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months, shall be liable for induction for training and ser-

vice under this Act, except after a declaration of war or

national emergency made by the Congress after August 9,

1955. In no event shall the number of enlistments or

appointments made under authority of this paragraph in

any fiscal year in any Reserve component of the Armed

Forces or in the Army National Guard or the Air National

Guard cause the personnel strength of such Reserve com-

ponent or the Army National Guard or the Air National

Guard, as the case may be, to exceed the personnel

strength for which funds have been made available by the

Congress for such fiscal year.”. . .

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 81, pp. 100–106.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968

Agreement adopted by the United Nations General Assembly

June 12, 1968, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The move to refrain from testing and increasing the num-

ber of nuclear weapons goes back at least to an address on dis-

armament delivered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower July

21, 1955, at a summit conference in Geneva, Switzerland. In

this “open skies” proposal, Eisenhower declared that the

United States was prepared to enter a “sound and reliable

agreement” for arms reduction with provisions for inspection

and proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union give

each other “a complete blueprint of our military establish-

ments” and allow mutual aerial photography for reconnais-

sance purposes. The French and British approved the

proposals, but the Russians rejected them.

Eisenhower’s proposal was reinforced June 10, 1963, when

President John F. Kennedy used his speech at the American Uni-

versity commencement to address world peace. He urged a rap-

prochement with the Soviet Union and a reexamination of

America’s cold war policy, arguing that the USSR and the

United States have common interests in “a just and genuine

peace” and an end to the nuclear arms race. In addition, he

announced an American, British, and Soviet agreement to begin

negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. To

show good faith, he initiated a U.S. moratorium on atmospheric

testing so long as other states also refrained from such testing.

Shortly thereafter, on August 5, 1963, the United King-

dom, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed a treaty

in Moscow prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the

atmosphere, in outer space, or underwater. Underground test-

ing was allowed because there were no provisions for on-site

inspection, control posts, or for international supervision, and

offsite seismographic technology was not deemed acceptable.

Nor did the treaty address such issues as reduction in nuclear

stockpiles, halting the production of nuclear weapons, or lim-

iting their employment during war. The signatories, however,

intended it as the first step on the road to complete disarma-

ment. Before enforcement (October 10, 1963), more than 100

countries had endorsed it—France and the People’s Republic

of China (which detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964)

being the two major exceptions.

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty banned the transfer of

nuclear weapons and devices to another country, as was the

acquiring of such by non–nuclear weapon countries, whose

nuclear systems would be subject to verification. However, the

development, manufacture, and use of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes, and international cooperation in this

regard—ensuring that any benefits accruing from peaceful

applications of nuclear technology could be passed on to non-

nuclear weapon states—would be encouraged. The signato-

ries pledged to continue negotiations for ending the nuclear

arms race at an early date. Subject then to ratification by the

Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 40

other countries, the treaty would be reviewed every five years.

In 1995, the treaty was extended permanently. By that time,

178 countries had signed it.

On May 26, 1972, United States president Richard M.

Nixon and Soviet general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev began

implementing disarmament with a five-year interim agreement

and protocol, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I, signed

in Moscow. No new land-based, intercontinental ballistic mis-

sile (ICBM) launchers would be built after July 1, 1972. Sub-

marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and other modern

ballistic missiles would be restricted to those already in use or

under construction, but these could be modernized or

replaced. The treaty permitted technical verification and

condemned interference in this process. The Standing Consul-

tative Commission (established by the treaty, limiting antibal-

listic missile systems) would assist in implementing the

provisions of this agreement. Negotiations were to continue

for further reduction in strategic offensive weapons. The pro-

tocol limited the number of SLBM launchers (710, United

States; 950, Soviet Union) and ballistic missile submarines (44,

United States; 62, Soviet Union) for each country.

At the same time, the two leaders announced the signing

of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty concerning ballistic

(guided) missile defense systems. The intent behind prohibit-

ing the United States and Soviet Union from deploying

antiballistic missile defense systems was to ensure that a coun-

try with a defense system would not launch an attack knowing

that a counterattack would be unsuccessful. In theory, this bal-

ance would maintain the cold war defensive policy of mutu-

ally assured destruction.

The ABM Treaty’s main protocol stated that neither party

should deploy a nationwide ABM defense system, although

each party could research and develop missile defense sys-

tems, as was done in the Ronald Reagan administration in the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed “Star Wars” by its

1522 ERA 9: Postwar United States

critics. The treaty also allowed limited deployment of an ABM

system in two sites, reduced in July 1974 to one, and reduced

the total missiles and launchers to 100. Article XV gave each

party the right to withdraw from the treaty. President George

W. Bush, against the wishes of Russian president Vladimir

Putin, abrogated the treaty in 2002.

________________________

_______________________

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to

as the “Parties to the Treaty”,

Considering the devastation that would be visited

upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent

need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a

war and to take measures to safeguard the security of

peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons

would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations

General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agree-

ment on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear

weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the applica-

tion of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on

peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development

and other efforts to further the application, within the

framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effec-

tively the flow of source and special fissionable materials

by use of instruments and other techniques at certain

strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful

applications of nuclear technology, including any techno-

logical by-products which may be derived by nuclear-

weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive

devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all

Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-

nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all

Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the

fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and

to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to,

the further development of the applications of atomic

energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest

possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to

undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear

disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment

of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties

to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the

atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Pream-

ble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explo-

sions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue nego-

tiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension

and the strengthening of trust between States in order to

facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear

weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and

the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons

and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on

general and complete disarmament under strict and effec-

tive international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the

United Nations, States must refrain in their international

relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-

torial integrity or political independence of any State, or in

any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the

United Nations, and that the establishment and mainte-

nance of international peace and security are to be pro-

moted with the least diversion for armaments of the

world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes

not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over

such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;

and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-

nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or

control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-

takes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatso-

ever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

or of control over such weapons or explosive devices

directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture

of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty

undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agree-

ment to be negotiated and concluded with the Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and

the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose

of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed

under this Treaty with a view of preventing diversion of

nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons to

other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safe-

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1523

guards required by this article shall be followed with

respect to source or special fissionable material whether it

is being produced, processed or used in any principal

nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safe-

guards required by this article shall be applied on all

source or special fissionable material in all peaceful

nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under

its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to

provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)

equipment or material especially designed or prepared for

the processing, use or production of special fissionable

material, to non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur-

poses, unless the source or special fissionable material

shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be

implemented in a manner designed to comply with article

IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or

technological development of the Parties or international

cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities,

including the international exchange of nuclear material

and equipment for the processing, use or production of

nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with

the provisions of this article and the principle of safe-

guarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall

conclude agreements with the International Atomic

Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article

either individually or together with other States in accor-

dance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy

Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence

within 180 days from the original entry into force of this

Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratifica-

tion or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of

such agreements shall commence not later than the date of

such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not

later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of

negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting

the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop

research, production and use of nuclear energy for peace-

ful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with

articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate,

and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible

exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and tech-

nological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also

cooperate in contributing alone or together with other

States or international organizations to the further devel-

opment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-

weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration

for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate

measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty,

under appropriate international observation and through

appropriate international procedures, potential benefits

from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will

be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to

the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the

charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will

be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research

and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a

special international agreement or agreements, through an

appropriate international body with adequate representa-

tion of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this

subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty

enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant

to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to

nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and com-

plete disarmament under strict and effective international

control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of

States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the

total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective terri-

tories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to

this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be

submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall cir-

culate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if

requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to

the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a

conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the

Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved

by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty,

including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to

the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the

1524 ERA 9: Postwar United States

amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of

Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that

deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment

upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a

majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of

ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the

amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of

Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party

upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the

amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a

conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in

Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of

this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the

Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being real-

ized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the

Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal

to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the conven-

ing of further conferences with the same objective of

reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any

State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into

force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may

accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signa-

tory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of

accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the

United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the

Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification

by the States, the Governments of which are designated

Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory

to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of rati-

fication. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon

State is one which has manufactured and exploded a

nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to

January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or

accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force

of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the

deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly

inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each

signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratifi-

cation or of accession, the date of the entry into force of

this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for con-

vening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary

Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the

United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty

have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that

extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this

Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its coun-

try. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Par-

ties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security

Council three months in advance. Such notice shall

include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards

as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the

Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether

the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be

extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This

decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the

Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and

Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be

deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.

Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by

the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the

signatory and acceding States.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly autho-

rized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London

and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hun-

dred sixty-eight.

Source:

U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts

Series, No. 6839.

Richard M. Nixon,

News Conference on Cambodia, 1970

News conference given by President Richard M. Nixon on

May 8, 1970, a week after he had ordered U.S. troops into

Cambodia in an expansion of the Vietnam War. The move

had triggered widespread protests on U.S. college campuses.

On several, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) buildings

were burned and the fire fighters called to douse the flames

were stoned and their hoses cut. Kent State University in

Ohio was one campus where these events occurred, and

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1525

the next day the governor called out the National Guard

to prevent further violence. Instead, during a demonstration,

the Guard fired on the students, killing four and wounding

others.

In an informal speech at the Pentagon May 1, Nixon had

referred to student protesters as “bums” in contrast to their

peers who did their duty by fighting in Vietnam. In his May 8

news conference, Nixon defended the Cambodia move, insist-

ing that it would shorten the war in Vietnam. He sought to

clarify his May 1 statement, saying the word “bums” applied

only to students who engaged in violent acts. He also denied

reports that he intended to “censor” Vice President Spiro

Agnew, whose criticism of antiwar protesters had been espe-

cially virulent.

On June 30, the Senate passed an amendment to the for-

eign military sales bill drafted by Senators John Sherman

Cooper (R-Ky.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho) in response to the

invasion of Cambodia. It would have banned the Nixon

administration from funding any U.S. military operations in

Cambodia without receiving congressional authorization.

Opponents managed to delay a vote until after American

troops had withdrawn and the House defeated the bill July 9.

At the end of August, four antiwar activists set off the

strongest terrorist bomb anywhere until 1983, destroying the

Army Math Research Center and damaging many other build-

ings at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The explosion

killed a graduate student and injured four others. Along with

the Kent State shootings, the Wisconsin bombing effectively

ended the more violent side of the antiwar movement. The

most revolutionary militants continued their antiwar-anticapi-

talist terrorism through small cells, such as the Weather

Underground and the Symbionese Liberation Army.

________________________

_______________________

Protests and the Decision on Cambodia

Q. Mr. President, have you been surprised by the intensity

of the protest against your decision to send troops into

Cambodia, and will these protests affect your policy in any

way?

The President. No, I have not been surprised by the

intensity of the protests. I realize that those who are

protesting believe that this decision will expand the war,

increase American casualties, and increase American

involvement. Those who protest want peace. They want to

reduce American casualties and they want our boys

brought home.

I made the decision, however, for the very reasons that

they are protesting. As far as affecting my decision is con-

cerned—their protests I am concerned about. I am con-

cerned because I know how deeply they feel. But I know

that what I have done will accomplish the goals that they

want. It will shorten this war. It will reduce American casu-

alties. It will allow us to go forward with our withdrawal pro-

gram. The 150,000 Americans that I announced for with-

drawal in the next year will come home on schedule. It will

in my opinion serve the cause of a just peace in Vietnam.

Q. Mr. President.

The President. Mr. Cormier.

Communication with the College Communities

Q. Do you believe that you can open up meaningful com-

munications with this college-age generation, and how?

The President. I would like to try as best I can to do

that. It is not easy. Sometimes they, as you know, talk so

loudly that it is difficult to be heard, as we have learned

during the campaigns, and also during the appearances

many of the Cabinet officers have made on university cam-

puses. However, on an individual basis, I believe that it is

possible to do what I have been doing, to bring represen-

tatives of the college and university communities to my

office, to talk with them, to have a dialogue. I am very glad

that Chancellor Heard, the Chancellor of Vanderbilt, has

agreed to take 2 months off from his very important

responsibilities in that position to work with us in the

administration to see if we cannot develop better lines of

communication both to school administrators, but also to

school students.

Mr. Kaplow.

The Students’ Message

Q. Mr. President, what do you think the students are try-

ing to say in this demonstration?

The President. They are trying to say that they want

peace. They are trying to say that they want to stop the

killing. They are trying to say that they want to end the

draft. They are trying to say that we ought to get out of

Vietnam. I agree with everything that they are trying to

accomplish.

I believe, however, that the decisions that I have

made, and particularly this last terribly difficult decision of

going into the Cambodian sanctuaries which were com-

pletely occupied by the enemy—I believe that that deci-

sion will serve that purpose, because you can be sure that

everything that I stand for is what they want.

I would add this: I think I understand what they want.

I would hope they would understand somewhat what I

want. When I came to the Presidency—I did not send

these men to Vietnam—there were 525,000 men there.

And since I have been here, I have been working 18 or 20

hours a day, mostly on Vietnam, trying to bring these men

home.

We brought home 115,000. Our casualties were the

lowest in the first quarter of this year in 5 years. We are

going to bring home another 150,000. And, as a result of

1526 ERA 9: Postwar United States

the greater accomplishments than we expected in even the

first week of the Cambodian campaign, I believe that we

will have accomplished our goal of reducing American

casualties and, also, of hastening the day that we can have

a just peace. But above everything else, to continue the

withdrawal program that they are for and that I am for.

Yes, sir?

Progress of Vietnamization

Q. On April 20th, you said Vietnamization was going so

well that you could pull 150,000 American troops out of

Vietnam. Then you turned around only 10 days later and

said that Vietnamization was so badly threatened you were

sending troops into Cambodia.

Would you explain this apparent contradiction for us?

The President. I explained it in my speech of April

20th, as you will recall, because then I said that Viet-

namization was going so well that we could bring 150,000

out by the spring of next year, regardless of the progress in

the Paris peace talks and the other criteria that I men-

tioned.

But I also warned at that time that increased enemy

action in Laos, in Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam, was

something that we had noted, and that if I had indicated,

and if I found, that that increased enemy action would

jeopardize the remaining forces who would be in Vietnam

after we had withdrawn 150,000, I would take strong

action to deal with it. I found that the action that the

enemy had taken in Cambodia would leave the 240,000

Americans who would be there a year from now without

many combat troops to help defend them, would leave

them in an untenable position. That is why I had to act.

The Possibility of Revolution and Repression

Q. Mr. President, some Americans believe this country is

heading for revolution, and others believe that crime and

dissent and violent demonstrations are leading us to an

era of repression. I wonder if you would give us your

view of the state of the American society and where it is

heading.

The President. That would require rather an extended

answer. Briefly, this country is not headed for revolution.

The very fact that we do have the safety valves of the right

to dissent, the very fact that the President of the United

States asked the District Commissioners to waive their

rule for 30 days’ notice for a demonstration, and also asked

that that demonstration occur not just around the Wash-

ington Monument but on the Ellipse where I could here

it—and you can hear it pretty well from there, I can assure

you—that fact is an indication that when you have that

kind of safety valve you are not going to have revolution

which comes from repression.

The second point, with regard to repression: That is

nonsense, in my opinion. I do not see that the critics of my

policies, our policies, are repressed. I note from reading

the press and from listening to television that criticism is

very vigorous and sometimes quite personal. It has every

right to be. I have no complaints about it.

Yes, sir?

Paris Peace Talks

Q. One of the consequences of the Cambodian action was

the fact that the other side boycotted this week’s peace

talks in Paris. There is some question as to whether our

side will attend next week. Have you made a decision on

that?

The President. Our side will attend next week. We

expect the talks to go forward. And at the time that we are

cleaning out the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, we will

pursue the path of peace at the negotiating table there

and in a number of other forums that we are presently

working on.

Mr. Horner?

Response to North Vietnamese Action

Q. Mr. President, Secretary of Defense Laird said last

week that if the North Vietnamese troops should move

across the DMZ in force, he would recommend resump-

tion of the bombing. What would be your reaction to such

a recommendation in those circumstances?

The President: I am not going to speculate as to what

the North Vietnamese may do. I will only say that if the

North Vietnamese did what some have suggested they

might do—move a massive force of 250,000 to 300,000

across the DMZ against our Marine Corps people who are

there—I would certainly not allow those men to be massa-

cred without using more force and more effective force

against North Vietnam.

I think we have warned the leaders of North Vietnam

on this point several times, and because we have warned

them I do not believe they will move across the DMZ.

Mrs. Dickerson?

The Vice President’s Speech

Q. After you met with the eight university presidents yes-

terday, they indicated that you had agreed to tone down

the criticism in your administration of those who disagree

with you. Then tonight Vice President Agnew is quoted all

over the news programs as making a speech which

includes these words, “That every debate has a cadre of

Jeremiahs, normally a gloomy coalition of choleric young

intellectuals and tired, embittered elders.” Why?

The President. Mrs. Dickerson, I have studied the his-

tory of this country over the past 190 years. And, of course,

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1527

the classic and the most interesting game is to try to drive

a wedge between the President and Vice President.

Believe me, I had 8 years of that, and I am experienced on

that point.

Now, as far as the Vice President is concerned, he will

answer for anything that he has said. As far as my attempt-

ing to tone him down or my attempting to censor the Sec-

retary of the Interior because he happens to take a different

point of view, I shall not do that. I would hope that all of the

members of this administration would have in mind the

fact, a rule that I have always had, and it is a very simple

one: When the action is hot, keep the rhetoric cool.

Schedule for Withdrawal from Cambodia

Q. Mr. President, on April 30 you announced that you, as

Commander in Chief, were sending in U.S. units and

South Vietnamese units into Cambodia. Do the South

Vietnamese abide by the same pull-out deadline as you

have laid down for the American forces?

The President. No, they do not. I would expect that

the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at

the same time that we do because when we come out our

logistical support and air support will also come out with

them.

I would like also to say that with response to that dead-

line I can give the members of the press some news with

regard to the developments that have occurred. The action

actually is going faster than we had anticipated. The mid-

dle of next week the first units, American units, will come

out. The end of next week the second group of American

units will come out. The great majority of all American

units will be out by the second week of June, and all Amer-

icans of all kinds, including advisers, will be out of Cam-

bodia by the end of June.

I will take you next, Mr. Potter. The writing press gets

a break.

Student Dissenters

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that the use of the word

“bums” to categorize some of those who are engaged in

dissent—and I know you meant it to apply to those who

are destructive, but it has been used in a broader context—

do you believe that is in keeping with your suggestion that

the rhetoric should be kept cool.?

The President. I would certainly regret that my use of

the word “bums” was interpreted to apply to those who

dissent. All the members of this press corps know that I

have for years defended the right of dissent. I have always

opposed the use of violence. On university campuses the

rule of reason is supposed to prevail over the rule of force.

And when students on university campuses burn buildings,

when they engage in violence, when they break up furni-

ture, when they terrorize their fellow students and terror-

ize the faculty, then I think “bums” is perhaps too kind a

word to apply to that kind of person. Those are the kind I

was referring to.

Mr. Rather? I will get you next, Mr. Bailey.

Accomplishments in Cambodia

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you expected the

Americans to be out of Cambodia by some time in June.

President Thieu was quoted as saying in an interview that

he felt the North Vietnamese could reestablish their sanc-

tuaries in Cambodia within 6 months and possibly, he was

quoted as saying, within 2 or 3 months.

If that is the case, what have we accomplished in Cam-

bodia? Was it worth the risks, and what do we do when

they reestablish those sanctuaries.?

The President. I am planning to give a report to the

Nation when our own actions are completed, toward the

latter part of June. At that time, I will answer that question

in full.

At the present time, I will say that it is my belief, based

on what we have accomplished to date, that we have

bought at least 6 months and probably 8 months of time

for the training of the ARVN, the Army of South Vietnam.

We have also saved, I think, hundreds, if not thousands, of

Americans, as Frank Reynolds reported tonight on ABC.

Rockets by the thousands and small arms ammunition by

the millions have already been captured and those rockets

and small arms will not be killing Americans in these next

few months. And what we have also accomplished is that

by buying time, it means that if the enemy does come back

into those sanctuaries next time, the South Vietnamese will

be strong enough and well trained enough to handle it

alone.

I should point out too, that they are handling a major-

ity of the assignment now in terms of manpower.

Mr. Bailey?

Secretary Hickel’s Letter to the President

Q. Sir, without asking you to censor the Secretary of the

Interior, could you comment on the substantive points that

he made in his letter?

The President. I think the Secretary of the Interior is

a man who has very strong views. He is outspoken. He is

courageous. That is one of the reasons I selected him for

the Cabinet, and one of the reasons that I defended him

very vigorously before this press corps when he was under

attack.

As far as his views are concerned, I will, of course, be

interested in his advice. I might say, too, that I hope he

gives some advice to the Postmaster General. That was the

fastest mail delivery I have had since I have been in the

White House. [ Laughter. ]

Mr. Scali?

1528 ERA 9: Postwar United States

Reasons for the Cambodian Action

Q. Mr. President, how do you answer the criticism that

the justification that you give for going into the Cam-

bodian sanctuaries is hauntingly similar to the reasons

that President Lyndon Johnson gave as he moved step by

step up the ladder of escalation? He wanted peace, too,

sir.

The President: Mr. Scali, President Johnson did want

peace, and, if I may use the vernacular, he has taken a bad

rap from those who say that he wanted war.

However, the difference is that he did move step by

step. This action is a decisive move, and this action also

puts the enemy on warning that if it escalates while we are

trying to deescalate, we will move decisively and not step

by step.

Mr. Healy.

Will the War Prove Worthwhile?

Q. Mr. President, this war was well underway before you

came in, as you just said. Considering the toll in lives and

in everything else that is happening now, do you think it

will have proved to be worthwhile?

The President. It is rather a moot question, Mr. Healy,

as to whether it will prove to have been worthwhile. As

Commander in Chief, I have found for 525,000 Americans

it has been my responsibility to do everything I could to

protect their lives and to get them home as quickly as I

can. And we have succeeded pretty well. We brought

115,000 home. We are going to bring another 150,000,

and this action will assure the continued success of that

program.

However, looking at the whole of Southeast Asia, look-

ing at the fact that we have lost lives there, I would say that

only history will record whether it was worthwhile.

I do know this: Now that America is there, if we do

what many of our very sincere critics think we should do,

if we withdraw from Vietnam and allow the enemy to come

into Vietnam and massacre the civilians there by the mil-

lions, as they would—if we do that, let me say that Amer-

ica is finished insofar as the peacekeeper in the Asian

world is concerned.

Police and National Guard Conduct

Q. Mr. President, in the light of the Kent State University

incident, could you tell us what, in your judgment, is the

proper action and conduct for a police force or a National

Guard force when ordered to clear the campus area and

faced with a crowd throwing rocks?

The President. We think we have done a rather good

job here in Washington in that respect. As you know, we

handled the two demonstrations, October 15 and Novem-

ber 15 of last year, without any significant casualties, and

that took a lot of doing because there were some pretty

rough people involved—a few were rough; most of them

were very peaceful.

I would hope that the experience that we have had in

that respect could be shared by the National Guards,

which, of course, are not under Federal control but under

State control.

Now, what I say is not to be interpreted as a criticism

in advance of my getting the facts of the National Guard at

Kent State. I want to know what the facts are. I have asked

for the facts. When I get them, I will have something to say

about it. But I do know when you do have a situation of a

crowd throwing rocks and the National Guard is called in,

that there is always the chance that it will escalate into the

kind of a tragedy that happened at Kent State.

If there is one thing I am personally committed to, it

is this: I saw the pictures of those four youngsters in the

Evening Star the day after that tragedy, and I vowed then

that we were going to find methods that would be more

effective to deal with these problems of violence, methods

that would deal with those who would use force and vio-

lence and endanger others, but, at the same time, would

not take the lives of innocent people.

Cambodia’s Future

Q. After the American troops are removed from Cambo-

dia, there may still be a question as to the future of Cam-

bodia’s ability to exist as a neutralist country.

What is your policy toward Cambodia’s future?

The President. The United States is, of course, inter-

ested in the future of Cambodia, and the future of Laos,

both of which, of course, as you know, are neutral coun-

tries. However, the United States, as I indicated in what

is called the Guam or Nixon Doctrine, cannot take the

responsibility and should not take the responsibility in

the future to send American men in to defend the neu-

trality of countries that are unable to defend them them-

selves.

In this area, what we have to do is to go down the

diplomatic trail, and that is why we are exploring with the

Soviet Union—with not too much success to date, but we

are going to continue to explore it—with Great Britain,

with the Asian countries that are meeting in Djakarta, and

through every possible channel, methods through which

the neutrality of countries like Cambodia and Laos, who

cannot possibly defend themselves, to see that that neu-

trality is guaranteed without having the intervention of for-

eign forces.

Progress toward Goals

Q. Mr. President, in your Inaugural Address, you said

that one of your goals was to bring us together in Amer-

ica. You said that you wanted to move us in international

terms from an era of confrontation to an era of negotia-

Cold War: U.S. International Relations 1529

tion. You said you wanted to bring peace to Vietnam.

During the past 2 weeks, it seems that we are farther than

ever from the goals. How do you account for this appar-

ent failure?

The President. Don’t judge us too quickly. When it

comes to negotiation, I would suggest that you recognize

the fact that some very important talks are going forward

on arms limitation with the Soviet Union. We are still far

apart. But I will predict now that there will be an agree-

ment. When that agreement comes, it will have great sig-

nificance. I say that having in mind the fact that we are far

apart from the Soviet Union in our policy toward South-

east Asia, in our policy toward the Mideast; but I say that

where the problem of arms is concerned, here is where our

interests are together. The Soviet Union has just as great

an interest as we have in seeing that there is some limita-

tion on nuclear arms…

Paris Talks and Consideration of a Coalition

Government

Q. Mr. President, is the United States prepared to pursue

with equal fervor in Paris negotiations to find a political

settlement of this war, including the possibility of dis-

cussing with the other side a coalition government?

The President. We are prepared to seek not only in

Paris but in any other forum a political settlement of this

war. We are not prepared, however, to seek any settlement

in which we or anyone else imposes upon the people of

South Vietnam a government that they do not choose. If

the people of South Vietnam choose a coalition govern-

ment, if they choose to change the leaders they presently

have, that is a decision we will accept. President Thieu has

indicated he will accept it. But we do not intend to impose

at the conference table on the people of South Vietnam a

government they do not choose…

The Cambodian Decision

Q. Mr. President, did Secretary of State Rogers oppose

your decision to go into Cambodia or did Dr. Kissinger

oppose it?

The President. Every one of my advisers, the Secre-

tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Kissinger,

Director Helms, raised questions about the decision, and,

believe me, I raised the most questions, because I knew

the stakes that were involved, I knew the division that

would be caused in this country. I knew also the problems

internationally. I knew the military risks. And then after

hearing all of their advice, I made the decision. Decisions,

of course, are not made by vote in the National Security

Council or in the Cabinet. They are made by the President

with the advice of those, and I made this decision. I take

the responsibility for it. I believe it was the right decision.

I believe it will work out. If it doesn’t, then I am to blame.

They are not.

Mr. Morgan?

Administration Discourse with Dissenters

Q. Volumes have been written about the loneliness of the

Presidency. You, yourself, have said that you were not

going to get trapped into an isolation as President. Have

you, particularly in recent days, felt isolated? And if you

have not, could you explain to us why it was not until yes-

terday that you, whose voice means more than anybody

else’s in the administration, whether it be Mr. Agnew or

Mr. Hickel, waited until yesterday to tell the educators that

the administration was lowering—was modifying its dis-

course with the dissenters?

The President. Well, first let us understand what I told

the educators. The educators came in to discuss their

problems, and since they are all presidents I felt a com-

munity of interest with them.

I indicated to them that I didn’t want to make their job

any harder for them and I would appreciate it if they

wouldn’t make my job any harder for me in their own

activities.

They raised questions about the Vice President, and

about other people in the administration, about the

rhetoric, and I know, of course, questions have been raised

about my rhetoric.

Let me say that in terms, however, of the Vice Presi-

dent, in terms of what I told the educators, I did not indi-

cate to them that I was going to muzzle the Vice President,

that I was going to censor him.

I believe that the Vice President, the Secretary of the

Interior, the Secretary of HEW, everybody in this adminis-

tration, should have the right, after considering all the fac-

tors, to speak out and express his views. This is an open

administration. It will continue to be.

I also think that people should have the right to speak

out as they do in the House, in the Senate, in the media,

and in the universities. The only difference is that, of all

these people—and I refer particularly to some of my lively

critics in the House and Senate—they have the luxury of

criticism.

I was once a Senator and a House Member; I thought

back to this when I called Harry Truman today and wished

him well on his 86th birthday, to some of the rather rugged

criticisms that I directed in his direction.

They have the luxury of criticism because they can

criticize and if it doesn’t work out then they can gloat over

it, or if it does work out, the criticism will be forgotten.

I don’t have that luxury. As Commander in Chief, I,

alone, am responsible for the lives 425,000 or 430,000

Americans in Vietnam. That is what I have been thinking

1530 ERA 9: Postwar United States

about. And the decision that I made on Cambodia will save

those lives. It will bring the peace that we all want, in my

opinion. I could be wrong, but if I am wrong, I am respon-

sible and nobody else.

Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam

Q. Mr. President, early in the news conference, in saying

that the troop withdrawals would continue, you said that a

year from now there would be 240,000 American soldiers

in Vietnam.

The President. Don’t hold me to the exact figure. I

haven’t—

Q. That is 185,000 less. Are you announcing a larger

withdrawal tonight?

The President. No, I wasn’t. What I was indicating was

a range. But don’t get the impression that we might not get

that low also, because you understand we are going to go

forward on the negotiating track at this time, and I am not

among those who has given up on that track. I still think

there is a possibility of progress there.

Possibility of Meeting with Demonstrators

Q. Mr. President, will you see any of the demonstrators

tomorrow in the White House? Will you talk with them?

The President. If arrangements are made by my staff

so that they can come in to see me, I will be glad to. I talk

to great numbers of people. I will be here all day long. As

a matter of fact, I will be here tonight and tomorrow as

well. But sometimes it is quite difficult to arrange which

groups should come in. I know members of my staff will go

out to see them. I have asked all the younger members of

my staff to talk to the demonstrators and try to get their

views, as we did on November 15 and October 15. I will be

glad to see them if some of them are available.

Frank Cormier, Associated Press: Thank you, Mr.

President.