Rosenfeld Susan. Encyclopedia of American Historical Documents

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Source:

Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 74, pp. 686–693.

Southern Manifesto on

Integration, 1956

Declaration issued March 12, 1956, and signed by 101 south-

ern members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives

condemning the U.S. Supreme Court decision in

Brown v.

Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas

and stating that they

would try to overturn it. It called the decision “a clear abuse

of judicial power” and urged the use of “all lawful means to

bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the

Constitution.” It encouraged states to resist the Supreme

Court’s mandate to desegregate public schools, which many

southern localities did to the point of closing all public schools

and instituting subsidized private ones open to whites only.

Among those resisting desegregation was Governor Orval

Faubus of Arkansas. When courts ordered the Little Rock

schools to admit black students, the governor resisted. The

nine students entering Central High School were met by a hos-

tile mob. When Faubus called out the National Guard, it was

not to protect them, but to keep them out. President Dwight D.

Eisenhower announced September 24 that he had sent federal

troops to preserve order. Declaring that “mob rule cannot be

allowed to override the decisions of our courts,” Eisenhower,

who sympathized with white southerners, justified his action

as necessary to preserve peace and order (not to enforce inte-

gration) when state and local authorities failed to do so.

Though the speech was conciliatory, many white southerners

were enraged by Eisenhower’s action.

Integration of schools in any state was upheld by the U.S.

Supreme Court in

Cooper v. Aaron,

issued September 29,

1958. This unanimous decision stated that the attempts of the

legislature and governor of Arkansas to resist court-ordered

desegregation were unconstitutional. State regulation of edu-

cation must be consistent with federal constitutional require-

ments of equal justice under law. State officials cannot nullify,

either directly or indirectly, through “evasive schemes for seg-

regation,” the constitutional rights of children to be protected

against discrimination.

________________________

_______________________

The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the

public school cases is now bearing the fruit always pro-

duced when men substitute naked power for established

law.

The Founding Fathers gave us a Constitution of

checks and balances because they realized the inescapable

lesson of history that no man or group of men can be safely

entrusted with unlimited power. They framed this Consti-

tution with its provisions for change by amendment in

order to secure the fundamentals of government against

the dangers of temporary popular passion or the personal

predilections of public officeholders.

We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the

school cases as clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a

trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in

derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach

upon the reserved rights of the states and the people.

The original Constitution does not mention education.

Neither does the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other

amendment. The debates preceding the submission of the

Fourteenth Amendment clearly show that there was no

intent that it should affect the systems of education main-

tained by the states.

The very Congress which proposed the amendment

subsequently provided for segregated schools in the Dis-

trict of Columbia.

When the amendment was adopted in 1868, there

were thirty-seven states of the Union. Every one of the

twenty-six states that had any substantial racial differences

among its people either approved the operation of segre-

gated schools already in existence or subsequently estab-

lished such schools by action of the same law-making body

which considered the Fourteenth Amendment.

As admitted by the Supreme Court in the public school

case (Brown v. Board of Education), the doctrine of sepa-

rate but equal schools “apparently originated in Roberts v.

City of Boston (1849), upholding school segregation against

attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee

of equality.” This constitutional doctrine began in the

North—not in the South—and it was followed not only in

Massachusetts but in Connecticut, New York, Illinois, Indi-

ana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania

and other northern states until they, exercising their rights

as states through the constitutional processes of local self-

government, changed their school systems.

In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 the Supreme

Court expressly declared that under the Fourteenth

Amendment no person was denied any of his rights if the

states provided separate but equal public facilities. This

decision has been followed in many other cases. It is

notable that the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief

Justice Taft, a former President of the United States, unan-

imously declared in 1927 in Lum v. Rice that the “separate

but equal” principle is “. . . within the discretion of the

state in regulating its public schools and does not conflict

with the Fourteenth Amendment.”

This interpretation, restated time and again, became a

part of the life of the people of many of the states and con-

firmed their habits, customs, traditions and way of life. It is

founded on elemental humanity and common sense, for

1572 ERA 9: Postwar United States

parents should not be deprived by Government of the right

to direct the lives and education of their own children.

Though there has been no constitutional amendment

or act of Congress changing this established legal principle

almost a century old, the Supreme Court of the United

States, with no legal basis for such action, undertook to

exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their

personal political and social ideas for the established law of

the land.

This unwarranted exercise of power by the court, con-

trary to the Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in

the states principally affected. It is destroying the amicable

relations between the white and Negro races that have

been created through ninety years of patient effort by the

good people of both races. It has planted hatred and sus-

picion where there has been heretofore friendship and

understanding.

Without regard to the consent of the governed, out-

side agitators are threatening immediate and revolutionary

changes in our public school systems. If done, this is cer-

tain to destroy the system of public education in some of

the states.

With the gravest concern for the explosive and dan-

gerous condition created by this decision and inflamed by

outside meddlers.

We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the

fundamental law of the land.

We decry the Supreme Court’s encroachments on

rights reserved to the states and to the people, contrary to

established law and to the Constitution.

We commend the motives of those states which have

declared the intention to resist forced integration by any

lawful means.

We appeal to the states and people who are not

directly affected by these decisions to consider the consti-

tutional principles involved against the time when they

too, on issues vital to them, may be the victims of judicial

encroachment.

Even though we constitute a minority in the present

congress, we have full faith that a majority of the American

people believe in the dual system of government which has

enabled us to achieve our greatness and will in time

demand that the reserved rights of the states and of the

people be made secure against judicial usurpation.

We pledge ourselves to use all lawful means to bring

about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the

Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its imple-

mentation.

In this trying period, as we all seek to right this wrong,

we appeal to our people not to be provoked by the agita-

tors and troublemakers invading our states and to scrupu-

lously refrain from disorder and lawless acts.

Signed by:

Members of the United States Senate:

Alabama—John Sparkman and Lister Hill.

Arkansas—J. W. Fulbright and John L. McClellan.

Florida—George A. Smathers and Spessard L. Holland.

Georgia—Walter F. George and Richard B. Russell.

Louisiana—Allen J. Ellender and Russell B. Lono.

Mississippi—John Stennis and James O. Eastland.

North Carolina—Sam J. Ervin Jr. and W. Kerr Scott.

South Carolina—Strom Thurmon and Olin D. Johnston.

Texas—Price Daniel.

Virginia—Harry F. Bird and A. Willis Robertson.

Members of the United States House of

Representatives:

Alabama—Frank J. Boykin, George M. Grant, George

M. Andrews, Kenneth R. Roberts, Albert Rains,

Armistead I. Selden Jr., Carl Elliott, Robert E. Jones

and George Huddleston Jr.

Arkansas—E. C. Gathings, Wilbur D. Mills, James W.

Trimble, Oren Harris, Brooks Hays, F. W. Norrell.

Florida—Charles E. Bennett Robert L. Sikes, A. S. Her

Jr., Paul G. Rogers, James A. Haley, D. R. Matthews.

Georgia—Prince H. Preston, John L. Pilcher, E. L.

Forrester, John James Flint Jr., James C. Davis, Carl

Vinson, Henderson Lanham, Iris F. Blitch, Phil M.

Landrum, Paul Brown.

Louisiana—F. Edward Hebert, Hale Boggs, Edwin E.

Willis, Overton Brooks, Otto E. Passman, James H.

Morrison, T. Ashton Thompson, George S. Long.

Mississippi—Thomas G. Abernethy, Jamie L. Whitten,

Frank E. Smith, John Bell Williams, Arthur Winsted,

William M. Colmer.

North Carolina—Herbert C. Bonner, L. H. Fountain,

Graham A. Barden, Carl T. Durham, F. Ertel

Carlyle, Hugh Q. Alexander, Woodrow W. Jones,

George A. Shuford.

South Carolina—L. Mendel Rivers, John J. Riley, W. J.

Bryan Dorn, Robert T. Ashmore, James P. Richards,

John L. McMillan.

Tennessee—James B. Frazier Jr., Tom Murray, Jere

Cooper, Clifford Davis.

Texas—Wright Patman, John Dowdy, Walter Rogers,

O. C. Fisher.

Virginia—Edward J. Robeson Jr., Porter Hardy Jr., J.

Vaughan Gary, Watkins M. Abbitt, William M. Tuck,

Richard H. Poff, Burr P. Harrison, Howard W.

Smith, W. Pat Jennings, Joel T. Brothill.

Source:

New York Times, March 12, 1956.

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and for the Extension of Civil Liberties 1573

Civil Rights Act, 1957

The first federal civil rights legislation since Reconstruction,

this legislation, enacted September 9, 1957, was a step pro-

tecting the civil rights of all American citizens, especially

blacks. It established the federal Civil Rights Commission, ele-

vated the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Section to a

division (CRD) headed by an assistant attorney general to pros-

ecute civil rights violators, and permitted the federal govern-

ment to seek injunctions to protect civil rights. The

commission was authorized to investigate violations of voting

and equal protection rights under the law and to recommend

new legislation to Congress.

Mild as it was, this act provided the underpinnings for

civil rights enforcement that later civil rights acts would pro-

vide. The next civil rights bill, enacted May 6, 1960, also

strengthened civil rights protection by providing criminal

penalties for obstruction of court orders for school desegrega-

tion, requiring that election records be kept for two years and

be available to DOJ, providing for education of children of

military personnel where schools were closed to avoid deseg-

regation, and establishing a system of court-appointed voting

referees to register black voters who had been denied registra-

tion in areas where there was a pattern of racial discrimina-

tion. However the federal government did not have the

authority to initiate suits regarding registration until 1965, ren-

dering the latter clause ineffective.

The much better known 1964 Civil Rights Act, signed July

2, 1964, and which received strong backing from Presidents

John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, prohibited discrimi-

nation in all public accommodations serving an interstate

clientele or involving interstate commerce, such as hotels, gas

stations, restaurants, and theaters, and in any program receiv-

ing federal funds. The act prohibited employers from refusing

to hire, from firing, or from discriminating against any individ-

ual because of race, religion, or sex (Title VII) and established

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce

these provisions. It also required state voting registrars to apply

qualification standards equally.

The Civil Rights Act of April 11, 1968, also called the

Fair Housing Act, was passed to end discrimination based on

race, color, religion, or national origin in housing in the

United States. It prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental

of housing owned or financed at least in part by the federal

government, except for owner-occupied dwellings of four or

fewer units, and in single-family houses sold or rented

through brokers, and prohibited discrimination in the financ-

ing of housing and in brokerage services. Also included in

this act was the Anti-riot Act. An amendment enacted Octo-

ber 14, 1972, renewed the Commission on Civil Rights and

extended the jurisdiction of the commission to include sexual

discrimination. Fair housing was expanded in 1988 with

amendments that provided new, more stringent provisions

against discrimination in housing. Now discrimination in

public and private housing against both the disabled and

families with children (except in housing specifically desig-

nated as housing for the retired) became illegal. In addition,

transgressors would receive substantial fines from the gov-

ernment.

None of these civil rights acts addressed racially moti-

vated violence. (The federal authority for combating those vio-

lations is found in the civil rights statutes of 1866 and are now

codified as 18 U.S.C. 141 and 142. Federal prosecutions

under them remained of questionable constitutionality until

1966, a full century after their original passage.)

No federal civil rights legislation has included sexual ori-

entation in its provisions.

________________________

_______________________

An Act

To provide means of further securing and protecting the

civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represen-

tatives of the United States of America in Congress

assembled,

Part I—Establishment of the Commission

on Civil Rights

Sec. 101. (a) There is created in the executive branch of

the Government a Commission on Civil Rights (here-

inafter called the “Commission”).

(b) The Commission shall be composed of six mem-

bers who shall be appointed by the President by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three

of the members shall at any one time be of the same polit-

ical party.

of the Commission as Chairman and one as Vice Chair-

man. The Vice Chairman shall act as Chairman in the

absence or disability of the Chairman, or in the event of a

vacancy in that office.

(d) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its

powers and shall be filled in the same manner, and subject

to the same limitation with respect to party affiliations as

the original appointment was made.

(e) Four members of the Commission shall constitute

a quorum.

Rules of Procedure of the Commission

Sec. 102. (a) The Chairman or one designated by him

to act as Chairman at a hearing of the Commission

shall announce in an opening statement the subject of the

hearing.

1574 ERA 9: Postwar United States

(b) A copy of the Commission’s rules shall be made

available to the witness before the Commission.

their own counsel for the purpose of advising them con-

cerning their constitutional rights.

(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punish

breaches of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics

on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the

hearings.

(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or

testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or

incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence

or testimony in executive session; (2) afford such person an

opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and (3)

receive and dispose of requests from such person to sub-

pena additional witnesses.

(f) Except as provided in sections 102 and 105 (f) of

this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission

shall dispose of requests to subpena additional witnesses.

(g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive ses-

sion may be released or used in public sessions without the

consent of the Commission. Whoever releases or uses in

public without the consent of the Commission evidence or

testimony taken in executive session shall be fined not

more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one

year.

(h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses

may submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writ-

ing for inclusion in the record. The Commission is the sole

judge of the pertinency of testimony and evidence

adduced at its hearings.

(i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may

obtain a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public

session or, if given at an executive session, when authorized

by the Commission.

(j) A witness attending any session of the Commission

shall receive $4 for each day’s attendance and for the time

necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the

same, and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to

his place of residence. Witnesses who attend at points so

far removed from their respective residences as to prohibit

return thereto from day to day shall be entitled to an addi-

tional allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsis-

tence, including the time necessarily occupied in going to

and returning from the place of attendance. Mileage pay-

ments shall be tendered to the witness upon service of a

subpena issued on behalf of the Commission or any sub-

committee thereof.

(k) The Commission shall not issue any subpena for

the attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the pro-

duction of written or other matter which would require the

presence of the party subpenaed at a hearing to be held

outside of the State, wherein the witness is found or

resides or transacts business.

Compensation of Members of the Commission

Sec. 103. (a) Each member of the Commission who is not

otherwise in the service of the Government of the United

States shall receive the sum of $50 per day for each day

spent in the work of the Commission, shall be reimbursed

for actual and necessary travel expenses, and shall receive

a per diem allowance of $12 in lieu of actual expenses for

subsistence when away from his usual place of residence,

inclusive of fees or tips to porters and stewards.

(b) Each member of the Commission who is otherwise

in the service of the Government of the United States shall

serve without compensation in addition to that received

for such other service, but while engaged in the work of

the Commission shall be reimbursed for actual and neces-

sary travel expenses, and shall receive a per diem

allowance of $12 in lieu of actual expenses for subsistence

when away from his usual place of residence, inclusive of

fees or tips to porters and stewards.

Duties of the Commission

Sec. 104. (a) The Commission shall—

(1) investigate allegations in writing under oath or

affirmation that certain citizens of the United States are

being deprived of their right to vote and have that vote

counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national

origin; which writing, under oath or affirmation, shall set

forth the facts upon which such belief or beliefs are based;

(2) study and collect information concerning legal

developments constituting a denial of equal protection of

the laws under the Constitution; and

(3) appraise the laws and policies of the Federal Gov-

ernment with respect to equal protection of the laws under

the Constitution.

(b) The Commission shall submit interim reports to

the President and to the Congress at such times as either

the Commission or the President shall deem desirable, and

shall submit to the President and to the Congress a final

and comprehensive report of its activities, findings, and

recommendations not later than two years from the date of

the enactment of this Act.

and recommendations the Commission shall cease to exist.

Powers of the Commission

Sec. 105. (a) There shall be a full-time staff director for the

Commission who shall be appointed by the President by

and with the advice and consent of the Senate and who

shall receive compensation at a rate, to be fixed by the

President, not in excess of $22,500 a year. The President

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and for the Extension of Civil Liberties 1575

shall consult with the Commission before submitting the

nomination of any person for appointment to the position

of staff director. Within the limitations of its appropria-

tions, the Commission may appoint such other personnel

as it deems advisable, in accordance with the civil service

and classification laws, and may procure services as autho-

rized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat.

810; 5 U.S.C. 55a), but at rates for individuals not in excess

of $50 per diem.

(b) The Commission shall not accept or utilize services

of voluntary or uncompensated personnel, and the term

“whoever” as used in paragraph (g) of section 102 hereof

shall be construed to mean a person whose services are

compensated by the United States.

committees within States composed of citizens of that

State and may consult with governors, attorneys general,

and other representatives of State and local governments,

and private organizations, as it deems advisable.

(d) Members of the Commission, and members of

advisory committees constituted pursuant to subsection (c)

of this section, shall be exempt from the operation of sec-

tions 281, 283, 284, 434, and 1914 of title 18 of the United

States Code, and section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5

U.S.C. 99).

(e) All Federal agencies shall cooperate fully with the

Commission to the end that it may effectively carry out its

functions and duties.

(f) The Commission, or on the authorization of the

Commission any subcommittee of two or more members,

at least one of whom shall be of each major political party,

may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this

Act, hold such hearings and act at such times and places as

the Commission or such authorized subcommittee may

deem advisable. Subpenas for the attendance and testi-

mony of witnesses or the production of written or other

matter may be issued in accordance with the rules of the

Commission as contained in section 102(j) and (k) of this

Act, over the signature of the Chairman of the Commis-

sion or of such subcommittee, and may be served by any

person designated by such Chairman.

(g) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena,

any district court of the United States or the United States

court of any Territory or possession, or the District Court

of the United States for the District of Columbia, within

the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within

the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy

or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business,

upon application by the Attorney General of the United

States shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an

order requiring such person to appear before the Com-

mission or a subcommittee thereof, there to produce evi-

dence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching

the matter under investigation; and any failure to obey

such order of the court may be punished by said court as a

contempt thereof.

Appropriations

Sec. 106. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated,

out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropri-

ated, so much as may be necessary to carry out the provi-

sions of this Act.

Part II—To Provide for an Additional Assistant

Attorney General

Sec. 111. There shall be in the Department of Justice one

additional Assistant Attorney General, who shall be

appointed by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, who shall assist the Attorney Gen-

eral in the performance of his duties, and who shall receive

compensation at the rate prescribed by law for other Assis-

tant Attorneys General.

Part III—To Strengthen the Civil Rights Statutes,

and for Other Purposes

Sec. 121. Section 1343 of title 28, United States Code, is

amended as follows:

(a) Amend the catch line of said section to read, “~~~

1343. Civil rights and elective franchise”

(b) Delete the period at the end of paragraph (3) and

insert in lieu thereof a semicolon.

“(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or

other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the

protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.”

Sec. 122. Section 1989 of the Revised Statutes (42

U.S.C. 1993) is hereby repealed.

Part IV—To Provide Means of Further Securing

and Protecting the Right to Vote

Sec. 131. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.

1971), is amended as follows:

(a) Amend the catch line of said section to read, “Vot-

ing rights.”

(b) Designate its present text with the subsection sym-

bol “(a).”

new subsections to read as follows:

“(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or

otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to

intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the

purpose of interfering with the right of such other person

to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such

other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate

1576 ERA 9: Postwar United States

for the office of President, Vice President, presidential

elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House

of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the

Territories or possessions, at any general, special, or pri-

mary election held solely or in part for the purpose of

selecting or electing any such candidate.

“(c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are

reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to

engage in any act or practice which would deprive any

other person of any right or privilege secured by subsec-

tion (a) or (b), the Attorney General may institute for the

United States, or in the name of the United States, a civil

action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief,

including an application for a permanent or temporary

injunction, restraining order, or other order. In any pro-

ceeding hereunder the United States shall be liable for

costs the same as a private person.

“(d) The district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this sec-

tion and shall exercise the same without regard to whether

the party aggrieved shall have exhausted any administra-

tive or other remedies that may be provided by law.

“(e) Any person cited for an alleged contempt under

this Act shall be allowed to make his full defense by coun-

sel learned in the law; and the court before which he is

cited or tried, or some judge thereof, shall immediately,

upon his request, assign to him such counsel, not exceed-

ing two, as he may desire, who shall have free access to

him at all reasonable hours. He shall be allowed, in his

defense to make any proof that he can produce by lawful

witnesses, and shall have the like process of the court to

compel his witnesses to appear at his trial or hearing, as

is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on

behalf of the prosecution. If such person shall be found

by the court to be financially unable to provide for such

counsel, it shall be the duty of the court to provide such

counsel.”

Part V—To Provide Trial by Jury for Proceedings to

Punish Criminal Contempts of Court Growing Out

of Civil Rights Cases and to Amend the Judicial

Code Relating to Federal Jury Qualifications

Sec. 151. In all cases of criminal contempt arising under

the provisions of this Act, the accused, upon conviction,

shall be punished by fine or imprisonment or both: Pro-

vided however, That in case the accused is a natural per-

son the fine to be paid shall not exceed the sum of $1,000,

nor shall imprisonment exceed the term of six months:

Provided further, That in any such proceeding for criminal

contempt, at the discretion of the judge, the accused may

be tried with or without a jury: Provided further, however,

That in the event such proceeding for criminal contempt

be tried before a judge without a jury and the sentence of

the court upon conviction is a fine in excess of the sum of

$300 or imprisonment in excess of forty-five days, the

accused in said proceeding, upon demand therefor, shall

be entitled to a trial de novo before a jury, which shall con-

form as near as may be to the practice in other criminal

cases.

This section shall not apply to contempts committed

in the presence of the courts or so near thereto as to inter-

fere directly with the administration of justice nor to the

misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience, of any officer of

the court in respect to the writs, orders, or process of the

court.

Nor shall anything herein or in any other provision of

law be construed to deprive courts of their power, by civil

contempt proceedings, without a jury, to secure compli-

ance with or to prevent obstruction of, as distinguished

from punishment for violations of, any lawful writ, process,

order, rule, decree, or command of the court in accordance

with the prevailing usages of law and equity, including the

power of detention.

Sec. 152. Section 1861, title 28, of the United States

Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

“~~~ 1861. Qualifications of Federal jurors

“Any citizen of the United States who has attained the

age of twenty-one years and who has resided for a period

of one year within the judicial district, is competent to

serve as a grand or petit juror unless—

“(1) He has been convicted in a State or Federal court

of record of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more

than one year and his civil rights have not been restored by

pardon or amnesty.

“(2) He is unable to read, write, speak, and understand

the English language.

“(3) He is incapable, by reason of mental or physical

infirmities to render efficient jury service.”

Sec. 161. This Act may be cited as the “Civil Rights

Act of 1957.”

Approved September 9, 1957.

Source:

Statutes at Large, Vol. 71, pp. 634–638.

Dwight D. Eisenhower,

Statements Concerning

Little Rock, Arkansas, 1957

The failures of the 1957 Civil Rights Act were underscored by

the problems Eisenhower faced when Governor Orval Faubus

of Arkansas called out the National Guard to prevent integrat-

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and for the Extension of Civil Liberties 1577

ing Little Rock’s Central High School. Eisenhower, born in

Texas and raised in segregated Kansas, served in a segregated

army and kept his vacation White House in segregated Geor-

gia. His sympathies lay with white southerners who opposed

integration. However, he considered upholding court orders

much more important than preserving racial separation. In the

end, Eisenhower was forced to use federal troops.

Eisenhower’s actions received support in

Cooper v. Aaron

(358 U.S. 1), issued September 29, 1958, which declared that

the states were required to obey the Court’s mandate to end

segregation in the public schools, following

Brown v. Board of

Education of Topeka, Kansas.

The unanimous decision stated

that the attempts of the legislature and governor of Arkansas to

resist court-ordered desegregation were unconstitutional. State

regulation of education had to be consistent with federal con-

stitutional requirements of equal justice under law and state

officials could not nullify, either directly or indirectly, through

“evasive schemes for segregation,” the constitutional rights of

children to be protected against discrimination.

________________________

_______________________

Good Evening, My Fellow Citizens:

For a few minutes this evening I want to speak to you

about the serious situation that has arisen in Little Rock.

To make this talk I have come to the President’s office in

the White House. I could have spoken from Rhode Island,

where I have been staying recently, but I felt that, in

speaking from the house of Lincoln, of Jackson and of Wil-

son, my words would better convey both the sadness I feel

in the action I was compelled today to take and the firm-

ness with which I intend to pursue this course until the

orders of the Federal Court at Little Rock can be executed

without unlawful interference.

In that city, under the leadership of demagogic

extremists, disorderly mobs have deliberately prevented

the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal Court.

Local authorities have not eliminated that violent opposi-

tion and, under the law, I yesterday issued a Proclamation

calling upon the mob to disperse.

This morning the mob again gathered in front of the

Central High School of Little Rock, obviously for the pur-

pose of again preventing the carrying out of the Court’s

order relating to the admission of Negro children to that

school.

Whenever normal agencies prove inadequate to the

task and it becomes necessary for the Executive Branch of

the Federal Government to use its powers and authority to

uphold Federal Courts, the President’s responsibility is

inescapable.

In accordance with that responsibility, I have today

issued an Executive Order directing the use of troops

under Federal authority to aid in the execution of Federal

law at Little Rock, Arkansas. This became necessary when

my Proclamation of yesterday was not observed, and the

obstruction of justice still continues.

It is important that the reasons for my action be

understood by all our citizens.

As you know, the Supreme Court of the United States

has decided that separate public educational facilities for

the races are inherently unequal and therefore compulsory

school segregation laws are unconstitutional.

Our personal opinions about the decision have no

bearing on the matter of enforcement; the responsibility

and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Con-

stitution are very clear. Local Federal Courts were

instructed by the Supreme Court to issue such orders and

decrees as might be necessary to achieve admission to

public schools without regard to race—and with all delib-

erate speed.

During the past several years, many communities in

our Southern States have instituted public school plans for

gradual progress in the enrollment and attendance of

school children of all races in order to bring themselves

into compliance with the law of the land.

They thus demonstrated to the world that we are a

nation in which laws, not men, are supreme.

I regret to say that this truth—the cornerstone of our

liberties—was not observed in this instance.

It was my hope that this localized situation would be

brought under control by city and State authorities. If the

use of local police powers had been sufficient, our tradi-

tional method of leaving the problems in those hands

would have been pursued. But when large gatherings of

obstructionists made it impossible for the decrees of the

Court to be carried out, both the law and the national

interest demanded that the President take action.

Here is the sequence of events in the development of

the Little Rock school case.

In May of 1955, the Little Rock School Board

approved a moderate plan for the gradual desegregation of

the public schools in that city. It provided that a start

toward integration would be made at the present term in

the high school, and that the plan would be in full opera-

tion by 1963. Here I might say that in a number of com-

munities in Arkansas integration in the schools has already

started and without violence of any kind. Now this Little

Rock plan was challenged in the courts by some who

believed that the period of time as proposed in the plan

was too long.

The United States Court at Little Rock, which has

supervisory responsibility under the law for the plan of

desegregation in the public schools, dismissed the chal-

lenge, thus approving a gradual rather than an abrupt

change from the existing system. The court found that the

1578 ERA 9: Postwar United States

school board had acted in good faith in planning for a pub-

lic school system free from racial discrimination.

Since that time, the court has on three separate occa-

sions issued orders directing that the plan be carried out.

All persons were instructed to refrain from interfering with

the efforts of the school board to comply with the law.

Proper and sensible observance of the law then

demanded the respectful obedience which the nation has

a right to expect from all its people. This, unfortunately,

has not been the case a Little Rock. Certain misguided

persons, many of them imported into Little Rock by agita-

tors, have insisted upon defying the law and have sought to

bring it into disrepute. The orders of the court have thus

been frustrated.

The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms

rests upon the certainty that the President and the Execu-

tive Branch of Government will support and insure the

carrying out of the decisions of the Federal Courts, even,

when necessary with all the means at the President’s com-

mand.

Unless the President did so, anarchy would result.

There would be no security for any except that which

each one of us could provide for himself.

The interest of the nation in the proper fulfillment of

the law’s requirements cannot yield to opposition and

demonstrations by some few persons.

Mob rule cannot be allowed to override the decisions

of our courts.

Now, let me make it very clear that Federal troops are

not being used to relieve local and state authorities of their

primary duty to preserve the peace and order of the com-

munity. Nor are the troops there for the purpose of taking

over the responsibility of the School Board and the other

responsible local officials in running Central High School.

The running of our school system and the maintenance of

peace and order in each of our States are strictly local

affairs and the Federal Government does not interfere

except in a very few special cases and when requested by

one of the several States. In the present case the troops are

there, pursuant to law, solely for the purpose of preventing

interference with the orders of the Court.

The proper use of the powers of the Executive Branch

to enforce the orders of a Federal Court is limited to

extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Manifestly,

such an extreme situation has been created in Little Rock.

This challenge must be met and with such measures as will

preserve to the people as a whole their lawfully-protected

rights in a climate permitting their free and fair exercise.

The overwhelming majority of our people in every

section of the country are united in their respect for obser-

vance of the law—even in those cases where they may dis-

agree with that law.

They deplore the call of extremists to violence.

The decision of the Supreme Court concerning school

integration, of course, affects the South more seriously

than it does other sections of the country. In that region I

have many warm friends, some of them in the city of Lit-

tle Rock. I have deemed it a great personal privilege to

spend in our Southland tours of duty while in the military

service and enjoyable recreational periods since that time.

So from intimate personal knowledge, I know that the

overwhelming majority of the people in the South—

including those of Arkansas and of Little Rock—are of

good will, united in their efforts to preserve and respect

the law even when they disagree with it.

They do not sympathize with mob rule. They, like the

rest of our nation, have proved in two great wars their

readiness to sacrifice for America.

A foundation of our American way of life is our

national respect for law.

In the South, as elsewhere, citizens are keenly aware

of the tremendous disservice that has been done to the

people of Arkansas in the eyes of the nation, and that has

been done to the nation in the eyes of the world.

At a time when we face grave situations abroad

because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a

system of government based on human rights, it would be

difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the

prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our

nation and the world.

Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using

it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation. We are

portrayed as a violator of those standards of conduct which

the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter

of the United Nations. There they affirmed “faith in fun-

damental human rights” and “in the dignity and worth of

the human person” and they did so “without distinction as

to race, sex, language or religion.”

And so, with deep confidence, I call upon the citizens

of the State of Arkansas to assist in bringing to an immedi-

ate end all interference with the law and its processes. If

resistance to the Federal Court orders ceases at once, the

further presence of Federal troops will be unnecessary and

the City of Little Rock will return to its normal habits of

peace and order and a blot upon the fair name and high

honor of our nation in the world will be removed.

Thus will be restored the image of America and of all its

parts as one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Good night, and thank you very much.

Source:

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 1957. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1953–61. pp. 678–679; 689–694.

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and for the Extension of Civil Liberties 1579

NAACP v. Alabama, 1958

U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision, issued June 30,

1958, protecting the right to privacy of association by ruling

that an organization may not be required to divulge its mem-

bership lists as a condition of doing business in a state.

Alabama, attempting to hamper the civil rights work of the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP) through a corporate registration requirement, sought

to compel the association to reveal the names and addresses

of its members in Alabama. The organization, fearing social,

economic, and physical reprisals, refused. The Supreme Court

stated that Alabama’s requirement would violate the constitu-

tional rights of members to associate lawfully in support of

common beliefs.

The following year, in

Uphaus v. Wyman

, the U.S. Supreme

Court affirmed the right of a state to investigate possible subver-

sives by questioning their associates. The Court upheld the civil

contempt conviction of the Reverend Willard Uphaus for refus-

ing to divulge, to a legislative committee investigating subver-

sive activities in the state, the names of persons who had

attended a World Fellowship camp in New Hampshire. In its

5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the state’s interest in “self-

preservation” outweighed individual rights to privacy in associa-

tion. The dissenting justices argued that the investigation was

“exposure for exposure’s sake” and violated constitutional rights

to privacy in relation to freedom of speech and association.

________________________

_______________________

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.

We review from the standpoint of its validity under the

Federal Constitution a judgment of civil contempt entered

against petitioner, the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, in the courts of Alabama.

The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently

with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State’s Attor-

ney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama

members and agents, without regard to their positions or

functions in the Association. The judgment of contempt

was based upon petitioner’s refusal to comply fully with a

court order requiring in part the production of member-

ship lists. Petitioner’s claim is that the order, in the cir-

cumstances shown by this record, violated rights assured to

petitioner and its members under the Constitution.

Alabama has a statute similar to those of many other

States which requires a foreign corporation, except as

exempted, to qualify before doing business by filing its cor-

porate charter with the Secretary of State and designating

a place of business and an agent to receive service of pro-

cess. The statute imposes a fine on a corporation transact-

ing intrastate business before qualifying and provides for

criminal prosecution of officers of such a corporation. The

National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-

ple is a nonprofit membership corporation organized

under the laws of New York. Its purposes, fostered on a

nationwide basis, are those indicated by its name, and it

operates through chartered affiliates which are indepen-

dent unincorporated associations, with membership

therein equivalent to membership in petitioner. The first

Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918. Since that time

the aims of the Association have been advanced through

activities of its affiliates, and in 1951 the Association itself

opened a regional office in Alabama, at which it employed

two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Asso-

ciation has never complied with the qualification statute,

from which it considered itself exempt.

In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an

equity suit in the State Circuit Court, Montgomery

County, to enjoin the Association from conducting further

activities within, and to oust it from, the State. Among

other things the bill in equity alleged that the Association

had opened a regional office and had organized various

affiliates in Alabama; had recruited members and solicited

contributions within the State; had given financial support

and furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking

admission to the state university; and had supported a

Negro boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to compel

the seating of passengers without regard to race. The bill

recited that the Association, by continuing to do business

in Alabama without complying with the qualification

statute, was “causing irreparable injury to the property and

civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of

Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at

law afford no adequate relief” On the day the complaint

was filed, the Circuit Court issued ex parte and order

restraining the Association, pendente lite, from engaging

in further activities within the State and forbidding it to

take any steps to qualify itself to do business therein.

Petitioner demurred to the allegations of the bill and

moved to dissolved the restraining order. It contended that

its activities did not subject it to the qualification require-

ments of the statute and that in any event what the State

sought to accomplish by its suit would violate rights to

freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States. Before the date set for a hearing on this motion, the

State moved for the production of a large number of the

Association’s records and papers, including bank state-

ments, leases, deeds, and records containing the names

and addresses of all Alabama “members” and “agents” of

the Association. It alleged that all such documents were

necessary for adequate preparation for the hearing, in view

of petitioner’s denial of the conduct of intrastate business

within the meaning of the qualification statute. Over peti-

tioner’s objections, the court ordered the production of a

1580 ERA 9: Postwar United States

substantial part of the requested records, including the

membership lists, and postponed the hearing on the

restraining order to a date later than the time ordered for

production.

Thereafter petitioner filed its answer to the bill in

equity. It admitted its Alabama activities substantially as

alleged in the complaint and that it had not qualified to do

business in the State. Although still disclaiming the

statute’s application to it, petitioner offered to qualify if the

bar from qualification made part of the restraining order

were lifted, and it submitted with the answer an executed

set of the forms required by the statute. However, peti-

tioner did not comply with the production order, and for

this failure was adjudged in civil contempt and fined

$10,000. The contempt judgment provided that the fine

would be subject to reduction or remission if compliance

were forthcoming within five days but otherwise would be

increased to $100,000.

At the end of the five-day period petitioner produced

substantially all the data called for by the production order

except its membership lists, as to which it contended that

Alabama could not constitutionally compel disclosure, and

moved to modify or vacate the contempt judgment, or stay

its execution pending appellate review. This motion was

denied. While a similar stay application, which was later

denied, was pending before the Supreme Court of

Alabama, the Circuit Court made a further order adjudg-

ing petitioner in continuing contempt and increasing the

fine already imposed to $100,000. Under Alabama law, see

Jacoby v. Goetter, Weil & Co., 74 Ala. 427, the effect of the

contempt adjudication was to foreclose petitioner from

obtaining a hearing on the merits of the underlying ouster

action, or from taking any steps to dissolve the temporary

restraining order which had been issued ex parte, until it

purged itself of contempt. . . .The State Supreme Court

thereafter twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review

this final contempt judgment, the first time, 265 Ala. 699,

91 So. 2d 221, for insufficiency of the petition’s allegations

and the second time on procedural grounds. 265 Ala. 349,

91 So. 2d 214. We granted certiorari because of the impor-

tance of the constitutional questions presented.

We address ourselves first to respondent’s contention that

we lack jurisdiction because the denial of certiorari by the

Supreme Court of Alabama rests on an independent non-

federal ground, namely, that petitioner in applying for cer-

tiorari had pursued the wrong appellate remedy under

state law. Respondent recognizes that our jurisdiction is

not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on by the

state court is “without any fair or substantial support,”. . .

It thus becomes our duty to ascertain, “in order that con-

stitutional guaranties may appropriately be enforced,

whether the asserted non-federal ground independently

and adequately supports the judgment.”

The Alabama Supreme Court held that it could not

consider the constitutional issues underlying the contempt

judgment which related to the power of the State to order

production of membership lists because review by certio-

rari was limited to instances “ where the court lacked juris-

diction of the proceeding, or where on the face of its the

order disobeyed was void, or where procedural require-

ments with respect to citation for contempt and the like

were not observed, or where the fact or contempt is not

sustained.” . . . The proper means for petitioner to obtain

review of the judgment in light of its constitutional claims,

said the court, was by way of mandamus to quash the dis-

covery order prior to the contempt adjudication. Because

of petitioner’s failure to pursue this remedy, its challenge

to the contempt order was restricted to the above grounds.

Apparently not deeming the constitutional objections to

draw into question whether “on the face of it the order dis-

obeyed was void,” the court found no infirmity in the con-

tempt judgment under this limited scope of review. At the

same time it did go on to consider petitioner’s constitu-

tional challenge to the order to produce membership lists

but found it untenable since membership lists were not

privileged against disclosure pursuant to reasonable state

demands and since the privilege against self-incrimination

was not available to corporations.

We are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of

the Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its

past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review avail-

able upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt

judgment. As early as 1909 that court said in such a case,

“Originally, on certiorari, only the question of jurisdiction

was inquired into; but this limit has been removed, and

now the court ‘examines the law questions involved in the

case which may affect its merits.’ . . . [T]he judgment of

this court is that the proper way to review the action of the

court in cases of this kind is by certiorari, and not by

appeal.

“We think that certiorari is a better remedy than man-

damus, because the office of a ‘mandamus’ is to require

the lower court or judge to act, and not ‘to correct error or

to reverse judicial action,’ . . . whereas, in a proceeding by

certiorari, errors of law in the judicial action of the lower

court may be inquired into and corrected.”

This statement was in full accord with the earlier case

of Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463 So. 279, and the prac-

tice in the later Alabama cases, until we reach the present

one, appears to have been entirely consistent with this

rule. For example, in Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551 42

So.2d 17, decided as late as 1949, the petitioner had been

held in contempt for his refusal to obey a court order to

produce names of members of the Ku Klux Klan. On write

Struggle for Racial and Gender Equality and for the Extension of Civil Liberties 1581