Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

ThefactremainedthatGeneralGoodpasterwasa manofvastexperience,great

honor,andconsiderableabilit y.



BytheendofDecember1968Iwasreadytosubmitmyrecommendations

tothePresident‐elect.OnDecember27Isenthimamemorandumdiscussingthe

strengthsandweaknessesoftheprevioussystemsasI sawthem:theflexibility

butoccasionaldisarrayoftheinformalJohnsonprocedure;theformalitybutalso

rigidityoftheEisenhowerstructure,whichfacedthePresidentwitha

bureaucraticconsensusbutnorealchoices.Ourtask,Iargued,wastocombine

thebestfeaturesofthetwosystems:theregularityandefficiencyoftheNational

SecurityCouncil,coupledwithproceduresthatensuredthatthePresidentandhis

topadvisersconsideredalltherealisticalternatives,thecostsandbenefitsof

each,andtheseparateviewsandrecommendationsofallinterestedagencies.

TheNationalSecurityCouncilwastobebuttressedbyastructureof

subcommittees.LiketheCouncilitselftheywouldincluderepresentativesofall

therelevantagencies;theirtaskwouldbetodraftanalysesofpolicythatwould

presentthefacts,problems,andchoices.InterdepartmentalGroupscovering

differents ubjectswouldbechairedbyanAssistantSecretaryofStateor(if

appropriate)Defense.AsintheEisenhowerper iod,thePresident’snational

securityadviserwouldbechairmanofaReviewGroupwhichwouldscreenthese

interagencypapersbeforepresentationtothefullNSCchairedbythePresident.



Attheendofmymemorandumappeare daninnocuoussentence:“The

elaboratedNSCmachinerymakesthecontinuedfunctioningoftheexistingSenior

InterdepartmentalGroupunnecessary.”ThisproposaltoabolishtheSenior

InterdepartmentalGroupwastostartamonumentalbureaucraticrow,thefirstin

thenewAdministration.Esotericasthisdisputemayseem,itsconducttoldmuch

aboutthestyleofthePresident‐electanditsoutcomeaffectedtheperceptionof

authoritywithinthegovernmentfortheentireNixonPresidency.



TheSeniorInterdepartmentalGroup(“SIG” inbureaucratese)hadbeen

establishedin1967.Itwascomposedofthehighestofficialsofthegovernment

justbelowCabinetlevel—theUnderSecretariesofState,Defense,andTreasury,

theDeputyDirectoroftheCIA,andtheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff.It

waschairedbytheUnderSecretaryofState.Itsrolewastoreviewtheoptionsto

bepresentedtotheNationalSecurityCouncilandtofollowupondecisions

reached.TheSIGsupervisedabatteryofinterdepartmenta lgroupscovering

differentregionsoftheworld;thesewerealsochairedbytheStateDepartment

representatives.Needlesstosay,theStateDepartmentconsideredthisstructure

amajorbureaucratictriumphbecauseitformallyenshrinedtheDepartment’s

preeminenceinforeignpolicy.Equallypredictablewasthedissatisfactionofevery

otherdepartment.ItmadenodifferencethattheNationalSecurityCouncilhad

rarelymetintheJohnsonAdministrationandthereforetherehadbeenlittlefor

theSeniorInterdepartmentalGrouptodo.Nordiditmatterthatthefollow‐upto

theTuesdaylunches,wheredecisionsweremade,wasoutsidetheSIGstructure.

TotheStateDepartment,itspreeminence,howeverhollowandformalistic,wasa

crucialsymbol.Anditwasnotwrong,giventheWashingtontendencytoidentify

therealityofpowerwithitsappearance.



AtfirstIwasagnostic.BeforeanearlymeetingwiththePresident‐electI

hadjotteddownsomenotessettingouttherequireme ntsofmyWhiteHouse

positionasIsawit.Thesenotesleavenodoubtthatmyfirstinstinctwasto

continuetheexistingstructuresinceIwassuggestingthatI becomeexofficioa

memberoftheSIGandthatmystaffparticipateinthevariousInterdepartmenta l

Groups.ThePresident‐electwouldhavenoneofthis.Firmlypersuadedofthe

ForeignService’sineradicablehostilitytohim,Nixonflatlyrefusedtoconsider

preservingtheSIG.Mynotesafterameetingreflectthisinstruction:“Influenceof

StateDepartmentestablishm entmustbereduced.”



GeneralGoodpasterandformerPresidentEisenhowertookanequally

strongline,ifforlesspersonalreasons.Shortlyaftermyappointment,General

GoodpastertookmetocallontheformerPresident,whowasbedriddenatthe

WalterReedArmyHospital.PresidentEisenhowerwasemaciatedbyhisillness

andlargelyimmobilizedbyaheartpacemaker.Ihadnevermethimbefore,and

heldabouthimtheconventionalacademicopinionthathewasagenialbut

inarticulatewarherowhohadbeenaratherineffectivePresident.Twoofmy

booksandseveralarticlesdeploredthevacuumofleadershipofhis

Administration—aviewIhavesincechanged.Successiveheartattackshadleft

littledoubtthathehadnotlongtolive.Despitethis,hisforcefulnesswas

surprising.Hissyntax,whichseemedsoawkwardinprint,becamemuchmore

graphicwhenenlivenedbyhiscold,deepblue,extraordinarilypenetratingeyes

andwhengivenemphasisbyhisstillcommandingvoice.



EisenhowerinsistedthattheSIGstructurehadtobeendedbecausethe

Pentagonwouldneverwillinglyaccept StateDepartmentdominationofthe

nationalsecurityprocess.Itwouldeitherattemptend‐runsorcounterattackby

leaking.HehadbeenfortunatetohaveastrongSecretaryofState,butDulles’s

influencehadderivedfromthePresident’sconfidenceinhimandnotfromthe

StateDepartmentmachinery.Andfo rallhisadmirationforDulles,hehadalways

insistedonkeepingcontroloftheNSCmachineryintheWhiteHouse.



AstimewentonIcametoseethatPresidentEisenhowerwasright.Nixon’s

instructionsmayhavebeentriggeredbypersonalpique;theynevertheless

reflectedPresidentialnecessities.APresidentshouldnotleavethepresentation

ofhisoptionstooneoftheCabinetdepartmentsoragencies.Sincetheviewsof

thedepartmentsareofteninconflict,toplaceoneinchargeofpresentingthe

optionswillbeperceivedbytheothersasgivingitanunfairadvantage.Moreover,

thestronginclinationofalldepartmentsistonarrowthescopeforPresidential

decision,nottoexpandit.Theyareorganizedto developapreferredpolicy,nota

rangeofchoices.Ifforcedtopresentoptions,thetypicaldepartmentwillpresent

twoabsurdalternativesasstrawmenbracketingitspreferredoption—which

usuallyappearsinthemiddleposition.Atotallyignorantdecision‐makercould

easilysatisfyhisdepartmentsbyblindlychoosingOption2ofanythreechoices

whichtheysubmittohim.Everydepartment,finally, dreadsbeingoverruledby

thePresident;allhave,therefore,ahighincentivetoobscuretheirdifferences.

Optionstendtodisappearinanemptyconsensusthatattheendoftheday

permitseachagencyordepartmentmaximumlatitudetopursueitsoriginal

preference.Ittakesastrong,dedicated,andfairPresidentialstafftoensurethat

thePresidenthasbeforehimgenuineandnotboguschoices.



TheschemeIhadsubmittedtothePresident‐electwasnotparticularly

novel.Itwas,ineffect,theEisenhowerNSCsystem,weightedsomewhatinfavor

oftheStateDepartmentbyretainingtheStateDepartmentchairmanshipofthe

varioussubcommittees.Asimilarsystem,butwithevengreaterformalWhite

Housecontrol,hadbeencompletelydominatedbySecretaryofStateDullesinthe

EisenhowerAdministration.



Inthetransitionperiod,however,thiswasnottheperceptionofthe

departments.ThePresident ‐electassembledhisseniorappointees—William

Rogers,MelvinLaird,andmyself—atKeyBiscayne,Florida,onDecember28,

1968,todiscussmyorganizationalproposals.Characteristically,Nixonhad

approvedmymemorandumthedaybefore—deprivingthemeetingofitssubject,

thoughtheotherparticipantsdidnotknowthis.Likesomanymeetingsinthe

NixonAdministrationtheKeyBiscaynesessionhaditsscriptdeterminedin

advance.AfteradesultoryexchangeNixoninformedhisfutureCabinetcolleagues

thathehadapprovedthestructureoutlinedinmymemorandum.Therewasno

objection,whichmayhavebeenbecausetheSecretaries‐designatehadfailedto

obtainstaffadviceorbecausethePresident‐electpresentedhisviewsso

ellipticallythattheirimportdidnotsinkinimmediat ely.Hisonlychangewasto

removetheDirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgencyfromtheNationalSecurity

Council.



OncetheyhadleftKeyBiscayne,RogersandLairdquicklyreversed

themselves.PerhapsfromlongfamiliaritywiththePresident‐elect,theyinnoway

consideredNixon’sapprovalofamemorandumtobeafinaldecision.



ThefirsttobeheardfromwasLaird,whointheprocessinitiatedmetohis

patentedtechniqueofbureaucratic warfare:tothrowupasmokescreenofmajor

objectionsinwhichhewasnotreallyinterestedbutwhichreducedtheitemthat

reallyconcernedhimtosuchminorproportionsthattorefusehimwouldappear

positivelyindecent.Applyingthistactic,Lairdspokewithmeandthensubmitted

amemorandumthatidentifiedsomefundamentaldisagreementswiththe

proposednewsystem.Heobjectedtotheintelligencecommunity’slackofdirect

accesstothePresident;hefearedanNSCstaffmonopolyoftherighttoinitiate

studies;somewhatcontradictorily,heaskedforassurancesagainstsenior

officials’“goingaroundtheNSCanddirectlytothePresidentasaregular

practice.”(HischiefworryherewastopreventtheChairmanoftheJoint Chiefsof

Stafffromexercisingtooliterallyhislegalprerogativeasprincipalmilitaryadviser

tothePresident.)ButwhenImetwithLairdfordinnerattheSheraton‐Carlton

HotelinWashingtontodiscusshismemorandum,itturnedoutthathesoughtno

morethantheparticipationoftheCIADirectoratNSCmeetingsandtherightto

proposetheinitiationofstudies.Theserequestswereeasilyaccommodated.



Rogers’sobjections,however,wenttotheheartofthesystem.Rogers

foundthathisnewsubordinatesattachedextremeimportancetoState

DepartmentchairmanshipoftheSIGandtothisgroup’sfunctionasclearinghouse

forallNSCbusiness.U.AlexisJohnson,newlyappointedUnderSecretaryofState

forPoliticalAffairs,wastheprincipalchampionoftheStateDepartmentpointof

view.OneofthemostdistinguishedForeignServiceOfficers,skilled,disciplined,

prudent,andloyal,AlexJohnsonrepresentedwithgreatabilityaninstitutionthat

Igrewtoadmire—thecorpsofprofessionaldiplomatswhoserveourcountrywith

anonymityanddedication,rega rdlessofAdministration,andwhotherebyassure

thecontinuityofour foreignpolicy.ThesesamequalitiescausedAlexJohnsonto

encourageBillRogerstofighta rearguardactiontodefendthepreeminenceof

theStateDepartme nt—whichevenfiveminutes’conversationwithNixoncould

leavenodoubtthatthePresident‐electwouldnevertolerate.



OnJanuary7IwrotethePresident‐electtoexplaintheissuesindispute

withtheStateDepartment.Stateproposedthatitcontinuetobethe“executive

agent”forthePresidentforthedesignandconductofforeignpolicy.State

wantedtocontrolthestaffingoftheinterdepartmentalmachinery;italsoinsisted

ontheauthoritytoresolvedisputeswithotherdepartmentsandtherighttotake

disagreementstotheNSC.IexplainedtothePresident‐electthattheprocedures

hehadalreadyapprovedembodiedhisinstructions.TheStateDepartmentwould

befullyrepresentedinthenewNSCstructure,chairing theInterdepartmental

GroupsandparticipatingintheReviewGroupandtheNSC.Onlythefinalreview

wasunderWhiteHousechairmanshipasithadbeenintheEisenhower

Administration.ThoughIhadnotstartedwithastrongpreferenceIdidnotthink

Nixoncouldaffordtoretreaton theissue.Ifheleftitopenhewouldbeginhis

Administrationwithabitterbureaucraticdisagreement;ifhereversedhisown

KeyBiscaynedecisionhewouldencouragefurtherchallenges.



AtthispointIexperiencedforthefirsttimetwoofNixon’sdistinguishing

attributes.Nixoncouldbeverydecisive.AlmostinvariablyduringhisPresidency

hisdecisionswerecourageousandstrongandoftentakeninloneliness againstall

expertadvice.ButwhereverpossibleNixonmadethesedecisionsinsolitudeon

thebasisofmemorandaorwithafewveryintimateaides.Heabhorred

confrontingcolleagueswithwhomhedisagreedandhecould notbringhimselfto 

faceadisapprovingfriend.WilliamRogerswasboth.SuddenlyNixonwas

unavailable fordaysonend.WhenIdidseehim,hewouldassertvaguelythatthe

organizationalproblemwouldresolveitself,withoutindicatinghow,andpasson

toothermatters.ThepublicheardlittleofthenewNSCsystemthathadbeen

announcedsotriumphantlythreeweeksearlier.Inordertobringmatte rstoa

head,GeneralGoodpasterandIdraftedadirectiveandsubmitteditfor

Presidentialsignature.InbureaucrateseitwasentitledNationalSecurityDecision

Memorandum2—abbreviatedasNSDM2.[

NSDM1wasatechnicaldirectivecreating

twoseriesofPresidentialdirectives:NationalSecurityStudyMemoranda(NSSMs)andNational

SecurityDecisionMemoranda(NSDMs).]NSDM2formallyestablishedtheNSCsystem

alongthelinesNixonhadapprovedinKeyBiscayne.



ConcurrentlyIsoughttonegotiateasettlementoftheissue.Andy

Goodpaster,I,andmyassistantLarryEagleburgervisitedtheStateDepartmentto

meetwithRogersandhisUnderSecretary‐designateElliotRichardsoninthe

officesetasideforRogersduringthetransition.Goodpasterdefendedthe

directiveforcefully.Rogersfollowedabriefwhichrepeatedtheinsistencethat

StatechairtheentireNSCmachinery.RichardsonstartedoutonRogers’sside,but

eventuallyswitchedandrathereffectivelydefendedNSDM2.Richardson,I

suspect,understooditwasthePresident’spreferenceandIbelievehisprecise

lawyer’smindalsosawitssenseandsymmetry.Nixon,however,waspreparedto

acceptneitherNSDM2asdraftednorRogers’sobjections.Thereasonhadlittleto

dowithsubstance;hisbasicproblemwastactical.GivenNixon’sspecific

instructions,hisstrongviewsontheneedforanNSCsystem,andhisdeepdistrust

oftheStateDepartment,theoutcomewasscarcelyindoubt.Buthowto

implementhispreferenceswithoutgivingadirectorderwasanothermatter.

WhileeveryonehadofficesatthePierreHotelinNewYork,Nixonfo undevena

writtenorderoractionthroughanintermediary—normallyhispreferred

method—difficulttoimplement.Hethereforecontinuedtoenvelophimselfin

silenceandambiguityonthethresholdissueofourforeignpolicymachinery.



WhenNixonsecludedhimselfagaintoworkonhisInauguraladdress,the

situationchanged.Geographicdistanceprovidedthemechanismforresolvingthe

dispute.Quiteunexpectedly,IreceivedaphonecallfromHaldemaninformingme

thatthePresident‐electhaddecidedtosignNSDM2andthat anyoneopposingit

shouldsubmithisresignation.ItwasallvintageNixon:adefiniteinstruction,

followedbymaddeningambiguityandprocrastination,whichmaskedthesearch

foranindirectmeansofsolution,cappedbyasuddendecision—transmittedto

theloserbytwoconsecutiveintermediaries.ItalsoexplainswhyhisWhiteHouse

Assistantscametoplaysuchadominantrole.Theywerethebufferthatabsorbed

unwantedinterlocutors,acategoryincludinganyonewhowantedtoexpressa

disagreementfacetoface.Theytransmittedunpopularinstructions.Theybore

theweightofdepartmentalwrath.



NSDM2wassignedonJanuary19andissuedshortlyafterInaugurationon

January20.



InthelightofNixon’sfirmconvictions,theoutcomeofthisdisputewas

foreordained.Norwasitacrucialgrantofpowertometothedegreethatwas

oftenalleged.

Thisincidentwasimportantlessintermsofrealpowerthanin

appearanceandinwhatitforetoldaboutthePresident’srelationswithhis

principaladvisers.Thefactthatthecontestendedinwhatwasperceivedtobea

victoryformehelpedestablishmyauthorityearlyon.Further,itturnedouttobe

thefirstofseeminglyunendingskirmishesbetweenthePresidentandhis

SecretaryofState—allthemoregratingonbothsinceeachusuallyfound

someoneelsetoblameforthedisagreement.Itwasthefutilityofthesebattles

thatshapedinpractice,muchmorethantheorganizationchart,therelative

influenceofNixon’skeyadvisers.Andthetrueoriginofourpolicymaking

procedureslayinNixon’sdetermination—antedatingmyappointment—to

conductforeignpolicyfromtheWhiteHouse,hisdistrustoftheexisting

bureaucracy,coupledwiththecongruenceofhisphilosophyandmineandthe

relativeinexperienceofthenewSecretaryofState.



Tobesure,theorganizationmadeWhiteHousecontroleasier.Itgavemea

meanstoinvolvemyselfandmystaffinearlystagesofpolicyformulation.Though

thiswasnotenvisionedatthebeginning,italsomadepossiblethesecret

negotiationsinwhichastimewentonIwasincreasinglyinvolved.NixonandI

couldusetheinterdepartmentalmachinerytoeducateourselvesbyordering

planningpapersonnegotiationsthatasfarasthebureaucracywasconcerned

werehypothetical;thesestudiestoldustherangeofoptionsandwhatcouldfind

supportwithinthegovernment.Wewerethenabletoputdepartmentalideas

intopracticeoutsideofformalchannels.Strangeas itmayseem,Inever

negotiatedwithoutamajordepartmentalcontributionevenwhenthe

departmentsdidnotknowwhatIwasdoing.



ButinthefinalanalysistheinfluenceofaPresidentialAssistantderives

almostexclusivelyfromtheconfidenceofthePresident,notfromadministrative

arrangements.Myrolewouldalmostsurelyhavebeenroughlythesameifthe

Johnsonsystemhadbeencontinued.Propinquitycountsformuch;the

opportunitytoconferwiththePresidentseveraltimesadayisoftenofdecisive 

importance,muchmoreso thanthechairmanshipofcommitteesortherightto

presentoptions.Forreasonsthatmustbelefttostudentsofpsychology,every

PresidentsinceKennedyseemstohavetrustedhisWhiteHouseaidesmorethan

hisCabinet. Itmaybebecausetheyareevenmoredependentonhim;itmaybe

thatunencumberedbythepressuresofmanagingalargebureaucracythe

PresidentialAssistantscancatermorefullytoPresidentialwhims;itmaybeas

simpleasthepsychologicalreassuranceconferredbyproximityjustdownthe

hall.InNixon’scasetheroleoftheAssistantswasmagnifiedbytheworkhabitsof

thePresident.Nixontendedtoworkinspurts.Duringperiods whenhewithdrew

hecountedonhisassistantstocarryontheday‐to‐daydecisions;duringspasms

ofextremeactivityhereliedonhisAssistantstoscreenhismoreimpetuous

commands.Theywereneededtopreventtheface‐to‐faceconfrontationsheso

dislikedanddreaded.AndtheyweretoprotectNixonagainstimpulsiveordersor

thetendencytoagreewiththevisitorshedidreceive.Haldeman’sstaffsystem

didnot“isolate”thePresidentaswasoftenalleged;Nixoninsistedonisolating

himself;itwastheonlywayinwhichhecouldmarshalhispsychologicalresources

andhisinstructionscouldbegivensystematicreview.



Inthiscontextthecontrolofinterdepartmentalmachineryandtherightto

presentoptionsatNSCmeetingswereusefulbutnotdecisive.Theoptionswere

afterallpreparedbyinterdepartmentalcommitteesandusuallydebatedatNSC

meetingsinthepresenceofalltheprincipals,anyoneofwhom—andevenmore

devastatinglyacombinationofthem—hadtherighttoobjectifthepresentation

wasone‐sided.Andtherewasanevenmorefundamentalcheck:aPresident

wouldnoteasilyforgetafailureresultingfrominadequatepresentationofthe

issues.



Eventually,thoughnotforthefirstoneandahalfyears,Ibecamethe

principaladviser.Untiltheendof1970Iwasinfluentialbutnotdominant.From

thenon,myroleincreasedasNixonsoughttobypassthedelaysandsometimes

oppositionofthedepartments.ThefactremainsthattheNSCmachine rywas

usedmorefullybeforemyauthoritywasconfirmed,whileafterwardtactical

decisionswereincreasinglytakenoutsidethesysteminpersonalconversations

withthePresident.



<<Contents>>



****



TurningtoSubstance



nthetransitionperiod,problemsofsubstanceusuallyappearasrequestsfor

meetingsorpleasforcontinuity.Almostfromthemomentmyjobwas

announced,foreigndiplomatssoughtappointments,drivenbythenecessityto

writereportsandinordertogetaheadstartindealingwiththenew

Administration.TheoutgoingAdministrationsoughttoenlistthenewappointees

insupportofitsownpreferences.



Wehadconsiderablerespectfortheleadingmembersofthe

Administration,manyofwhomhadservedforfiveoreightyearsinWashington.

Wedidourutmosttoeasetheirtransitionintoprivatelife.Nocriticalcomment

aboutanykeyofficialoftheJohnsonAdministrationcamefromtheNixonteam

eitherbeforeoraftertheInauguration.Aneffortwasmadetotreatthemwith

courtesyandtobenefitfromtheirexperience;weregularlybriefedformer

PresidentJohnsonandsomeofhisadvisersforyearsaftertheyleftoffice.Later

on,almosteverytimeaseniorembassyopenedupitwasofferedfirsttoDean

Rusk;CyrusVancewasaskedtoundertakeasensitivemission.



Butwecouldnotcontinueforeignpolicybymomentum;wewerenot

preparedtosubmergeourdoubtsaboutsomeoftheexistingtrendsand

procedures.Inthisrespectthemostpainfulproblemwashowtodealwiththe

JohnsonAdministration’scontinuingefforttoarrangea summitmeetingbetween

theoutgoingPresidentandSovietPremierAlexeiKosygin.PresidentJohnsonhad

usedtheoccasionofsigningtheNon‐ProliferationTreatyonJulyI,1968,to

announcethatthetwogovernmentshadagreedtobegintalksonstrategicarms

limitation. AjointannouncementwasscheduledforAugust21todisclosethat

thesenegotiationswouldbelaunchedonSeptember30atasummitmeeting

betweenKosyginandJohnsoninLeningrad.Thisannouncementwasabortedby

theSovietinvasionofCzechoslovakia.



YettheJohnsonAdministrationcontinuedtopressforasummitevenafter

theinvasionofCzechoslo vakiaandevenaftertheAmericanPresidentialelection.

TheSovietUnion,foritspart,waseagerforit.TheSovietswantedtocommitthe

UnitedStatestotheprincipleofstrategicarmslimitationbeforePresidentNixon

tookoffice(theycouldthenblameNixonforanylaterdeadlockbycontrasting

himwithhispredecessor);theyalsosoughttopurgethediplomaticatmosphere

ofthestenchoftheCzechoslovakinvasion.OnNovember14,1968,aweekafter

Nixon’selection,AmbassadorDobrynintoldPresidentialAssistantWaltRostow

thathisgovernmentfeltitimportantnottolosemomentuminthemissiletalks

andthatitwasequallyimportantthatagoodatmospherebecreatedfor

ratificationoftheNon‐ProliferationTreaty.Itwouldbeagreatcontributiontothe

futureofUS‐Sovietrelations,Dobryninadded,ifPresidentJohns on wouldlaya

basisformovingrapidlywiththenextAdministration.AlthoughRostowreplied

thatthecontinuedpresenceofSoviettroopsinCzechoslovakiawasaproblem,

theconversationturnedtodiscussionofasummitmeeting.AslateasDecember

15,DefenseSecretaryClarkCliffordonthetelevisionprogram“FacetheNation”

wasstronglyurginganearlyUS‐Sovietsummitmeetingtolaunchthestrategic

armsnegotiations. 



ItwasimpossiblenottobemovedbyPresidentJohnson’seagernesstogo

downinhistoryformakingabreakthroughtowardpeaceandbeingthwartedby

fate,personality,andeventsfromrealizinghisdream.Sobrutallyvilifiedfora

Vietnampolicywhichhehadpartlyinherited,PresidentJohnsonunderstandably

wantedtoleaveofficeonanoteofhope.Nevertheless,wethoughtaSoviet‐

Americansummitduringthetransitionperiodinappropriate.Norshoulda

PresidentoftheUnitedStateshavemetwithSovietleaderswithin monthsofthe

invasionofCzechoslovakia.Theimpactofsuchagesturewouldhavebeen

devastating,especiallyinWesternEurope.Itwasparticularlyunwise foralame‐

duckAdministration.Whateverwouldbeachievedwouldhavetobecarriedout

byofficialswithnohandinnegotiatingorshapingit.TheSovietUnionwith

continuityinleadershipmightemergeastheauthoritativeinterpreterof

whateveragreementwasreached.Andanychangeofpolicythenew

Administrationmightwishtomakewouldbecriticizedasbreakingsolemn

internationalcommitmentsorwouldbecontrastedunfavorablywithits

predecessor’s.



Oneofthefirstdecisionsmadeaftermyappointmentwasannouncedon

December2,therefore,wastoheadoffasummit beforeInauguration.On

December8,Nixon’sadviserRobertEllsworth,withwhomtheSovietEmbassy

hadmaintainedcontactduringthecampaign,wasinstructedtoexplaintoSoviet

chargéd’affairesYuriN.ChernyakovthatthePresident‐electwouldnotlookwith

favoronasummitmeetingbeforeJanuary20.ImadethesamepointtoBoris