Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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standardization of specifications and for the greatest prac-

ticable allocation of purchase authority of technical equip-

ment and common use items on the basis of single

procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, pro-

curement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logis-

tic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various seg-

ments of the military procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or

may be created to consider the subjects falling within the

scope of the Board’s responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or

dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the

fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such

manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and

agencies for the proper correlation of military require-

ments with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to

the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical

material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such

material, and to make recommendations as to policies in

connection therewith;

(9) to assemble and review material and personnel

requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

those presented by the production, procurement, and dis-

tribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to

make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of

Defense; and

(10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of

Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed

has taken office, the Joint Army and Navy Munitions

Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel

shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board

with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may

determine to be required by the Board for the perfor-

mance of its functions.

Research and Development Board

Sec. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the

National Military Establishment a Research and Develop-

ment Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the

“Board”). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman,

who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives

from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respec-

tive Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from

civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at

the rate of $14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall

be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of sci-

entific research relative to the national security, and to

assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and

development on scientific problems relating to the

national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direc-

tion of the Secretary of Defense—

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of

research and development for military purposes;

(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific

research relating to national security and the measures

necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of

research and development among the military depart-

ments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for

specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Estab-

lishment in connection with research and development

matters involving agencies outside the National Military

Establishment;

(5) to consider the interaction of research and devel-

opment and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of

Defense may direct.

has taken office, the Joint Research and Development

Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel

shall be transferred to the Research and Development

Board.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board

with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may

determine to be required by the Board for the perfor-

mance of its functions.

Title III—Miscellaneous

Compensation of Secretaries

Sec. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive

the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive

departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the

Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive

the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive

departments.

Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries

Sec. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secre-

taries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each

receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year and

shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their

respective departments may prescribe.

Advisory Committees and Personnel

Sec. 303. (a) This Secretary of Defense, the Chairman

of the National Security Resources Board, and the Direc-

1502 ERA 9: Postwar United States

tor of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such

advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other

provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as

they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective

functions and the functions of agencies under their con-

trol. Persons holding other offices or positions under the

United States for which they receive compensation while

serving as members of such committees shall receive no

additional compensation for such service. Other members

of such committees and other part-time advisory person-

nel so employed may serve without compensation or may

receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $35 for each

day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such

advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for

a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered

as service bringing such individual within the provisions of

section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U.S.C., 1940 edi-

tion, title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19(e) of the

Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such

individual, which by such section is made unlawful when

performed by an individual referred to in such section, is

with respect to any particular matter which directly

involves a department or agency which such person is

advising or in which such department or agency is directly

interested.

Status of Transferred Civilian Personnel

Sec. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this

Act shall be without change in classification or compensa-

tion, but the head of any department or agency to which

such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes

in the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in

the duties of such personnel commensurate with their

classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

Saving Provisions

Sec. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other

actions applicable with respect to any function, activity,

personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred

under this Act, or with respect to any officer, department,

or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except

to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated,

or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have the

same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but,

after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or

other action which vested functions in or otherwise related

to any officer, department, or agency from which such

transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect

to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or

other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent

with other provisions of this Act, be deemed to have vested

such function in or relate to the officer, department, or

agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully com-

menced by or against the head of any department or

agency or other officer of the United States, in his official

capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties,

shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or

change in title under the provisions of this Act; and, in the

case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other pro-

ceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of

such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if

the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion

or supplemental petition filed within twelve months after

such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the sur-

vival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain set-

tlement of the questions involved.

graph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act,

1941, the existing organization of the War Department

under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9082

of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order

Numbered 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organi-

zation of the Department of the Navy under the provisions

of Executive Order Numbered 9635 of September 29,

1945, including the assignment of functions to organiza-

tional units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to

the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, con-

tinue in force for two years following the date of enact-

ment of this Act except to the extent modified by the

provisions of this Act or under the authority of law.

Transfer of Funds

Sec. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations,

allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds avail-

able or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of

the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be trans-

ferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in con-

nection with the exercise of its functions. Such other

unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, non-

appropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter

made available for use by the Department of War or the

Department of the Army in exercise of functions trans-

ferred to the Department of the Air Force under this Act,

as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be

transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in

connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended

balances transferred under this section may be used for

the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or

other funds were originally made available, or for new

expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act.

The transfers herein authorized may be made with or

without warrant action as may be appropriate from time

to time from any appropriation covered by this section to

any other such appropriation or to such new accounts

established on the books of the Treasury as may be deter-

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1503

mined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of

this Act.

Authorization for Appropriations

Sec. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropri-

ated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to

carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

Definitions

Sec. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term “function”

includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this Act, the term “budget program”

refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the

allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated

funds.

Separability

Sec. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application

thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the

validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application

of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall

not be affected thereby.

Effective Date

Sec. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202(a) and

sections 1, 2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect

immediately upon the enactment of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions

of this Act shall take effect on whichever of the following

days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the

Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the six-

tieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Succession to the Presidency

Sec. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1

of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the performance

of the duties of the office of President in case of the

removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the Presi-

dent and Vice President”, approved July 18, 1947, is

amended by striking out “Secretary of War” and inserting

in lieu thereof “Secretary of Defense”, and by striking out

“Secretary of the Navy,”.

Approved July 26, 1947.

Source:

United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 61, pp. 495–510.

President Truman’s Recognition of the

State of Israel, White House Press

Releases, 5/14/48 and 1/31/49

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, most of the remaining Euro-

pean Jews had no country. For religious, economic, and social

reasons, Zionists (supporters of a Jewish homeland) had

begun to populate and purchase land in Palestine (a British

protectorate, and before that under Turkish jurisdiction) since

early in the 20th century. Zionists saw their dream realized

when the United Nations General Assembly voted in principle

to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas. The British

announced they would leave May 15, 1948, and on May 14

the Jews proclaimed their state. In order to make certain that

the United States rather than the Soviets would have primacy

in Israel, Truman recognized the new state within minutes. The

next day, Arab forces invaded. A UN-sponsored truce did not

last long and Israel and her Arab neighbors have been fighting

in one form or another ever since. Truman’s initial recognition

was de facto because Israel had only a provisional govern-

ment. On January 31, 1949, after elections, the recognition

became de jure, i.e. within the law. Israel may not have sur-

vived without U.S. recognition and support, nor would it have

been able to join the United Nations.

________________________

_______________________

Statement by President Truman, 1948

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state

has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has

been requested by the provisional government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional govern-

ment as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.

Statement by President Truman, 1949

On October 24, 1948, the president stated that when a

permanent government was elected in Israel, it would

promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a

government were held on January 25th. The votes have

now been counted, and this Government has been offi-

cially informed of the results. The United States Govern-

ment is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to

the Government of Israel as of this date.

Source:

White House Press Releases in Henry Steele Commager, ed.,

Documents of American History, 6th ed., New York: Apple-

ton, Century, Crofts, 1958.

George Marshall, Note on

Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948

Note by U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall July 6,

1948, to the Soviet Union, protesting that nation’s June 24

halting of all land and water traffic between West Germany

and the city of West Berlin.

Berlin, the former capital of Germany, although located

more than 100 miles into the Soviet-dominated East Germany,

was jointly occupied by the United States, France, and the

United Kingdom, as well as the USSR. It remained a major

source of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West until

1989.

1504 ERA 9: Postwar United States

After Germany’s surrender, the Allies carved Berlin into

four zones of occupation. By June 1948 the French, Ameri-

can, and British zones had merged, and preparations had

begun to create what became West Germany (the Federal

Republic of Germany–FRG) in 1949. In retaliation, Soviet

officials, declaring that Berlin was an integral part of the

Soviet zone, refused to permit the Western occupying powers

access to the western zones of the city. Marshall, in his note,

demanded restoration of free access to Berlin, maintaining

the city was an international, not a USSR, zone of occupa-

tion. The Soviet blockade, however, lasted until May 12,

1949. During that period, the Western nations airlifted more

than 2 million tons of food, clothing, and other necessities

into the city.

In 1961, Premier Nikita Khrushchev demanded that

British, French, and U.S. troops be removed from West Berlin.

In a report to the American people on July 25, President

Kennedy called the Soviet proposal a threat to peace and

freedom. “We do not want to fight, but we have fought before.

. . . We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us

out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.” He asked Congress

to appropriate additional funding for the armed forces and for

civil defense, to authorize an increase in military personnel,

and to increase draft calls. The Soviet response was to build a

wall separating East and West Berlin. East Berliners escaping

over it risked being shot. The wall stood until 1989 when Ger-

mans tore it down in defiance of the Soviets.

On June 3, 1972, the ambassadors of Great Britain,

France, and the United States to the FRG, and the Soviet

ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

signed the Four Power Agreement on the status of Berlin. The

previous year, they agreed to help ease the tension in the

area, to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to respect their

individual and common rights and obligations. This agree-

ment eased transit and communications between West Berlin

and the FRG. Berlin’s legal status, however, remained

unchanged, and Great Britain, France, and the United States

reiterated their continued and absolute responsibility for West

Berlin.

________________________

_______________________

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of

your note No. 51/41/48 of June 18, 1948, protesting on

behalf of your Government the recommendations result-

ing from the Six-Power talks on Germany, recently held in

London, on the grounds that the participants were “not

competent and not empowered to deal with these prob-

lems.” You stressed your Government’s opposition to many

of the recommendations as being contrary to existing inter-

national agreements and your Government’s belief that all

matters involving the future of Germany should be the

exclusive concern of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I

noted with particular interest your observation that “any

possible difficulties in reconciling the positions within the

Council cannot be insuperable, if all the Powers will abide

by the Potsdam agreements.”

I need hardly remind you of my Government’s persis-

tent efforts to achieve four-power agreement on Germany

on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. I discussed this

point in my note to you of September 30, 1947, in connec-

tion with the decision to revise the level of industry in the

Anglo-American zone. The record clearly shows that the

continuing efforts of my Government to achieve an equi-

table solution of the German problem in the Council of

Foreign Ministers and in the Allied Control Council in

Berlin have been fruitless largely as a result of the intran-

sigent attitude of one of the occupying powers. The

records of the Control Council as of March 1948 show that

the Soviet representative has vetoed the agreed decisions

of the other three powers in 69 instances—nearly three

times the combined number of vetoes exercised by the

other powers. As explained in my note under reference, it

is because of the repeated failure over a period of three

years to achieve four-power agreement that my Govern-

ment “feels justified in pursuing objectives which have

been commonly agreed and making arrangements for that

purpose with any other occupying power willing to work

toward the common end.”

My Government agrees with your Government that

German resources ought to be used for the benefit of the

general reconstruction of Europe rather than for the

reconstruction of only a part of Europe. The United States

has consistently endeavored to implement the clear under-

standing in the Potsdam Agreement that Germany, includ-

ing the Soviet Zone, should be treated as an economic

whole and it has consistently striven to create those condi-

tions which would lead to the establishment of a demo-

cratic German state capable of assisting the reconstruction

of all the devastated countries of Europe and yet not con-

stituting a threat to the security of those nations. The

assertion that the United States has sought to divide Ger-

many or to divide Europe is without any foundation. The

fact that its offer to assist the general European recovery

has not been accepted by certain countries, including

Poland, has of necessity limited the application of that

recovery program to those countries which have accepted

it. The apparent division of Germany today after three

years of unsuccessful attempts to hold it together is greatly

deplored by my Government. Here again the necessity to

confine our joint program in Germany to Western Ger-

many is not of our making and certainly not in accordance

with our wishes. The fact that the efforts of the United

States toward the rehabilitation of Europe now have to be

concentrated on the program for Western Europe, includ-

ing Western Germany, is a direct result of the failure of the

other countries of Europe at the instigation of the Soviet

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1505

Union to join in a common program looking toward the

rehabilitation of all Europe.

With regard to the substance of the London recom-

mendations I must point out that there was no attempt in

these talks to cover all aspects of the German problem.

Therefore, there is no basis for your protesting the fact

that the problem of reparations was omitted in the recom-

mendations of the conference, a conference which you

have insisted had no right to discuss any matters relating to

Germany.

I must take exception to your comments on the rec-

ommendations concerning security and your statement

that the fundamental aim of removing Germany’s eco-

nomic basis of aggression has been ignored. It should not

be necessary for me to remind you that the United States

has twice been engaged in major wars with Germany and

that it is vitally interested in preventing a recurrence of

German aggression. Security considerations, far from hav-

ing been relegated to a secondary position, were constantly

in mind throughout the London discussions as should be

evident from the communique reporting the final recom-

mendations. This problem has of course become more

complicated as a result of the unwillingness of the Soviet

Union to join the other occupying powers in a long term

treaty guaranteeing the disarmament and demilitarization

of Germany. The London recommendations on the Ruhr

and on general security make specific provision against the

rebuilding of German economic power as a means to

future aggression.

Your comments on the plan for the control of the

Ruhr have, I believe, been answered in the general dis-

cussion above with respect to the division of Germany

and of Europe. It should be observed that the program

for the rehabilitation of Western Germany does not

exclude that area from trade relations with Eastern

Europe but, on the contrary, seeks to foster such trade in

the common interest. If certain countries “who suffered

most in consequence of German aggression” claim that

their interests are not sufficiently taken into account by

the program planned for Western Germany, their com-

plaint should not be addressed to the United States Gov-

ernment but to the Government primarily responsible for

preventing these countries from cooperating in the gen-

eral recovery program for Europe. In the same way it

seems to me that your protest against the failure to utilize

quadripartite consultative machinery, should more appro-

priately be addressed to the occupying power responsible

for the present deplorable division of Europe and Ger-

many.

Source:

U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 19 (July 18, 1948), pp.

86–87.

North Atlantic Treaty, 1949

Security pact established on April 4, 1949, by countries of the

North Atlantic region. The treaty created the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), a military and political alliance

intended to counteract the Soviet Union’s increasing military

presence and expansionist postures in Europe. Successor to

the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty was

endorsed by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice-

land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,

and the United States, and later joined by Greece, Turkey, and

West Germany. The treaty, initiated by the United States,

bound its signatories to help each other in the event of aggres-

sion (an attack on one was to be regarded as an attack on all)

and “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civi-

lization of their peoples founded on the principles of democ-

racy, individual organization, liberty and the rule of law.”

NATO has standing military forces in Europe and operates

chiefly through its council (made up of representatives from

the member nations). NATO’s major adversary was the War-

saw Pact, consisting of Eastern European Communist coun-

tries. However, since the fall of communism and the breakup

of the Soviet Union, several former Warsaw Pact nations have

joined or are otherwise associated with NATO.

Several pacts also reinforced relationships between the

United States and Latin American countries. On September 2,

1947, they signed the Rio Treaty, followed by the formal char-

tering of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Bogotá,

Colombia, April 30, 1948. Signed at the close of the Ninth Pan-

American Conference by representatives of the 21 American

states (excluding, notably, Canada), the charter laid down fun-

damental principles for the OAS and described its structure.

Through this document the signatories agreed to settle all dis-

putes peacefully; to work together to promote economic,

social, and cultural progress among them; and to respect the

right of each state to govern itself in its own way. While not

explicitly stated, the OAS was anticommunist in its orientation.

On September 1, 1951, Australia, New Zealand, and the

United States (ANZUS) signed a mutual security treaty for the

preservation of peace and security in the Pacific region. Meet-

ing in San Francisco, they reaffirmed their commitment to the

United Nations Charter and agreed to consult and help each

other if their “territorial integrity, political independence or

security” was threatened in the Pacific. Ratified by the Aus-

tralian Parliament in 1952, the treaty was considered valid

indefinitely. ANZUS located its headquarters in the Australian

capital of Canberra.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) began

September 8, 1954, in Manila, Philippines, to counteract the

growing communist influence in the Far East. Signed by

Britain, France, the United States, Australia, New Zealand,

the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand, the treaty became

operative on February 19, 1955. Headquartered in Bangkok,

1506 ERA 9: Postwar United States

SEATO’s role was mainly to provide consultation during an

emergency; unlike NATO it did not command standing forces.

The absence of India, Indonesia, and Burma (Myanmar) and

the exclusion of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia undermined

SEATO’s effectiveness in the region. After losing Pakistan in

1973 (following the creation of Bangladesh) and France in

1974, SEATO’s signatories decided in September 1975 to

gradually phase out operations in view of the changing

regional picture. SEATO was formally dissolved on June 30,

1977.

________________________

_______________________

April 4, 1949

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the pur-

poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all

governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, com-

mon heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on

the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule

of law.

The seek to promote stability and well-being in the

North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective

defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty

Art. 1. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Char-

ter of the United Nations to settle any international dis-

putes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in

such a manner that international peace and security, and

justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their interna-

tional relations from the threat or use of force in any man-

ner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

Art. 2. The Parties will contribute toward the further

development of peaceful and friendly international rela-

tions by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing

about a better understanding of the principles upon which

these institutions are founded, and by promoting condi-

tions of stability and well-being. They will seek to elimi-

nate conflict in their international economic policies and

will encourage economic collaboration between any or all

of them.

Art. 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objec-

tives of this treaty, The Parties, separately and jointly by

means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual

aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collec-

tive capacity to resist armed attack.

Art. 4. The Parties will consult together whenever, in

the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, politi-

cal independence or security of any of the Parties is threat-

ened.

Art. 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against

one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be

considered an attack against them all and consequently

they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of

them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective

self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the

United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked

by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the

other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including

the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the secu-

rity of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and

all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be

reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be

terminated when Security Council has taken the measures

necessary to restore and maintain international peace and

security.

Art. 6. For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on

one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed

attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or

North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,

on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the juris-

diction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area

north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels or air-

craft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories

or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of

any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the

treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the

North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Art. 7. This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be

interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obliga-

tions under the Charter of the Parties which are members

of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the

Security Council for the maintenance of international

peace and security.

Art. 8. Each Party declares that none of the interna-

tional engagements now in force between it and any other

of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the pro-

visions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any

international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Art. 9. The Parties hereby establish a council, on

which each of them shall be represented, to consider mat-

ters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The

council shall be so organized as to be able to meet

promptly at any time. The council shall set up such sub-

sidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall

establish immediately a defence committee which shall

recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3

and 5.

Art. 10. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement,

invite any other European State in a position to further the

principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of

the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state

so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing

its instrument of accession with the Government of the

United States of America. The Government of the United

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1507

States of America will inform each of the Parties of the

deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Art. 11. This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions

carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respec-

tive constitutional processes. The instruments of ratifica-

tion shall be deposited as soon as possible with the

Government of the United States of America, which will

notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty

shall enter into force between the States which have rati-

fied it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the sig-

natories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada,

France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United King-

dom and the United States, have been deposited and shall

come into effect with respect to other States on the date of

the deposit of their ratifications.

Art. 12. After the Treaty has been in force for ten

years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of

them so requests, consult together for the purpose of

reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then

affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area,

including the development of universal as well as regional

arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for

the maintenance of international peace and security.

Art. 13. After the Treaty has been in force for twenty

years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its

notice of denunciation has been given to the Government

of the United States of America, which will inform the

Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each

notice of denunciation.

Art. 14. This Treaty, of which the English and French

texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the

archives of the Government of the United States of Amer-

ica. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by

that Government to the Governments of the other signa-

tories.

See also

DWIGHT D

EISENHOWER

, “

I SHALL GO TO KOREA

”

SPEECH

, 1952;

KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE

, 1953;

KOREA

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

Source:

Henry Steele Commager, ed. Documents of American History,

Vol. 2, Since 1898. 9th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice

Hall, 1973, pp. 553–554.

Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957

Doctrine proposed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower Jan-

uary 5, 1957, and adopted by Congress on March 9, authoriz-

ing military aid for any Middle Eastern nation requesting such

assistance in order to resist communist aggression. It was pro-

mulgated after the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli

troops from Egypt during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, which

arose after pro-Soviet Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser

nationalize, and, when attacked, blocked the canal. The doc-

trine was an effort to forestall Soviet attempts to fill the subse-

quent power vacuum. In July 1958 Eisenhower used the

doctrine to send U.S. forces to protect a pro-Western govern-

ment in Lebanon. Some of the later problems of U.S. relations

in the Middle East trace back to American support of anticom-

munist but otherwise dictatorial or overly Westernized rulers.

________________________

_______________________

To the Congress of the United States:

First may I express to you my deep appreciation of

your courtesy in giving me, at some inconvenience to your-

selves, this early opportunity of addressing you on a matter

I deem to be of grave importance to our country.

In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall

review the international situation generally. There are

worldwide hopes which we can reasonably entertain, and

there are worldwide responsibilities which we must carry

to make certain that freedom—including our own—may

be secure.

There is, however, a special situation in the Middle

East which I feel I should, even now, lay before you.

Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our

basic national objective in international affairs remains

peace—a world peace based on justice. Such a peace must

include all areas, all peoples of the world if it is to be

enduring. There is no nation, great or small, with which we

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1509

would refuse to negotiate, in mutual good faith, with

patience and in the determination to secure a better

understanding between us. Out of such understandings

must, and eventually will, grow confidence and trust, indis-

pensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans

for lifting from us all the burdens of expensive armaments.

To promote these objectives, our government works tire-

lessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But until

a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all

nations peaceful existence, we must, in the interests of

peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical

stage in its long and important history. In past decades

many of the countries in that area were not fully self-gov-

erning. Other nations exercised considerable authority in

the area and the security of the region was largely built

around their power. But since the First World War there

has been a steady evolution toward self-government and

independence. This development the United States has

welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports

without reservation the full sovereignty and independence

of each and every nation of the Middle East.

The evolution to independence has in the main been

a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled.

Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids

back and forth across national boundaries have brought

about a high degree of instability in much of the Mid East.

Just recently there have been hostilities involving Western

European nations that once exercised much influence in

the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in Octo-

ber has intensified the basic differences between that

nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been

heightened and, at times, manipulated by International

Communism.

II.

Russia’s rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle

East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bol-

sheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not

affect Russia’s security, for no one plans to use the Middle

East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a

moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from

the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in

the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first

resort to aggression.

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Neither does Russia’s desire to dominate the Middle

East spring from its own economic interest in the area.

Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez

Canal. In 1955 Soviet traffic through the Canal repre-

sented only about three fourths of 1% of the total. The

Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for,

the petroleum resources which constitute the principal

natural wealth of the area. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a

substantial exporter of petroleum products.

The reason for Russia’s interest in the Middle East is

solely that of power politics. Considering her announced

purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to under-

stand her hope of dominating the Middle East.

This region has always been the crossroads of the con-

tinents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Suez Canal

enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the

commerce that is essential if these countries are to main-

tain well-rounded and prosperous economies. The Middle

East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa.

It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil

deposits of the world and it normally supplies the

petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and

Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent

upon this supply, and this dependency relates to trans-

portation as well as to production! This has been vividly

demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and

some of the pipelines. Alternate ways of transportation

and, indeed, alternate sources of power can, if necessary,

be developed. But these cannot be considered as early

prospects.

These things stress the immense importance of the

Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their

independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hos-

tile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area

and for many other free nations whose economic life

would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe

would be endangered just as though there had been no

Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The

free nations of Asia and Africa, too, would be placed in

serious jeopardy. And the countries of the Middle East

would lose the markets upon which their economies

depend. All this would have the most adverse, if not disas-

trous, effect upon our own nation’s economic life and polit-

ical prospects.

Then there are other factors which transcend the

material. The Middle East is the birthplace of three great

religions—Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and

Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbol-

ize religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over

matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of

which no despotic government can rightfully deprive him.

It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle

East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic

materialism.

International Communism, of course, seeks to mask

its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and

by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and

1510 ERA 9: Postwar United States

military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of

Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look

behind the mask.

Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania! In 1939 the

Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with

these then independent countries; and the Soviet Foreign

Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the

Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly

declared that “we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious

observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciproc-

ity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the

Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest

of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provoca-

teurs.” Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were

forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern

Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn

promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II.

Stalin’s death brought hope that this pattern would

change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of

1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite coun-

tries “the principles of mutual respect for their indepen-

dence and sovereignty and non-interference in domestic

affairs.” But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary

by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian

tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises

have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs

and seeks a recognizable success.

Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by

Russia, would today be prized more than ever by Interna-

tional Communism.

2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not

scruple to use any means to gain their ends.

3. The free nations of the Middle East need, and for

the most part want, added strength to assure their contin-

ued independence.

III.

Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a pro-

tector of small nations. Its charter gives it primary respon-

sibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security. Our country has given the United Nations its full

support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in

Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a

cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt

because it was dealing with governments and peoples who

had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as

reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in

the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The

Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to

require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hun-

gary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recom-

mendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly.

The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be

a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambi-

tions of the Soviet Union are involved.

IV.

Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a

greater responsibility now devolves upon the United

States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedi-

cation to the principle that force shall not be used interna-

tionally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity

and independence of the nations of the Middle East

should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation’s dedi-

cation to principle been tested as severely as ours during

recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as

elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either

political or economic domination over any other people.

Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servi-

tude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of

the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from

International Communism and welcome closer coopera-

tion with the United States to realize for themselves the

United Nations goals of independence, economic well-

being and spiritual growth.

If the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of

uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast

economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peo-

ples there, as well as that of others; and if its cultures and

religions and their shrines are to be preserved for the

uplifting of the spirits of the peoples, then the United

States must make more evident its willingness to support

the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the

area.

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the

cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation

can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to

give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to

freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would

gravely endanger all of the free world.

There have been several Executive declarations made

by the United States in relation to the Middle East. There

is the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, followed by

the Presidential assurance of October 31, 1950, to the King

of Saudi Arabia. There is the Presidential declaration of

April 9, 1956, that the United States will within constitu-

tional means oppose any aggression in the area. There is

our Declaration of November 29, 1956, that a threat to the

territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq,

Pakistan, or Turkey would be viewed by the United States

with the utmost gravity.

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1511