Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and

the increased danger from International Communism,

convince me that basic United States policy should now

find expression in joint action by the Congress and the

Executive. Furthermore, our joint resolve should be so

couched as to make it apparent that if need be our words

will be backed by action.

VI.

It is nothing new for the President and the Congress to

join to recognize that the national integrity of other free

nations is directly related to our own security.

We have joined to create and support the security sys-

tem of the United Nations. We have reinforced the collec-

tive security system of the United Nations by a series of

collective defense arrangements. Today we have security

treaties with 42 other nations which recognize that our

peace and security are intertwined. We have joined to take

decisive action in relation to Greece and Turkey and in

relation to Taiwan.

Thus, the United States through the joint action of the

President and the Congress, or, in the case of treaties, the

Senate, has manifested in many endangered areas its pur-

pose to support free and independent governments—and

peace—against external menace, notably the menace of

International Communism. Thereby we have helped to

maintain peace and security during a period of great dan-

ger. It is now essential that the United States should man-

ifest through joint action of the President and the

Congress our determination to assist those nations of the

Mid East area, which desire that assistance.

The action which I propose would have the following

features.

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to

cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in

the general area of the Middle East in the development of

economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of

national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive

to undertake in the same region programs of military assis-

tance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations

which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance

and cooperation to include the employment of the armed

forces of the United States to secure and protect the terri-

torial integrity and political independence of such nations,

requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from

any nation controlled by International Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the

treaty obligations of the United States, including the Char-

ter of the United Nations and with any action or recom-

mendations of the United Nations. They would also, if

armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority

of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with

the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place,

authorize the President to employ, for economic and

defensive military purposes, sums available under the

Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard

to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the

authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe

that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropri-

ated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present

fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subse-

quent legislation the authorization of $200,000,000 to be

available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for

discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other

mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided

for by the Congress.

VII.

This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle

East. Neither does it represent the totality of our policies

for the area. There are the problems of Palestine and rela-

tions between Israel and the Arab States, and the future of

the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the future sta-

tus of the Suez Canal. These difficulties are aggravated by

International Communism, but they would exist quite

apart from that threat. It is not the purpose of the legisla-

tion I propose to deal directly with these problems. The

United Nations is actively concerning itself with all these

matters, and we are supporting the United Nations. The

United States has made clear, notably by Secretary Dulles’

address of August 26, 1955, that we are willing to do much

to assist the United Nations in solving the basic problems

of Palestine.

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal

with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and

indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power

in the area should be made good, not by external or alien

force, but by the increased vigor and security of the inde-

pendent nations of the area.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if

ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against

direct aggression; where the government disposes of loyal

security forces, and where economic conditions are such as

not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative.

The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this

matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression.

It is my hope and belief that if our purpose be pro-

claimed, as proposed by the requested legislation, that

very fact will serve to halt any contemplated aggression.

We shall have heartened the patriots who are dedicated to

1512 ERA 9: Postwar United States

the independence of their nations. They will not feel that

they stand alone, under the menace of great power. And I

should add that patriotism is, throughout this area, a pow-

erful sentiment. It is true that fear sometimes perverts true

patriotism into fanaticism and to the acceptance of dan-

gerous enticements from without. But if that fear can be

allayed, then the climate will be more favorable to the

attainment of worthy national ambitions.

And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for us

to contribute economically to strengthen those countries,

or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly

dedicated to the preservation of independence and resis-

tance to subversion. Such measures will provide the great-

est insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are

not enough.

VIII.

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ

the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend

the territorial integrity and the political independence of

any nation in the area against Communist armed aggres-

sion. Such authority would not be exercised except at the

desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my pro-

found hope that this authority would never have to be

exercised at all.

Nothing is more necessary to assure this than that our

policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly

and clearly determined and declared. Thus the United

Nations and all friendly governments, and indeed govern-

ments which are not friendly, will know where we stand.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation

arose which called for the military application of the policy

which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I

would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the

Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were

not in session, and if the situation had grave implications,

I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special

session.

In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is

often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate.

If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or cor-

rectly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately

defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of

armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circum-

stances which would almost surely involve the United

States in military action. I am convinced that the best

insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make

clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with

our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the

purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend

promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to

explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

IX.

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and

indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the

area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are

grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Amer-

icans have seen our nation’s vital interests and human free-

dom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have

been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of

our words, motives and actions.

Indeed, the sacrifices of the American people in the

cause of freedom have, even since the close of World War

II, been measured in many billions of dollars and in thou-

sands of the precious lives of our youth. These sacrifices,

by which great areas of the world have been preserved to

freedom, must not be thrown away.

In those momentous periods of the past, the President

and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to

serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free

world.

The occasion has come for us to manifest again our

national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep

respect for the rights and independence of every nation—

however great, however small. We seek not violence, but

peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies,

our determination, ourselves.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 1957, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1953–1961, pp. 6–16.

Proclamation 3504:

Interdiction of the Delivery of

Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 1962

Presidential proclamation issued by President John F. Kennedy

October 23, 1962, imposing a naval blockade of Cuba to pre-

vent further deliveries of weapons from the Soviet Union.

The day before announcing this proclamation, President

Kennedy addressed the nation explaining the Soviet Union’s

secret placement of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic

missiles in Cuba and the U.S. response. Calling the Soviet

action “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the

Americas,” Kennedy announced the blockade. He declared

that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any

nation in the Western Hemisphere would be considered an

attack by the Soviet Union against the United States and

would elicit a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1513

The October 23 proclamation ordered U.S. land, sea, and

air forces to prohibit the delivery of all offensive weapons to

Cuba. It gave U.S. forces the authority to search any ship head-

ing toward Cuba and to take into custody any ship that failed

to comply. It said that force would be used “only to the extent

necessary.” Copies of the text were given to all foreign ambas-

sadors in Washington, D.C., and were transmitted by the

United States to all foreign governments; the Soviet Foreign

Ministry refused to accept its copy.

For a week, as the United States turned away several

Soviet ships, the threat of a full-fledged nuclear war loomed.

But negotiations continued. President Kennedy wrote to Soviet

premier Nikita Khrushchev October 27, 1962, responding to

terms received from Khrushchev the previous day. Kennedy

accepted Moscow’s proposal that all Soviet missiles be

removed from Cuba under UN supervision if the United States

suspended its blockade and gave assurances that it would not

invade the island. Regarding a second proposal issued by

Khrushchev later on October 26, demanding that the United

States remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey, Kennedy noted

only that he was “very much interested in reducing tensions

and halting the arms race” but resolving the Cuban missiles sit-

uation came first. Two days later, Khrushchev agreed to stop

building bases in Cuba and to dismantle and remove offensive

weapons there.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 produced a widespread

awareness of the possibility of an accidental nuclear war

between the two nations. As a result, the United States and the

Soviet Union agreed June 20, 1963, to establish a direct com-

munications link (the so-called hot line) between the two gov-

ernments for use in times of emergency. The 4,883-mile cable

telephone line between the White House and the Kremlin

opened August 30, 1963. In 1978 the hot line began operating

via satellite.

________________________

_______________________

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the

United States and of all American States are endangered

by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers

of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases

for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of

North and South America;

Whereas by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress

of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it

was declared that the United States is determined to pre-

vent by whatever means may be necessary, including the

use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from

extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or

subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to

prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally sup-

ported military capability endangering the security of the

United States; and

Whereas the Organ of Consultation of the American

Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962,

recommended that the Member States, in accordance with

Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively,

including the use of armed force, which they may deem

necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot

continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military

material and related supplies which may threaten the peace

and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in

Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an

active threat to the peace and security of the Continent:

Now, Therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the

United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the

authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and

statutes of the United States, in accordance with the afore-

mentioned resolutions of the United States Congress and

of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics,

and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby

proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered,

beginning at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time October 24, 1962,

to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained,

the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel

to Cuba.

For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following

are declared to be prohibited materiel:

Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs,

air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for

any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equip-

ment to support or operate the above items; and any other

classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of

Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall

take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of pro-

hibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air

forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces

that may be made available by other American States.

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations

and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure

the effectiveness of this order, including the designation,

within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or

restricted zones and of prescribed routes.

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward

Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify

itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call,

to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed

as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to

respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to

being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is

believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohib-

ited materiel or may itself constitute such materiel shall,

wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another des-

1514 ERA 9: Postwar United States

tination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if

it fails or refuses to obey such directions. All vessels or

craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the

United States for appropriate disposition.

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used

except in case of failure or refusal to comply with direc-

tions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of

Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have

been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or

in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only

to the extent necessary.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and

cause the seal of the United States of America to be

affixed.

Done in the City of Washington this twenty-third day

of October in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and

sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of

America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.

John F. Kennedy

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F.

Kennedy, 1962. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1962–64. pp. 809–811.

Lyndon Johnson,

Tonkin Gulf Incident Message;

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964

Joint resolution passed overwhelmingly by the U.S. Congress

on August 7, 1964, giving President Lyndon B. Johnson broad

powers to fight communism in Southeast Asia. Two days ear-

lier, Johnson had announced that he had ordered air strikes

against North Vietnam in retaliation for alleged North Viet-

namese attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. The

resolution gave Johnson congressional approval for “all nec-

essary measures to repel any armed attack” against U.S.

forces and for “all necessary steps” to assist any ally in South-

east Asia seeking to defend its freedom. It became the basis

for Johnson’s escalation of the war in Vietnam. A 1968 U.S.

Senate investigation raised serious doubts about the alleged

Gulf of Tonkin attacks, and the resolution was repealed in

May 1970.

The problems in Southeast Asia trace back to the war of

the indigenous, communist-inspired Indochinese (Vietnamese,

Cambodian, and Laotian) colonists against the French. The

United States refused to assist France, but in 1954, with the

war still going on, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told the

press in Washington, D.C., that as one Asian country falls to

communism its neighbor follows until all are lost. “You would

call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of domi-

noes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will hap-

pen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very

quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that

would have the most profound influences.” This “Domino

Theory” influenced Presidents Johnson and Nixon and their

advisers to persist in their involvement in the former

Indochina, even when, early on, it appeared that a victory for

anticommunist forces would require a major expenditure in

money, manpower, and loss of life.

________________________

_______________________

Lyndon Johnson, Tonkin Gulf Incident Message,

1964

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that

the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further

deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in

international waters, and that I had therefore directed air

action against gun boats and supporting facilities used in

these hostile operations. This air action has now been car-

ried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities.

Two US aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in

the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the

Congress for a Resolution expressing the unity and deter-

mination of the United States in supporting freedom and

in protecting peace in Southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime

have given new and grave turn to the already serious situ-

ation in Southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are

well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954

by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in

the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by

the Senate in February 1955.

This Treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates

the United States and other members to act in accordance

with their Constitutional processes to meet the Commu-

nist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and

unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four

simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we

must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a

threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political

or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for free-

dom on every front of human activity. Our military and

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1515

economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in partic-

ular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel

aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of Southeast Asia has

long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has con-

stantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This

Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for

Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of

subversion, which includes the direction, training, and

supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla

warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North

Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used

Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and

most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct

violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Viet-

namese regime have become steadily more threatening. In

May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos,

the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over

Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of

Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determin-

ing the situation in territory where Communist forces were

preventing inspection by the International Control Com-

mission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I

responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions

to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Viet-

namese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct

attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded

that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in

affirming the national determination that all such attacks

will be met, and that the U.S. will continue in its basic pol-

icy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their

freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States

intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must

make it clear to all that the United States is united in its

determination to bring about the end of Communist sub-

version and aggression in the area. We seek the full and

effective restoration of the international agreements

signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam,

and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of

the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed

forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty.

At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall con-

tinue readily to explore any avenues of political solution

that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist

subversion and the preservation of the independence of

the nations of the area.

The Resolution could well be based upon similar res-

olutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the

threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Mid-

dle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962.

It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support

of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with

attacks against our armed forces and to defend freedom

and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with

the obligations of the United States under the southeast

Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a Resolution

promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the

aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a

whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried for-

ward—and that the peace and security of the area will be

preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have

made the passage of a Congressional Resolution essential.

But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time

when we are entering on three months of political cam-

paigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a

period the United States will continue to protect its

national interests, and that in these matters there is no

division among us.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964

JOINT RESOLUTION

To promote the maintenance of international peace and

security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in

Vietnam, violation of the principles of the Charter of

the United Nations and of international law, have delib-

erately and repeatedly attacked United States naval ves-

sels lawfully present in international waters, and have

thereby created a serious threat to international peace;

and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and sys-

tematic campaign of aggression that the Communist

regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its

neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collec-

tive defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of

southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no terri-

torial, military or political ambitions in the area, but

desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to

work out their own destinies in their own way: Now,

therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the Congress approves and supports the determina-

tion of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take

all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against

1516 ERA 9: Postwar United States

the forces of the United States and to prevent further

aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its

national interest and to world peace the maintenance

of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Consonant with the Constitution of the United States

and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance

with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared,

as the President determines, to take all necessary steps,

including the use of armed force, to assist any member

or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its

freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President

shall determine that the peace and security of the area is

reasonably assured by international conditions created by

action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it

may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the

Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964.

Source:

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964, United States Statutes at Large;

Lyndon Johnson, Tonkin Gulf Incident Message, Public

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.

Johnson, 1963–64. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1963–69. Vol. 78, pp. 384, 930–932.

Address on Vietnam before the

National Legislative Congress, 1967

Televised speech delivered by President Lyndon B. Johnson to

the National Legislative Conference at San Antonio, Texas,

September 29, 1967. Johnson used this opportunity to defend

his administration’s policies in Vietnam. Because Vietnam

was “the arena where Communist expansionism is most

aggressively at work in the world today,” it directly threatens

the security of the United States. Johnson invoked the

Domino Theory, warning that if South Vietnam fell to the

Communists, this would likely “be followed by a Communist

conquest of Southeast Asia.” Moreover, he insisted that South

Vietnam was making progress toward the formation of a

“constitutional government.” Johnson condemned Hanoi’s

refusal to accept the U.S. proposals to begin direct talks and

blamed continuance of the war squarely on North Vietnam.

He maintained that the United States would “continue to

press forward” in its commitment to South Vietnam and

asserted that the antiwar protests at home would not “pro-

duce surrender.”

________________________

_______________________

Speaker Barnes, Governor Hughes, Governor Smith, Con-

gressman Kazen, Representative Graham, most distin-

guished legislators, ladies and gentlemen:

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to appear before

an organization whose members contribute every day such

important work to the public affairs of our State and of our

country.

This evening I came here to speak to you about Viet-

nam.

I do not have to tell you that our people are pro-

foundly concerned about that struggle.

There are passionate convictions about the wisest

course for our Nation to follow. There are many sincere

and patriotic Americans who harbor doubts about sustain-

ing the commitment that three Presidents and a half a mil-

lion of our young men have made.

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problems

of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of polit-

ical turmoil—of poverty—of religious and factional

strife—of ancient servitude and modern longing for free-

dom. Vietnam is all of these things.

Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that

is spurred by an appetite for conquest.

It is the arena where Communist expansionism is

most aggressively at work in the world today—where it is

crossing international frontiers in violation of interna-

tional agreements; where it is killing and kidnapping;

where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to

its will.

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and

hope, America has entered—with its material power and

with its moral commitment.

Why?

Why should three Presidents and the elected repre-

sentatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian

nation more than 10,000 miles from American shores?

We cherish freedom—yes. We cherish self-determina-

tion for all people—yes. We abhor the political murder of

any state by another, and the bodily murder of any people

by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for 27 years—since

the days of lend-lease—we have sought to strengthen free

people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

But the key to all that we have done is really our own

security. At times of crisis—before asking Americans to

fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land—every

American President has finally had to answer this question:

Is the aggression a threat—not only to the immediate

victim—but to the United States of America and to the

peace and security of the entire world of which we in

America are a very vital part?

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1517

That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and

John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in fac-

ing the issue in Vietnam.

That is the question that the Senate of the United

States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and

approved the SEATO treaty in 1955, and to which the

Members of the United States Congress responded in a

resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2,

“ . . . the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the Pres-

ident determines, to take all necessary steps, including the

use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state

of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting

assistance in defense of its freedom.”

Those who tell us now that we should abandon our

commitment—that securing South Vietnam from armed

domination is not worth the price we are paying—must

also answer this question. And the test they must meet is

this: What would be the consequences of letting armed

aggression against South Vietnam succeed? What would

follow in the time ahead? What kind of world are they pre-

pared to live in 5 months or 5 years from tonight?

For those who have borne the responsibility for deci-

sion during these past 10 years, the stakes to us have

seemed clear—and have seemed high.

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959:

Strategically, South Vietnam’s capture by the Com-

munists would bring their power several hundred miles

into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in

Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking

movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be

lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands

would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-

nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could,

as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for

freedom. . .”

And President John F. Kennedy said in 1962:

“ . . . withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case

of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area.”

A year later, he reaffirmed that:

“We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my

opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a

collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So

we are going to stay there,” said President Kennedy.

This is not simply an American viewpoint, I would

have you legislative leaders know. I am going to call the roll

now of those who live in that part of the world—in the

great arc of Asian and Pacific nations—and who bear the

responsibility for leading their people, and the responsibil-

ity for the fate of their people.

The President of the Philippines had this to say:

“Vietnam is the focus of attention now. . .It may hap-

pen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever

there is misery, disease, ignorance . . . For you to renounce

your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chi-

nese to gobble up all of Asia.”

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said:

“(The American) decision will go down in history as

the move that prevented the world from having to face

another major conflagration.”

The Prime Minister of Australia said:

“We are there because while Communist aggression

persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened.”

President Park of Korea said:

“For the first time in our history, we decided to dis-

patch our combat troops overseas. . .because in our belief

any aggression against the Republic of Vietnam repre-

sented a direct and grave menace against the security and

peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the

very security and freedom of our own people.”

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that

if the United States pulled out of South Vietnam, it would

go to the Communists, and after that, it would be only a

matter of time until they moved against neighboring states.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said:

“We can thank God that America at least regards

aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards

aggression in Europe—and is prepared to back up its con-

cern with action.”

The Prime Minister of Singapore said:

“I feel the fate of Asia—South and Southeast Asia—

will be decided in the next few years by what happens in

Vietnam.”

I cannot tell you tonight as your President—with cer-

tainty—that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam

would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast

Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in

Laos. I do know that there are North Vietnamese trained

guerrillas tonight in northeast Thailand. I do know that

there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating

in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in

Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

So your American President cannot tell you—with

certainty—that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist

power would bring a third world war much closer to terri-

ble reality. One could hope that this would not be so.

But all that we have learned in this tragic century

strongly suggests to me that it would be so. As President of

the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the

chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to risk the secu-

rity—indeed, the survival—of this American Nation on

mere hope and wishful thinking. I am convinced that by

seeing this struggle through now, we are greatly reducing

the chances of a much larger war—perhaps a nuclear war.

I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and by meet-

ing this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the

danger for our children and for our grandchildren.

1518 ERA 9: Postwar United States

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam itself.

There are questions about this difficult war that must

trouble every really thoughtful person. I am going to put

some of these questions. And I am going to give you the

very best answers that I can give you.

First, are the Vietnamese—with our help, and that of

their other allies—really making any progress? Is there a

forward movement? The reports I see make it clear that

there is. Certainly there is a positive movement toward con-

stitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have met

the political schedule that they laid down in January 1966.

The people wanted an elected, responsive govern-

ment. They wanted it strongly enough to brave a vicious

campaign of Communist terror and assassination to vote

for it. It has been said that they killed more civilians in 4

weeks trying to keep them from voting before the election

than our American bombers have killed in the big cities of

North Vietnam in bombing military targets.

On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of

the Constituent Assembly, an elected government will be

inaugurated and an elected Senate and Legislature will be

installed. Their responsibility is clear: To answer the

desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determi-

nation and for peace, for an attack on corruption, for eco-

nomic development, and for social justice.

There is progress in the war itself, steady progress

considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic

progress considering the situation that actually prevailed

when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we inter-

vened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by

the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from

many of their major interior bases. The military victory al-

most within Hanoi’s grasp in 1965 has now been denied them.

The grip of the Vietcong on the people is being broken.

Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965

the proportion of the population living under Communist

control has been reduced to well under 20 percent.

Tonight the secure proportion of the population has grown

from about 45 percent to 65 percent—and in the con-

tested areas, the tide continues to run with us.

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese

have suffered severely, as have we—particularly in the

First Corps area in the north, where the enemy has

mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines of com-

munication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties

in the war have reached about 13,500 killed in action, and

about 85,000 wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded, we

thank God that 79,000 of the 85,000 have been returned,

or will return to duty shortly. Thanks to our great Ameri-

can medical science and the helicopter.

I know there are other questions on your minds, and

on the minds of many sincere, troubled Americans: “Why

not negotiate now?” so many ask me. The answer is that we

and our South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared to

negotiate tonight.

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh, and other chiefs

of state concerned, tomorrow.

I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their for-

eign minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative of Amer-

ica to any spot on this earth to talk in public or private with

a spokesman of Hanoi.

We have twice sought to have the issue of Vietnam

dealt with by the United Nations—and twice Hanoi has

refused.

Our desire to negotiate peace—through the United

Nations or out—has been made very, very clear to

Hanoi—directly and many times through third parties.

As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again,

the heart of the matter is really this: The United States is

willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North

Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive dis-

cussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions pro-

ceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the

bombing cessation or limitation.

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

So it is by Hanoi’s choice—and not ours, and not the

rest of the world’s—that the war continues.

Why, in the face of military and political progress in

the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do

they insist and persist with the war?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still

hope that the people of the United States will not see this

struggle through to the very end. As one Western diplomat

reported to me only this week—he had just been in

Hanoi—”They believe their staying power is greater than

ours and that they can’t lose.” A visitor from a Communist

capital had this to say: “They expect the war to be long, and

that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a break-

down in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors.” The

Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: “Amer-

icans do not like long, inconclusive war. . .Thus we are sure

to win in the end.”

Are the North Vietnamese right about us?

I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I think it is the

common failing of totalitarian regimes that they cannot

really understand the nature of our democracy:

—They mistake dissent for disloyalty.

—They mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy.

—They mistake a few committees for a country.

—They misjudge individual speeches for public

policy.

They are no better suited to judge the strength and

perseverance of America than the Nazi and the Stalinist

propagandists were able to judge it. It is a tragedy that they

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1519

must discover these qualities in the American people, and

discover them through a bloody war.

And, soon or late, they will discover them.

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to continue to

seek negotiations—confident that reason will some day

prevail; that Hanoi will realize that it just can never win;

that it will turn away from fighting and start building for its

own people.

Since World War II, this Nation has met and has mas-

tered many challenges—challenges in Greece and Turkey,

in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba.

We met them because brave men were willing to risk

their lives for their nation’s security. And braver men have

never lived than those who carry our colors in Vietnam at

this very hour.

The price of these efforts, of course, has been heavy.

But the price of not having made them at all, not having

seen them through, in my judgment would have been

vastly greater.

Our goal has been the same—in Europe, in Asia, in

our own hemisphere. It has been—and it is now—peace.

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peace cannot

be preserved by noble words and pure intentions. “Endur-

ing peace,” Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “cannot be bought

at the cost of other people’s freedom.”

The late President Kennedy put it precisely in

November 1961, when he said: “We are neither warmon-

gers nor appeasers, neither hard nor soft. We are Ameri-

cans determined to defend the frontiers of freedom by an

honorable peace if peace is possible but by arms if arms

are used against us.”

The true peace-keepers in the world tonight are not

those who urge us to retire from the field in Vietnam—

who tell us to try to find the quickest, cheapest exit from

that tormented land, no matter what the consequences to

us may be.

The true peace-keepers are those men who stand out

there on the DMZ at this very hour, taking the worst that

the enemy can give. The true peace-keepers are the sol-

diers who are breaking the terrorist’s grip around the vil-

lages of Vietnam—the civilians who are bringing medical

care and food and education to people who have already

suffered a generation of war.

And so I report to you that we are going to continue

to press forward. Two things we must do. Two things we

shall do.

First, we must not mislead the enemy. Let him not

think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and

withdrawal. For I can assure you they won’t. Let him not

think that protests will produce surrender. Because they

won’t. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he

won’t.

Second, we will provide all that our brave men require

to do the job that must be done. And that job is going to be

done.

These gallant men have our prayers—have our thanks

—have our heart-felt praise—and our deepest gratitude.

Let the world know that the keepers of peace will

endure through every trial—and that with the full backing

of their countrymen, they are going to prevail.

Source:

The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon

B. Johnson, 1967. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1963–69, pp. 876–881.

Selective Service Act, 1967

Federal U.S. legislation enacted on June 20, 1967, that pro-

vided for full-time college students to receive deferments from

military service. It amended the Selective Service Act of 1948,

which reinstituted the draft because of the cold war. The draft

was renewed continuously until 1973.

Passed during the Vietnam War, the 1967 act allowed

deferments until students in any institute of higher instruction

completed their baccalaureate degrees, failed to continue

satisfactorily in full-time studies, or reached the age of 24,

whichever occurred first. There were also deferments for grad-

uate students in medicine and other fields, as well as for,

among others, fathers, extreme hardship cases, sole surviving

sons, ministers, some agricultural and industrial workers, and

persons with physical, mental, and moral problems (the latter,

under the predominant beliefs of the day, included homosex-

uals). This act, like its predecessors, left many decisions to the

discretion of local draft boards.

One draft exemption permitted those with religious scru-

ples to achieve conscientious objector status. In

United States

v. Seeger

(860 U.S. 868), issued March 8, 1965, the U.S.

Supreme Court denied exemption from military service if con-

scientious objection relied only on a personal moral code that

is in no way related to a supreme being. The case involved

three young men who did not belong to any traditional reli-

gious groups and did not declare a belief in a supreme being.

Interpreting the Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940, the Supreme

Court ruled that the statutory requirement for belief in a

supreme being could be met by anyone who had a “sincere

and meaningful belief” that occupied in the life of its posses-

sor a place parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in

God.” It defined “Supreme Being” as a broad concept of a

power “to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else

is ultimately dependent.”

Gillette v. United States

(401 U.S. 437), March 8, 1971,

the Supreme Court also limited conscientious-objector status

1520 ERA 9: Postwar United States

to those who object to all wars, not to those who oppose a par-

ticular war. In its decision, the Court declared that the Selec-

tive Service Act of 1967, which allowed exemption from

service only for those “conscientiously opposed to participa-

tion in war in any form,” did not violate constitutional protec-

tions of the free exercise of religion and prohibitions against

the establishment of religion.

On November 1, 1969, a lottery system was introduced

based on a registrant’s birthday. It removed some of the biases

that sent a disproportionate number of minority and poor and

working-class whites into the service. Student deferments, how-

ever, remained until 1971.

The Selective Service Act expired on June 30, 1971; the

Selective Service Act of 1971 supplanted it. The new act’s

draft-induction authority expired June 30, 1973. Although the

draft ended, registration for 18-year-old males continues to be

mandatory.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

An Act

To amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act,

and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled, That the Universal Military Training and Service Act

is amended as follows:

(1) Section 1(a) (50 App. U.S.C. 451(a)) is amended to

read as follows:

“(a) This Act may be cited as the ‘Military Selective

Service Act of 1967.’”

(2) Section 4 (50 App. U.S.C. 454) is amended by:

(a) Inserting after the first proviso of subsection (a)

the following: “ Provided further, That, notwithstanding

any other provision of law, any registrant who has failed or

refused to report for induction shall continue to remain

liable for induction and when available shall be immedi-

ately inducted.”, and

(b) Adding the following new subsection (g) to read as

follows:

“(g) The National Security Council shall periodically

advise the Director of the Selective Service System and

coordinate with him the work of such State and local volun-

teer advisory committees which the Director of Selective

Service may establish, with respect to the identification,

selection, and deferment of needed professional and scien-

tific personnel and those engaged in, and preparing for, crit-

ical skills and other essential occupations. In the

performance of its duties under this subsection the National

Security Council shall consider the needs of both the

Armed Forces and the civilian segment of the population.”

(3) Section 5(a) (50 App. U.S.C. 455(a)) is amended by

inserting “(1)” immediately after “Sec. 5. (a)”; and by

adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of

this subsection, the President in establishing the order of

induction for registrants within the various age groups

found qualified for induction shall not effect any change in

the method of determining the relative order of induction

for such registrants within such age groups as has been

heretofore established and in effect on the date of enact-

ment of this paragraph, unless authorized by law enacted

after the date of enactment of the Military Selective Ser-

vice Act of 1967.”

(4) Section 6(c)(2)(A) (50 App. U.S.C. 456(c)(2)(A)), is

amended to read as follows:

“(2)(A) Any person, other than a person referred to in

subsection (d) of this section, who—

“(i) prior to the issuance of orders for him to report for

induction; or

“(ii) prior to the date scheduled for his induction and

pursuant to a proclamation by the Governor of a State to

the effect that the authorized strength of any organized

unit of the National Guard of that State cannot be main-

tained by the enlistment or appointment of persons who

have not been issued orders to report for induction under

this title; or

“(iii) prior to the date scheduled for his induction and

pursuant to a determination by the President that the

strength of the Ready Reserve of the Army Reserve, Naval

Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, or

Coast Guard Reserve cannot be maintained by the enlist-

ment or appointment of persons who have not been issued

orders to report for induction under this title;

enlists or accepts appointment, before attaining the

age of 26 years, in the Ready Reserve of any Reserve com-

ponent of the Armed Forces, the Army National Guard, or

the Air National Guard, shall be deferred from training

and service under this title so long as he serves satisfacto-

rily as a member of an organized unit of such Reserve or

National Guard in accordance with section 270 of title 10

or section 502 of title 32, United States Code, as the case

may be, or satisfactorily performs such other Ready

Reserve service as may be prescribed by the Secretary of

Defense. Enlistments or appointments under subpara-

graphs (ii) and (iii) of this clause may be accepted notwith-

standing the provisions of section 15(d) of this title.

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (h) of this

section, no person deferred under this clause who has

completed six years of such satisfactory service as a mem-

ber of the Ready Reserve or National Guard, and who dur-

ing such service has performed active duty for training

with an armed force for not less than four consecutive

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1521