Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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114 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Bissolati in particular was in a stronger position. Having entered Paolo Boselli's

cabinet, he unleashed a press polemic when in September he suggested that he

had joined the government partly in order to encourage an Italian±Yugoslav

agreement. A month later at Cremona, speaking in honour of Battisti who had

been captured and executed by the Austrians, he became the first `Entente'

statesman to propose publicly that Austria's destruction should be a war aim

(`the hydraheaded monster must be slain'). These statements greatly encour-

aged Czech

and Yugoslav e

migre

s, but they were always dampened by the

official Sonnino line. On 5 December 1916, when Boselli suggested in Parlia-

ment that

Yugoslav propaganda was largely the work of the enemy, he was still

able to carry most of the deputies with him.

It was the case, as we will see, that some of the Italian military were already

out of step with Sonnino with respect to the nationality principle and were

ploughing their own furrow. But the Consulta, through its negative attitude to

the Austro-Hungarian e

migre

movements, was able for a long time to obstruct

the e

migre

s' effective participation in Italy's war. It did so by ignoring their

organizations and refusing to recognize Austrian prisoners in Italy as anything

other than enemy prisoners of war. Naturally, out of the best-organized e

migre

movements in the West ± the Czechs and the Yugoslavs ± it was the Yugoslavs

who had the steepest path to tread in Italy. Since most South Slav e

migre

s who

had fled from Austria to Italy in the first months of the war hailed from

Dalmatia or Istria, lands coveted by Italy in the Treaty of London, it was not

surprising that official Italy was extremely wary and questioned their integrity.

Indeed, under pressure from hostile public opinion, the e

migre

s in April 1915

were forced to leave Rome for Paris where they officially founded the Yugoslav

Committee ( Jugoslavenski Odbor) under the presidency of the dry Dalmatian

lawyer, Ante Trumbic

; not until April 1918 would they be allowed any official

representative in Italy. Their struggle for recognition during the war, moreover,

was further complicated by their relations with the Serbian government of

Nikola Pas

. This was clear from the beginning. When in early 1915 Trumbic

had pressed Pas

to found a special Adriatic legion on Serbian soil, composed of

southern Slav volunteers from the Habsburg lands, he received no response, a

sign already that Pas

's agenda for Serbian expansion up to the Adriatic did not

envisage competition with any other `Yugoslav' body.

In this way, the Yugoslav Committee, caught in the cross-fire between Italian

and Serbian suspicions, was doubly obstructed in its quest for Entente recogni-

tion as

the official representative of Austria-Hungary's South Slavs. It could also

hardly expect to be allowed access to men of southern Slav nationality in Italy's

prison camps.

After a few years of war these numbered at least 20 000 men and

officers (about 16 per cent of Italy's prisoners), who were usually mixed up with

prisoners of other nationalities, since only deserters were separated and dis-

patched to

a special camp at Bibbiena. The Italian authorities would only

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 115

release Austrian prisoners who were ethnically Italian and could prove their

`political reliability'. In all other cases, Sonnino took a very firm line. His

standard argument, repeated until the end of the war, was that it was against

international law (the Hague Convention of 1907) for prisoners of war to be

used for `military purposes' against their former army, and that to do so would

provoke reprisals by the Austrians against Italian prisoners. A more substan-

tial reason,

of course, was Sonnino's aversion to undermining the Habsburg

Empire by rewarding `treasonable conduct' and, most importantly, his refusal

to countenance any Yugoslav recognition which might undermine the Treaty

of London. He would never allow southern Slav prisoners to be organized into

combatant units as in Russia.

Sonnino's priorities were revealed, and the whole issue was complicated,

when from early 1916 the Serbian government, now on Corfu, began to peti-

tion Rome

to release `Yugoslav' prisoners and permit them to join the depleted

Serbian forces in the Macedonian theatre. If some of these Yugoslavs had

reached Italy's prison camps via the Italian Front, many others, about 8000,

were ex-prisoners of the Serbians who had been evacuated to Italy from Albania

after the Central Powers occupied Serbia in the winter of 1915±16. In June, Pas

approached Sonnino, cunningly linking his request for Yugoslav prisoners to

Italy's own desire to acquire ethnically Italian prisoners from Russia; in turn,

the French and Russian military and their governments made repeated requests

on Serbia's behalf. But Sonnino, constantly alluding to the `moral' and `inter-

national' implications,

would only agree to release individual prisoners at

regular intervals. Not even this properly materialized. Although the Entente

governments, for example at their Petrograd conference in February 1917,

might press Italy to permit Serbian recruiting in the prison camps so as to

strengthen the Serbian army in morale and numbers, the Italians were deaf

to all such requests. By June 1917 only 140 prisoners had been released and sent

to Salonika. All of them were Serbs from Bosnia or Vojvodina: in other words,

none were prisoners whose origin lay in territory upon which Italy had preten-

sions. Sonnino

in any case far preferred to retain all prisoners in Italy and use

them to Italy's own advantage, even as `labour units' in the war zone although

this could well be interpreted as work for `military purposes'. As a result, by the

time of Caporetto, Serbia had made little progress. Conscious that the Italians

might now be more receptive, Pas

when in Paris in November 1917 felt bound

to petition the allies once again, reminding them how

at this

moment when the Central Powers are using all possible methods to

strengthen themselves, both by recruiting in occupied territory and stimu-

lating anarchical

parties in enemy lands, it would be a mistake for the

Entente powers not to make good use of all those elements who are willing

to help us fight against the Central Powers.

116 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

A few weeks later in Rome, Pas

personally gave a memorandum to Sonnino

which summed up the benefits of freeing Yugoslav prisoners: `Liberating them

would certainly influence many Austrian soldiers of Slav nationalities to sur-

render on

first contact with the Italian army, as soon as they were assured that

Italy would permit them to fight against their eternal enemy.'

Sonnino in

reply brought up the old argument of Austrian reprisals, and then proceeded

to ignore the Serbian requests.

Since the

Consulta opposed all moves which hinted at Yugoslav recognition

of any kind, it was only the Czech e

migre

s who were able to forge a path in Italy

during 1917. Thereby they pushed the Italians towards `nationality politics'

and benefited the Yugoslav cause in the long run. In January 1917, when the

Entente had made their first statement of war aims to the American President,

they had, due to Sonnino's sensitivity, omitted any mention of the Yugoslavs;

but for the first time they had raised the Czechoslovak cause as an international

issue by proposing to liberate the `Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination'.

The inclusion of this phrase was a personal success for Edvard Benes

, secretary

of the Czechoslovak National Council based in Paris. Having persistently urged

the Quai d'Orsay in this direction, he only discovered that he had been success-

ful on

10 January when he was on a train, approaching Rome for the first time

in his life; it was, as he noted later, `a marvellous introduction to the eternal

city'.

Benes

's main official Italian contact before this time had been Nicola

Brancaccio, head of Italian military Intelligence in Paris. Brancaccio had taken a

personal interest in the Czech cause after talking to Benes

's Slovak colleague,

Milan S

tefa

nik, in the winter of 1915 and he had subsequently, as we will see,

facilitated some preliminary Czech propaganda on the Italian Front.

By the

summer of 1916, Benes

was feeding to Brancaccio intelligence from his Mafie

contacts in Bohemia; and Brancaccio in turn appears to have been a prime

mover, urging Benes

to visit Italy and advance the Czech cause there in a way

already evident in France and Russia.

Before this

visit, Czech agitation in Italy had largely been in the hands of a

few Czech individuals who had escaped internment: Oskar Bra

zda, a painter,

who had been first to inform the Czech National Council about Italy; Bohumõ

Chytil, who had translated Lu

tzow's

short history of Bohemia into Italian; but

especially Karel Vesely

, director of a sugar refinery, who had lived in the

country for many years and was foremost in trying to publicize the Czechs in

the Italian press. The Italian response was commensurably small but growing.

Apart from Salvemini and his intellectual circle, the Czech cause was gradually

able to arouse interest even among some fervent anti-Yugoslav nationalists

such as Sonnino's nephew, Colonna di Cesaro

, who in April 1916 had suggested

to Parliament that an independent Bohemia was vital as a barrier to German

expansion.

As for the government, even Sonnino, despite the implications,

had felt able to express privately some sympathy to S

tefa

nik when he passed

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 117

through Rome in mid-1916; while Leonida Bissolati, on entering the cabinet,

had found a real ally in the person of the leading republican Ubaldo Coman-

dini, a

minister without portfolio but entrusted with keeping an eye on Aus-

tria's activities abroad. In the summer of 1916, Comandini's secretary, Gino

Scarpa, had met Benes

in Paris and then arranged greater access for Vesely

to the

Italian press.

Publicity at this time was everything, for the Czech cause in Italy

had no official recognition. Czech and Slovak prisoners of war remained mixed

with other Austrian prisoners in diverse locations, their efforts to contact the

migre

leadership usually thwarted by vigilant camp commanders or the Italian

censor.

In January

1917 when Benes

arrived in Rome at the invitation of Com-

andini's ministry, he was able to capitalize on the Entente's statement of

war aims.

He established, through Comandini's good offices (and with the

approval of the Consulta), a Czech press bureau which would have direct links

to the government and be run by Karel Vesely

. One of Vesely

's prime tasks would

still be publicity, for example, publishing and distributing copies of Lu

tzow's

history as well as an Italian version of Benes

's own book, De

truisez l'Autriche

(translated by Vesely

himself as La Boemia contro l'Austria-Ungheria). But the

bureau would gain valuable support from a new network of contacts. Benes

had

not only made some tentative approaches to the Consulta (visiting Giacomo

De Martino, its general secretary); he had sought out some of Salvemini's

circle, for example the liberal economist Antonio De Viti de Marco, a co-editor

of L'Unita

, and the writer Umberto Zanotti-Bianco, who in 1918 would be

closely involved with front propaganda. With Scarpa's help, Benes

also founded

an `Italian Committee for Czechoslovak Independence', and even gingerly

courted the nationalist propaganda group, Dante Alighieri, trying to persuade

them that hostility to the Habsburgs should mean friendship towards the

Yugoslavs. Benes

returned to Paris, bubbling with optimism that he had been

received in Italy like the representative of an independent nation.

Certainly,

his visit was to prove a watershed in Italy's official stance towards Austria-

Hungary. Most importantly, perhaps, as far as future front propaganda was

concerned, Benes

had secured guarantees that Czech and Slovak prisoners of

war would be separated and could be contacted and visited by the Czech

migre

s. It was at this very time that a group of Czech prisoners, headed by a

deserter Jan C

apek,

spontaneously created a `Czech volunteer corps' in the

southern camp of Santa Maria Capua Vetere. Their numbers swelled from 200

to 450 by the end of April, by which time they had been visited by Miroslav

Plesinger-Boz

inov, head of the Czech bureau in Switzerland. Finally, in July

1917 the Italians began to concentrate them and other `Czechoslovak' prison-

ers in

a new camp at Padula near Salerno.

When Benes

returned to Italy in late August 1917 he found that the public

mood had significantly changed. One of the most prominent converts by this

118 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

time to the nationality principle was Senator Luigi Albertini, editor of Italy's

most influential newspaper, the Corriere della Sera. Whereas in late 1916 the

Corriere della Sera could be described as `Slavophobe' by Salvemini,

by the

following summer it was at the forefront of those who were urging Italy to

rethink its attitude towards the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire. Albertini

was increasingly aware that unless Italy changed its policy, it might not emerge

with any gains or influence after the war. This was a danger because of a

number of developments. In January 1917, the Entente powers had signalled

their growing commitment to `nationality politics'; in March, the United

States, which had not signed the Treaty of London, had entered the war;

and in July, the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government in a `Corfu

Declaration' had at last expressed outward solidarity by calling for an indepen-

dent Yugoslav

state. For all of these reasons, Sonnino's foreign policy seemed

far less secure. Albertini, from his editorial position, was fully conscious of

Italy's `imperialist' image abroad, its low-standing in the eyes of the western

Allies, and this undoubtedly did much to persuade him that Italy could not be

allowed to fall too far out of step with them. Indeed, one Italian historian has

even suggested that Albertini's conversion to the nationality principle was not

sincere, but `only a convenient expression exhibited to throw smoke in the eyes

of the Allies'.

In fact, Albertini's behaviour was as much practical as tactical.

Although he would never share Salvemini's ideological commitment to the

Czechs or Yugoslavs, he realized, partly as a logical consequence of Sonnino's

isolation, that Italy must moderate its aspirations and renounce Dalmatia if it

was to emerge from the war with any influence. Since Entente policy seemed to

be moving in the direction of Austria-Hungary's destruction, it was vital for

Italy to be a key player among the ruins of the Monarchy.

At the same time,

Albertini was naturally aware that with the stone of `nationality politics' one

could kill two birds: as well as restoring Italy's reputation and influence,

the weapon could in itself produce the Monarchy's ruin and Italy's victory in

the war.

In his

outlook, Albertini was fully on the wavelength of colleagues who wrote

for the Corriere della Sera such as G.A. Borgese and Ugo Ojetti, both of whom

would play a prominent role in the propaganda campaign of 1918. Indeed,

Albertini's views were shaped to some extent by Professor Borgese. Borgese was

a well-known writer and critic, a specialist on Germany (having spent two years

there before the war) and a national-liberal who had for a long time wished

Italy to assume an influential and moral stance in the struggle against the

Central Powers.

From the outbreak of hostilities he had been assigned first

to the CS to analyze the foreign press, and then to the Ministry of the Navy with

the purpose of strengthening their propaganda service in allied countries. It was

in this capacity that Borgese in early 1917 visited France and discovered there

Italy's lamentable reputation and the prevalence of `Austrophilia'. He was then

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 119

sent to the Balkans and, after observing the degree of French influence there, he

returned with the conviction that Italy, in order to reassert its control in the

future, must make a special agreement with Serbia. On the strength of these

reports (and possibly Albertini's influence), in June 1917 Borgese was assigned a

more specific mission in neutral Switzerland. This appears to have been largely

on the orders of Colonel Garruccio, the head of Italian military Intelligence,

who was based at Rome and was increasingly dabbling in the political sphere.

The task for Borgese, and his assistant Gaetano Paterno

(a former legation

secretary in Montenegro, who by this time was attached to the CS), was to

investigate the truth about the Yugoslav e

migre

s. In Borgese's words, they

aimed to discover

whether the

queer word `Yugoslavia', never heard before, had any meaning

at all or was merely an Austrian trick contrived to ensnare public opinion

and to lure the western Powers into a separate peace with Austria, thus

cheating Italy of the promised rewards.

There took place, at the Serbian press bureau in Geneva in late July, three

meetings with Serbian e

migre

s and members of the Yugoslav Committee. Since

Switzerland was a hot-bed of intrigue and espionage, the visit and its purpose

was soon well-known to the Austrians, for Borgese inadvertently discussed it

with an Austrian agent.

To the e

migre

s, Borgese explained that he represented

a new current in Italy which desired to remove Italian±Yugoslav conflict and

find a basis for agreement. The South Slavs answered that the Italians must

show by their deeds that they were not imperialist and not hostile to a Yugoslav

state. In particular, as Julije Gazzari (an exile from Dalmatia) stressed, `national

freedom' for Dalmatia was vital: if Italy made this clear, `Yugoslavs' in the

Austrian forces would cease to show such resistance to the Italians.

Borgese

and Paterno

returned to Italy and drew up a lengthy report, for the eyes of the

political and military authorities, emphasizing the genuineness of the Yugoslav

cause. They recommended that Italy should set up a press office in Switzerland

in order to be better informed about the Yugoslav question. But most impor-

tantly, they

urged Italy to renounce Dalmatia and become the centre for

Yugoslav agitation, directing such powerful ideas at southern Slav regiments

in the Austro-Hungarian forces.

For Borgese, this change of direction was the

means by which Italy would secure its rightful place of `primacy and leadership'

in postwar Europe, a contrast to the more idealistic Salvemini who, Borgese

claimed, was still living in the smaller, vanished world of Giuseppe Mazzini.

Although the report was `highly praised' by Garruccio, it was, in Borgese's

words, `deeply buried' by more influential figures (probably Sonnino).

But

many of its ideas were to be adopted by Orlando after Caporetto. For Albertini,

moreover, it appears to have finally confirmed the direction which he was

120 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

taking, convincing him that some accommodation with the Yugoslavs would

eventually be essential.

For all Italians it was naturally the Yugoslav issue which would remain the

most sensitive element of `nationality politics'. While some of them were

nearer to Salvemini's perception and some to Sonnino's, some like Albertini

and Borgese adopted a practical stance which roughly fell between the two.

Only with the shock of Caporetto would they all, ostensibly at least, begin to

converge and move more determinedly towards the idea of an Italian±Yugoslav

agreement, papering over some substantial cracks with the chief purpose of

securing victory on the battlefield. In the meantime, in the late summer of

1917, it was on the Czechoslovak issue that there could be more consensus;

thereby the door to the other nationalities could be steadily opened. For this

purpose, Karel Vesely

's press bureau had been notably effective in Italy. In

mid-June 1917, Vesely

had dispatched a thousand questionnaires to prominent

public figures who had previously been sent Benes

's book; he received almost

unanimously positive replies, including one from a newspaper editor, Benito

Mussolini, affirming that Czechoslovakia must indeed be an independent state

in order to guarantee European peace in the future.

An even more zealous

advocate was Nicola Brancaccio in Paris. In late June he confided to his diary his

regrets that Italy might be lagging behind its allies in supporting the Czechs: `At

this moment', he wrote, `by encouraging the Czech cause we will have an extra

instrument with which to shatter Austria' and one which could be an economic

asset to Italy in the future.

The Czech e

migre

s were now able to exploit these

Italian hopes and fears, particularly at this time the fear, which Brancaccio

clearly shared with Albertini, that Italy's allies were making all the running

when it came to Austria-Hungary. After all, the French had just negotiated with

Benes

the creation of a Czech Legion, while the Russians had not only made

Zborov possible but had agreed to dispatch 30 000 Czech volunteers to the

Western Front. It was these arguments which the Italian military could put

before Sonnino, persuading him eventually to invite Benes

for a personal inter-

view in

Rome.

The idea

that military pressure played some part in influencing Sonnino

seems clearer when we note that it was Colonel Garruccio who on 6 September

escorted Benes

to the Consulta. Benes

on this visit, contrary to Leo Valiani's

account, was to get much of what he desired.

Sonnino agreed to recognize the

National Council as the highest representative of the Czechoslovak cause and

to free Czech and Slovak civilians from internment. He was, as is clear from his

behaviour, anxious above all to secure some control of events and reassert

Italy's influence, particularly with regard to the Yugoslav issue. Thus, he

emphasized to Benes

, Italy had a special interest in the Czech cause; thus

also, he was prepared publicly to send his best wishes when on 30 September

the `Italian Committee for Czechoslovak Independence' organized a huge

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 121

reception in Benes

's honour. Benes

, however, while acknowledging Sonnino's

worth as `one of the strongest personalities of the war', was soon to understand

that platonic speeches were one thing, concrete decisions another.

Sonnino

especially remained equivocal on the subject of Czech prisoners of war, citing as

usual the Hague Convention, and blatantly opposing Benes

's wish that they

be sent to the Western Front, for this would strengthen French influence in the

whole business. The only possibility was that a Czech Legion might (`if a

suitable way was found') be organized on Italian soil.

On 5

October, after lengthy negotiations at the Consulta and the Ministry of

War, where he boldly insisted that the Czechs had already sabotaged the

Habsburg army's effectiveness, Benes

received the final Italian proposal in his

room at Rome's Grand Hotel.

It was a memorandum which was highly dis-

appointing for

someone as optimistic as Benes

. Although signed by Giardino

(Minister of War), its `extremely twisted style' indicated the pervasive influence

on the one hand of Sonnino, and on the other of General Paolo Spingardi, who

headed the War Ministry's prisoner of war commission and was highly sensitive

to his own powers and influence. While agreeing to free Czech and Slovak

prisoners and form them into units, the Italians proposed first, only to employ

them as labour units in the rear of the front and second, to continue their legal

status as prisoners rather than liberated members of a Czechoslovak army. The

danger was that Sonnino had gone as far as he would, and might even try to

reverse these concessions in the future.

Nevertheless, Benes

's initial shock was quickly tempered when Bissolati,

Comandini and others advised him that this was only the beginning. As the

Marchese della Torretta, a friend in Spingardi's commission, observed, the

memorandum was a `strait-jacket' but one in which the Czechs were able to

move their arms so that it could eventually be torn off!

Benes

, therefore, after

registering his objections to certain aspects of the note, returned to Paris feeling

that `the situation is not all I wished, but there has been a great improve-

ment'.

He had reorganized the Czech office in Rome, leaving it now in the

capable hands of an officer-deserter, Frantis

ek Hlava

ek, with specific instruc-

tions to

propagate the Czech cause, stimulate the morale of Czech prisoners,

but to stall if Italy tried to form them into labour units. In fact, events were to

show that neither the Czech e

migre

s nor the Consulta could control the use of

Czech soldiers when they were in the war zone. Both sides, for their own

reasons, wished to limit this employment ± Sonnino, as a matter of principle,

Benes

, in order to avoid half-measures and ensure that Italy created a Czecho-

slovak army

fully under the National Council's control. These political reserva-

tions were

always likely to take second place when it came to Italian military

requirements. Some of the Italian military had for a long time had an interest in

furthering the nationality principle, oblivious of political repercussions and

purely for military ends. Sonnino might try to block this trend, the Czech

122 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

and Yugoslav e

migre

s might try to harness it. But after Caporetto, military

considerations were the priority when Italy weighed up the benefits of `nation-

ality politics'.

5.2 The role of Italian military Intelligence

Among the Italian military, it was rather naturally the Intelligence officers who

became the chief missionaries for using propaganda to divide and depress the

nationalities of the opposing army. Since the Intelligence Service, the `eye of

the army at war',

was trying to gather as much information as possible about

the enemy, it was usually most keenly aware of the enemy's weaknesses and the

opportunities to exploit them. The network of contacts and channels which

wartime military Intelligence developed in order to pick up useful information,

could equally be used to distribute poisonous ideas. Thus it was that Austria's

propaganda campaigns against Russia and Italy were largely entrusted to Intel-

ligence personnel,

men who were quick to publicize the importance of the new

weapon to the surprise of some of their more conservative commanders. The

Italian army, as we will see, possessed even more energetic and imaginative

Intelligence officers, individuals whose significance has escaped discussion

in the historiography of the Great War. They were to become committed to

the nationality principle partly from experiencing at first-hand the nature of

the Austro-Hungarian army. But their beliefs were reinforced, especially in one

case, by a longstanding interest in Italian irredentism in the Trentino [southern

Tyrol] and a subsequent appreciation of Czech, Polish or even Yugoslav aspira-

tions.

Until 1918

at least, Italian military Intelligence was a thoroughly uncoord-

inated business.

This stemmed in part from the way in which the Service was

organized from May 1915. Ufficio I, the Intelligence centre attached to the

Italian General Staff in Rome, had done little during the months of Italy's

neutrality to prepare for wartime activity apart from establishing seven Intelli-

gence centres

(centri staccati) on the northern frontier. Most of these on the

outbreak of war became the Intelligence offices of the respective Italian armies

(from October 1916 termed Uffici I.T.O. ± Informazioni Truppe Operanti).

Ufficio I, meanwhile, moved to Udine to act as the CS's Intelligence centre.

There resulted a lack of real coordination. At Udine, Ufficio I became largely a

receptor for information from a wide range of different sources, while the actual

sifting and analysis of Intelligence for the High Command was jealously

assumed by the Ufficio Situazione di Guerra. But apart from the tensions caused

by this division of labour, the chief obstacle to centralized control was the

independent activity of the army Intelligence offices. Their officers were

directly responsible to the individual army commands and as such, as one

authority notes, were from the start `uprooted from the main trunk' of the

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 123

Intelligence Service; their branch, highly luxuriant though it became, was

never fully grafted back onto the main stem.

Although they had to dispatch

regular reports to Udine and attend weekly meetings with the head of military

Intelligence, some of the more independently minded Intelligence officers

quickly questioned the competence of CS Intelligence and what they viewed

as its indiscriminate gathering of information from suspect sources. It was a

point graphically underlined in early 1916, when CS Intelligence (notably the

Ufficio Situazione) refused to believe the warnings of an approaching Austrian

offensive in the Trentino provided by the 1st army Intelligence officers, leaving

the latter thoroughly disillusioned.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Tullio Marchetti and Cesare Finzi, the two

leading Intelligence officers of the lst army, were the men who did most to

further the nationality principle among the Italian military. Although other

Intelligence heads (particularly Attilio Vigevano of the 4th army) were similarly

involved in such activity from the beginning of the war, it was Marchetti and

Finzi who were the most resourceful and ingenious. They built up an Intelli-

gence network

of contacts and controls which by 1918 was not only the equal

of British and French military Intelligence, but which provided a basic founda-

tion upon

which to construct Italy's propaganda offensive against Austria-

Hungary.

For Tullio

Marchetti, in particular, the idea of undermining the enemy

through exploiting nationalist tensions was a logical sequel to his own irredent-

ist background.

A native of the Austrian Trentino (from Bolbeno, near Tione),

Marchetti had already, in the 1890s as an Alpini officer, dabbled in amateur

Intelligence activity, keeping in touch with acquaintances in the western Tren-

tino. From

1902 he was officially employed by Ufficio I and expanded his

network of agents, by regularly taking official leave in Bolbeno and also by

visiting other parts of the Tyrol through clandestine journeys via Switzerland.

Unlike some of his less cautious brethren (the eccentric Giuseppe Colpi, for

example), Marchetti managed to escape discovery by the Austrians and by 1915

was to be found at Milan creating an Intelligence centre for the prospective lst

army.

When on the eve of war centri staccati were established in Brescia and

Verona, Marchetti took over the former and filled it with many of his old

`Trentini' agents (now refugees) ± veterans such as Damiano Cis and Arturo

Castelli. When in May 1915 the centri at Brescia and Verona were grouped

together as part of lst army Intelligence, Marchetti retained his organization

at Brescia while Cesare Finzi (in August) assumed control of the centre at

Verona.

For Marchetti

it was an axiom from his pre-war experience that military

Intelligence in the front line had to be balanced by information-gathering

in profundita

: in the rear of the enemy forces. Although his own network in the

Tyrol had largely disintegrated into a flood of refugees, Marchetti by May 1915