Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over

the past 3 years, there can be no stable and enduring peace

without the participation of the People’s Republic of China

and its 750 million people. That is why I have undertaken

initiatives in several areas to open the door for more nor-

mal relations between our two countries.

In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my

Assistant for National Security Affairs, to Peking during his

recent world tour for the purpose of having talks with Pre-

mier Chou En-Lai.

The announcement I shall now read is being issued

simultaneously in Peking and in the United States:

Premier Chou En-Lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, Pres-

ident Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held

talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of Presi-

dent Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Repub-

lic of China, Premier Chou En-Lai, on behalf of the

Government of the People’s Republic of China, has

extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at

an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has

accepted the invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the

United States is to seek the normalization of relations

between the two countries and also to exchange views on

questions of concern to the two sides.

In anticipation of the inevitable speculation which will

follow this announcement, I want to put our policy in the

clearest possible context.

Our action in seeking a new relationship with the Peo-

ple’s Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old

friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek

friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our

friend without being any other nation’s enemy.

I have taken this action because of my profound con-

viction that all nations will gain from a reduction of ten-

sions and a better relationship between the United States

and the People’s Republic of China.

It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply

hope will become a journey for peace, peace not just for

our generation but for future generations on this earth we

share together.

Thank you and good night.

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard

Nixon, 1971. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1969–74. pp. 819–820.

Agreement to End the Vietnam War, 1973

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-

nam, signed on January 27, 1973, in Paris, by representatives

of the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam),

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the

Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the

National Liberation Front, the political representation of the

Viet Cong).

Many of those voting for Nixon as president in 1968 had

expected him to end the war during his first administration. A

year after his election, with the war, now the longest in U.S.

history, continuing and protests becoming larger and attracting

a more mainstream demonstrator, the president delivered a

radio and television address announcing a new policy on the

Vietnam War. He revealed his plan “for the complete with-

drawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and their replacement

by South Vietnamese forces. However, he refused to announce

any timetable for total withdrawal, arguing that it would

remove any incentive for the Communist side to negotiate a

final settlement. He concluded the speech by asking, in a

phrase that entered the American cultural vocabulary, for the

support of the “great silent majority of my fellow Americans.”

At the start of Nixon’s second administration, he

announced a permanent cease-fire in the war to be monitored

by two joint military commissions made up of the parties to

the conflict. In the next 60 days, all U.S. prisoners of war were

to be released by Hanoi. At the same time, all U.S. military

personnel would be withdrawn from South Vietnam. Both the

United States and North Vietnam pledged to respect the right

of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination. The

enforcement of the peace agreement was to be the job of an

international control commission.

By March 29, the last of the remaining 23,500 U.S.

troops left South Vietnam, and the North released 586 POWs.

The longest war in American history seemed to be over. How-

ever, the reconciliation between the Viet Cong and the Saigon

government, as specified by the agreement, never occurred.

Soon, the fighting resumed, with the North Vietnamese

emerging victorious. Americans were forced to escape by

helicopter from the roof of their embassy, leaving behind

many of their South Vietnamese allies. On April 30, 1975,

Saigon fell, finally bringing the war to an end. Vietnam was

formally reunited the following year and Saigon was renamed

Ho Chi Minh City.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

Paris, France

January 27, 1973

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-

nam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in

Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peo-

ple’s fundamental national rights and the South Viet-

namese people’s right to self-determination, and to

1532 ERA 9: Postwar United States

contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the

world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and under-

take to respect and to implement them:

Chapter I

The Vietnamese People’s Fundamental National

Rights

Article 1. The United States and all other countries respect

the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial

integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva

Agreements on Vietnam.

Chapter II

Cessation of Hostilities—Withdrawal of Troops

Article 2. A ceasefire shall be observed throughout South

Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its

military activities against the territory of the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wher-

ever they may be based, and end the mining of the territo-

rial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will

remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in

the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of

North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this

Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3. The parties undertake to maintain the cease-

fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the ceasefire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other

foreign countries allied with the United States and the

Republic of Vietnam shall remain in place pending the

implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-

Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16

shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese

parties shall remain in place. The Two-Party Joint Military

Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the

areas controlled by each party and the modalities of sta-

tioning.

irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop

all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly

abide by the following stipulations:

—All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the

sea shall be prohibited;

—All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides

will be banned.

Article 4. The United States will not continue it mili-

tary involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of

South Vietnam.

Article 5. Within sixty days of the signing of this

Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South

Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military person-

nel, including technical military personnel and military

personnel associated with the pacification program,

armaments, munitions, and war material of the United

States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned

in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned

countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police

force will also be withdrawn within the same period

of time.

Article 6. The dismantlement of all military bases in

South Vietnam of the United States and of the other for-

eign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be com-

pleted within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

Article 7. From the enforcement of the ceasefire to

the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9

(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese

parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military

advisers, and military personnel including technical mili-

tary personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material

into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted

to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions

and war material which have been destroyed, damaged,

worn out or used up after the ceasefire, on the basis of

piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties,

under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of

the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International

Commission of Control and Supervision . . .

Source:

J. A. S. Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, ed., The Major Inter-

national Treaties since 1945: A History and Guide with

Texts, London: Methuen, 1987.

War Powers Act, 1973

The last time Congress declared war was in December 1941

after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Frustrated over the conduct

of the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Act

November 7, 1973 (over the October 24 veto by President

Richard M. Nixon) that restricted the right of the president to

use his powers as commander in chief to introduce U.S. armed

forces into foreign wars or situations abroad where hostilities

were imminent. The act required the president to consult

with Congress before and during any direct involvement of

U.S. forces in hostilities abroad. It limited the commitment of

armed forces by the president to 60 days (plus a possible 30-

day extension) unless Congress declared war or authorized the

continued use of forces in the situation. In the absence of a

declaration of war or statutory authorization, Congress was

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1533

given the right, by adopting a concurrent resolution, to order

the removal of such forces. Every president, including Nixon,

has considered the War Powers Act an unconstitutional

infringement on the powers of president as commander in

chief. However, presidents have received confirming resolu-

tions when they have mobilized a major commitment of

troops, as with the Gulf War (1990–91) and war against Iraq

(2002).

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

Concerning the war powers of Congress and the

President.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Short Title

Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the

“War Powers Resolution.”

Purpose and Policy

Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to ful-

fill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the

United States and insure that the collective judgment of

both the Congress and the President will apply to the

introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-

ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in

hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to

the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such

situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is

specifically provided that the Congress shall have the

power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying

into execution, not only its own powers but also all other

powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of

the United States, or in any department or officer

thereof.

Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed

Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the

circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a de-

claration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or

(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the

United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed

forces.

Consultation

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall con-

sult with Congress before introducing United States

Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where

imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by

the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall

consult regularly with the Congress until United States

Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have

been removed from such situations.

Reporting

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any

case in which United States Armed Forces are intro-

duced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-

cumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign

nation, while equipped for combat, except for deploy-

ments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or

training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United

States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located

in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within 48

hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and

to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in

writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction

of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under

which such introduction took place; and

or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other informa-

tion as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its

constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing

the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed

Forces abroad.

duced into hostilities or into any situation described in

subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as

such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostili-

ties or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the

status of such hostilities or situations as well as on the

scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no

event shall he report to the Congress less often than once

every six months.

Congressional Action

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section

4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House

of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of

the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so

transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on For-

eign Affairs on the House of Representatives and to the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appro-

priate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the

Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for

any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker

1534 ERA 9: Postwar United States

Domestic Policies after World War II 1535

of the House of Representatives and the President pro

tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if

petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of

their respective Houses) shall jointly request the Presi-

dent to convene Congress in order that it may consider

the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this

section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is sub-

mitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section

4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate

any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to

which such report was submitted (or required to be sub-

mitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has

enacted a specific authorization for such use of United

States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-

day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result

of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-

day period shall be extended for not more than an addi-

tional thirty days if the President determines and certifies

to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military

necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed

Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces

in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such

forces.

United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities

outside the territory of the United States, its possessions

and territories without a declaration of war or specific

statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed

by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent

resolution.

Source:

Statutes st Large, Vol. 87, pp. 555–559.

Domestic Policies after World War II

Harry S. Truman,

Statement by the President

Regarding the Loyalty Program, 1947

President Harry S. Truman used Executive Order (EO) 9835,

March 21, 1947, to answer allegations that the U.S. govern-

ment harbored Communists by tightening the federal govern-

ment’s loyalty procedures. Disloyalty was defined to include

espionage, sabotage, disclosure of confidential documents,

and “membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic associa-

tion with” organizations that the attorney general (AG) desig-

nated as totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or

advocating force, violence, or the use of unconstitutional

means to alter the government.

Previously a signed oath asserting that a federal employee

had not belonged to an organization advocating violent over-

throw of the government was considered sufficient proof of

loyalty. In addition to an oath and affidavit, the new program

required loyalty investigations by the FBI at an agency’s

request for all civilian employees of the executive branch and

all its job applicants on whom “derogatory” information was

alleged. After the investigation, the decision whether to keep

or dismiss an employee was the responsibility of the agency.

The EO created agency review boards and a policy-making

Loyalty Review Board (LRB) within the Civil Service Commis-

sion. Regional boards and the LRB could hear disputes, with

the LRB decision being final. (Contrary to popular belief, only

the requesting agency or a review board, not the FBI, had the

power to “clear” someone.) In this statement, delivered

November 14, 1947, Truman outlined how he envisioned the

loyalty program would work.

Approximately 6,000 individuals resigned their positions

rather than undergo a loyalty check, but only about 1,200 of

some 5 million civilian and military federal personnel actually

lost their jobs as a result of the program. The numbers,

however, do not account for the chilling effect the program may

have had on potential applicants. Although highly criticized at

the time by civil libertarians for implicating “innocent” people,

virtually all individuals who came before a loyalty board did so

because they had some connection to a suspect organization.

At least during its earliest years, however, the program did

not result in automatic expulsions, even if an employee had

associations with one or more of the communist, fascist, and

other groups prohibited by the AG’s List of Subversive Organi-

zations.

Truman’s program was criticized for not touching those

who were loyal but still posed a security risk. Therefore, Pres-

ident Dwight D. Eisenhower, in EO 10450, made security

rather than loyalty, the determination of a person’s government

employment. Many of those dismissed under its provisions

had criminal records or engaged in conduct considered ques-

tionable in the 1950s, such as alcoholism or homosexuality,

rather than disloyalty.

________________________

_______________________

Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of

an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive

Branch of the Government

Whereas each employee of the Government of the United

States is endowed with a measure of trusteeship over the

democratic processes which are the heart and sinew of the

United States; and

Whereas it is of vital importance that persons em-

ployed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerv-

ing loyalty to the United States; and

Whereas, although the loyalty of by far the over-

whelming majority of all Government employees is beyond

question, the presence within the Government service of

any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat to our

democratic processes; and

Whereas maximum protection must be afforded the

United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into

the ranks of its employees, and equal protection from

unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be afforded the

loyal employees of the Government:

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in

me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States,

including the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403), as

amended, and section 9A of the act approved August 2,

1939 (18 U.S.C. 61i), and as President and Chief Executive

of the United States, it is hereby, in the interest of the

internal management of the Government, ordered as fol-

lows:

Part I—Investigation of Applicants

1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every per-

son entering the civilian employment of any department or

agency of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-

ment.

a. Investigations of persons entering the competitive

service shall be conducted by the Civil Service Commis-

sion, except in such cases as are covered by a special agree-

ment between the Commission and any given department

or agency.

b. Investigations of persons other than those entering

the competitive service shall be conducted by the

employing department or agency. Departments and

agencies without investigative organizations shall utilize

the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Com-

mission.

2. The investigations of persons entering the employ

of the executive branch may be conducted after any such

person enters upon actual employment therein, but in any

such case the appointment of such person shall be condi-

tioned upon a favorable determination with respect to his

loyalty.

a. Investigations of persons entering the competitive

service shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible;

provided, however, that if any such investigation is not

completed within 18 months from the date on which a per-

son enters actual employment, the condition that his

employment is subject to investigation shall expire, except

in a case in which the Civil Service Commission has made

an initial adjudication of disloyalty and the case continues

to be active by reason of an appeal, and it shall then be the

responsibility of the employing department or agency to

conclude such investigation and make a final determina-

tion concerning the loyalty of such person.

3. An investigation shall be made of all applicants at all

available pertinent sources of information and shall

include reference to:

a. Federal Bureau of Investigation files.

b. Civil Service Commission files.

c. Military and naval intelligence files.

d. The files of any other appropriate government

investigative or intelligence agency.

e. House Committee on un-American Activities files.

f. Local law-enforcement files at the place of resi-

dence and employment of the applicant, including munic-

ipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.

g. Schools and colleges attended by applicant.

h. Former employers of applicant.

i. References given by applicant.

j. Any other appropriate source.

4. Whenever derogatory information with respect to

loyalty of an applicant is revealed a full investigation shall

be conducted. A full field investigation shall also be con-

ducted of those applicants, or of applicants for particular

positions, as may be designated by the head of the employ-

ing department or agency, such designations to be based

on the determination by any such head of the best inter-

ests of national security.

Part II—Investigation of Employees

1. The head of each department and agency in the

executive branch of the Government shall be personally

responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal

civilian officers or employees are not retained in employ-

ment in his department or agency.

a. He shall be responsible for prescribing and super-

vising the loyalty determination procedures of his depart-

1536 ERA 9: Postwar United States

ment or agency, in accordance with the provisions of this

order, which shall be considered as providing minimum

requirements.

b. The head of a department or agency which does not

have an investigative organization shall utilize the inves-

tigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission.

2. The head of each department and agency shall

appoint one or more loyalty boards, each composed of not

less than three representatives of the department or

agency concerned, for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases

arising within such department or agency and making rec-

ommendations with respect to the removal of any officer

or employee of such department or agency on grounds

relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for

the conduct of the proceedings before such boards.

a. An officer or employee who is charged with being

disloyal shall have a right to an administrative hearing

before a loyalty board in the employing department or

agency. He may appear before such board personally,

accompanied by counsel or representative of his own

choosing, and present evidence on his own behalf, through

witnesses or by affidavit.

b. The officer or employee shall be served with a writ-

ten notice of such hearing in sufficient time, and shall be

informed therein of the nature of the charges against him

in sufficient detail, so that he will be enabled to prepare his

defense. The charges shall be stated as specifically and

completely as, in the discretion of the employing depart-

ment or agency, security considerations permit, and the

officer or employee shall be informed in the notice (1) of

his right to reply to such charges in writing within a speci-

fied reasonable period of time, (2) of his right to an admin-

istrative hearing on such charges before a loyalty board,

and (3) of his right to appear before such board personally,

to be accompanied by counsel or representative of his own

choosing, and to present evidence on his behalf, through

witness or by affidavit.

3. A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board

shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee

affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employ-

ing department or agency or to such person or persons as

may be designated by such head, under such regulations as

may be prescribed by him, and the decision of the depart-

ment or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the

Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, here-

inafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation.

4. The rights of hearing, notice thereof, and appeal

therefrom shall be accorded to every officer or employee

prior to his removal on grounds of disloyalty, irrespective

of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appoint-

ment, but the head of the employing department or

agency may suspend any officer or employee at any time

pending a determination with respect to loyalty.

5. The loyalty boards of the various departments and

agencies shall furnish to the Loyalty Review Board, here-

inafter provided for, such reports as may be requested con-

cerning the operation of the loyalty program in any such

department or agency.

Part III—Responsibilities of Civil Service

Commission

1. There shall be established in the Civil Service Com-

mission a Loyalty Review Board of not less than three

impartial persons, the members of which shall be officers

or employees of the Commission.

a. The Board shall have authority to review cases involv-

ing persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating

to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency

and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the head

of the employing department or agency. Such cases may be

referred to the Board either by the employing department

or agency, or by the officer or employee concerned.

b. The Board shall make rules and regulations, not

inconsistent with the provisions of this order, deemed nec-

essary to implement statutes and Executive orders relating

to employee loyalty.

c. The Loyalty Review Board shall also:

(1) Advise all departments and agencies on all prob-

lems relating to employee loyalty.

(2) Disseminate information pertinent to employee

loyalty programs.

(3) Coordinate the employee loyalty policies and pro-

cedures of the several departments and agencies.

(4) Make reports and submit recommendations to the

Civil Service Commission for transmission to the President

from time to time as may be necessary to the maintenance

of the employee loyalty program.

2. There shall also be established and maintained in

the Civil Service Commission a central master index cov-

ering all persons on whom loyalty investigations have been

made by any department or agency since September 1,

1939. Such master index shall contain the name of each

person investigated, adequate identifying information con-

cerning each such person, and a reference to each depart-

ment and agency which has conducted a loyalty

investigation concerning the person involved.

a. All executive departments and agencies are directed

to furnish to the Civil Service Commission all information

appropriate for the establishment and maintenance of the

central master index.

b. The reports and other investigative material and

information developed by the investigating department or

agency shall be retained by such department or agency in

each case.

3. The loyalty Review Board shall currently be fur-

nished by the Department of Justice the name of each

Domestic Policies after World War II 1537

foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,

group or combination of persons which the Attorney Gen-

eral, after appropriate investigation and determination,

designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive,

or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving

the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others

their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or

as seeking to alter the form of government of the United

States by unconstitutional means.

a. The Loyalty Review Board shall disseminate such

information to all departments and agencies.

Part IV—Security Measures in Investigations

1. At the request of the head of any department or

agency of the executive branch an investigative agency

shall make available to such head, personally, all investiga-

tive material and information collected by the investigative

agency concerning any employee or prospective employee

of the requesting department or agency, or shall make such

material and information available to any officer or officers

designated by such head and approved by the investigative

agency.

2. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, how-

ever, the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the

names of confidential informants, provided it furnishes

sufficient information about such informants on the basis

of which the requesting department or agency can make

an adequate evaluation of the information furnished by

them, and provided it advises the requesting department

or agency in writing that it is essential to the protection of

the informants or to the investigation of other cases that

the identity of the informants not be revealed. Investiga-

tive agencies shall not use this discretion to decline to

reveal sources of information where such action is not

essential.

3. Each department and agency of the executive

branch should develop and maintain, for the collection and

analysis of information relating to the loyalty of its employ-

ees and prospective employees, a staff specially trained in

security techniques, and an effective security control sys-

tem for protecting such information generally and for pro-

tecting confidential sources of such information

particularly.

Part V—Standards

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the

removal from employment in an executive department or

agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all

the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the

person involved is disloyal to the Government of the

United States.

2. Activities and associations of an applicant or

employee which may be considered in connection with the

determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the

following:

a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations

therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;

b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;

c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter

the constitutional form of government of the United

States;

d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person,

under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the

United States, of documents or information of a confiden-

tial or non-public character obtained by the person making

the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Gov-

ernment of the United States;

e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or

otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another

government in preference to the interests of the United

States.

f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic asso-

ciation with any foreign or domestic organization, associa-

tion, movement, group or combination of persons,

designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist,

communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of

advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or

violence to deny other persons their rights under the Con-

stitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the

form of government of the United States by unconstitu-

tional means.

Part VI—Miscellaneous

1. Each department and agency of the executive

branch, to the extent that it has not already done so, shall

submit, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the

Department of Justice, either directly or through the Civil

Service Commission, the names (and such other necessary

identifying material as the Federal Bureau of Investigation

may require) of all of its incumbent employees.

a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall check

such names against its records of persons concerning

whom there is substantial evidence of being within the

purview of paragraph 2 of Part V hereof, and shall notify

each department and agency of such information.

b. Upon receipt of the above-mentioned information

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, each depart-

ment and agency shall make, or cause to be made by the

Civil Service Commission, such investigation of those

employees as the head of the department or agency shall

deem advisable.

2. The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee shall draft rules applicable to the

handling and transmission of confidential documents and

other documents and information which should not be

publicly disclosed, and upon approval by the President

1538 ERA 9: Postwar United States

such rules shall constitute the minimum standards for the

handling and transmission of such documents and infor-

mation, and shall be applicable to all departments and

agencies of the executive branch.

3. The provisions of this order shall not be applicable

to persons summarily removed under the provisions of sec-

tion 3 of the act of December 17, 1942, 56 Stat. 1053, of

the act of July 5, 1946, 60 Stat. 453, or of any other statute

conferring the power of summary removal.

4. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy,

and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast

Guard, are hereby directed to continue to enforce and

maintain the highest standards of loyalty within the armed

services, pursuant to the applicable statutes, the Articles of

War, and the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

5. This order shall be effective immediately, but com-

pliance with such of its provisions as require the expendi-

ture of funds shall be deferred pending the appropriation

of such funds.

6. Executive Order No. 9300 of February 5, 1943, is

hereby revoked.

Harry S. Truman

The White House, March 21, 1947.

Source:

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Papers of Harry S. Tru-

man, Official File, Box 102, FBI.

J. Edgar Hoover, Statement before the

Committee on Un-American Activities,

House of Representatives, 1947

The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)

was one of the most aggressive anticommunist governmental

institutions. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director J.

Edgar Hoover outlined his vision of the internal Communist

menace to this committee March 26, 1947. From the Gangster

era in the 1930s through the capture of German spies and

saboteurs in World War II and into the cold war, Hoover was

considered an American hero and his pronouncements were

influential.

In his testimony, Hoover outlined the FBI’s previous role in

countering German subversion and espionage and its current

role in combating communism. The excerpts here include the

reasons why he contends that communism threatens American

security and how to recognize communists, their sympathizers,

and their propaganda. The statement incorporates arguments

Hoover will use the rest of his career to support continued vig-

ilance against American “Marxist-Leninism.” It concludes with

a refrain that echoes in Congress and in the courts: “Commu-

nism . . . is not a political Party. It is . . . an evil and malignant

way of life.”

A technique Communists often used with congressional

committees was a refusal to answer questions on the grounds

of the Fifth Amendment. In

Ullmann v. United States

(350 U.S.

452) decided March 26, 1956, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld

the Immunity Act of 1954, under which witnesses could be

forced to testify in national security cases—in courts and grand

juries, as well as congressional committees—by granting them

immunity from prosecution for criminal actions they might

admit. Ullmann, pleading the Fifth Amendment, had refused to

testify about an espionage ring when questioned by a grand

jury and a congressional committee. He was later granted

immunity but argued that he could lose his job, his union

membership, and eligibility for a passport, and could be sub-

jected to public censure, if he admitted any subversive activity.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment did protect

against such noncriminal penalties.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpts)

March 26, 1947

My feelings concerning the Communist Party of the

United States are well known. I have not hesitated over the

years to express my concern and apprehension. As a con-

sequence its professional smear brigades have conducted a

relentless assault against the FBI. You who have been

members of this committee also know the fury with which

the party, its sympathizers and fellow travelers can launch

an assault. I do not mind such attacks. What has been dis-

illusioning is the manner in which they have been able to

enlist support often from apparently well-meaning but

thoroughly duped persons. . . .

The communist movement in the United States began

to manifest itself in 1919. Since then it has changed its

name and its party line whenever expedient and tactical.

But always it comes back to fundamentals and bills itself as

the party of Marxism-Leninism. As such, it stands for the

destruction of our American form of government; it stands

for the destruction of American democracy; it stands for

the destruction of free enterprise; and it stands for the cre-

ation of a “Soviet of the United States” and ultimate world

revolution. . . .

The communist, once he is fully trained and indoctri-

nated, realizes that he can create his order in the United

States only by “bloody revolution.” Their chief textbook,

“The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union,” is used as a basis for planning their revolution.

Their tactics require that to be successful they must have:

1. The will and sympathy of the people.

2. Military aid and assistance.

3. Plenty of guns and ammunition.

Domestic Policies after World War II 1539

4. A program for extermination of the police as they

are the most important enemy and are termed “trained fas-

cists.”

5. Seizure of all communications, buses, railroads,

radio stations, and other forms of communications and

transportation. . . .

One thing is certain. The American progress which all

good citizens seek, such as old-age security, houses for vet-

erans, child assistance, and a host of others, is being

adopted as window dressing by the communists to conceal

their true aims and entrap gullible followers. . . .

The mad march of Red fascism is a cause for concern

in America. But the deceit, the trickery, and the lies of the

American communists are catching up with them. When-

ever the spotlight of truth is focused upon them they cry,

“Red-baiting.” Now that their aims and objectives are

being exposed, they are creating a Committee for the Con-

stitutional Rights of Communists, and are feverishly work-

ing to build up what they term a quarter-million-dollar

defense fund to place ads in papers, to publish pamphlets,

to buy radio time. They know that their backs will soon be

to the wall. . . .

What is important is the claim of the communists

themselves that for every party member there are 10 oth-

ers ready, willing and able to do the party’s work. Herein

lies the greatest menace of communism. For these are the

people who infiltrate and corrupt various spheres of Amer-

ican life. So rather than the size of the Communist Party,

the way to weigh its true importance is by testing its influ-

ence, its ability to infiltrate. . . .

The communists have developed one of the greatest

propaganda machines the world has ever known. They

have been able to penetrate and infiltrate many

respectable public opinion mediums. They capitalize upon

ill-founded charges associating known honest progressive

liberals with left-wing causes. I have always entertained

the view that there are few appellations more degrading

than “communist” and hence it should be reserved for

those justly deserving the degradation.

The communist propaganda technique is designed to

promote emotional response with the hope that the victim

will be attracted by what he is told the communist way of

life holds in store for him. The objective, of course, is to

develop discontent and hasten the day when the commu-

nists can gather sufficient support and following to over-

throw the American way of life. . . .

Communists and their followers are prolific letter

writers, and some of the more energetic ones follow the

practice of directing numerous letters of protest to editors

but signing a different name to each. Members of

Congress are well aware of communists starting their pres-

sure campaigns by an avalanche of mail which follows the

party line. . . .

The American communists launched a furtive attack

on Hollywood in 1935 by the issuance of a directive calling

for a concentration in Hollywood. The orders called for

action on two fronts: One, an effort to infiltrate the labor

unions; two, infiltrate the so-called intellectual and cre-

ative fields.

In movie circles, communists developed an effective

defense a few years ago in meeting criticism. They would

counter with the question “After all, what is the matter

with communism?” It was effective because many persons

did not possess adequate knowledge of the subject to give

an intelligent answer. . . .

I feel that this committee could render a great service

to the nation through its power of exposure in quickly spot-

lighting existing front organizations and those which will

be created in the future. There are easy tests to establish

the real character of such organizations:

1. Does the group espouse the cause of Americanism

or the cause of Soviet Russia?

2. Does the organization feature as speakers at its

meeting known communists, sympathizers, or fellow trav-

elers?

3. Does the organization shift when the party line

shifts?

4. Does the organization sponsor causes, campaigns,

literature, petitions, or other activities sponsored by the

party or other front organizations?

5. Is the organization used as a sounding board by or

is it endorsed by communist-controlled labor unions?

6. Does its literature follow the communist line or is it

printed by the communist press?

7. Does the organization receive consistent favorable

mention in the communist publications?

8. Does the organization present itself to be nonparti-

san yet engage in political activities and consistently advo-

cate causes favored by the communists?

9. Does the organization denounce American and

British foreign policy while always lauding Soviet policy?

10. Does the organization utilize communist “double-

talk” by referring to Soviet dominated countries as democ-

racies, complaining that the United States is imperialistic

and constantly denouncing monopoly-capital?

11. Have outstanding leaders in public life openly

renounced affiliation with the organization?

12. Does the organization, if espousing liberal pro-

gressive causes, attract well-known honest patriotic liberals

or does it denounce well-known liberals?

13. Does the organization have a consistent record of

supporting the American viewpoint over the years?

14. Does the organization consider matters now

directly related to its avowed purposes and objectives?

The Communist Party of the United States is a fifth

column if there ever was one. It is far better organized

1540 ERA 9: Postwar United States

than were the Nazis in occupied countries prior to their

capitulation. They are seeking to weaken America just as

they did in their era of obstruction when they were aligned

with the Nazis. Their goal is the overthrow of our govern-

ment. There is no doubt as to where a real communist’s

loyalty rests. Their allegiance is to Russia, not the United

States. . . .

What can we do? And what should be our course of

action? The best antidote to communism is vigorous, intel-

ligent, old-fashioned Americanism, with eternal vigilance.

I do not favor any course of action which would give the

communists cause to portray and pity themselves as mar-

tyrs. I do favor unrelenting prosecution wherever they are

found to be violating our country’s laws.

As Americans, our most effective defense is a work-

able democracy that guarantees and preserves our cher-

ished freedoms.

I would have no fears if more Americans possessed the

zeal, the fervor, the persistence and the industry to learn

about this menace of Red fascism. I do fear for the liberal

and progressive who has been hoodwinked and duped into

joining hands with the communists. I confess to a real

apprehension so long as communists are able to secure

ministers of the gospel to promote their evil work and

espouse a cause that is alien to the religion of Christ and

Judaism. I do fear so long as school boards and parents tol-

erate conditions whereby communists and fellow travelers,

under the guise of academic freedom, can teach our youth

a way of life that eventually will destroy the sanctity of the

home, that undermines faith in God, that causes them to

scorn respect for constituted authority and sabotage our

revered Constitution.

I do fear so long as American labor groups are infil-

trated, dominated or saturated with the virus of commu-

nism. I do fear the palliation and weasel-worded gestures

against communism indulged in by some of our labor lead-

ers who should know better, but who have become pawns

in the hands of sinister but astute manipulations for the

communist cause.

I fear for ignorance on the part of all our people who

may take the poisonous pills of communist propaganda.

Source:

National Archives. Also available on-line at CNN Interactive.

URL: http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/

06/documents/hoover/. Accessed November 2003.

Internal Security Act, 1950

Also known as the McCarran Act and the Subversive Activities

Control Act, this legislation was passed September 23, 1950,

over the veto of President Harry S. Truman. Congress intended

it to effectively destroy the Communist Party in the United

States without actually outlawing it. Sponsored by Senator

Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada, the act required all Commu-

nist and Communist-front organizations to register with the

attorney general. It prohibited Communists from working in

defense plants and prevented them from acquiring passports.

It allowed the president, during national emergencies, to

authorize the seizure and detention of persons who might

engage in espionage or sabotage and established a Subversive

Activities Control Board to determine who “knowingly” acted

in behalf of a foreign individual or entity to establish “a total-

itarian dictatorship.”

The act was widely criticized as a violation of civil liber-

ties, most prominently by the president in his veto message.

President Truman felt so strongly that the McCarran Act

would be detrimental to both countersubversion and civil

rights that he had copies of his veto message typed on one

side of the page only and placed on the desk of every mem-

ber of Congress. He noted that rather than hinder any dan-

gerous American Communists, who would lie to protect

themselves, it was more likely to curb American progressives

and dissidents entitled to express their opinions under the

First Amendment. The Korean War had been going on for

over two months, and the president noted that “when our

young men are fighting for freedom . . . it would be tragic to

advance the objectives of communism in this country, as this

bill would do.” Ultimately, the courts overturned so many of

its provisions that by the end of the 1950s it was virtually

defunct, although the detention provisions remained until

Congress removed them in 1971.

On August 24, 1954, Congress strengthened the Internal

Security Act by, for the first time, outlawing the Communist

Party in the Communist Control Act. The act declared the

party an “instrumentality of conspiracy” to overthrow the U.S.

government and a clear and present danger to the nation’s

security. In addition, it provided severe penalties for Com-

munists who did not register, refused collective bargaining

powers to Communist-controlled unions, and removed the

legal “rights, privileges, and immunities” of the party. Though

criticized as repressive, the act was promoted by liberal anti-

communist Democrats such as Minnesota senator Hubert H.

Humphrey as well as conservatives. This act, like the Internal

Security Act, failed to produce any effective prosecutions. In

Pennsylvania v. Nelson

(350 U.S. 497 [1956]) the Supreme

Court declared that it and the Smith Act precluded the states

from prosecuting anyone for advocating overthrow of the fed-

eral government although they might be liable for advocating

overthrow of state governments.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

Domestic Policies after World War II 1541