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and indirect financial transfers under the CAP, for instance the Netherlands, Denmark and
Ireland; and (c) the labyrinthine policy-making process of the EU, its numerous ‘checks
and balances’ favouring incremental adjustments to the status quo rather than radical reform.
Thus the founding principles of the CAP were continued into the mid-1980s, including
maintaining common guaranteed prices above international market levels, intervention
buying of the main farm products, protection by variable levies against imports from non-
EU producers, and common funding. Running in parallel with price policies were measures
designed to raise the efficiency of farming. EU Regulations 17/64, 355/77 and 1932/84, for
example, offered grant aid to improve agricultural marketing and processing, while Directives
72/159, 72/160 and 72/161 sought to further modernise individual farm businesses, pay
early retirement pensions and provide socio-economic guidance and agricultural training to
farmers. Like their counterparts in the other member states, UK farmers responded by
increasing their output of production per hectare of farmland, particularly milk, wheat and
oilseed rape. By the early 1980s, however, the financial burden of agricultural support on
the member states had become so great as to threaten the very existence of the EU.
Consequently, during the 1980s, price support levels for all farm products were allowed to
fall in real terms by between 2 and 5 per cent each year, while expenditure from the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was capped by a series of measures,
including co-responsibility levies, production quotas and maximum guaranteed quantities
(stabilisers).
The financial crisis facing the EU formed part of the context for a reregulation of
agriculture under the third food regime. In a broader context, however, reregulation should
be interpreted as a renegotiation of the relationship between the state and agriculture, not
just in the EU but internationally. Three arenas of renegotiation can be identified in a process
more accurately termed the ‘reregulation’ rather than ‘deregulation’ of agriculture: state
intervention in the market, agri-environmental relations and food quality/safety.
State intervention in the market
On the first arena, the member states of the EU are attempting to reduce their level of
intervention in the market for agricultural produce so as to: (a) reduce the output of ‘surplus’
farm products; (b) reduce the financial cost to the EAGGF of ‘productionist’ support policies;
and (c) open the market of the EU to global competition. The need to reduce, or at least limit
the increase in production of farm products underpinned a 1992 package of CAP measures,
commonly known as the ‘MacSharry reforms’ after the incumbent EU Commissioner for
Agriculture. These reforms cut the support prices of cereals by 29 per cent and beef by 15
per cent over three years, placed individual farm quotas on subsidies in the beef and sheep
sectors, reduced the price support on milk by 5 per cent but extended the time limit on the
1984 milk quota scheme, introduced area-based direct income payments for arable crops
(the Arable Area Payments Scheme in the UK—AAPs), made set-aside of arable land
compulsory for the receipt of the AAPs (cross-compliance) and introduced ‘accompanying
measures’ for the afforestation of farmland and early farmer retirement. In sum, an attempt
was made through direct income aids to decouple the link between farm incomes and the
volume of food produced. In practice intervention stocks and their associated costs have
fallen, while the burden of farm support has been shifted from consumers to taxpayers but
with little impact on the overall cost of the CAP.