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TER-MATEVOSYAN VAHRAM

KEMALISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT:

TRANSFORMING PATTERNS OF COLLECTIVE

IDENTITIES IN TURKEY

Definitional framework for Kemalism

The guiding philosophical basis of the Republic of Turkey has

been Kemalism, named after the founding father of Turkey Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk. Kemalism played a pivotal role in constructing a unified

and an internationally recognized state, it also enormously empowered

the state vis-à-vis the society. There are certainly many aspects of

Kemalism and understandably it is not our intention to mention them

all in the paper. But we do want to stop on one feature or a

perspective of Kemalism that had been understudied - the social

component of it. In this paper we explore the topic of Kemalism as a

social movement, which will make it easier for us to clarify the roots

how it became such an influential ideological construct in the

Republican decades, an approach which in turn can help to

understand how a party program can be transformed into a state

ideology and then turned into a social movement. Once we do this, we

might better understand and estimate the causes for the emergence,

evolution and the current state of the Kemalist discourse in Turkey.

Why and how was a state ideology transformed into a social

movement? Our paper will revolve around that question, because we

think that there is not much clarity concerning the bonds of

mentioned transformation. Prominent observers in the field like

Niyazi Berkes, Kemal Karpat, Suna Kili, Andrew Mango and Metin

Heper wrote immensely about Kemalism and its different

manifestations

, however, they largely failed to capture the moment

Niyazi Berkes, The development of secularism in Turkey, Montreal, McGill

University Press, 1964; Karpat Kemal, Turkish politics, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1959. Karpat Kemal, Social change and politics

of the transformation of Kemalist state ideology into a social

movement. This was mainly because they did not believe that the

corporatist structure of the state, which they saw as a powerful and

an indissoluble tool for social domination, could suffer any division.

They gave no credit to those speculations which situated Kemalism

vis-à-vis other social and political adversaries. In a word, they treated

Kemalism as a purely political and ideological phenomenon, existing

above everything, without giving credits to its social capital.

Our tentative answer to the aforementioned question is that

because of the diversification of the polity the advocates of the

Kemalist felt that the possession of the leverages on ideological

power were not sufficient to have the society to follow the centre,

hence, the power structure of the Kemalists was diversified and

expanded. As a result, along with the “elite Kemalism”

a new

process was triggered thereby initiating Kemalism as a social

movement. We suggest that it was done to cope with the emerging

counter-forces more efficiently. By no means, that initiative needs to

be considered as a thoroughly designed policy, it was a counter-

measure and an instinctive balance creation effort against ethno-

nationalist centrifugal forces (Kurds) and Islamists.

With that clarified, we deem it necessary to consider the

following questions - why it is important to consider the Kemalist

social movement, what possible difference will the findings make? It

is widely accepted that one of the vulnerable parts of the Kemalist

discourse is the consistent obscurity about its content and social

in Turkey: A structural-historical analysis, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973; Mango

Andrew, Turkey: Emergence of a Modern Problem in Aspects of modern

Turkey, ed.William Hale, London and New York, Bowker: 1976; Kili Suna,

The Atatürk Revolution: A paradigm of modernization, İstanbul: Türk Iş

Bankası, Kültür Yayınları, 2003; Kili Suna, Kemalism, İstanbul, Robert

College: School of business administration and economics, 1969; Metin

Heper, The State tradition in Turkey, Hull: The Eothen press, 1985.

We suggest this term to describe those forces in the elite of Turkey, which

are in power positions and are regarded as the only devoted guardians of

the Kemalist ideology acting versus those power circles in the elite, which

seek compromise between Kemalism and other competing ideologies.

manifestations. Hence, Kemalism is a subject that has been more

the object of speculation than research. The Kemalist social

movement constitutes a part of a larger package of Kemalism and

without a clear idea how that movement relate to Kemalism we can

barely understand the complexity of Kemalism. Hence, although we

acknowledge that Kemalism (or a portion of it) does not easily fall

into the category of "social movement", we examine Kemalism from

that perspective, because we think that approach can bring out more

essential features of Kemalism that are otherwise difficult to notice.

Therefore, in this paper, we will detail the main features of the

Kemalist power structure and delineate the internal dynamics within

the Kemalist ideology. Once we do that we will have a plainer picture

of those contextual characteristics which shaped Kemalism as a

distinct social movement.

Initially (until 1935) Kemalism was a program of the ruling

Republican People’s Party (henceforth - RPP) but later on it was

transformed into a state ideology and was inserted into the

Constitution (in 1937). In the founding years of the state (1919-1923)

the term “Kemalists” was in use to describe those members of the

elite who were close associates of Mustafa Kemal

, the hero of the

Independence War. From time to time, the term Kemalism was put in

circulation, mainly by foreign, particularly Russian, observers, to

denote the processes of founding the state and coping with the

centrifugal forces. With a passage of time and with the consolidation

of power Mustafa Kemal strengthened his authoritarian power

through different agencies and measures. Hence, making Kemalism

a guiding philosophy of the Republic became the sole tour de force

in the 1930s. By the time, the central idea of Kemalism was to erect

a homogenous, secular and nationalist society highly sensitive

towards internal and external adversaries. In the minds of those who

were close to Mustafa Kemal and his cause Kemalism became a

The name Atatürk (forefather of Turks) was given to Mustafa Kemal after

the 1934 Surname law.

synonymous of unquestioned devotion and sacrifice to the principles

of the leader. After the death of Kemal Atatürk (1938) it was taken for

granted that the internal stability of the country was firmly

maintained, therefore, no major instances of social and political

upheavals were imminent. During the presidency of İsmet İnönü

(1938-1950), Kemalism was transformed into a political vision and a

source of an ideologically cohesive power structure. However, the

developments in the later decades brought a new social and

collective identity to the Kemalists characterized by an identical

collective experience of struggling against those forces who were

striving to threaten the secular and homogenous order of the society.

As the multi-party politics got on its way (from 1946 onwards),

the situation started to change albeit extremely slowly. The society

started to be more vocal about the socio-political challenges and

aspired to have its word on vital maters. In other words, the

vernacular movements in Turkey started to gain weight and

substance. This factor has not gone unnoticed by the Kemalist elite,

which by the 1960s and 1970s did not possess those powerful

ideological leverages, which once were in their undisputed ‘territory’.

So, the Kemalist elite and the military felt that the ground under their

feet was moving, which meant they needed support from outside of

the elitist circle. The Kemalist had problems acknowledging the fact

that the corporatist structure of the state, which they saw as a

powerful and an indissoluble tool for social domination, could suffer

any division. By no means, that application for support has

immediately been proceeded, since, at the outset, the Kemalists tried

to rely on their resources first, by triggering the military interventions

in 1960, 1971 and 1980. But the more they intervened the more they

felt alienated from the social support. Hence, by the 1980s the

Kemalists had to revise their policy of exclusion and tried to engage

the society to be on their side and to defend those values that had

been inherited from the founder of the state. Thus, we can identify at

least three reasons that the Kemalits turned to the society and the

social movements. One is that they felt alienated from the society

and did not enjoy the same backing as they used to and the existing

power structures were not sufficient to have the society to follow the

centre, and secondly, the social movements in Turkey were quite

well organized possessing vital organizational and individual

networks and last but not least, the emerging social and political

forces, the political Islamist groups and ethno-nationalism of Kurds

added more incentives to the Kemalist to broaden their front and

engage new forces to deal with new “existential threats”.

Concurrently, the official interpretation of Kemalism ceased to

exist by the 1960s and different “Kemalisms” started to appear.

During the 1930s at least six interpretations or definitions of

Kemalism were known (proposed and defended by Celal Bayar,

İsmet İnönü, Recep Peker, journals of Kadro and Ulku, a group of

Bergsonians)

. But later decades, especially in the 1960s, 1970s and

1980s, more interpretations and definitions of Kemalism were

circulated, which will be succinctly presented in the below lines. That

implies that Kemalism is - new political stand on the revolutionary

practices that had taken place between 1923 and 1935; a new

nation- and state-building ideology; basic principles and values of the

Turkish path to modernity; philosophical-political stand and genre;

unfinished revolution advocated by positivist humanist groups; a late-

Enlightenment movement that had its roots in the secular-rationalist

tradition of ideological positivism; a zero-sum game between secular-

modernist Kemalists in action and religiously oriented anti-

modernists in reaction; an intellectual tradition of nationalism,

modernism, Westernization, radical culturalism, secularism and

romanticism; a conservative force; a rationalist dogma that aimed to

realize a universal civilizing project; a source of philosophical

inspiration; a omnipresent philosophical and political current; a power

structure; a scientific breakthrough; a creative spirit to renew the

Türkeş Mustafa, A Patriotic Leftist Development-Strategy Proposal in

Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement,

International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2001), pp. 91-

114.