Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Americans,whetherMayflowerdescendantsorrefugeesfromthefailed

revolutionsof1848,cametoassumethatwewereimmunefromthenecessities

thatimpelledothernations.Therewas,ofcourse,alsoapragmaticandrealistic

strain.AdmiralMahan’sperceptionoftheroleofseapowerprovedthat

Americanscouldthinkprofoundlyingeopoliticalterms.Themethodsbywhichwe

acquiredthePhilippinesandthePanamaCanalprovedthatpowerpoliticswas

nottotallyneglected.Nevertheless,Americanpoliticalthoughthadcome

increasinglytoregarddiplomacywithsuspicion.Armsandallianceswere

consideredimmoralandreactionary.Negotiationsweretreatedlessasameans

ofreconcilingouridealswithourintereststhanasatraptoentangleusinthe

endlessquarrelsofamorallyquestionableworld.Ournativeinclinationfor

straightforwardness,ourinstinctforopen,noisypolitics,ourdistrustofEuropean

mannersandcontinentalelitesallbroughtaboutanincreasingimpatiencewith

thestylizedmethodsofEuropeandiplomacyandwithitstendencytoward

ambiguouscompromise.InitsdayeventhepurchaseofAlaska,whichfinally

ejectedRussiafromourcontinent,wasregardedasatoweringfollyexplicable

onlybyAmericangullibilityinthefaceofOldWorlddiplomaticmachinations.

Congresswasprevailedupononlywiththegreatestdifficultytoappropriate$7

milliontocompletethedeal.



Themythologyofforeigners’guilefulsuperiorityinthewaysofdiplomacy

wascarriedintothetwentiethcentury.WillRogerswasalwaysassuredofalaugh

whenhecracked:“Americaneverlostawarandneverwonaconference.”



ThusAmericaenteredthetwentiethcenturylargelyunprepa redforthe

partitwouldbecalledupontoplay.Forgottenwastheskilledstatecraftbywhich

theFoundingFathershadsecuredourindependence;disdainedwerethe

techniquesbywhichallnationsmustpreservetheirinterests.AsLordBryce

observedin1888inTheAmericanCommonwealth,Americahadbeensailing“on

asummersea,”butnowacloudbankwas“onthehorizonandnownolonger

distant,atimeofmistsandshadows,whereindangersmaybeconcealedwhose

formandmagnitudeshecanscarcelyconjecture.”



ThoughAmericawasnottograspitsconsequencesformanydecades,the

PaxBritannicaonwhichwehadreliedforsolongwasending.Wehaddeveloped

intotheworld’smajoreconomicpower;andwewerefastbecomingtheonly

democraticnationwithsufficientstrengthtomaintainaprecariousworld

balance.



OurentryintoWorldWarIwastheinevitableresultofourgeopolitical

interestinmaintainingfreedomoftheseasandpreventingEurope’sdomination

byahostilepower.Buttruetoourtradition,wechosetointerpretour

participationinlegalandidealistic terms.Wefoughtthewar“toendallwars”and

“tomaketheworldsafefordemocracy.”Theinevitabledisillusionwithan

imperfectoutcomeletloosethetideofisolationism.Wefellbackonour

preferenceforlawinrepeatedattemptstolegislateanendtointernational

conflict—automaticmachineryforcollectivesecurity,newdisarmamentschemes,

theKellogg‐BriandPacttobanwar.Ourrefusaltoacceptthatforeignpolicymust

startwithsecurityledusintheinterwaryearstotreatalliesasrivals,whose

armamentshadtobelimitedbecauseweaponsbydefinition contributedto

internationaltensions.Welookedforscapegoats—theso‐calledmunitions‐

makers—toexplainwhywehadeverengagedinsosordidanundertakingasthe

FirstWorldWar.Intelligenceserviceswereconsideredunworthyifnotathreatto

ourliberties.EconomicactivitywasseenastheonlydefensibleformofAmerican

involvementabroad;itsobjectiveswereeitherhumanitarian,exemplifiedbythe

reliefeffortsofHerbertHoover,oressentiallypassive:freetrade,asadvocatedby

CordellHull.



Later,whentotalitarianismwasontheriseandtheentireinternational

orderwasbeingchallenged,weclungtoourisolation,whichhadbeen

transformedfromapolicypreferenceintoamoralconviction.Wehadvirtually

abandonedthebasicprecautio nsneededforournationalsecurity.Onlywiththe

greatestdifficultycouldPresidentRoosevelttakethefirsttentativestepsagainst

themountingthreat,aidingGreatBritainbysubterfugeandrebuildingour

militarymight.TheSecondWorldWarwaswellunderwaybeforewewere

shockedoutofisolationbyasurpriseatta ckagainstAmericansoil.Buttheninour

absorptionwithtotalvictory,wespurnedthenotionthatthesecurityofthe

postwarworldmightdependonsomesortofequilibriumofpower.Wewerethus

muchsurprisedbythewar’saftermath.Thecentralfactofthepostwarperiod

wasthatthedestructionofGermanyandItalyandtheexhaustionofBritainand

FrancedrewSovietpowerintotheheartoftheEuropeancontinentandfora

whileseemedtoplaceWesternEuropeatSovietmercy.Moscow’srenewed

ideologicalhostilityincreasinglychallengedourcomfortablewartimeassumptions

aboutpostwarinternationalharmony.Andourscientistshadunleashedtheatom,

usheringinarevolutioninweaponrythatsetourageapartfromallthathadgone

before.



WhenDeanAchesonsaidhewas“presentatthecreation,”hereferrednot

onlytothecreationofourpos twarforeignpolicybuttoanewerainourown

history.Aftertwoworldwarsinthiscentury,there sponsibilitiesandtheburdens

ofworldleadershipprovedinescapable.TheUnitedStateshaddespiteitself

becometheguardianofthenewequilibrium.Itistothelastingcreditofthat

generationofAmericansthattheyassumedtheseresponsibilitieswithenergy,

imagination,andskill.ByhelpingEuroperebuild,encouragingEuropeanunity,

shapinginstitutionsofeconomiccooperation,andextendingtheprotectionofour

alliances,theysavedthepossibilitiesoffreedom.Thisburstofcreativityisoneof

thegloriousmomentsofAmericanhistory.



Yetthisperiodofexuberancewasboundtowane,ifonlybecausewe

inevitablyencounteredtheconsequencesofoursuccess.TherecoveryofEurope

andJapanrequiredadjustmentsinouralliancerelations;thedevelopingworldof

newnationswhoseindependencewehadpromotedwascertaintoclaima

greatershareofglobalprosperity.Andnothingwecouldhavedonewouldhave

preventedtheSovietUnionfromrecoveringfromthewarandassertingitsnew

power.Ourearlypostwarsuccessesdidnotequipusforanewera ofmore

complexproblems.OurearlyprogramsliketheMarshallPlanandPointFour

expressedouridealism,ourtechnologicalknow‐how,andourabilityto

overwhelmproblemswithresources.Inasensewewereapplyingthepreceptsof

ourownNewDeal,expectingpoliticalconflicttodissolveineconomicprogress.It

workedinEuropeandpartsofAsiawherepoliticalstructuresexisted;itwouldbe

lessrelevantinthescoresofnewnations.Intherelativelysimplebipolarworldof

theColdWar,weheldfastagainstpressureorblackmailinBerlin,inKorea,in

Berlinagain,andfinallyduringtheCubanmissilecrisis.Theseweresuccesses.But

inanimportantsensewehadonlybeguntoscratchthesurfaceofthelong‐term

problemofourrelationshipwiththeSovietUnioninthethermonuclearage,

whichwouldsoonproducemoreambiguouschallenges. 



Ourdeeperproblemwasconceptual.Becausepeacewasbelievedtobe 

“normal,”manyofourgreatinternationalexertionswereexpectedtobringabout 

afinalresult,restoringnormalitybyovercominganinterve ning obstacle.The

programsforEuropeaneconomicrecoverywereexpectedtobringlasting

prosperity.Exertionstoensuresecuritywereaimedataconclusivesettlement

withtheSovietUnion.Thiswasimplicitintheconceptof“containment”that

expressedourpostwarpolicytowardtheSovietUnion.



AccordingtoGeorgeKennan’sfamous“X”articleinForeignAffairsin1947,

ourtaskwastoresistSovietprobeswithcounterforce,patientlyawaitingthe

mellowingoftheSovietsystem.AsappliedinthediplomacyofDeanAchesonand

tosomeextentJohnFosterDulles,weweretomarktimeuntilwebuiltthe

strengthtocontainSovietaggression—especiallytheassaultonCentralEurope,

whichpreoccupiedourstrategicthinking.Aftercontainme nthadbeenachieved,

diplomacywouldtakeover.“Whatwemustdo,”saidSecretaryofStateAcheson,

“istocreatesituationsofstrength;wemustbuildstrengthandifwecreatethat

strengththenIthinkthewholesituationintheworldbeginstochange…withthat

changetherecomesadifferenceinthenegotiatingpositionsofthevarious

parties,andoutofthatIshouldhopethattherewouldbeawillingnessonthe

partoftheKremlintorecognizethefacts…”



Thisdefinitionofcontainmenttreatedpoweranddiplomacyastwodist inct

elementsorphasesofpolicy.Itaimedatanultimatenegotiationbutsuppliedno

guidetothecontentofthosenegotiations.Itimpliedthatstrengthwasself‐

evidentandthatoncenegotiationsstartedtheircontentwouldalsobeself‐

evident.Itdidnotanswerthequestionofhowthesituationofstrengthwastobe

demonstratedintheabsenceofadirectattackonusoronourallies.Nordidit

makeclearwhatwouldhappenafterwehadachievedapositionofstrengthifour

adversary,insteadofnegotiating,concentratedonerodingitorturningourflank.



Thispolicyofcontainmentwasflawedinthreeways.First,ourexcessively

militaryconceptionofthebalanceofpower—anditscorollary,thepolicyof

deferringnegotiationsforapostwarsettlement—paradoxicallygavetheSoviet

Uniontimetoconsolidateitsconquestsandtoredressthenuclearimbalance.To

besure,intheimmediatepostwarperiodthemassiveSovietarmiesinCentral

Europeweremuchlargerthantheforcesarrayedagainstthem;WesternEurope

wasprostrateandtheUnitedStateswasdemobilized.Buttherealstrengthofthe

SovietUnionwasbutafractionofourown.TheSovietUnionhadbeenexhausted

byfouryearsofwarand20millioncasualties.Wehadanatomicmonopolyand

fortwentyyearsavastnuclearsuperiority.Ourrelativestrengthwasnever

greaterthanatthebeginningofwhatsooncametobecalledtheColdWar.



Secondly,thenatureofmilitarytechnologywassuchthatthebalanceof

powercouldnolongerbethoughtofasuniform.Nuclearweaponswereso

cataclysmicthatasthearsenalsgrewtheyprovedlessandlessusefulto repel

everyconceivableaggression.Forawhilethisrealitywasobscuredbyournuclear

monopolyandlaterbyournumericalpreponderance.Butthepointwasinevitably

reachedwhentechnologyenabledtheKremlintoposerisksthatreducedthe

credibilityofthethreatofnuclearretaliation.Fromthenon,managingthe

militarybalanceofpowerrequiredvigilanceontwolevels:beingstrongenough

notonlystrategicallywithnuclearpowerbutalsolocallywithconventionalarms.

Formaldeclarationsoftheunimpairedsincerityofournuclearguaranteewould

notremovethefactofnucleardeadlockandtheconsequentrequirementfor

alternativeregionaldefenses.Yeteverydecadehashadtorelearntheessential

dualityofourburden.



Thirdly,ourdoctrineofcontainmentcouldneverbeanadequateresponse

tothemodernimpactofCommunistideology,whichtransformsrelations

betweenstatesintoconflictsbetweenphilosophies andposeschallengestothe

balanceofpowerthroughdomesticupheavals.



Inshort,weneverfullyunderstoodthatwhileourabsolutepowerwas

growing,ourrelativepositionwasboundtodeclineastheUSSRrecoveredfrom

WorldWarII.Ourmilitaryanddiplo maticpositionwasnevermorefavorablethan

attheverybeginningofthecontainmentpolicyinthelate1940s.Thatwasthe

timetoattemptaseriousdiscussiononthefutureofEurope.Welostour

opportunity.



Infact,Iaminclinedtodoubt thatStalinoriginallyexpectedtolockallof

EasternEuropeintohissatelliteorbit;hisfirstpostwarsteps—suchaspermitting

freeelectionsinPoland,Czechoslovak ia,andHungary,allofwhichthe

Communistslost—suggestthathemighthavebeenpreparedtosettlefortheir

havingastatussimilartoFinland’s.Unexpectedly,wedeferredserious

negotiationsuntilwehadmobilizedmoreofourpotentialstrength.Thuswegave

theSovietUniontime—themostpreciouscommodityitneededtoconsolidateits

conquestsandtorecoverfromthewar.



Assooftenbefore,WinstonChurchillunderstoodthisbest.Inamuch

neglectedspeechinOctober1948,duringhisperiodoutofoffice,hesaid:



Thequestionisasked:Whatwillhappenwhentheygettheatomicbombthemselves

andhaveaccumulatedalargestore?Youcanjudgeyourselveswhatwillhappenthenbywhat

ishappeningnow.Ifthesethingsaredoneinthegreenwood,whatwillbedoneinthedry?If

theycancontinuemonthaftermonthdisturbingandtormentingtheworld,trustingtoour

Christianandaltruisticinhibitionsagainstusingthisstrangenewpoweragainstthem,whatwill

theydowhentheythemselveshavelargequantitiesofatomicbombs?…Nooneinhissenses

canbelievethatwehavealimitlessperiodoftimebeforeus.Weoughttobringmatterstoa

headandmakeafinalsettlement.Weoughtnottogojoggingalongimprovident,incompetent,

waitingforsomethingtoturnup,bywhichImeanwaitingforsomethingbadforustoturnup.

TheWesternNationswillbefarmorelikelytoreachalastingsettlement,withoutbloodshed,if

theyformulatetheirjustdemandswhiletheyhavetheatomicpowerandbeforetheRussian

Communistshavegotittoo.



SoithappenedthatthetwowarsinwhichAmericaengagedafter1945—in

KoreaandVietnam—didnotcorrespondtoanyofourpoliticalorstrategic

expectations.KoreawasawarnotinitiatedbyanattackontheUnitedStatesor

ourmajorallies.ItwasnotaimedattheheartlandofEurope. Nordiditdirectly

involvetheUSSR.Littlewonderthatthoserespo nsibleinWashingtonsawinita

strategicdiversiontodrawusinto AsiawhiletheSovietUnionpreparedan

onslaughtinEurope. Ourconductofthewarwas,therefore,tentative.Our

objectivesfluctuatedwiththemilitarysituation.Atvarioustimesouraimwas

declaredtoberepellingaggression,theunificationofKorea,thesecurityofour

forces,oraguaranteedarmisticetoratifythemilitarystalemate.



Ourperceptionofpoweranddiplomacyasdistinctandsuccessivephases

offoreignpolicypreventedusfromnegotiatingtosettletheKoreanWarafterthe

landingatInchonwhenwewereinthestrongestmilitaryposition;ittemptedus

toescalateouraims.Ayearlateritalsocausedustostopmilitaryoperations

exceptofapurelydefensivenaturethemomentnegotiationsgotunderway,thus

removingtheenemy’smajorincentiveforarapiddiplomaticsettlement.We

actedasiftheprocessofnegotiationsoperatedonitsowninherentlogic

independentofthemilitarybalance—indeed,thatmilitarypressuresmight

jeopardizethenegotiationsbyantagonizingouradversaryordemonstratingbad

faith.Notsurprisingly,astalemateofnearlytwoyears’durationfollowed,during

whichourcasualtiesequaledthosewehadenduredwhenhostilitieswere

unconstrained.Treatingforceanddiplomacyasdiscretephenomenacausedour

powertolackpurposeandournegotiationstolackforce.



Theresultwasdomesticconvulsionthatrepresentedthefirstbreachinthe

newnationalconsensusonforeignpolicy:theconflictbetweenGeneralDouglas

MacArthurandthecivilianandmilitaryleadershipinWashington.MacArthur

advocatedvictoryintheFarEast.Hiscriticsargued,amongotherthings,thatwe

hadtoconserveourstrengthforapossiblyimminentall‐outtestwiththeSoviet

Union,probablyinEurope.MacArthurobjectedtohisdirectivesbecausethey

seemedtohimtooconfiningintermsofourtraditionalconceptofwar;tothe

politicalleadership,ontheotherhand,Koreawasastrategicdiversion:Itwastoo

bigawarintermsofWashington’s perceptionofEuropeasthedecisivearena.



GiventhethreatthegrowingSovietnucleararsenalwouldsoonpose,itis

possibletodoubtthepremisesthattimewasonoursideorthatwehadmoreto

losefromanall‐outwarthantheSovietUnion.Theparadoxweneversolvedwas

thatwehadenteredtheKoreanWarbecausewewereafraidthattofailtodoso

wouldproduceamuchgraverdangertoEuropeinthenearfuture.Butthenthe

veryreluctancetofaceanall‐outonslaughtonEuropeseverelycircumscribedthe

riskswewerepreparedtoruntoprevailinKorea.Theresultingdeadlocksapped

ourdomesticcohesionandcontributedtotheassaultonourlibertiesintheform

ofMcCarthyism.



TenyearslaterweencounteredthesamedilemmasinVietnam.Oncemore

webecameinvolvedbecauseweconsideredthewarfareinIndochinathe

manifestationofacoordinatedglobalCommuniststrategy.Againwesoughtto

limitourrisksbecausetheveryglobalchallengeofwhichIndochinaseemedtobe

apartalsomadeVietnamappearasanunprofitableplaceforashowdo wn.At

everystagewesoughttokeepourrisksbelowthelevelwhich inourestimate

wouldtriggerChineseorSovietintervention. Inshort,ourperceptionofthe

globalchallengeatthesametimetemptedusintodistantenterprisesand

preventedusfrommeetingthemconclusively.Onceagain,awarthatwehad

enteredwithgreatpublicsupportturnedintoafrustratingstalematethat

graduallyforfeitedpublicacceptance.



By1969,thewarinVietnamhadbecomeanationalnightmarethat

stimulatedanattackonourentirepostwarforeignpolicy.Thehithertoalmost

unanimousconvictionthattheColdWarhadbeencausedbySovietintransigence

waschallengedbyavocalandattimesviolentminoritywhichbegantoinsistit

wasAmericanbellicosity,Americanmilitarism,andAmericaneconomic

imperialismthatweretherootcausesofinternationaltensions.Thishome‐grown

radicalismneverhadmanytrueadherents;itcollapsedinstantaneouslyoncewe

leftVietnam.Whatisstrikingisnotsomuchitstemporaryappealasitsshattering

effectindemoralizingtheverygroupsthatmighthavebeenexpectedtodefend

thepremisesandaccomplishmentsofourpostwarpolicy. Theinternationalist

Establishment,whichhadbeenresponsibleforthegreatachievementsofour

foreignpolicy,collapsedbeforetheonslaughtofitschildrenwhoquestionedall

itsvalues.



ThenewNixonAdministrationwasthefirstofthepostwargenerationthat

hadtoconductforeignpolicywithoutthenationalconsensusthathadsustained

itspredecessorslargelysince1947.Andourtaskwasifanythingmorecomplex. 

Wefacednotonlythedislocationsofawarbuttheneedtoarticulate anew

foreignpolicyforanewera.SoonerorlatertheVietnamwarwouldend.What

weretheglobalchallengeswefaced?Whatwereourgoalsintheworld?Could

weshapeanewconsensusthatcouldreconcileouridealismandour

responsibilities,oursecurityandourvalues,ourdreamsandourpossibilities?



<<Contents>>



****



ProblemsofaNewEquilibrium



venasweenteredoffice,itwasclearthattheagonyofVietnamthreateneda

newdisillusionmentwithinternationalaffairsthatcoulddrawAmericainward

tonurseitswoundsandrenounceitsworldleadership.Thiswouldbeaprofound

tragedy,farmoregrievousthanthetragedyofVietnamitself.Wewouldbeback

toourhistoricalcycleofexuberantoverextensionandsulkingisolationism.And

thistimewewouldbeforsakingaworldfarmorecomplex,moredangerous,

moredependentuponAmerica’sleadershipthantheworldofthe1930s.

ThereforetheNixonAdministrationsawitasitstasktolaythefoundationfora

long‐rangeAmericanforeignpolicy,evenwhileliquidatingourIndochina

involvement.Crisismanagement,theacademicfocusoftheSixties,wasnolonger

enough.Crisesweresymptomsofdeeperproblemswhichifallowedtofester

wouldproveincreasinglyunmanageable.Moralexuberancehadinspiredboth

overinvolvementandisolationism.Itwasmyconvictionthataconceptofour

fundamentalnationalinterestswouldprovideaballastofrestraintandanassur‐

anceofcontinuity.Ouridealismhadtobenotanexcuseforirresponsibilitybuta

sourceofcourage,stamina,self‐confidence,anddirection.Onlyinthismanner

wouldwebeabletoshapeanemerginginternationalsystemthatwas

unprecedentedinitsperils,itspromise,anditsglobalnature.



SincewewerebesetbyamalaisedeeperthanVietnam,itssolutionwas

lessamatterofexpertisethanofphilosophy.Inanessaypublishedafewweeks

beforethe1968election,whenIhadnoinklingthatIwouldbeaskedtoputmy

ideastothetest,Iwrote:



Thecontemporaryunrestisnodoubtexploitedbysomewhosepurposesarealltoo

clear.Butthatitistheretoexploitisproofofaprofounddissatisfactionwiththemerely

managerialandconsumer‐orientedqualitiesofthemodernstateandwithaworldwhichseems

togeneratecrisesbyinertia.Themodernbureaucraticstate,forallitspanoplyofstrength,

oftenfindsitselfshakentoitsfoundationsbyseeminglytrivialcauses.Itsbrittlenessandthe

world‐widerevolutionofyouth—especiallyinadvancedcountriesandamongtherelatively

affluent—suggestaspiritualvoid,analmostmetaphysicalboredomwithapolitical

environmentthatincreasinglyemphasizesbureaucraticchallengesandisdedicatedtono

deeperpurposethanmaterialcomfort…



Inthebestofcircumstances,thenextadministrationwillbebesetbycrises.Inalmost

everyareaoftheworld,wehavebeenlivingoffcapital—wardingofftheimmediate,rarely

dealingwithunderlyingproblems.Thesedifficultiesarelikelytomultiplywhenitbecomes

apparentthatoneofthelegaciesofthewarinVietnamwillbeastrongAmericanreluctanceto

riskoverseasinvolvements.



Anewadministrationhastherighttoaskforcompassionandunderstandingfromthe

Americanpeople.Butitmustfounditsclaimnotonpattechnicalanswerstodifficultissues;it

mustaboveallasktherightquestions.Itmustrecognizethat,inthefieldofforeignpolicy,we

willneverbeabletocontributetobuildingastableandcreativeworldorderunlesswefirst

formsomeconceptionofit.



Themostominouschangethatmarkedourperiodwasthetransformation

inthenatureofpower.Untilthebeginningofthenuclearageitwouldhavebeen

inconceivablethatacountrycouldpossesstoomuchmilitarystrengthfor

effectivepoliticaluse;everyadditionofpowerwas—atleasttheoretically—

politicallyuseful.Thenuclearagedestroyedthistraditionalmeasure.Acountry

mightbestrongenoughtodestroyanadversaryandyetnolongerbeableto

protectitsownpopulationagainstattack.Byanironyofhistoryagargantuan

increaseinpowerhaderodedtherelationshipofpowertopolicy.Henceforth,the

majornuclearpowerswouldbeabletodevastateoneanother.Buttheywould

alsohavegreatdifficultyinbringingtheirpowertobearontheissuesmostlikely

toarise.Theymightbeabletodeterdirectchallengestotheirownsurvival;they

couldnotnecessarilyusethispowertoimposetheirwill.Thecapacitytodestroy

proveddifficulttotranslateintoa plausiblethreatevenagainstcountrieswithno

capacityforretaliation.Themarginofthesuperpowersovernon‐nuclearstates

hadbeenwidening; yettheawesomenessoftheirpowerhadincreasedtheir

inhibitions.Aspowerhadgrownmoreawesome,ithadalsoturnedabstract,

intangible,elusive.



Themilitarypolicyweadoptedwasdeterrence.Butdeterrenceisa

psychologicalphenomenon.Itdependsaboveallonwhata potentialaggressor

considersanunacceptablerisk.Inthenuclearageablufftakenseriouslyisuseful;

aseriousthreattakenasabluffmayprovedisastrous.Thelongerdeterrence

succeeds,themoredifficultitistodemonstratewhatmadeitwork.Waspeace

maintainedbytheriskofwar,orbecausetheadversaryneverintended

aggressioninthefirstplace?Itisnoaccidentthatpeacemovementshave

multipliedthelongerpeacehasbeenmaintained.Butifdeterrenceiseffectual,

thenwedismantletheforcesthatsustainitonlyatourgraveperil.



Nuclearweaponshavecompoundedthepoliticalrigidityofatwo‐power

world.Theguardians oftheequilibriumofthenineteenthcenturywereprepared

toadjustittochangesinthestructureofpower.Thepolicymakersofthe

superpowersinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyhavemuchless

confidenceintheabilityoftheequilibriumtorightitselfafterdisturbance.The

“balance”betweenthesuperpowershasbecomebothprecariousandinflexible.

Astheworldhasgrownbipolar,ithasalsolosttheperspectiv efornuance;again

foronesideappearsasanabsolutelossfortheother.Everyissueseemstobear

onthequestionofsurvival.Diplomacyturnsrigid;relationsareinherentlywary.



Atthesametime,strangelyenough,militarybipolarityhasencouraged,and

notdiminished,theglobaldiffusionofpoliticalpower.Smallercountriesaretorn

betweenadesireforprotectionandawishtoescapebig‐powerdominance.To