
Environmental Encyclopedia 3
Bhopal, India
amounts of water entered the MIC storage tank and initiated
the hydrolysis reaction, which was followed by MIC’s spon-
taneous reactions. The plant was not well designed for safety,
and maintenance was especially poor. Four key safety factors
should have contained the reaction, but it was later discov-
ered that they were all inoperative at the time of the accident.
The refrigerator that should have slowed the reaction by
cooling the chemical was shut off, and, as heat and pressure
built up in the tank, the relief valve blew. A vent gas scrubber
designed to neutralize escaping gas with caustic soda failed
to work. Also, the flare tower that would have burned the
gas to harmless by-products was under repair. Yet even if
all these features had been operational, subsequent investiga-
tions found them to be poorly designed and insufficient for
the capacity of the plant. Once the runaway reaction started,
it was virtually impossible to contain.
The poisonous cloud of MIC released from the plant
was carried by the prevailing winds to the south and east of
the city—an area populated by highly congested communi-
ties of poorer people, many of whom worked as laborers at
the Union Carbide plant and other nearby industrial facili-
ties. Released at night, the silent cloud went undetected by
residents who remained asleep in their homes, thus possibly
ensuring a maximal degree of exposure. Many hundreds died
in their sleep, others choked to death on the streets as they
ran out in hopes of escaping the lethal cloud. Thousands
more died in the following days and weeks. The Indian
government and numerous volunteer agencies organized a
massive relief effort in the immediate aftermath of the disas-
ter consisting of emergency medical treatment, hospital facil-
ities, and supplies of food and water. Medical treatment was
often ineffective, for doctors had an incomplete knowledge
of the toxicity of MIC and the appropriate course of action.
In the weeks following the accident, the financial, legal
and political consequences of the disaster unfolded. In the
United States Union Carbide’s stock dipped 25% in the
week immediately following the event. Union Carbide India
Ltd. (UCIL) came forward and accepted moral responsibility
for the accident, arranging some interim financial compensa-
tion for victims and their families. However its parent com-
pany, Union Carbide Inc., which owned 50.9% of UCIL,
refused to accept any legal responsibility for their subsidiary.
The Indian government and hundreds of lawyers on both
sides pondered issues of liability and the question of a settle-
ment. While Union Carbide hoped for out-of-court settle-
ments or lawsuits in the Indian courts, the Indian govern-
ment ultimately decided to pursue class action suits on behalf
of the victims in the United States courts in the hope of
larger settlements. The United States courts refused to hear
the case, and it was transferred to the Indian court system.
Warren Anderson, then chairman of Union Carbide, refused
to appear in Indian court. The case is still under litigation
125
and the interim compensation set aside has reached only a
fraction of the victims.
The disaster in Bhopal has had far-reaching political
consequences in the United States. A number of Congres-
sional hearings were called and the
Environmental Protec-
tion Agency
(EPA) and OSHA initiated inspections and
investigations. A Union Carbide plant in McLean, Virginia,
that uses processes and products similar to those in Bhopal
was repeatedly inspected by officials. While no glaring defi-
ciencies in operation or maintenance were found, it was
noted that several small leaks and spills had occurred at the
plant in previous years that had gone unreported. These
added weight to growing national concern about workers’
right-to-know
provisions and emergency response capabili-
ties. In the years following the Bhopal accident, both state
and federal environmental regulations were expanded to in-
clude mandatory preparedness to handle spills and releases
on land, water, or air. These regulations include measures
for emergency response such as communication and coordi-
nation with local health and law enforcement facilities, as
well as community leaders and others. In addition, employers
are now required to inform any workers in contact with
hazardous materials of the nature and types of hazards to
which they are exposed; they are also required to train them
in emergency health and safety measures.
The disaster at Bhopal raises a number of critical issues
and highlights the wide gulf between developed and devel-
oping countries in regard to design and maintenance stan-
dards for health and safety. Management decisions allowed
the Bhopal plant to operate in an unsafe manner and for a
shanty-town to develop around its perimeter without appro-
priate emergency planning. The Indian government, like
many other developing nations in need of foreign invest-
ment, appeared to sacrifice worker safety in order to attract
and keep Union Carbide and other industries within its
borders. While a number of environmental and occupational
health and safety standards existed in India before the acci-
dent, their inspection and enforcement was cursory or non-
existent. Often understaffed, the responsible Indian regula-
tory agencies were rife with corruption as well. The Bhopal
disaster also raised questions concerning the moral and legal
responsibilities of American companies abroad, and the will-
ingness of those corporations to apply stringent United
States safety and environmental standards to their operations
in the
Third World
despite the relatively free hand given
them by local governments.
Although worldwide shock at the Bhopal accident has
largely faded, the suffering of many victims continues. While
many national and international safeguards on the manufac-
ture and handling of hazardous
chemicals
have been insti-
tuted, few expect that lasting improvements will occur in
developing countries without a gradual recognition of the