Сафрастян Р. Тюркологические и османистические исследования

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third military intervention was initiated by the army generals ‘to

safeguard the state against internal rivals’. As stated above, the third

military intervention was designed to recover the Kemalist principles,

to encourage all the efforts to diversify Kemalism and to empower all

the movements, which aimed to newly disseminate the principles of

Kemalism. In other words, the 1980 intervention intended to

resurrect Kemalism through multiple channels. As a result, the 1980s

and 1990s were the decades when Turkey witnessed an

unprecedented mushrooming of various Kemalist movements. There

are several factors that can explain that boom. First of all, the neo-

Kemalism as a new wave of Kemalism was directly supported and

sponsored by the state, enjoyed the support of those citizens who

wanted Kemalist principles to play pivotal role in helping Turkey to

cope with the internal and external challenges. Secondly, unlike the

previous decades, the Islamists and Kurdish nationalists became

more organized and more vocal, which led the Kemalists to felt

threatened and disturbed about their social statues and possible

changes in the social and political structure of the state.

The most important characteristic of the 1990s has been the

emerging influence of political Islam in Turkish politics. The main

discourse of that decade was the increasing conflict between political

Islamism and laicism. This is the period when Islamic discourses

paid lip service to the laicist symbols and images of the Republic just

as much as the Kemalists utilize Islamic symbols and images.

In the 1990s a dozen of Kemalist intellectuals were assassinated

the majority of whom were the columnists in the leading secular and

left-leaning newspaper Cumhuriyet (Çetin Emeç, editor in chief of

the daily Hüriyyet; Maummar Aksoy, he was a Law Professor at the

Ankara University and the President of the Turkish Law Society, who

also wrote extensively on Kemalism; Bahriye Üçok, she was secular

theologist; Onat Kutlar, who was a prominent writer and poet and

many other). The murder of Uğur Mumcu in 1993, a die-hard

Kemalist and human rights activist who had been investigating

Islamic underground groups for the Cumhuriyet, engendered an

102

unprecedented wave of resentment and his funeral turned into

demonstration of furious citizens who demanded more watchful

attitude towards the ever-growing influence of Islamic circles, which

attacked on secular personalities and gravely challenged the stability

of the country. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, another staunch Kemalist, an

intellectual, a columnist for the same Cumhuriyet, a former Minister

of Culture, noted that “Mumcu’s death shocked the nation, it was a

kind of mass awakening, with people everywhere saying: What can I

do to save democracy and Kemalism?”. He also linked the renewed

interest in Atatürk to the Mumcu’s murder

. In 1999, A. T. Kışlalı

was also assassinated in Ankara by a bomb placed in his car.

The last instance when the Kemalist social movement was

consolidated was the recent developments around the candidacy for the

president of the Republic. A candidate from the ruling Justice and

Development Party (which has ideological roots in the Islamic politics of

Turkey) was nominated for that prestigious position. The reaction to that

‘grievance’ turned into mass rallies in major cities of Turkey organized

mainly by the NGOs and associations, which associated themselves

with the secular course of Mustafa Kemal. This broad-based coalition of

the Kemalist movements protested against the candidate of the ruling

party on the grounds that ‘he might endanger and threaten the secular

character of the Turkish state’. This motto alone was sufficient to

establish a coalition of forces ready to appose the tendency of the ruling

party. The “Republican” rallies (as they were coined later), in spite of

time constraints, demonstrated the mobilization strength of the

Kemalists. The final result, however, was not very satisfying for them,

because the candidate from the ruling party succeeded in being elected,

but the lessons learned from that clash of interests became important

factors that the ruling party had to take into consideration.

Another point worthy of consideration is the level of engagement

of the Turkish Armed forces in the discourse of the Kemalist

Howe Marvine, Turkey: A nation divided over Islam’s revival, Colorado:

Westview press, 2000, p. 21.

103

mobilization. For many decades the Turkish army has been an

outspoken proponent of the secular character of Turkey. That is to

suggest that all the social movements, which pursued the same

target, found strong assistance from the army. When we also

consider the fact that for the last five decades the army intervened

into Turkish politics five times in order to preserve the legacy of

Atatürk, we can perhaps discern the level of responsibility that the

army generals put on themselves. The army is one of the most

organized institutions of the Turkish Republic, hence, any support

coming from it is widely welcomed among the various Kemalist

movements. More than that, the army founded a few enterprises and

industries to secure financial aspects of its involvement. All this

evidence suggests that army plays crucial role in making the

Kemalist voice heard, ultimately, the army constitutes, to put it mildly,

a key element in the hierarchy of the Kemalist social movement.

Conclusion

Social movements constitute an under-researched aspect of

Kemalism. The state ideology of Kemalism, which is now undergoing

significant ideological transformations, is faced with a crucial

question – how it can be efficiently developed to cope with the ever

increasing pressure from the inside and outside forces demanding

reforms in its structure and accents. In that context social

movements have a central role to play, since they constitute the

grassroots of Kemalism. No matter how ambiguous the term

Kemalism has been and remains, it is still associated with the power,

dominance and ideological vision set by the eternal leader of the

Turks, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and pursued by his followers, the

Kemalists. It is still a powerful denominator, it still enjoys a wide

popular backing, especially among those who are not intend to be

silent spectators of the major identity transformations rapidly

occurring in Turkey.

104

The state ideology of Kemalism was transformed into a social

movement, for of the following reasons – a) with the passage of the

time other popular voices became widely heard, as a result

Kemalism became one among many other ideologies, b) the

additional factors of the increasing level of societal participation,

social movements and social communication enhanced the actual

size and potency of other social movements, c) the routines of

previous engagements in power relations became obsolete and

Kemalism was faced to leave aside its statist-authoritarian

measures, d) Kemalism had to look for a wider popular support

through social movements to make their level of engagement far-

reaching and productive. To sum up, there are different mass based

social movements in Turkey arguing for the preservation of Atatürk’s

legacy, opting for protecting the secular, republican and nationalist

characters of the state, however, by force of pursued objectives, all

these movements are united under one broader movement – the

Kemalist social movement, in order to cope more efficiently with the

those forces which want the opposite. Another distinctive feature of

the Kemalist social movement/s is that for the last two decades their

members have tried to counteract adversaries not only with the

assistance of the state agencies, but to a great extent with rules of

engagement characteristic of the civil society.

By no means can we consider the task of correlating of

Kemalism and social movements solved thanks to this paper. It is an

extremely interesting subject which requires further deliberate

research, because the sooner it is scrutinized the better for the

researchers involved in the study of the Kemalist discourse.

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Elliot Hen-Tov, The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization,

Middle East Review of international Affairs, Vol. 8, No 4, (December 2004).

p. 50

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Õ³ñÇ ï»Õ³Ï³É ¨ ì³ßÇÝ·ïáÝáõÙ ³Û¹ »ñÏñÇ ¹»ëå³Ý ÞÛáõùñÛáõ ¾-

É»ù¹³ÕÁ, ³Ù»Ý³ÛÝ Ñ³í³Ý³Ï³ÝáõÃÛ³Ùµ ³ñï³Ñ³Ûï»Éáí ½ÇÝíá-

ñ³Ï³ÝáõÃÛ³Ý Ùáï»óáõÙÝ»ñÁ, ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ Ñ³ñ¨³ÝÝ»ñÇó ÐáõÝ³ë-

ï³ÝÁ ¨ êÇñÇ³Ý ¹³ëáõÙ ¿ñ áñå»ë ëå³éÝ³ÉÇù Ý»ñÏ³Û³óÝáÕ

»ñÏñÝ»ñ, áñáÝù ï³ñ³Íù³ÛÇÝ Ñ³í³ÏÝáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñ áõÝ»Ý ÂáõñùÇ³-

Henri J. Barkey, Turkey and The New Middle East, A Geopolitical

Exploration, Reluctant Neighbour, Turkey,s Role in the Middle East, United

States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, pp. 30-31

Michael Robert Hickok, Hegemon Rising: The Gap Between Turkish

Strategy and Military Modernization, The Eurasian Politician - Issue 3

(February 2001), http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/hickok.htm

108

ÛÇó: Àëï Ýñ³` ë³éÁå³ï»ñ³½ÙÛ³Ý ßñç³ÝÇ Ñ³Ù»Ù³ï ÂáõñùÇ³Ý

90-³Ï³Ý ÃÃ. ëÏ½µÇÝ ·ïÝíáõÙ ¿ñ µ³½Ù³ÏáÕÙ é³½Ù³Ï³Ý ·áñÍá-

ÕáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÇ Ù»ç Ý»ñù³ßí»Éáõ ëå³éÝ³ÉÇùÇ ³éç¨ ¨ å»ïù ¿

å³ïñ³ëï ÉÇÝ»ñ ³ÝÑñ³Å»ßïáõÃÛ³Ý ¹»åùáõÙ Çñ Ñ³ñ¨³ÝÝ»ñÇó

áñ¨¿ Ù»ÏÇ Ñ»ï é³½Ù³Ï³Ý ·áñÍáÕáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÇ Ù»ç ÙïÝ»É

Âáõñù³Ï³Ý å³ßïå³Ý³Ï³Ý Ñ³Û»ó³Ï³ñ·áõÙ ëÏ½µáõÝù³ÛÇÝ

Ýáñ é³½Ù³í³ñáõÃÛáõÝ Ñ³ÛïÝí»ó, Áëï áñÇ »ñÏñÇ ¼àô-Á å³ï-

ñ³ëï »Ý ÉÇÝ»Éáõ Ï³ÝË»É ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ ¹»Ù Ñ³ñÓ³ÏáõÙÝ»ñÝ áõ

ëå³éÝ³ÉÇùÝ»ñÁ ÙÇÝã¨ Ãáõñù³Ï³Ý ï³ñ³ÍùÇÝ Ñ³ëÝ»ÉÁ: ²ÝÏ³-

(forward engagement) é³½Ù³í³ñáõÃÛáõÝÁ »ÝÃ³¹ñáõÙ ¿ñ é³½Ù³-

Ï³Ý ·áñÍáÕáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÇ ëÏëÙ³Ý ¹»åùáõÙ ¹ñ³Ýù Ï³ÝË»É »ñÏñÇ

ë³ÑÙ³ÝÝ»ñÇó ¹áõñë, ½ÇÝí³Í ·áñÍáÕáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÝ Çñ³Ï³Ý³óÝ»É

ÃßÝ³Ùáõ ï³ñ³ÍùáõÙ

: è³½Ù³í³ñ³Ï³Ý ³Ûë åÉ³Ý³íáñÙ³Ý

ïñ³Ù³µ³ÝáõÃÛáõÝÇó ¿ µËáõÙ »ñÏñÇ û¹³ÛÇÝ ï³ñ³ÍùÇ áõ Ñ³-

Ï³ÑñÃÇé³ÛÇÝ å³ßïå³ÝáõÃÛ³Ý Ï³ÛáõÝ áõ Å³Ù³Ý³Ï³ÏÇó Ñ³Ù³-

Ï³ñ·Ç Ý»ñ¹ñáõÙÁ, »Ã» Ñ³ßíÇ ³éÝ»Ýù í»ñçÇÝ ï³ñÇÝ»ñÇÝ Ù»ñÓ³-

íáñ³ñ¨»ÉÛ³Ý ï³ñ³Í³ßñç³ÝáõÙ ëå³é³½ÇÝáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÇ ³×áÕ

Ùñó³í³½ùÝ áõ ÑñÃÇé³ÛÇÝ ï»ËÝáÉá·Ç³Ý»ñÇ ½³ñ·³óáõÙÁ:

ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ Ñ³Ù³ñ Ñ»Ýó ï³ñ³Í³ßñç³ÝáõÙ ³ÝÏ³ÝË³ï»ë»ÉÇ

½³ñ·³óáõÙÝ»ñÇ ÑÝ³ñ³íáñáõÃÛ³Ý å³ñ³·³ÛáõÙ ËÇëï Ññ³ï³å ¿

¹³éÝáõÙ ë»÷³Ï³Ý ½³ñ·³ó³Í Ñ³Ï³û¹³ÛÇÝ å³ßïå³ÝáõÃÛ³Ý

(³ÛëáõÑ»ïª Ðúä, Ãáõñù.

Hava savunma

) Ñ³Ù³Ï³ñ·Ç Ý»ñ¹ñáõÙÁ,

ù³ÝÇ áñ ï³ñ³Í³ßñç³ÝáõÙ ³ñ¹»Ý ³Ýí»ñ³ÑëÏ»ÉÇ ¹³ñÓ³Í ÑñÃÇ-

é³ÛÇÝ ï»ËÝÉá·Ç³Ý»ñÇ ï³ñ³ÍáõÙÝ áõ Ñ³ïÏ³å»ë Æñ³ÝÇ ÏáÕÙÇó

µ³ÉÇëïÇÏ ÑñÃÇéÝ»ñÇ ½³ñ·³óáõÙÁ Ãáõñù³Ï³Ý é³½Ù³ù³Õ³ù³-

Ï³Ý ßñç³Ý³ÏÝ»ñÇ ÏáÕÙÇó ¹Çï³ñÏíáõÙ »Ý áñå»ë ³½·³ÛÇÝ ³Ý-

íï³Ý·áõÃÛ³Ý Ù³ñï³Ññ³í»ñÝ»ñ: 90-³Ï³Ý ÃÃ. ÂáõñùÇ³Ý Éáõñç

³ÝÑ³Ý·ëïáõÃÛáõÝ ¿ñ Ñ³ÛïÝáõÙ Æñ³ÝÇ, Æñ³ùÇ áõ Ý³¨ êÇñÇ³ÛÇ

Şükrü Elekdağ, 2 ½ War Strategy, Center for Strategic Research, Journal

of International Affairs, Perceptions, Vol.1, March-May, 1996

Michael Robert Hickok, Ýßí.³ßË.:

109

ÏáÕÙÇó ùÇÙÇ³Ï³Ý áõ Ï»Ýë³µ³Ý³Ï³Ý ½»Ýù»ñÇ áõ ÑñÃÇéÝ»ñÇ ½³ñ-

·³óÙ³Ý ÑÝ³ñ³íáñáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñÇ Ï³å³ÏóáõÃÛ³Ùµ: ÂáõñùÇ³Ý Ø»ñ-

Ó³íáñ ²ñ¨»ÉùáõÙ Éñçáñ»Ý ·Çï³Ïó»ó µ³ÉÇëïÇÏ ÑñÃÇéÝ»ñÇ É³ÛÝ³-

Ù³ëßï³µ ÏÇñ³éÙ³Ý Ù³ñï³Ññ³í»ñÝ»ñÁ ÌáóÇ å³ï»ñ³½ÙáõÙ,

»ñµ Æñ³ùÝ ëÏë»ó û·ï³·áñÍ»É Scud-Bs ¨ Al-Hussein ÑñÃÇéÝ»ñÁ,

ÇëÏ Ñ»ï³·³ÛáõÙ ³ñ¹»Ý Éáõñç Ùï³í³ËáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñ ëÏë»ó ³é³ç µ»-

ñ»É Æñ³ùÇ ÏáÕÙÇó ½³Ý·í³Í³ÛÇÝ áãÝã³óÙ³Ý ½»ÝùÇ (³ÛëáõÑ»ïª

¼à¼, Ãáõñù.

Kitle Imha Silahı

) û·ï³·áñÍÙ³Ý ÑÝ³ñ³íáñáõÃÛáõÝÁ

ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ Ñ³Ù³ñ Ý»ñÏ³ÛáõÙë Éáõñç Ù³ñï³Ññ³í»ñ ¿ Ý»ñÏ³Û³ó-

ÝáõÙ Æñ³ÝÇ ÏáÕÙÇó ÑñÃÇé³ÛÇÝ ï»ËÝáÉá·Ç³Ý»ñÇ ½³ñ·³óáõÙÁ, ÙÇ-

çáõÏ³ÛÇÝ áÉáñïáõÙ Çñ³Ý³Ï³Ý Íñ³·ñ»ñÝ áõ ï³ñ³Í³ßñç³Ý³ÛÇÝ

½³ñ·³óáõÙÝ»ñÇ ³ÝÏ³ÝË³ï»ë»ÉÇáõÃÛ³Ý ·áñÍáÝÁ:

ÀÝ¹Ñ³Ýáõñ ³éÙ³Ùµ, ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ å³ßïå³Ý³Ï³Ý Ñ³Û»ó³-

Ï³ñ·Ý áõ é³½Ù³í³ñáõÃÛáõÝÁ »ÝÃ³¹ñáõÙ »Ý ³ÛÝåÇëÇ å³ßïå³-

Ý³Ï³Ý Ñ³Ù³Ï³ñ·Ç ³éÏ³ÛáõÃÛáõÝ, áñÝ Ç íÇ×³ÏÇ ÉÇÝÇ ³é³í»É

Ù³ñï³Ññ³í»ñÝ»ñÇÝ áõ ³ñï³ùÇÝ íï³Ý·Ý»ñÇÝ:

è²¼Ø²²ð¸ÚàôÜ²´ºðàôÂÚàôÜÀ ÐðÂÆè²Ððºî²Ü²ÚÆÜ

ØÆæàòÜºðÆ ²ðî²¸ðàôÂÚ²Ü àÈàðîàôØ

ÂáõñùÇ³ÛÇ é³½Ù³Ï³Ý ³ñ¹ÛáõÝ³µ»ñáõÃÛ³Ý áÉáñïáõÙ ·áñÍáõÙ

»Ý ÙÇ ù³ÝÇ ÁÝÏ»ñáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñ, áñáÝù Ù³ëÝ³·Çï³óí³Í »Ý é³½-

Ù³Ï³Ý ï»ËÝÇÏ³ÛÇ, ëå³é³½ÇÝáõÃÛ³Ý áõ ï³ñµ»ñ ½ÇÝ³ï»ë³Ï-

Ý»ñÇ ³ñï³¹ñáõÃÛ³Ý áÉáñïáõÙ: ÐñÃÇé³ÛÇÝ ï»ËÝáÉá·Ç³Ý»ñÇ áõ

½»ÝÇÃ³ÑñÃÇé³ÛÇÝ, Ññ»ï³Ý³ÛÇÝ Ñ³Ù³ÉÇñÝ»ñÇ ³ñï³¹ñáõÃÛ³Ý á-

ÉáñïáõÙ ·áñÍáõÙ »Ý Ãáõñù³Ï³Ý Roketsan áõ Aselsan ÁÝÏ»ñáõÃ-

ÛáõÝÝ»ñÁ, ÇÝãå»ë Ý³¨ ÙÇ ù³ÝÇ ³ÛÉ ÁÝÏ»ñáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñ ï³ñµ»ñ µ³-

Õ³¹ñ³Ù³ë»ñÇ ³ñï³¹ñ³Ï³Ý ·áñÍÁÝÃ³óáõÙ:

Şebnem Udum, Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile

Defence, Turkish Studies Institute, Vol.4, N3, 2003, p. 76

110