Kennedy G. Imperial Defence. The Old World Order, 1856-1956

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Empire with global interests that varied so widely in cultural, economic

and political circumstances.

The Dominions pressed successfully for seats at the peace conference

in their own right, signed the peace treaties of their own accord and

became founding member states of the League of Nations. This assertion

of status confused the rest of the world, but to the British ‘family’ seemed

like a logical progression from the developments of 1917–18. In fact, the

imperial relationship remained anything but logical, including arrange-

ments for defence. The Dominions dismantled their swollen military

forces as enthusiastically as the British, returned to a defence policy of

minimal commitment and thus remained physically dependent on British

power. This constrained the degree to which they could pursue a really

different defence and thus foreign policy. On the other hand, they all

insisted on being heard, by the British and or the world, when they

pressed their own ever more individual agendas, especially on foreign

policy. The wartime trend towards more formal centralization quickly col-

lapsed. It was replaced by a series of decisions, some thrashed out by argu-

ment in conference, others made in response to problems on the ground,

which set in stone changes made before the war and those brought about

by it. Functional integration of the different military forces became the

established practice in all three services, as the air force now lined up

alongside the older arms. It remained functional integration between a

large and widely dispersed British military machine and tiny Dominion

ones. Canada, under a new Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King,

emphasized Macdonald’s old desire to preserve room for Canada to make

its own decisions, rather than Borden’s wartime hope to make Canada a

full and active partner in making British ones. South Africa and Australia

took on regional colonial responsibilities of their own, but remained

fundamentally dependent on British power to exercise them. Rebellion in

Ireland forced Lloyd George to make most of the country a Dominion,

but the Irish went well beyond Mackenzie King to become the most reluct-

ant and aloof partner at the changing imperial table.

King, nevertheless, sent the most important signal of change. When the

British government decided in 1922 to resist a Turkish attempt to restore

full control over their own territory along the Aegean coast, they assumed

the Dominions would again rally to the call. In order to intimidate the

Turks, Winston Churchill, serving as colonial secretary, publicly stated that

Dominion forces would reinforce British defences around Chanak. It is

true that Churchill released this statement without ﬁrst checking with the

Dominion governments. It is also true New Zealand and Australia replied

in the afﬁrmative. But Mackenzie King publicly went out of his way to

reject this British appeal in deliberately angry terms, not just because it was

sprung on him so rudely. King returned to the same point Macdonald

made forty years earlier: this conﬂict did not threaten the very survival of

British power; therefore, it did not directly threaten any Canadian national

292 B.P. Farrell

interest and, therefore, Canada would not intervene in any way. Canada

did not support the British appeal for help in Sudan forty years earlier, but

the key difference was the way Mackenzie King deliberately made a public

constitutional issue out of refusing. When the South Africans agreed with

him, this established the point once and for all. Depend as they did on

British power, in any dispute short of a mortal threat to that power each

Dominion would make its own decision regarding whether or not to offer

military support.

Antipodean support in the Chanak crisis indicated their strategic depen-

dence on lines of communication running through the Mediterranean at

least as much as any political ‘loyalty’; such lines were no direct concern to

Canada, South Africa or Ireland. That same year the Dominions split on the

question of naval disarmament and relations with the Americans and Japan-

ese. Canada insisted the British not pursue any policy that would affront the

Americans; the Australians were more concerned about provoking the

Japanese. The strategic difference here was manifest. When the British

announced their policy to build a naval base in Singapore to protect the

Empire in the Far East, Canada was indifferent; the ‘British of the South’ wel-

comed the policy despite its many serious question marks.

The British

themselves clariﬁed the relationship between foreign and defence policy in

1923, when they decided they would rather not share control of a foreign

policy to which the Dominions seemed likely to contribute more complaints

than commitments. They decided to rely instead on Macdonald’s fundamen-

tal bonds – above all, on the fact the Dominions still depended on being

associated with a British-centred world order and wanted this to continue.

In the end, the Great War made apparent what was already inherent. Mil-

itarily, the British and their Dominions certainly proved to be a coalition of

the usually willing – provided the stakes were high enough to threaten the

order on which they all ultimately depended. The central theme was not, as

many mistakenly believed, a conﬂict between imperial solidarity and

Dominion nationalism. The central theme was the effort to keep all inter-

ests in play, to balance the many competing forces. Canadian military com-

manders instinctively assumed their government would respond to the

British appeal over Chanak, made plans to send an expeditionary force and

were dismayed by their prime minister’s public rebuttal. The ensuing mis-

understanding summed up the larger confusion about arrangements for

imperial defence. King saw the military reaction as proof that functional

integration was dangerous, because many Canadians still saw themselves

more as an extension of Britain than as a junior but sovereign ally. His mili-

tary and political critics saw his position as separatism. Neither view was

entirely fair. King felt as Macdonald and Laurier felt in their day and

behaved accordingly: the British connection was central to Canada’s ulti-

mate national interest, but Canada also had its own particular interests,

imperatives and vulnerabilities, so Canada must decide for itself how to

work that connection. King saw more danger than duty in being entangled

Coalition of the usually willing 293

in world affairs, so he coined the formula that henceforth deﬁned Canada’s

connection to imperial defence: as and when problems arose, Canada’s own

Parliament would decide how to respond. But there was no question, as

King told Hitler himself in 1938, about how Canada would respond to any

mortal threat to British power. It would not – did not – stand aside.

The constitutional issues that engaged scholars for so long are best

understood when it comes to imperial defence as part and parcel of the

constant effort to deﬁne and promote national interests. When Dominion

autonomy and sovereignty was proclaimed in 1926 by the Balfour Declara-

tion, and codiﬁed in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster, only the Irish

wanted nothing to do with any association with British military power. Trade

within the Empire became more important for all parties after the Great

War, so important that one of the most signiﬁcant responses to the Great

Depression was the Ottawa Conference decision in 1932 to establish formal

Imperial Preferences. It was much harder to understand and therefore to

accept any vaguely deﬁned coalition of the usually willing as a reliable

military partnership, particularly when so much rhetoric concentrated on

status rather than solidarity. It would have been easier to grasp a more struc-

tured federation – but impossible to make it work. Such a structure would

have been too brittle to withstand the dynamic economic, demographic and

political forces that shaped the evolution of the UK and each Dominion.

Any Imperial Parliament or Committee of Prime Ministers after 1919 would

have been ruptured by the Chanak Crisis and the Singapore decision, let

alone the turmoil of the 1930s. The Dominions remained associated with

the British on their own individual terms, but associated they remained.

Dominion support was a major factor bolstering the British decision to

pursue a policy of appeasement in the second half of the 1930s – just as

Dominion support buttressed the British decision to go to war again in 1939

and ﬁght on in 1940. There were limits, and they were not minor. Ireland

remained neutral, even if the Irish people did not. South Africa barely

entered the war and restricted its role throughout. But the audit of both

world wars produced the same bottom line: when it came to general war

between Great Powers, the economic, political and military strength the

Dominions produced was a greater net gain to British power than the rest

of the Empire combined.

The coalition of the usually willing did not survive as the framework for

a viable system of imperial defence after the Second World War. Holland

is right to describe the military partnership after 1919 as a response to

weakening British power, even as a British attempt to draw on Dominion

power to compensate for the ebbing of their capability. But it did not

simply die at any one moment, or because of any one event – not even the

notorious Suez Crisis of 1956. British and Dominion forces fought

together again as formations in Korea and in the Far East into the 1960s.

This time, however, they did so more and more as partners in a larger

Western alliance led by the Americans – and less and less as functionally

294 B.P. Farrell

integrated ‘sister armies’. Instead, the association faded into a loose circle

of familiars within a larger coalition of the usually willing, a coalition that

again was strongest when fundamental common interests were threat-

ened. The crucial fact was that imperial defence was driven by the

combination of attachment to, as well as dependence on, a British-

centred world order. When that world order gave way during and after

the Second World War, the partners responded accordingly – and, as

always, individually.

The core dimension of ‘race patriotism’ that marked out the Domin-

ions from other British overseas territories was, of course, a major reason

why it proved impossible to transform those other territories, notably

India and Pakistan, into friendly Dominions working within a renewed

military partnership after the Second World War. Self-government came

far too late to be credible outside the settler colonies.

Nor was it possible

to rely on any sense of attachment to keep the military partnership alive,

when concrete national interests adjusted to a changing world order.

Mansergh identiﬁed Mackenzie King as one of three central ﬁgures in the

evolution of what his magisterial study depicted as the transformation of

an Empire of power into a Commonwealth of associates. The relationship

between the British and the overseas Dominions was central to that

process, whatever one thinks of Mansergh’s argument. King’s often wilful

rejection of British efforts to foster imperial solidarity to buttress their

foreign policy is a target for the same critics who charge that Dominion

leaders sought security at British expense, demanding much but offering

little. This is not completely unfair. Canadian and Australian reluctance to

take more responsibility for their own defence in the dangerous 1930s was

a sign of immaturity, and both countries paid a heavy price for it in the

Second World War. But there is a more important point. Just as in 1914,

when a mortal threat to British power did erupt, the Dominions

responded. The coalition of the usually willing stood ﬁrm and fought to

the death. And once again Dominion contributions to a larger war effort

provided a vital increment of power, military, economic and psycho-

logical, that helped the UK prevail against a far more dangerous threat to

its civilization than the Empire saw off in the Great War.

The coalition of the usually willing was a unique military partnership in

imperial history. No other imperial power in modern times made any

effort to nurture any kind of military partnership between governments in

a larger association. The balance sheet of that partnership can not be

restricted to how much British taxpayers spent on defence as opposed to

their Australian or South African counterparts.

Nor can it be dismissed

as shallow because it faced real constraints on military cooperation, or

struggled to bridge real differences in individual capabilities and agendas,

or even because everyone in the end fought ﬁrst and foremost for their

own national interests. It must instead take note of the fact that for nearly

a century different governments and public opinions saw the partnership

Coalition of the usually willing 295

as necessary and strove to keep it alive despite its many difﬁculties. The

real test was neither Sudan nor Chanak, but rather 1914 and 1940. The

coalition of the ultimate common interest did not falter and did not fail.

In the end it only disappeared.

Notes

1 Ireland, Newfoundland, Rhodesia, India and Pakistan were all formally con-

sidered Dominions at some point but constitute special cases. Newfoundland

and Rhodesia were too small as military powers to make any impact on discus-

sion of imperial defence; the other three are discussed below.

2 Three classic studies are D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial

Defense 1870–1914 (Baltimore, 1965); N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience

(London, 1969); R.A. Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense: A Study of the Origins

of the British Commonwealth’s Defense Organisation 1867–1919 (Durham, NC, 1967).

3 A question addressed by P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism

1688–2000 (London, 2002) and L.E. Davis and R.A. Huttenback, Mammon and

the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1912 (Cam-

bridge, 1986). See also note 96.

4 B. Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850–1982: Delusions of Grandeur

(London, 1983), 79, 87; B. Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British

Imperialism 1850–2004 (London, 2004).

5 P. Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, in A. Porter (ed.), The Oxford

History of the British Empire: Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999), 324–5;

Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 41–6; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership

in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, xi.

6 G. St J. Barclay, The Empire Is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British

Empire 1800–1945 (London, 1976), 8.

7 Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 325–7; Mansergh, The Common-

wealth Experience, 39; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense

1870–1914, 9.

8 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 48; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership

in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 7–8.

9 Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 327–8, saw Mills and the bulk of

his committee as adopting a ‘moderate’stance; Gordon, The Dominion Partner-

ship in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 12–13, considered them more critical of the

status quo; Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 8.

10 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 146; Burroughs,

‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 328–9; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in

Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 22–3; Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 122;

Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 8.

11 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 53; Burroughs,

‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 332–3; B. Nicholls, ‘Colonial Naval Forces

before Federation’, in D. Stevens and J. Reeve (eds), Southern Trident: Strategy,

History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Sydney, 2001), 125–9.

12 Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 329–30; Davis and Huttenback,

Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 151–2.

13 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 33; Burroughs,

‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 331–2.

14 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army 1846–1871: A Study in the Practice of

Responsible Government (Toronto, 1963), 259–60.

15 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688–2000, 234; Davis and Huttenback,

296 B.P. Farrell

Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 152; Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Dis-

unity’, 330–1.

16 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 58; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperial-

ism 1688–2000, 230, 234; Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 330–1.

The Bible inspired the evocative term Dominion: Psalm 72, verse 8, ‘He shall

have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the

earth.’

17 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 35, 54–7, 64; D. Morton, Ministers and Gen-

erals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868–1904 (Toronto, 1970), 5–11.

18 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 123; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership

in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 31; Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 85.

19 J. Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and Shurman: Imperial Defence in the Post-Crimean

Era 1856–1905’, in G. Kennedy and K. Neilson (eds), Far Flung Lines: Essays on

Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1996), 32;

Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 58–9, noted

another ‘wake up call’ for self-governing colonies in Colomb’s argument, which

listed strategic priorities: the UK, the sea lanes, then India, leaving other regions

to protect themselves ‘unless they were to be regarded as military positions

necessary to hold for the general welfare of the Empire’; Burroughs, ‘Defence

and Imperial Disunity’, 333–4.

20 Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 334–6; Barclay, The Empire Is

Marching, 10; Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and Shurman’, 35; Preston, Canada and

Imperial Defense, 93.

21 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 7, 122; Davis and Huttenback,

Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 42–3, 51; Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial

Disunity’, 335–36.

22 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 71, 98–100.

23 C. Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism

1867–1914 (Toronto, 1970), is the standard study of imperialism in Canada in

this period; Morton, Ministers and Generals, 48; Preston, Canada and Imperial

Defense, 131.

24 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1977), 32–3;

Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 139; Morton, Ministers and Generals, 51.

25 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 68–9, 129;

Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 154; S.J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The

Making of a Professional Army 1860–1939 (Toronto, 1988), 16–21.

26 R.C. Brown and M.E. Prang (eds), Confederation to 1949 (Scarborough, 1966),

62–3.

27 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 134–6; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in

Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 65; R. Sarty, ‘Canada and the Great Rapprochement

1902–1914’, in B. McKercher and L. Aronsen (eds), The North Atlantic Triangle in

a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations 1902–1956 (Toronto, 1996),

14.

28 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 41–4; Preston, Canada and Imperial

Defense, 161–8; Morton, Ministers and Generals, 83.

29 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 95, 105; M.L. Hadley and R. Sarty, Tin Pots

and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880–1918 (Mon-

treal, 1991), 4–8.

30 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 7, 97, 109–11; Gordon, The Dominion

Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 78, Nicholls, ‘Colonial Naval Forces

before Federation’, 129–36.

31 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 91; Nicholls,

‘Colonial Naval Forces before Federation’, 136–7.

32 Burroughs, 337–8; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 45.

Coalition of the usually willing 297

33 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 96–7, 112;

Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 130–31; Burroughs, ‘Defence and

Imperial Disunity’, 338; R. Jackson, ‘New Zealand’s Naval Defence 1854–1914’,

in Stevens and Reeve (eds), Southern Trident, 122.

34 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 157; P. Kennedy. The

Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 2004), ch. 7.

35 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 11, 21; Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 61–2;

Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 16; Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and

Shurman’, 43; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914,

112.

36 Brown and Prang, Confederation to 1949, 65.

37 Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and Shurman’, 39; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in

Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 119.

38 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 120; Stacey,

Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 45–6.

39 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 2; Berger, The Sense of Power, 172; Morton, Min-

isters and Generals 95, 131–42; Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 207, 233;

Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’, 342–3.

40 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 110, 119, saw some validity to Chamber-

lain’s strategic argument, but suggested vague British strategic arguments were

rebutted by clear colonial concerns about constitutionality; Gordon, The

Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 104, 117; Davis and Hutten-

back, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 157; Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial

Disunity’, 339–40.

41 I. R. Smith. The Origins of the South African War 1899–1902 (London, 1996); A.S.

Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics 1880–1932 (London,

2000), 25; Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 264; Gordon, The Dominion

Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 144–5.

42 Barclay, Gordon, Preston and Stacey discuss this ‘traditional’ interpretation.

43 J. Crawford and I. McGibbon (eds), One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New

Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War (Auckland, 2003).

44 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 39–41; Morton, Ministers and Generals, 169;

Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 115; J. Grey, A Military History of Aus-

tralia (Cambridge, 1999), 52–61.

45 C. Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War (Montreal,

1993); Morton, Ministers and Generals, 151–2; Preston, Canada and Imperial

Defense, 255–62; Harris, Canadian Brass, 62–7.

46 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 276–82; Berger, The Sense of Power, 169;

Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 23.

47 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 283–7; Mansergh, The Commonwealth

Experience, 133–7; Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 43; Gordon, The Dominion

Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 164, 191–4; Davis and Huttenback,

Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 158; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate

Ships, 20.

48 Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 63–5; R. Ross, A Concise History of South

Africa (Cambridge, 1999), 79–83; M. King, The Penguin History of New Zealand

(Auckland, 2003), 292–3.

49 D. Judd and P. Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth 1902–1980

(London, 1982), 11, 21; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense

1870–1914, 194.

50 M. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference (London, 1946), 83–5; R.B. Haldane, An

Autobiography (London, 1929), 183–99.

51 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 271; Preston,

Canada and Imperial Defense, Canada and Imperial Defense, 299–307; Mansergh,

298 B.P. Farrell

The Commonwealth Experience, 144; Judd and Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern

Commonwealth, 22; Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 85–9; Stacey, Canada and the

Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 81.

52 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 357–71; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in

Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 272–3; Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 145.

53 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 181, 189;

Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 22–30, 41; Stacey, Canada and the

Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 81–4.

54 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 274–8; Morton,

Ministers and Generals, 195–200; Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 323, 335,

344–52, 378; Grey, A Military History of Australia, 76; Harris, Canadian Brass,

71–8.

55 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 202–3; J.

Pollock, Kitchener: Architect of Victory, Artisan of Peace (New York, 2001), 344–5;

Grey, A Military History of Australia, 75–6.

56 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 47–50; Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in

Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 194, 216; N. Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire? The

Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest for Collective Security in the Paciﬁc,

1909–1914’, in Kennedy and Neilson (eds), Far Flung Lines, 56; D. Stevens,

‘1901–1913: The Genesis of an Australian Navy’, in D. Stevens (ed.), The Royal

Australian Navy (Melbourne, 2001), 14–17; R. Lamont, ‘A.W. Jose in the Poli-

tics and Strategy of Naval Defence 1903–1909’, in Stevens and Reeve (eds),

Southern Trident, 200–11.

57 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 233–5; Thomp-

son, Imperial Britain, 118–23; Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire’? 56–7; Preston,

Canada and Imperial Defense, 390.

58 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 236; Thomp-

son, Imperial Britain, 120; Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire’? 59–60.

59 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, ch. 5; D. Morton, A Short History of

Canada (Toronto, 2001), 170–72; Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 389–91,

400, 427; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 22–9.

60 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 236–7; Lambert,

‘Economy or Empire’? 59, notes that the Admiralty review of naval strategy in

1909 was prompted in the ﬁrst instance not by Dominion offers of assistance but

rather by complaints from the China Station about the weakness of the Hong

Kong defences; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 27–8, note that the

Admiralty gave Laurier justiﬁcation to reject the plan by conceding there was no

serious threat to Canada in the Paciﬁc and planning to use a Canadian Fleet

unit ‘far from home’.

61 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 429–32, 447, summarized a very inﬂu-

ential argument in the study of imperial defence. He concluded that decisions

made by 1911 reﬂected Canadian success in reorienting imperial defence on

arrangements that combined political autonomy and Canadian control of

Canadian defence policy and forces with voluntary commitment to broader

imperial defence concerns, smoothed by functional integration. This was a

‘high water mark’ of the evolution from ‘imperial’ towards ‘commonwealth’

defence, and it allowed the Empire to march united into the Great War. Stacey

agreed the combination was the key and leaving the Empire was not the

agenda, noting in Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 117–21, that the Cana-

dian decision to establish in 1909 a Department of External Affairs ‘appears

more important today than it did at the time’; Gordon, The Dominion Partner-

ship in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 241, 289.

62 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 213, 224; Davis and Huttenback,

Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 160–3, 189–91, 303–6.

Coalition of the usually willing 299

63 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 161; Judd and Slinn,

The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, 5.

64 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914, 281–93;

Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire’? 74–5.

65 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 153–68; Mansergh, The Common-

wealth Experience, 156; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 41; Preston,

Canada and Imperial Defense, 447.

66 Steven, The Royal Australian Navy, 24–7; Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 55–7,

Judd and Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, 15; Thompson, Imper-

ial Britain, 118, 122.

67 Harris, Canadian Brass, ch. 5, makes important points about the progress and

pitfalls of functional integration in Canada under Sam Hughes as minister of

militia; Haldane, An Autobiography, 225–40; Mansergh, The Commonwealth

Experience, 165; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, 37–8; Preston,

Canada and Imperial Defense, 452–61.

68 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 21; Judd and Slinn, The Evolution of the

Modern Commonwealth, 39–40; J. Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire? The Domin-

ion Idea in Imperial Politics’, in J.M. Brown and W.R. Louis (eds), The Oxford

History of the British Empire: Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), 66–7;

Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 79, and The Lion’s Share, 228.

69 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 21; R. Holland, ‘The British Empire

and the Great War’, in Brown and Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British

Empire, 118; Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 70; M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset,

Vol. 1: Britain’s Liberal Empire 1897–1921 (Basingstoke, 1987, 1969), 178–82; J.

Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto, 1975).

70 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 173–6; R.C. Brown, Robert Laird

Borden: A Biography (Toronto, 1975), 8–9.

71 Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 22.

72 Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 5; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1,

177–79; Harris, Canadian Brass, ch. 6.

73 R. Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1986 [1964]), ch. xxii; Grey, A Military History of

Australia, 88–95; King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, 296–300. Robin

Prior’s essay ‘Gallipoli’, in J. Beaumont (ed.), Australian Defence: Sources and

Statistics, Australian Centenary History of Defence Vol. VI (Melbourne, 2001),

264–70, typiﬁes the great value of this volume for research on all aspects of the

Australian role in imperial defence. Such volumes are sorely needed for the

other national experiences.

74 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience 171–2; Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 27–34;

Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 183–94. Borden’s anger was all the

more poignant given Law’s own background, born and raised in New Brunswick.

75 Harris, Canadian Brass, ch. 6; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1,

194–6.

76 Holland, ‘The British Empire and the Great War’, 127–8; Brown, Robert Laird

Borden, 58–63; Grey, A Military History of Australia, 108–11; Harris, Canadian

Brass, 118–21.

77 Jenkins, Asquith, chs xxv–xxvii; Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 70, 75; Grey, A Mili-

tary History of Australia, 109–10; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1,

203–6; Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 55–58.

78 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 203–11; Brown, Robert Laird Borden,

85; I.M. Cumpston, The Evolution of the Commonwealth of Nations 1900–1980

(Canberra, 1997), 4–5.

79 Cumpston, The Evolution of the Commonwealth, 4–5; Brown, Robert Laird Borden,

81; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 213–16; Mansergh, The Com-

monwealth Experience, 26; Hadley and Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships, part 3.

300 B.P. Farrell

80 Judd and Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, 38–40; Holland, ‘The

British Empire and the Great War’, 127–30; Kendle, The Round Table Movement

and Imperial Union, 218–22.

81 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 109–12; Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 91–112;

Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 217–18.

82 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 74–5; Grey, A Military History of Australia, 101–5;

Harris, Canadian Brass, ch. 7.

83 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 105–8; Holland, ‘The British Empire and

the Great War’, 132–5.

84 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 219–21; Brown, Robert Laird Borden,

135–6; Holland, ‘The British Empire and the Great War’, 125.

85 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 221–3; Brown, Robert Laird Borden,

140–2.

86 G. Kennedy, ‘Strategy and Supply in the North Atlantic Triangle 1914–1918’,

in McKercher and Aronsen (eds), The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing

World, 76, note 92; G. Johnson and D. Lenarcic, ‘The Decade of Transition:

The North Atlantic Triangle During the 1920s’, in McKercher and Aronsen

(eds), The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World, 93; Stacey, Canada and the

Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 223–7; Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial

Union, 302.

87 Kennedy, ‘Strategy and Supply’, 73, note 66, points out that Canada enlisted

9.6 per cent of its male population for military service, Australia 10.7 per cent,

New Zealand 11.9 per cent, South Africa 1.7 per cent; the UK ﬁgure was over

22 per cent. Statistics for economic mobilization suggest a similar comparison.

Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 1, 235–6; Grey, A Military History of

Australia, 115–17.

88 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1981), 17–31; Harris,

Canadian Brass, 176; K. Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire

1918–1922 (Manchester, 1984), makes some interesting points about British

plans for military cooperation aborted by changing Dominion attitudes.

89 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 2, chs 1–2; Johnson and Lenarcic,

‘The Decade of Transition’, 94; Grey, A Military History of Australia, 122–3;

Barclay, 90–8, raised an interesting point about the running friction regarding

defence in the Far East. When Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce visited

Canada in 1927 he provoked a public row with Mackenzie King by accusing

Canada of freeloading in defence. King scolded his counterpart and emphas-

ized Canada’s duty to pursue its own interests. It is hard not to sympathize with

Barclay’s contention that when defence commitments were left solely to the

Dominions to determine, then imperial defence in circumstances other than

the threat of general war came close to being ‘simply every man for himself’.

But the crucial caveat is ‘other than’.

90 R.F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918–1939 (London, 1981),

13–23; Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 2, is subtitled ‘The Mackenzie

King Era’.

91 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conﬂict, vol. 2, ch. 6; Harris, Canadian Brass,

180–1, notes that by the 1930s the Canadian General Staff felt Canada should

not participate in conﬂicts involving internal unrest within the Empire or an

attack by a minor power on imperial interests and spent most of their time

reﬁning Defence Scheme 3, the plan to dispatch a seven-division expeditionary

force overseas in another general war. Functional integration meant among

other things that the only major power the Dominion military forces could

work with effectively was the UK, which always bothered Mackenzie King.

92 Barclay, The Empire Is Marching, 81, 218; Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire’?

84–5; A. Clayton, ‘Deceptive Might’: Imperial Defence and Security

Coalition of the usually willing 301