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ration and from these studies we will begin to set our

course toward the Great Society.

The solution to these problems does not rest on a mas-

sive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the

strained resources of local authority. They require us to

create new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism,

between the National Capital and the leaders of local com-

munities.

Woodrow Wilson once wrote: “Every man sent out

from his university should be a man of his Nation as well

as a man of his time.”

Within your lifetime powerful forces, already loosed,

will take us toward a way of life beyond the realm of

our experience, almost beyond the bounds of our ima-

gination.

For better or for worse, your generation has been

appointed by history to deal with those problems and to

lead America toward a new age. You have the chance

never before afforded to any people in any age. You can

help build a society where the demands of morality, and

the needs of the spirit, can be realized in the life of the

Nation.

So, will you join in the battle to give every citizen the

full equality which God enjoins and the law requires, what-

ever his belief, or race, or the color of his skin?

Will you join in the battle to give every citizen an

escape from the crushing weight of poverty?

Will you join in the battle to make it possible for all

nations to live in enduring peace—as neighbors and not as

mortal enemies?

Will you join in the battle to build the Great Society,

to prove that our material progress is only the foundation

on which we will build a richer life of mind and spirit?

There are those timid souls who say this battle cannot

be won; that we are condemned to a soulless wealth. I do

not agree. We have the power to shape the civilization that

we want. But we need your will, your labor, your hearts, if

we are to build that kind of society.

Those who came to this land sought to build more

than just a new country. They sought a new world. So I

have come here today to your campus to say that you can

make their vision our reality. So let us from this moment

begin our work so that in the future men will look back and

say: It was then, after a long and weary way, that man

turned the exploits of his genius to the full enrichment of

his life.

Thank you. Good-bye.

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B.

Johnson, 1965. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1963–68. pp. 704–707.

Social Security Amendments Act

(Medicare), 1965

Federal legislation enacted July 30, 1965, providing federally

funded health insurance for the elderly. President Lyndon

Baines Johnson signed the measure into law at a ceremony in

Independence, Missouri, honoring former president Harry S.

Truman, who had been the first president to propose such a

plan. The legislation established both a basic Medicare plan

and a supplemental plan. The basic plan provided for limited

hospitalization and nursing home care for each Social Security

recipient over age 65. The basic plan also covered hospital

diagnostic services and limited home health care visits follow-

ing a hospitalization. The optional supplementary plan, for

which enrollees initially paid a $3 monthly premium, pro-

vided for a wider range of services, including those provided

by physicians, radiologists, anesthesiologists, and psychia-

trists, as well as prosthetic devices, ambulance services, and

home health care visits without prior hospitalization. The leg-

islation also expanded other federal health and welfare pro-

grams and revised the Social Security payroll tax to help pay

for the new program.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

An Act

To provide a hospital insurance program for the aged

under the Social Security Act with a supplementary medi-

cal benefits program and an expanded program of medical

assistance, to increase benefits under the Old-Age, Sur-

vivors, and Disability Insurance System, to improve the

Federal-State public assistance programs, and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represen-

tatives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled, That this Act, with the following table of contents,

may be cited as the “Social Security Amendments of

1965.”

* * *

Title I—Health Insurance for the Aged and

Medical Assistance

Short Title

Sec. 100. This title may be cited as the “Health Insur-

ance for the Aged Act.”

Part 1—Health Insurance Benefits for the Aged

Entitlement to Hospital Insurance Benefits

Sec. 101. Title II of the Social Security Act is amended

by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

“Entitlement to Hospital Insurance Benefits

1562 ERA 9: Postwar United States

“Sec. 226. (a) Every individual who—

“(1) has attained the age of 65, and

“(2) is entitled to monthly insurance benefits under

section 202 or is a qualified railroad retirement beneficiary

shall be entitled to hospital insurance benefits under part

A of title XVIII for each month for which he meets the

condition specified in paragraph (2), beginning with the

first month after June 1966 for which he meets the condi-

tions specified in paragraphs (1) and (2).

“(b) For purposes of subsection (a)—

“(1) entitlement of an individual to hospital insur-

ance benefits for a month shall consist of entitlement

to have payment made under, and subject to the limita-

tions in, part A of title XVIII on his behalf for inpatient

hospital services, post-hospital extended care services,

post-hospital home health services, and outpatient hospi-

tal diagnostic services (as such terms are defined in part

C of title XVIII) furnished him in the United States

(or outside the United States in the case of inpatient hos-

pital services furnished under the conditions described in

section 1814(f)) during such month; except that (A) no

such payment may be made for post-hospital extended

care services furnished before January 1967, and (B) no

such payment may be made for post-hospital extended

care services or post-hospital home health services unless

the discharge from the hospital required to qualify such

services for payment under part A of title XVIII occurred

after June 30, 1966, or on or after the first day of

the month in which he attains age 65, whichever is later;

and

“(2) an individual shall be deemed entitled to

monthly insurance benefits under section 202, or to be a

qualified railroad retirement beneficiary, for the month

in which he died if he would have been entitled to such

benefits, or would have been a qualified railroad retire-

ment beneficiary, for such month had he died in the next

month.

“(c) For purposes of this section, the term ‘qualified

railroad retirement beneficiary’ means an individual whose

name has been certified to the Secretary by the Railroad

Retirement Board under section 21 of the Railroad Retire-

ment Act of 1937. An individual shall cease to be a quali-

fied railroad retirement beneficiary at the close of the

month preceding the month which is certified by the Rail-

road Retirement Board as the month in which he ceased to

meet the requirements of section 21 of the Railroad

Retirement Act of 1937.

“(d) For entitlement to hospital insurance benefits in

the case of certain uninsured individuals, see section 103

of the Social Security Amendments of 1965.”

Hospital Insurance Benefits and Supplementary Med-

ical Insurance Benefits

Sec. 102. (a) The Social Security Act is amended by

adding after title XVII the following new title:

“Title XVIII—Health Insurance for the Aged

“Prohibition against any Federal Interference

“Sec. 1801. Nothing in this title shall be construed to

authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any

supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the

manner in which medical services are provided, or over

the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or

employee of any institution, agency, or person providing

health services; or to exercise any supervision or control

over the administration or operation of any such institu-

tion, agency, or person.

* * *

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 79, pp. 286–423.

Clean Air Act, 1970

Federal U.S. legislation enacted on December 31, 1970, that

provided for national ambient air quality standards and set

deadlines for the abatement of most mobile and stationary

sources of air pollution that adversely affect public health and

welfare. It established the principle that clean air must be

maintained and placed authority to administer the program

under the new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The

act required that states submit for EPA approval air quality

plans to achieve federally mandated goals. The plans had to

assure the achievement of primary standards, to protect public

health, and secondary standards, to avoid any adverse envi-

ronmental effects; limit emissions; set compliance schedules;

and include land-use and transportation control.

Previously, the National Environmental Policy Act, which

became effective on January 1, 1970, required federal agen-

cies to include an environmental impact statement in every

recommendation or report on proposed federal action or leg-

islation significantly affecting the U.S. environment. The state-

ment had to identify any unavoidable, adverse environmental

effects, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship

between local short-term use of the environment and the

maintenance of long-term productivity, and any irreversible

commitments of resources that the action would involve. The

act declared as national policy “a productive harmony

between man and his environment” and established the Coun-

cil on Environmental Quality to advise the president on envi-

ronmental issues.

Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA could establish its own

emission standards for pollutants deemed hazardous to health

Domestic Policies after World War II 1563

and for motor vehicle emissions. The act provided for vehicle

testing, maintenance requirements, and recalls. As a result of

this act, the air in major cities became demonstrably cleaner.

Nevertheless, smog and pollution continued to plague not

only metropolitan areas but even sparsely populated places

downwind of cities, including major national parks and wild-

erness areas. In addition, the amount of various elements con-

sidered dangerous was revised over time.

Congress, in a law signed by President George H. W. Bush

on November 15, 1990, updated and tightened federal air pol-

lution standards in order to curb acid rain, urban smog, and

toxic chemicals. Environmental groups praised the regulations,

the implementation of which was expected to cost as much as

$25 billion a year; industry representatives expressed much less

approval. Ironically, under George H. W. Bush’s son, George

W., clean air standards themselves became endangered as his

administration weakened them in favor of industry.

On December 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon,

signed an environmental law that demonstrated the rule of

unintended consequences, the Endangered Species Act. It pro-

vided absolute protection for fish and wildlife, including plants,

that were in peril of becoming extinct (“endangered species”),

and developed a second category with somewhat lesser pro-

tections, species “threatened” with extinction. The act

increased the penalties on illegal trafficking of endangered

species and barred the federal government from funding any

programs that “jeopardize the continued existence” of endan-

gered and threatened species, or “result in the destruction or

modification of habitat” seen as critical to the survival of the

wildlife living there. Environmentalists used the latter provi-

sion to stop federal projects such as dams and highways. The

act authorized the secretaries of the interior and commerce to

provide lands and waters in order to protect and replenish

endangered and threatened species. While the courts upheld

the letter of the law, most famously in the “snail darter” case in

the late 1970s, administrations attempted to mediate between

the loss of jobs and corporate income in national forests, as

President Bill Clinton did with the spotted owl situation in the

Northwest. President Ronald Reagan’s and especially George

W. Bush’s administrations, however, worked to undo a number

of previously protected areas and favored industry and recre-

ation enthusiasts over environmental protection.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

An Act

To amend the Clean Air Act to provide for a more effective

program to improve the quality of the Nation’s air.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-

bled, That this Act may be cited as the “Clean Air

Amendments of 1970.”

Research

Sec. 2. (a) Section 103 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.

1857, et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the

following new subsection:

“(f)(1) In carrying out research pursuant to this Act,

the Administrator shall give special emphasis to research

on the short-and long-term effects of air pollutants on pub-

lic health and welfare. In the furtherance of such research,

he shall conduct an accelerated research program—

“(A) to improve knowledge of the contribution of air

pollutants to the occurrence of adverse effects on health,

including, but not limited to, behavioral, physiological, tox-

icological, and biochemical effects; and

“(B) to improve knowledge of the short-and long-term

effects of air pollutants on welfare.

“(2) In carrying out the provisions of this subsection

the Administrator may—

“(A) conduct epidemiological studies of the effects of

air pollutants on mortality and morbidity;

“(B) conduct clinical and laboratory studies on the

immunologic, biochemical, physiological, and the toxico-

logical effects including carcinogenic, teratogenic, and

mutagenic effects of air pollutants;

“(C) utilize, on a reimbursable basis, the facilities of

existing Federal scientific laboratories and research cen-

ters;

“(D) utilize the authority contained in paragraphs (1)

through (4) of subsection (b); and

“(E) consult with other appropriate Federal agencies

to assure that research or studies conducted pursuant to

this subsection will be coordinated with research and stud-

ies of such other Federal agencies.

“(3) In entering into contracts under this subsection,

the Administrator is authorized to contract for a term not

to exceed 10 years in duration. For the purposes of this

paragraph, there are authorized to be appropriated

$15,000,000. Such amounts as are appropriated shall

remain available until expended and shall be in addition to

any other appropriations under this Act.”

(b) Section 104(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act is amended

to read as follows:

“(1) conduct and accelerate research programs

directed toward development of improved, low-cost tech-

niques for—

“(A) control of combustion by products of fuels,

“(B) removal of potential air pollutants from fuels

prior to combustion,

“(C) control of emissions from the evaporation of

fuels,

“(D) improving the efficiency of fuels combustion so

as to decrease atmospheric emissions, and

“(E) producing synthetic or new fuels which, when

used, result in decreased atmospheric emissions.”

1564 ERA 9: Postwar United States

by striking and (B)” and inserting in lieu thereof the fol-

lowing: “(B) part of the cost of programs to develop low

emission alternatives to the present internal combustion

engine; (C) the cost to purchase vehicles and vehicle

engines, or portions thereof, for research, development,

and testing purposes; and (D).”

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 84, pp. 1,676–1,713.

The Meeting of Elvis Presley and

President Richard Nixon, 1970

Visit of popular singer and cult figure Elvis Presley (known as

“the King”) to President Richard M. Nixon, December 21,

1970, at Presley’s request. The entertainer offered to influence

teenagers against using illegal drugs, which had become pop-

ular nationwide during the previous decade. Nixon agreed to

see Presley because “he thought he could reach young peo-

ple.” The meeting represented the significance of a youth cul-

ture figure like Presley to the president, especially since the

Twenty-sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which

would soon be ratified, lowered the voting age to 18. Ironi-

cally Presley himself may have died of an overdose of pre-

scription drugs. Representations of “The President and the

King” shaking hands on T-shirts, mugs, and other parapherna-

lia ranging from $3 pens and magnets to a $65 framed poster

are best-sellers of the National Archives and the Nixon Birth-

place and Library. This continuing enthusiasm for “the King”

demonstrates the role of nostalgia in American culture, espe-

cially for “baby boomers” (born between 1946 and 1964) and

their slightly older brothers and sisters (Elvis’s first big hit,

Heartbreak Hotel

, was in 1956).

________________________

_______________________

The meeting opened with pictures taken of the President

and Elvis Presley.

Presley immediately began showing the President his

law enforcement paraphernalia including badges from

police departments in California, Colorado and Tennessee.

Presley indicated that he had been playing Las Vegas and

the President indicated that he was aware of how difficult

it is to perform in Las Vegas.

The President mentioned that he thought Presley

could reach young people, and that it was important for

Presley to retain his credibility. Presley responded that he

did his thing by “just singing.” He said that he could not

get to the kids if he made a speech on the stage, that he

had to reach them in his own way. The President nodded

in agreement.

Presley indicated that he thought the Beatles had

been a real force for anti-American spirit. He said that the

Beatles came to this country, made their money, and then

returned to England where they promoted an anti-Ameri-

can theme. The President nodded in agreement and

expressed some surprise. The President then indicated

that those who use drugs are also those in the vanguard of

anti-American protest. Violence, drug usage, dissent,

protest all seem to merge in generally the same group of

young people.

Presley indicated to the President in a very emotional

manner that he was “on your side.” Presley kept repeating

that he wanted to be helpful, that he wanted to restore

some respect for the flag which was being lost. He men-

tioned that he was just a poor boy from Tennessee who had

gotten a lot from his country, which in some way he wanted

to repay. He also mentioned that he is studying Commu-

nist brainwashing and the drug culture for over ten years.

He mentioned that he knew a lot about this and was

accepted by the hippies. He said he could go right into a

group of young people or hippies and be accepted which

he felt could be helpful to him in his drug drive. The Pres-

ident indicated again his concern that Presley retain his

credibility.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Presley again told

the President how much he supported him, and then, in a

surprising, spontaneous gesture, put his left arm around

the President and hugged him.

In going out, Presley asked the President if he would

see his two associates. The President agreed and they

came over and shook hands with the President briefly. At

this meeting, the President thanked him for their efforts

and again mentioned his concern for Presley’s credibility.

—Bud Krogh

Source:

Memorandum for the President’s File from Bud Krogh, Nixon

Materials Project, National Archives and Records Adminis-

tration. Available on-line. URL: http://www.archives.gov/

exhibit_hall/when_nixon_met_elvis/summary.html.

New York Times v. United States;

United States v. Washington Post, 1971

The chain of events that led up to Watergate may be traced to

the Nixon administration’s attempt to halt publication in 1971

of the

Pentagon Papers

, a classified report about the history of

the war in Vietnam in prior administrations that had been

copied and given to the

New York Times

and

Washington Post

In the

New York Times v. United States

and

United States v.

Domestic Policies after World War II 1565

Washington Post

the Supreme Court refused to allow the gov-

ernment to exercise prior restraint of publication in this in-

stance. However, it left open the possibility that the

government could prevent publication in the future if it could

demonstrate that publication would seriously compromise

national security.

________________________

_______________________

(excerpt)

Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,

concurring.

I adhere to the view that the Government’s case

against the Washington Post should have been dismissed

and that the injunction against the New York Times should

have been vacated without oral argument when the cases

were first presented to this Court. I believe that every

moment’s continuance of the injunctions against these

newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and con-

tinuing violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore,

after oral argument, I agree completely that we must

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit and reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons

stated by my Brothers Douglas and Brennan. In my view it

is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently

willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes

be enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the

First Amendment.

Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adop-

tion of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the

First Amendment, followed in 1791. Now, for the first

time in the 182 years since the founding of the Republic,

the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amend-

ment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the

Government can halt the publication of current news of

vital importance to the people of this country.

In seeking injunctions against these newspapers and

in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch

seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history

of the First Amendment. When the Constitution was

adopted, many people strongly opposed it because the

document contained no Bill of Rights to safeguard certain

basic freedoms. They especially feared that the new pow-

ers granted to a central government might be interpreted

to permit the government to curtail freedom of religion,

press, assembly, and speech. In response to an over-

whelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series

of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties

would remain safe and beyond the power of government

to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First

Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out

below, and one of which proclaimed: “The people shall

not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to

write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of

the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be

inviolable.” The amendments were offered to curtail and

restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Leg-

islative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the

original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the orig-

inal Constitution into a new charter under which no

branch of government could abridge the people’s free-

doms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the

Solicitor General argues and some members of the Court

appear to agree that the general powers of the Govern-

ment adopted in the original Constitution should be inter-

preted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic

guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imag-

ine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the

other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that

they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed

could never be misunderstood: “Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press. . . .” Both

the history and language of the First Amendment support

the view that the press must be left free to publish news,

whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or

prior restraints.

In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave

the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its

essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the

governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to

censor the press was abolished so that the press would

remain forever free to censure the Government. The press

was protected so that it could bare the secrets of govern-

ment and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained

press can effectively expose deception in government. And

paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the

duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving

the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of

foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far

from deserving condemnation for their courageous report-

ing, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other

newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose

that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the

workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the

newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders

hoped and trusted they would do. . . .

. . . Two federal district courts, two United States

courts of appeals, and this Court—within a period of less

than three weeks from inception until today—have been

pressed into hurried decision of profound constitutional

issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts

without the careful deliberation that, one would hope,

should characterize the American judicial process. . . .

1566 ERA 9: Postwar United States

With such respect as may be due to the contrary view,

this, in my opinion, is not the way to try a lawsuit of this

magnitude and asserted importance. It is not the way for

federal courts to adjudicate, and to be required to adjudi-

cate, issues that allegedly concern the Nation’s vital wel-

fare. The country would be none the worse off were the

cases tried quickly, to be sure, but in the customary and

properly deliberate manner. The most recent of the mate-

rial, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already about three

years ago, and the Times itself took three months to for-

mulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its public

for that period.

The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an

entire Constitution. Article II of the great document vests

in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct

of foreign affairs and places in that branch the responsi-

bility for the Nation’s safety. Each provision of the Con-

stitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine

of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the

cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment

absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court

. . . . What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly

developed standards, of the broad right of the press to

print and of the very narrow right of the Government to

prevent. Such standards are nor yet developed. The par-

ties here are in disagreement as to what those standards

should be. But even the newspapers concede that there

are situations where restraint is in order and is constitu-

tional. . . .

I therefore would remand these cases to be devel-

oped expeditiously, of course, but on a schedule permit-

ting the orderly presentation of evidence from both sides,

with the use if discovery, if necessary, as authorized by the

rules, and with the preparation of briefs, oral argument,

and court opinions of a quality better than has been seen

to this point. In making this last statement, I criticize no

lawyer or judge. I know from past personal experience

the agony of time pressure in the preparation of litigation.

But these cases and the issues involved and the courts,

including this one, deserve better than has been produced

thus far.

It may well be that if these cases were allowed to

develop as they should be developed, and to be tried as

lawyers should try them and as courts should hear them,

free of pressure and panic and sensationalism, other light

would be shed on the situation and contrary consideration,

for me, might prevail. But that is not the present posture

of the litigation.

The Court, however, decides the cases today the other

way. I therefore add one final comment.

I strongly urge, and sincerely hope, that these two

newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsi-

bilities to the United States of America. Judge Wilkey,

dissenting in the District of Columbia case, after a review

of only the affidavits before his court (the basic papers

had not then been made available by either party), con-

cluded that there were a number of examples of docu-

ments that, if in the possession of the Post, and if

published, “could clearly result in great harm to the

nation,” and he defined “harm” to mean “the death of sol-

diers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased

difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of

our diplomats to negotiate . . . .” I, for one, have now been

able to give at least some cursory study not only to the

affidavits, but to the material itself. I regret to say that

from this examination I fear that Judge Wilkey’s state-

ments have possible foundation. I therefore share his

concern. I hope that damage has not already been done.

If, however, damage has been done, and if, with the

Court’s action today, these newspapers proceed to publish

the critical documents and there results therefrom “the

death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly

increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the

inability of our diplomats to negotiate,” to which list I

might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of

further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners,

then the Nation’s people will know where the responsibil-

ity for these sad consequences rests.

See also

NEW YORK TIMES V

UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON POST

, 1971.

Source:

Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 94, pp. 3,090–3,111.

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and

for the Extension of Civil Liberties

Brown v. Board of Education of

Topeka, Kansas, 1954

Landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision issued on May 17,

1954, declaring that racial segregation in public schools was

unconstitutional. Reversing

Plessy v. Ferguson

, which

allowed for “separate but equal” facilities, the Court now

unanimously ruled that “separate educational facilities are

inherently unequal” and violate the equal protection guaran-

tees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Topeka case was

brought before the Court by the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on behalf of Linda

Brown, a student who attended an all-black elementary

school. Also included in the decision were several other cases

brought on behalf of students in Delaware, Virginia, and

South Carolina districts. A separate case handled the segre-

gated District of Columbia system.

Brown

paved the way for

prohibiting de jure (i.e., legislated) Jim Crow (segregation)

laws in all phases of society, including public accommoda-

tions and housing. However, it could not touch de facto seg-

regation, in which, for example, housing patterns rather than

ordinances kept schools segregated, as happened frequently

in the North. The decision itself, overturning more than a half-

century of racial separation, was so difficult for the justices

that they took another year to suggest how desegregation

should take place (

Brown II)

. The solution, “with all deliber-

ate speed,” resulted in slow and even non-existent desegre-

gation in many areas.

On April 20, 1971, in

Swann v. Mecklenberg Board of

Education,

the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the

district courts were justified in ordering compliance with

their own desegregation plans when the local school author-

ities fail to desegregate voluntarily. Chief Justice Burger, writ-

ing for the Court, held that the objective of the courts was to

eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation in public

schools.

Almost a half-century after

Brown,

many major public

school systems still have de facto segregation. Attempts to rec-

tify years of discrimination by affirmative action initially

appeared effective. However, whites, beginning in the 1970s,

brought cases contending that they were being discriminated

against because of race, e.g.,

Regents of the University of Cal-

ifornia v. Bakke

(438 U.S. 265 [1978]). Although de jure Jim

Crow no longer exists in the United States, the Rehnquist

Court has for all intents and purposes removed race from affir-

mative consideration in all but the most restrictive situations,

exacerbating continued separation.

________________________

_______________________

Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the

Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas,

South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are

premised on different facts and different local conditions,

but a common legal question justifies their consideration

together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race,

through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the

courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their

community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance,

they have been denied admission to schools attended by

white children under laws requiring or permitting segre-

gation according to race. This segregation was alleged to

deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws

under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases

other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal dis-

trict court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called

“separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed.

256. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded

when the races are provided substantially equal facilities,

even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware

case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doc-

trine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the

white schools because of their superiority to the Negro

schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools

are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that

hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the

laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question

presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was

heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this

Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances

surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment

in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the

Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then

existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of

proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This dis-

cussion and our own investigation convince us that,

although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to

resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they

are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the postwar

Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all

legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized in

the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were

antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amend-

ments and wished them to have the most limited effect.

What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in

mind cannot be determined with any degree of

certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the

Amendment’s history, with respect to segregated schools,

is the status of public education at that time. In the South,

the movement toward free common schools, supported by

general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of

white children was largely in the hands of private groups.

Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practi-

cally all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of

Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in

contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success

in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and pro-

fessional world. It is true that public school education at

the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the

North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern

States was generally ignored in the congressional debates.

Even in the North, the conditions of public education

did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum

was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common

in rural areas; the school term was but three months a

year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was

virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising

that there should be so little in the history of the Four-

teenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on pub-

lic education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Four-

teenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the

Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed dis-

criminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of “sep-

arate but equal” did not make its appearance in this Court

until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involv-

ing not education but transportation. American courts

have since labored with the doctrine for over half a cen-

tury. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the

“separate but equal” doctrine in the field of public educa-

tion. In Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond

County, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197, 44 L.Ed. 262, and

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172,

the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In

more recent cases, all on the graduate school level,

inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by

white students were denied to Negro students of the same

educational qualifications. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines

v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208;

Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332

U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; Sweatt v. Painter, 339

U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; McLaurin v. Okla-

homa State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed.

1149. In none of these cases was it necessary to re-exam-

ine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And

in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved

decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson

should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly pre-

sented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings

below that the Negro and white schools involved have

been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to

buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers,

and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, can-

not turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors

1570 ERA 9: Postwar United States

in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the

cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation

itself on public education.

[1] In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the

clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or

even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We

must consider public education in the light of its full devel-

opment and its present place in American life throughout

the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segre-

gation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the

equal protection of the laws.

[2] Today, education is perhaps the most important

function of state and local governments. Compulsory

school attendance laws and the great expenditures for edu-

cation both demonstrate our recognition of the importance

of education to our democratic society. It is required in the

performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even

service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of

good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in

awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for

later professional training, and in helping him to adjust

normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful

that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in

life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such

an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide

it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal

terms.

[3] We come then to the question presented: Does

segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis

of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tan-

gible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the

minority group of equal educational opportunities? We

believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter, supra [339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct.

850], in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes

could not provide them equal educational opportunities,

this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are

incapable of objective measurement but which make for

greatness in a law school.” In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State

Regents, supra [339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 853], the Court, in

requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school

be treated like all other students, again resorted to intan-

gible considerations: “. . . his ability to study, to engage in

discussions and exchange views with other students, and,

in general, to learn his profession.” Such considerations

apply with added force to children in grade and high

schools. To separate them from others of similar age and

qualifications solely because of their race generates a feel-

ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that

may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to

be undone. The effect of this separation on their educa-

tional opportunities was well stated by a finding in the

Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled

to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

“Segregation of white and colored children in public

schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.

The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;

for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted

as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of

inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segre-

gation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency

to [retard] the educational and [mental] development of

Negro children and to deprive them of some of the bene-

fits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school sys-

tem. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological

knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is

amply supported by modern authority. Any language in

Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

[4] We conclude that in the field of public education

the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate

educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,

we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for

whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the

segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protec-

tion of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion

whether such segregation also violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

[5] Because these are class actions, because of the

wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great

variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in

these cases presents problems of considerable complexity.

On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief

was necessarily subordinated to the primary question—the

constitutionality of segregation in public education. We

have now announced that such segregation is a denial of

the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have

the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the

cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are

requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and

5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument

this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is

again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the

states requiring or permitting segregation in public educa-

tion will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon

request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of

briefs of October 1, 1954.

It is so ordered.

Cases ordered restored to docket for further argu-

ment on question of appropriate decrees