Thetugofwaroverresponsibilityforpolicyemergedearly.Forhispart,
SecretaryRogerstookthepositionthathewouldcarryoutorderswithwhichhe
disagreedonlyiftheyweretransmittedpersonallybythePresident.Thiswasthe
onethingNixonwaspsychologicallyincapableofdoing.Hewouldresorttoany
subterfugetoavoidapersonalconfrontation.Hewouldsendlettersexplaining
whathemeant;hewoulduseemissaries.ButsinceRogersbelieved—quite
correctly—thattheselettersweredraftedbymeormystaff,hedidnotgivethem
fullcredenceeventhoughtheyweresignedbythePresident.Hefrustratedthe
emissary,usuallyJohnMitchell,byinvokinghisoldfriendshipwiththePresident
andclaimingthatheunderstoodNixonbetter.Thiscontest,whichwaspartially
obscuredbecausebothmenblameditonthirdparties,wasunending.Nixon
wouldrepeatedlyorderthatalloutgoingpolicycablesweretobeclearedinthe
WhiteHouse.Butthiswasfrequentlycircumvented,andinanyevent,themeans
bywhichaSecretaryofStatecancommunicatewithhissubordinatesaretoo
manifoldtobecontrolledbyfiat.
Astimewentby,thePresident,orIonhisbehalf,inordertoavoidthese
endlessconfrontations, cametodealincreasinglywithkeyforeignleaders
throughchannelsthatdirectlylinkedtheWhiteHouseSituationRoomtothefield
withoutgoingthroughtheStateDepartment—theso‐calledbackchannels.This
processstartedonthedayafterInauguration.ThenewPresidentwantedto
changethenegotiatinginstructionsonVietnamdraftedatStatethatreflectedthe
approachofthepreviousAdministration.Buthewishedalsotoavoida
controversy.Hethereforeaskedmetophone AmbassadorHenryCabotLodge,
ournegotiatorinParis,tosuggestthatLodgesendinthroughregularchannels,as
hisownrecommendation,thecourseofactionthatthePresidentpreferred.
Lodgereadilyagreed.Sincesuchprocedureswerecomplicatedandcouldnot
workinmostcases,Nixonincreasinglymovedsensitivenegotiationsintothe
WhiteHousewherehecouldsupervisethemdirectly,getthecreditpersonally,
andavoidthebureaucraticdisputesorinertiathathefoundsodistasteful.
NorwasthePresidentabovedissociatinghimselffromStateDepartment
foreignpolicyventures.ThusinMarch1969Nixonaskedmetoinform
AmbassadorDobryninprivatelythattheSecretaryofStateinhisfirstlengthytalk
onVietnamwiththeSovietenvoyhadgonebeyondthePresident’sthinking.Idid
notdosoatonce,waitingratherforsomeconcreteissuetocomeup.Therecan
benodoubt,however,thattheconductofboththeWhiteHouseandtheState