetheirlearning.Apolicymaker’s

greatestneedforoutsideadviceisinanintermediaterealmbetweentacticsand

goals.Tacticsareusuallysodependentontheimmediatesituationthatoutsiders

withoutaccesstocablescanrarelymakeasignificantcontribution.Attheother

extreme,ultimategoalsreflectphilosophicalperceptionsandpoliticalnecessities;

whileanadvisercanprovidesomeinsightshere,tobeeffectivehemustbe

conversantwiththeperceptionsofthepolicymaker—changesofcourserequire

self‐confidencerathermorethanexpertknowledge.Thedimensionforwhich

outsideadviceismostusefulisthemedium term,tocarrythepolicymaker

beyondtheurgentbutshortoftheultim ate—theperspectiveoftwotofiveyears.

Unfortunately,thisisnormallytheroutinepreoccupationofacademicians

interestedinpoliticalproblemsandtheyseemtofeelthemselvescheated,

deprivedoftheexcitementofproximitytopower,iftheyarecalledto

Washingtontodonomorethantheycanaccomplishathome.Soinsteadof

focusingonthemediumtermtheytendtofloodthepolicymakerwithminute

tacticaladviceorelaboraterecommendationsastograndstrategyuntil,glassy‐

eyed,hebeginstofeelnewandunaccustomedaffectionforhisregular

bureaucracy.



Thisishowitwaswiththesinologistsearlyin1971.TheacademicChina

expertswereconvincedthattheissuesofprimaryconcerntoChinawereVietnam

andTaiwan.Thisturnedouttobequitewrong.Armscontrolwasanotherpriority

urgedonme;theChineseneverevenraisedthismatterandrebuffeduswhenwe

did;theyconsistentlytooktheGaullistviewthatthewholesubjectwasjust

anotherformofUS‐Sovietcollusion.Anothernearlyuniversalexpertopinionwas

thatbeforeUS‐Chineserelationscouldimprove,wehadtorecognizePekingas

thesolegovernmentofChinaoratleastallowPekingintotheUnitedNations.

Thistoowaswrong:Thebreakthroughoccurredmonthsbeforethelatterevent

tookplace,andsevenyearsbeforePresidentCarterdidtheformer.Bilateraltrade

andexchangeswereanotherprofessorialpriority(exchangesmeantthat

professorscouldvisitChina);theseturnedouttobeofmarginalinteresttothe

Chinese,doledoutwhennecessaryforsymbolicpurposes.Itwaswidelyheld,

again,thatChinawouldinsistonreassurancethatwewerewithdrawingfrom

Asia.Theoppositewastrue.ChinadesperatelywantedusinAsiaasa

counterweighttotheSovietUnion.Ilistenedpolitelytomycolleagues ’

suggestions,chasteninganyimpatiencewiththerecognitionthatIcouldhardly

havebeenmorerelevantwhenIhadservedasanacademicconsultanttotwo

previousadministrations.



Thesecondopportunityforeducationwhilewewerewaitingforthe

Chinesereplywasprovidedbythethreeinteragencystudiesrequestedin1969

and1970regardingChinapolicy,theUNmembershipissue,andourmilitary

strategyinthePacific.[

TheSeniorReviewGroupmetonMarch12andtheNSConMarch

25,1971.]OneadvantageoftheNSCsystemforthesecretdiplomacyinwhichwe

werenowinvolvedwasthatitenabledthePresidentandmetoobtainagency

viewsandideaswithoutrevealingourtacticalplan.Thus,aspartofthestudyof

ourmilitarypostureinAsia,Irequestedabreakdownofwhichofourforcesin

TaiwanwereneededforIndochinaoperationsandwhichwererequiredaspartof

theMutualSecurityTreatywithTaipei.Thisgavemesomeideaofwhatitwas

possibletoconcedeifweweretowithdrawsomeforcesas“tensionsinthearea

diminished.”AsItoldtheSeniorReviewGroup:“Somethingthatwehavenever

donewellbeforeistoextractconcessionsforchangesinmilitarydeployments

thatweweregoingtomakeanyway.Itmightnotbeabadidea tohavethissort

ofinformationavailableforTaiwan.”



Agreatdealofbureaucraticandintellectualenergywasexpendedonthe

issueofChineserepresentationintheUnitedNations,withwhichIshalldeal

later.



AnotherpreoccupationinFebruaryandearlyMarchof1971wastheSouth

Vietnamesemilitarycampaigntocut,withourlogisticandairsupport,theHoChi

MinhTrailintheLaospanhandle. SomeofourcriticsintheCongressandthe

mediaprofessedtoseeinthislimitedoperation—at theSouthernmostextremity

ofLaos,inanareainwhichthewritoftheLaotiangovernmenthadnotrunfor

nearlyadecade—aprovocationtoPekingonthescaleofMacArthur’sadvanceto

theYaluin1950.Thehesitanteffortsofthehithertomuch‐decriedARVNwere

denouncedbymanycriticsastheprecursorofanattackonNorthVietnamitself,

which,itwassaid,Pekingmightintervenetoprevent.(HadtheSouthVietnamese

infactpossessedthiscapacity,thewarinVietnamwouldhaveendedmuch

differently.)ButwewereconvincedthatChinawasplayingabiggergameand

wouldnotvolunteertoputitselfintoitsworstnightmare—aUS‐Soviet

collusion—bylaunchingawaragainstusonHanoi’sbehalfintheuninhabitable

junglesofSouthernLaos.



Eventsboreoutthisjudgment.Tobesure,onFebruary4,1971,the

People’sDailygroundoutaneloquentdenunciationoftheoperationsinLaos.But

justasintheprecedingyearoverCambodia,itcarefullyavoidedpersonalattacks

onNixon;Maowasquoteddirectlyonlyonceandonthesamethemeasinthe

precedingyearoverCambodia:“Strengtheningtheirunity,supportingeachother,

andperseveringinaprotractedpeople’swar,thethreeIndochinesepeopleswill

certainlyovercomealldifficultiesandwincompletevictory.”Inotherwords,

Vietnamwasperfectlycapableofwinningitsownwar;Chinawouldnotinvolv e

itselfmilitarily.



Lestwemissthepoint,ChineseleaderschosethedayofthePeople’sDaily

tiradetosendusanothersignal.Ch’iaoKuan‐hua,ChineseDeputyForeign

MinisterandanoldfriendandassociateofChouEn‐lai,toldtheNorwegian

AmbassadorinPeking,OleAalgard, thatChinawasawareofanewtrendin

Americanpolicy.TheIndochinawarmadeitimpossibletoresumetheWarsaw

talks,Ch’iaosaid,butsoonerorlatertheChinesewouldwanttositdownandtalk

tous.Heexpressedthespecialdesiretomeetwithme,andrequestedthatthe

conversationbebroughttoourattention.Wenotedthemessageandmade

doublysurethatChinaunderstoodourlimitedpurposesinLaos.Nixondeclared

athispressconferenceofFebruary17that“thisactionisnotdirectedagainst

CommunistChina.ItisdirectedagainsttheNorthVietnamesewhoarepointed

towardSouthVietnamandtowardCambodia.Consequently,Idonotbelievethat

theCommunistChinesehaveanyreasontointerpretthisasathreatagainstthem

oranyreasonthereforetoreacttoit.”Noteworthyalsowastherestraintshown

byChouEn‐laiduringavisittoHanoifromMarch5to8.HeofferedtheNorth

Vietnamesemoralandmaterialsupportbutstayedclearofanypersonalinvective

againstNixonorthreatofChineseintervention.



Inthemeantime,inthePresident’ssecondForeignPolicyReport,issuedon

February25,1971,wereiteratedourdesiretoimproverelations.Forthefirst

timeanAmericanofficialdocumentreferredtothePeople’sRepublicofChinaby

itsofficialname.AndwecontinuedtheeasingofrestrictionsonChinatrade.On

March15,theStateDepartmentdisclosedthePresident’sdecisiontoterminate

allrestrictionsontheuseofUSpasspo rts fortraveltothePeople’sRepublicof

China;thereafter,visitstoChinawerepermittedforanylegitimatepurpose.(The

Chinesehadbeenlessliberalwithentryvisas,grantingonlythreeforAmericans

ineighteenmonths.)OnmyinstructionsRonZieglercalledattentionto the

decisioninaWhiteHousebriefing:“Wehopefor,butwillnotbedeterredbya

lackof,reciprocity.”



OnMarch17theChineseshowedwhatpinnaclesofinvectivetheywere

capableofwhentheymeantbusiness:Theylaunchedafire‐breathingverbal

assaultontheSovietUnion.ThethreemajorChinesenewspaperspublisheda

jointeditorialonthecentenaryoftheParisCommuneof1871,stressingthat

revolutionaryvictoryrequiredthe“poweroftherevolutionarymasses.”Brezhnev

wasdenouncedasa“renegade.” TheUnitedStateswasdealtwithinasharply

contrasting,perfunctorymanner.TheSovietUnionhadreplacedusasthe

principalenemyofPeking.



EventhoughMoscowcouldonlylosebyexhibitingitssenseofvulnerability,

ChinawastoorawanervefortheSovietstoignoreevenaverbalassault,asall

werenowenabledtosee.OnMarch26an articleintheSovietforeignaffairs

weeklyNewTimesbitterlyattackedtheUnitedStatesforconducting“adiplomacy

ofsmiles”towardChinainthehopeoffurtheraggravatingSoviet‐Chinese

relations.Even“ultra‐reactionary“groupsintheUnitedStatesweresaidtobein

favorofestablishingtieswithPekingforthissinisterpurpose.



Marchdrewtoaclosewiththetwenty‐fourthCongressoftheSoviet

CommunistPartyinMoscow.GeneralSecretaryBrezhnev’sofficialreporton

March30lamentedthecontinuingstalemateintheUSSR’srelationswithChina,

but“resolutely”rejectedthe“slanderousinventions“abouttheSovietUnionthat

were“beingspreadfromPekingandinstilled intothemindsoftheChinese

people”:



ItisthemoreabsurdandharmfultosowdissentbetweenChinaandtheUSSR

consideringthatthisistakingplaceinasituationinwhichtheimperialistshavebeenstepping

uptheiraggressiveactionagainstthefreedom‐lovingpeoples.Morethaneverbeforethe

situationdemandscohesionandjointactionbyalltheanti‐imperialist,revolutionaryforces,

insteadoffanninghostilitybetweensuchstatesastheUSSRandChina.



ButBrezhnev’soperationalproposalsprovedthatMoscowhadlittleability

topreventwhatitfeared.Heproposedafive‐nat ionconferenceofnuclear

powers—theUnitedStates,theSovietUnion,Britain,France,andChina—“at

whichtheproblemsofnucleardisarmamentasawholeshouldbeconsidered.”

SincePeking’srejectionofallsuchschemeswasaforegoneconclusion,thiswas

anothertransparentattempttoisolateChina.AndtheUnitedStates,ifit

understooditsowninterests,couldnothaveanymotivefo rjoiningsuchaneffort.



BytheendofMarchthetrendwasclear.Wewereapproachingtheendof

thefirststageofourlonganddifficultjourney. AtthispointChouEn‐laitook

anothergiantstepforward.



<<Contents>>



****



Ping‐PongDiplomacy



T

hedramaticeventsthatwereabout toburstuponuswereforeshadowe dby

China’ssystematicrestorationofitsglobaldiplomacyaftertheself‐inflicted

paralysisoftheCulturalRevolution.InMay1969Pekinghadbeguntoreplacethe

ambassadorsofwhomallexceptonehadbeenrecalledduringthatupheaval;in

1970itsoughtnewtieswithcountrieswithwhichithadnotpreviouslyhad

diplomaticrelations.BythebeginningofApril1971,SecretaryRogersreportedto

thePresidentthatPekinghadbeenrecognizedbysevenmorecountriesinthe

previoussixmonths,morethanintheprecedingsevenyears.Chinawas

discussingrenewalofdiplomaticrelations withsuchdiversecountriesasAustria,

Lebanon,Peru,andCameroon,Rogersreported.Ithadmadeoverturestorestore

tiesandestablishneweconomicaidmissionsinseveralAfricanstates;itwasalso

seekingimprovedrelationswithBritainandJapanandwasextendingfeelerseven

toEasternEuropeannationsintheSovietorbit.MuchofPeking’seffort,according

toRogers,seemedaimedatencouragingsupportofitsadmissionto theUnited

Nations.ChouEn‐laimadeitcleartotheBritishchargeinPekingonMarch3that

thepriceofupgradedAnglo‐ChineserelationswouldbeaBritishswitchonthe

issueofChineseadmissiontotheUNandwithdrawaloftheBritishconsulatein

Taipei.



OnApril1,1971,theStateDepartmentreportedothersignificant

developments.ChouEn‐lai,forexample,hadreceivedformerJapaneseForeign

MinisterAiichiroFujiyamainMarchandtoldhimthat“atsome pointasudden

dramaticimprovementispossible”inrelationswiththeUnitedStates.Chousaid

thathehad“verycarefully”readthePresident’sForeignPolicyReportand“took

specificnoteofthefactthatforthefirsttimeanAmericanPresidentcalledChina

byitsofficialname.”ThesameStatememorandumincludedareportofEdgar

Snow’simpressionsfromhisrecenttalkswithMaoandChou.Statecouldnot

havehadthefulltextoftheinterview,foritignoredtheimportantelementofthe

invitationtoNixon;itreportedinsteadthatSnowhadcomeawayfromhis

meetingswiththeimpressionthat“therewasnoimmediateprospectof

improvingSino‐USrelationsbecauseofthewarinI ndochina.”Mao,saidthe

memorandum,didnotexpectprogressinUS‐Chineserelationsbefore1972.The

depressingconclusionwasbelied,didwebutknowit,byanother,apparently

trivialsentenceinthesamereportinaparagraphaboutChina’sambiguous

relationswithJa pan.Thetwocountrieshadtheirdifficulties,theDepartment

pointedout,butamongthepositivesignswasthat“Pekinghasalsosentitstable

tennisteamtoJapantoparticipateinaninternationaltournament,thefirstsuch

sportsactivityinseveralyears.”Fivedayslaterweallgraspedthesignificanceof

thissentence.



TheUnitedStatestabletennisteamwasalsocompetinginthetournament,

thethirty‐firstWorldTableTennisChampionship,stagedinNagoya,Japan.The

nineyoungAmericansonourteamdidnotknowit,buttheywereabouttobe

playersalsoinacomplicatedchessgame.OnApril4,adayofrestinthe

competition,GlennCowan,anineteen‐year‐oldfromSantaMonicaCityCollege

nearLosAngeles,approachedtheChineseteamcaptain,three‐timeworld

championChuangTse‐tung,andwangledarideonthebuswiththeChinese

playerstoanoutingatthepearlfarmsonMiePeninsula.(“Wangled”isalmost

certainlythewrongword;theChinesewouldnothaveagreedhadtheynotcome

toNagoyawithfirminstructionstobefriendtheAmericans.Oneofthemost

remarkablegiftsoftheChineseistomakethemeticulouslyplannedappear

spontaneous.)Thenextday,CowanwaitedforChuangtofinishamatchand

offeredhimaT‐shirt asagift.Cowan,asophomoremajoringinhistoryand

politicalscience,late rsaidhewantedto“promotefriendshipwitheverybody,

includingtheChinese.”Tohissurprise,Chuangaccepted,andinreturngave

CowanaChinesehandkerchiefshowingprintedChinesescenes.



OnApril6,toeverybody’sstunnedsurprise,theChineseinvitedthe

AmericanteamtovisitChina.GrahamB.Steenhoven,PresidentoftheUSTable

TennisAssociationandmanageroftheAmericanteam,phonedtheAmerican

EmbassyinTokyoforadvice.Wit houthesitation,theEmbassy’sChinaspecialist,

WilliamCunningham,whoknewnothingofouroverturestoPekingexceptour

generaldesiretoimproverelations,recommendedthatSteenhovenaccept.



Cunninghamdeservesmuchcreditforhisperceptionandinitiative.The

Washingtonbureaucracywaslessdaring.OnApril7theStateDepartmentmade

surethatitwouldnotbeaccusedofrecklessnessbyreportingtotheWhite

House:“Thoughwehaveasyetnowayofbeingsure,theinvitationmaybe

intendedatleastinpartasagestureinresponsetorecentUSinitiatives.”The

visitwasaninternationalsensation;itcapturedtheworld’simagination,aidedno

littlebyChouEn‐lai’scarefulstagemanagement.PekingRadiobroadcastsgave

prideofplacetotheteam’sarrivalinChinaeventhoughseveralothernational

teamshadalsobeeninvited.



ThedayaftertheChineseinvitationtotheAmericanPing‐Pongteam,Nixon

gaveaspeechonVietnam.Whileanno uncingthewithdrawalof100,000

additionalAmericantroopsbetweenMay1andDecember1of1971,Nixonalso 

madearingingdefenseofhisIndochinapolicy,includingtheLaosoperation.This

hadnoadverseeffectwhatsoeveronPeking.TheUnitedStatestabletennis

playersweregivenadazzlingwelcomeinChina.OnApril14,intheGreatHallof

thePeople,theywerereceivedbyChouEn‐laihimself,anachievementthatwas

stillanunfulfilledambitionofmostoftheWesterndiplomatsstationedinPeking.

“YouhaveopenedanewchapterintherelationsoftheAmericanandChinese

people,”saidtheextraordinaryChinesePremier.“Iamconfidentthatthis

beginningagainofourfriendshipwillcertainlymeetwithmajoritysupportofour

twopeoples.”Whenthestunnedathletesdidnotrespond,thePremierpursued

thesubject:“Don’tyouagreewithme?”TheAmericansburstintoapplause.They

quicklyinvitedtheChineseteamtotourtheUnitedStates.Theinvitationwas

acceptedimmediately.



ThewholeenterprisewasvintageChouEn‐lai.LikeallChinesemoves,it

hadsomanylayersofmeaningthatthebrilliantlypaintedsurfacewastheleast

significantpart.AtitsmostobvioustheinvitationtotheyoungAmericans

symbolizedChina’scommitmenttoimprovedrelationswiththeUnitedStates;on

adeeperlevelitreassured—more thananydiplomaticcommunicationthrough

anychannel—thattheemissarywhowouldnowsurelybeinvitedwouldstepon

friendlysoil.ItwasasignaltotheWhiteHousethatourinitiativeshadbeen

noted.Thefactthattheplayerscouldnotpossiblyrepresentaparticularpolitical

tendencyaddedtotheattractivenessofthemaneuverfromtheChinese

perspective.Chinawouldbeabletomakeitspointwithoutanypossibilityofa

jarringAmericancommentary.ChouEn‐lai,too,knewhowtomakegesturesthat

couldnotberebuffed.WithinChinaithelpedconditionthepublicandparty

cadrestoanimpendingandrevolutionarychangeofcourse.Butitwasalsoa

subtlewarningtous:IfChineseovertureswererebuffed, Pekingcouldactivatea

people‐to‐peopleapproachandseektopressitscaseinapubliccampaignmuch

asHanoiwasdoing.



Whatmadethesituationmoreintriguingwasthatwewereexpecting

DobryninbackfromtheSovietUnionanydaywithaninvitationtoasummit.An

announcementofaMoscowsummitmightaborttheChineseovertureandtoo

activeaChinesediplomacymightfrustrateourSovietpolicy.Intheevent,the

Soviets’undyingquestforpettyadvantagebroughtDobryninbackwithanother

procrastinatinganswer.Hismastershadstillnotgivenuponusingthesummitas

baittoobtainconcessionsonBerlin.Excessiveclevernessusuallybackfires;inthis