Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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104 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

committees at the front, and therefore the extra obstacles to disseminating

ideas. Yet Baden was still perhaps too inclined to adopt propaganda arguments

and techniques from the Eastern Front, assuming that they could be employed

equally effectively in Italy. In argument they dwelt heavily on `English self-

ishness' (largely

ignoring the issue of `land for the peasants' which might have

been exploited); in technique they were far too inclined, in spite of the terrain,

to concentrate on personal contact across the trenches and to neglect, early in

the campaign, a mass distribution of material from the air.

Indeed, it

was especially the nature of the Austrians' `propaganda machinery'

in the Italian environment which hampered their campaign: the material was

simply not reaching the Italians. When the latter began their own campaign,

they were able to bombard the Austrian trenches with aerial propaganda on a

scale far in excess of Austria's efforts. The Austrians could not compete

with this, partly because they were concentrating anyway on `trench propa-

ganda', but

also because by February 1918 they were no longer masters of the

skies in the Italian theatre. Furthermore, although the AOK had realized that

its campaign would have to try to influence each individual Italian soldier (since

no revolutionary committees existed to spread the ideas),

142

the limited `trench-

propaganda' was

highly unlikely to achieve this result, all the more so as it

could easily be obstructed by vigilant Italian officers in the front line. The CS

counter-measures, advanced enthusiastically by Diaz and Badoglio, seem to

have acted as a fairly reliable shield, preventing the soldiers from experiencing

Austria's propaganda at a time when they were most susceptible.

In turn,

the CS counter-measures were not wholly defensive. It was partly as

an offensive response to Austria's campaign that the new CS would launch its

own battle of ideas against the Austro-Hungarian army. While inadvertently

adopting many of Austria's own techniques and arguments, the Italian cam-

paign would

strike further, by attempting to exploit nationalist tensions within

the Habsburg forces. It was naturally a threat which the AOK had been fully

conscious of during its Russian campaign, especially in the later stages, but only

in the final year of war would the menace fully materialize. As the head of

Conrad's Intelligence staff warned Baden in February 1918, `the danger that

systematic propaganda activity will produce a similar outcome to that in Russia

exists for our men far more than for the Italians'.

143

Many of the Austrian military

undoubtedly shared this view. But until the early summer they still felt that

their own campaign required more attention than the enemy's. In the propa-

ganda duel

on the Italian Front, the Austrians preferred to concentrate on the

offensive, spreading their own ideas, rather than using their energy defensively,

to combat Italian propaganda and protect their own forces. Only by July 1918

did the AOK realize that it had lost the duel. By then it was also clear that the

Austro-Hungarian forces were inadequately equipped to resist the propaganda

weapon which was wielded by the enemy.

Austria-Hungary's Campaign against Italy 105

Notes

1. Cesare Pettorelli Lalatta [Finzi], Note Informazioni di un Capo del Servizio Informazioni

d'Armata (1915±1918), 2nd edn (Milan, 1934) p. 141.

2. OULK, VI,

pp. 493ff for the preparations: this sector was singled out by the AOK in

July as the ideal base from which to attack.

3. Relazione della

Commissione d'Inchiesta. Dall'Isonzo al Piave, 24 Ottobre±9 Novembre

1917 [hereafter Relazione], 2 vols (Rome, 1919), II: Le Cause e la Responsabilita

degli

Avvenimenti, p. 552.

4. OULK, VI,

pp. 511, 520.

5. See Relazione,I

: Cenno Schematico degli Avvenimenti, pp. 8ff; and II, pp. 43ff, for a

discussion of the available Intelligence.

6. The words of

Tullio Marchetti, Ventotto Anni nel Servizio Informazioni Militari (Trento,

1960) p. 246. See also the discussion of Odoardo Marchetti (who had just become

head of Italian military Intelligence): Il Servizio Informazioni dell'Esercito Italiano nella

Grande Guerra (Rome, 1937) pp. 175ff.

7. Giorgio Candeloro

, Storia dell'Italia Moderna, vol. 8, 4th edn (Milan, 1993) pp. 184±5;

Relazione, II, p. 48.

8. PRO, Cabinet

minutes [CAB] 23/4, W.C.260, 30 October 1917. The British ambas-

sador in

Rome, Sir Rennell Rodd (an arch-rival of Delme

-Radcliffe) gained the same

impression: `What has happened was not so much a military defeat as a refusal to

fight ± something like a strike on the part of the 4th army corps of the 2nd

army . . . they had been undermined by the socialist and clerical peace propaganda.

They had also no doubt received communications and promises from the enemy.

They were ``fed up'' with the monotony of existence and contemplated another

winter of it with dread' (House of Lords Record Office [HLRO], Lloyd George MSS,

F/56/1/56, Rodd to Lloyd George, 4 November 1917).

9. Relazione,

II, pp. 506ff.

10. Luciano Tosi,

La Propaganda Italiana all'Estero nella Prima Guerra Mondiale. Rivendica-

zioni Territoriali

e Politica delle Nazionalita

(Udine, 1977) pp. 80±7.

11. Giovanna Procacci

, Soldati e Prigionieri Italiani nella Grande Guerra (Rome, 1993) p. 63.

12. Relazione,

II, p. 453 note 1.

13. Ibid., pp.

454ff and 519ff.

14. According to

the British official history, the Italians lost 40 000 dead, 108 000

wounded and 18 000 prisoners, while the Austrians lost 10 000 dead, more than

45 000 wounded and about 30 000 missing: J.E. Edmonds and H.R. Davies, Official

History of the War. Military Operations Italy 1915±1919 (London, 1949) p. 38.

15. Procacci, Soldati

e Prigionieri, pp. 25, 51 note 75.

16. Relazione,

II, p. 381.

17. Churchill College

Cambridge [CCC], Cavan MSS, 1/3, Memoirs: `Recollections hazy

but happy', part I, p. 36.

18. Relazione,

II, pp. 375±9; Procacci, Soldati e Prigionieri, pp. 78ff.

19. Tullio Marchetti,

Ventotto Anni, pp. 297±8. See Relazione, II, pp. 381ff, for a full

discussion of propaganda among the Italian troops.

20. OULK, VI,

p. 561.

21. PRO, WO

106/814, `Morale of the Italian army': report by Delme

-Radcliffe, 11 April

1918.

22. Procacci, Soldati

e Prigionieri, pp. 64±5.

23. Relazione,

II, pp. 502±3, 527.

106 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

24. Ibid., pp.

503±4.

25. See KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2030, AOK Op Nr 766/21: `Die Propagan-

daverha

ltnisse

an der russ.Front im Vergleiche zu jenen an der ital.Front' [early

February 1918].

26. Finzi, `I.T.O.',

pp. 137, 140: Finzi, however, suggests that the manifestos had little

effect.

27. See Relazione,

II, pp. 485, 552.

28. F. von

Lembruch, quoted in Amedeo Tosti, Come ci vide l'Austria Imperiale. Dall'Ulti-

matum alla Serbia a Villa Giusti (Milan, 1930) p. 211.

29. Ljudevit Pivko,

Informatorji (Maribor, 1925) pp. 31±3.

30. Rino Alessi,

Dall'Isonzo al Piave. Lettere Clandestine di un Corrispondente di Guerra,

ed. Arnoldo Mondadori (Milan, 1966) p. 136.

31. Pivko, Informat

orji, pp. 33±6.

32. See Tosti,

Come ci vide l'Austria, p. 210 note, quoting the German general, Krafft von

Dellmensingen.

33. Pivko, Informat

orji, p. 39.

34. See Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 311.

35. HHStA, PA

XL/199, Military attache

in Berne to AOK Na.Abt (Res.No 5111),

9 October 1917.

36. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66d, `Frontpropaganda gegenu

ber

der italienischen Armee

Juli±Dezember 1917', Waldsta

tten to Czernin, Op.Nr 450/286 geh., 22 October

1917, enclosing Beilage 2: `Richtlinien fu

die Propaganda gegen Italien'.

37. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/95, HGK Conrad to 10AK, 10 March

1918.

38. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.275, 12±10/4, 11AK Gstbs Abt to HGK Conrad, Op.Nr

2058, 13 April 1918.

39. HLRO, Lloyd

George MSS, F/56/1/56, Sir Rennell Rodd to Balfour, pte, 7 November

1917; Richard Challener (ed.), United States Military Intelligence 1917±1927 (New York

and London, 1978), II, weekly summary, 8 December 1917.

40. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66d, Waldsta

tten

to Czernin, 22 October 1917, Beilage 1.

Most of this leaflet was identical to a text suggested by Czernin (drafted by Friedrich

von Wiesner) a few days earlier; but significantly, the AOK omitted the sentence,

`we don't demand an inch of Italian territory from you' (see ibid., Czernin to AOK,

Nr 5537 geheim, 19 October).

41. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2014, Flottenkommando (Admiral Njegovan)

to AOK, Res.Nr 539/Op., 25 January 1918: texts of the leaflets were sent by radio or

Hughes telegram to the naval stations at Trieste and Sebenico where they were

printed. Some of the leaflets were thrown onto the Italian coast in bottles by torpedo

units, but most were distributed by air, 12 flights taking place between 31 October and

20 December. For example, on 16 November, two seaplanes from Pula threw 20 000

leaflets over Ravenna and Rimini; on 28 November the same occurred with 13 000

leaflets over Sinigallia during a reconnaissance of the area from Ancona to Rimini.

42. See Hildegund

Schmo

lzer,

Die Propaganda des Kriegspressequartiers im Ersten Weltkrieg

1914±1918, Ph.Diss. (Vienna, 1965) pp. 73ff, for the KPQ's moves to indirectly

influence Italian morale.

43. Hadto

rte

neti

Inte

zet e

s Leve

lta

r, Budapest [hereafter HIL], 6AK Gstbs Abt 1918,

Fasz.83, Op.Nr 118/Ev., 6AK to corps and divisions, 9 February 1918.

44. Oskar Regele,

Feldmarschall Conrad. Auftrag und Erfu

llung

1906±1918 (Vienna and

Munich, 1955) p. 398.

Austria-Hungary's Campaign against Italy 107

45. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1918 `I Gruppe', Fasz.586, Op.Nr 766/34, AOK to Conrad, Boroevic

etc., 10 February 1918.

46. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2005, AOK to Kmdo SW front, HGK Conrad,

Boroevic

, XIX corps, Flottenkmdo, Op.Nr 450/684, 5 January 1918: Waldsta

tten

here set out what should be included in the monthly propaganda reports to the

AOK.

47. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, zu Pr.2002, `Organisation der Propagandata

tig-

keit bei

der 11.Armee', 19 January.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., Pr.2082,

11AK to corps, 4 March, Beilage 1 Verzeichnis; Pr.2003, `Dolmetsch-

verzeichnis': most

of the interpreters appointed in the 11AK sector were of Italian,

German or Slovene nationality.

50. Ibid., Pr.2030.

See newspapers (usually four-sided) such as Novita

Mondiali, L'Astico

and Il Risveglio della Pace: KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Karton 768.

51. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/19, 10AK to Conrad, Op.Nr 1022/7 Prop,

23 January 1918.

52. However, colourful

leaflets were soon forbidden as it was felt that they would be too

easily noticed by Italian officers and confiscated.

53. Imperial War

Museum, London [IWM], diary of Captain L.I.L. Ferguson, entry for

14 February: `it was not till two days later did we hear Russia had signed a separate

peace. To this day we wonder how the blighters got that notice up.'

54. See, for

example, KA, HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/25, 10AK to Conrad,

28 January 1918.

55. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2168, 11AK to corps, 21 April 1918.

56. See KA,

HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/95, Conrad to 10AK, 10 March 1918;

HIL, KISA Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.77, Op.Nr 6023/1, 16 May 1918: `the pilots' nervous-

ness about

throwing out leaflets has still not been overcome'.

57. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Pr.2030, AOK Op.Nr 766/21: `Die Propagandaverha

ltnisse

an der russ. Front im Vergleiche zu jenen an der ital. Front'.

58. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/59, AOK to Conrad, Boroevic

etc, Op.Nr

766/34, 12 February: enclosing `Richtlinien fu

die Propaganda'.

59. See, for

example, KA, HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/255: leaflets, `I sogni

imperialistici del Governo Italiano!', `La guerra d'Italia', `I sogni imperialistici del

governo inglese, dei Sonnino e complici'; and KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448,

Pr.2004/2: `Italia nella guerra mondiale'; Pr.2004/29: `Le perdite dell'Italia!'

60. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/292: Notiziette, 13 April 1918.

61. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/20: `Soldati squarciati, imboscati

decorati . . . ' (speech of Maffi on 19 February); HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr

400a/292: Notiziette, 9 April 1918.

62. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/236, 10AK to Conrad, Op.4092/9, 5 May

1918, enclosing leaflet `Beffa contro beffa'.

63. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2230, AOK to 11AK, Op.Nr 766/134, 18 May

1918, enclosing leaflet `Spaghetti signori!' (with minute by GO Scheuchenstuel).

64. See, for

example, KA, HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/59; 11AK Gstbs Abt

1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/1: `Italiani!', Pr.2004/26: `Aiutateci!'

65. Ibid., Pr.2004/

21: `Chi paghera

le spese di guerra?'; Pr.2004/32: `L'Italia sfruttata

dall'Inghilterra e dall'America!'

66. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/292: Notiziette, 25 April 1918; KA, 10AK

1918, Fasz.418, leaflet: `L'Inghilterra comincia a ravverdersi!'

108 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

67. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/292: Notiziette, 18 April 1918.

68. See KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/12: `La grandiosa offensiva germa-

nica in

Francia'; Pr.2004/15: `Due armata inglesi completamente sconfitte'; Pr.2004/

18: `La potente

offensive germanica in Francia'; Pr.2004/35: `Offensiva germanica'.

The war correspondent Philip Gibbs was quoted at least twice in Austrian propa-

ganda, explaining

the horrors experienced by British troops (HGK Conrad, Fasz.66,

Na Nr 400a/292, Notiziette, 20 and 23 April 1918); the same newspapers repeatedly

told of panic in Paris.

69. KA, 10AK

1918, Fasz.418, leaflet: `Illusioni che sfumano!'; HGK Conrad 1918,

Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/292, Notiziette, 6 April and 23 April 1918.

70. KA, 10AK

1918, Fasz.418, leaflet: `I disastrosi effeti della Guerra'; 11AK 1918,

Fasz.448, Pr.2004/27: `Comunicati dell'Ammiragliato Inglese sulla Guerra dei

sottomarini' (the British Admiralty confessed that eight million tons of shipping

had been lost since the start of the U-boat war); HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr

400a/292, Notiziette, 11 April 1918: the Daily Telegraph and Le Matin disputed the

effects of the U-boat war, the former admitting that it had been a disaster for the

Entente.

71. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/6: `La pace con la Russia conchiusa!';

Pr.2004/7: `Pace coll'Ucraina'; Pr.2004/9: `I preliminari di pace colla Romania fir-

mati'.

72. See Pr.2004/6.

In oral propaganda too the actual peace treaty was anticipated by the

propagandists by a month.

73. See Pr.2004/

5: `Italiani!'; and Pr.2004/7.

74. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2025, KISA to 11AK, Na Nr 320/6, 1 February

1918: `Novita

del giorno'.

75. Ibid., Pr.2004/

5: `Italiani!'; Pr.2004/30: `4 Domande': `Non e

meglio fringuel in man

che tordo in frasca?'

76. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66d, Czernin to AOK (Nr 5537 geheim), 19 October 1917.

77. PRO, FO

371/3228, Rodd to Balfour, despatch [d.] 94, 14 March 1918.

78. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, leaflet in Pr.2004: `Il Capo dello Stato Maggiore

Austro-Ungarico sullo sciopero terminato'.

79. Pr.2004/10: `Soldati

Italiani!' Cf. the reality, described in Procacci, Soldati e Prigio-

nieri, pp.

240ff.

80. Pr.2004/0: `Soldati

Italiani!'; 10AK, Fasz.418: `Soldati italiani!', telling of the chival-

rous treatment

accorded to one Italian officer. Rino Alessi records that there were

some Austrian leaflets `in a Bolshevik style' which urged the Italians to follow the

Russian example, revolt and desert: Alessi, Dall'Isonzo al Piave, p. 211.

81. PRO, FO

371/3228, Rodd to Balfour, d.94, 14 March 1918, enclosure no.1. See also,

KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/3, `Soldati Italiani!', appealing to Ita-

lians to

make contact by letter.

82. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/60, AOK to Conrad, Boroevic

, Op.Nr

766/37, 15 February 1918. Other small brochures were distributed, showing with

photographs how well the Venetian population was treated: see `Die Wahrheit im

Bilde' (in Pr.2004) which was probably produced by the AOK at the suggestion of the

11AK (Pr.2008), and was widely propagated.

83. See Procacci,

Soldati e Prigionieri, pp. 101ff for a recent survey of Italian morale.

84. Alessi, Dall'Isonzo

al Piave, pp. 211, 220±1.

85. See the

prisoner and deserter statements in KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.442,

Na Nrs 8±1827.

Austria-Hungary's Campaign against Italy 109

86. Ibid., Na

Nrs 385 and 401: the latter is the statement of an Alpini officer and three

men who deserted when on patrol on Monte Solarolo, detailing contact with

Austrian propaganda in this sector. See also Delme

-Radcliffe's comments, of how

`it was even found necessary to transfer some of the Alpini battalions from the

Brenta-Piave sector to the eastern side of the Lake Garda so as to [stop] temptation

to desert' (PRO, WO 106/814, 11 April 1918).

87. An early

example of this: KA, HGK Conrad Evid.Gruppe 1918, Fasz.56, Na Nr 700/

31, 10AK to Conrad, t.Op.Nr 695/2, 6 January 1918.

88. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.586, AOK to Boroevic

, Conrad, the armies, etc., Op.Nr

766/34, 10 February 1918.

89. Before April,

the 6AK only attempted some propaganda in the sector of the XV

corps (later part of the 11AK): see KA, 11AK Op.Abt, Fasz.444, Na Nr 529, 6AK to

Boroevic

, Op.Nr 360/Ev., 28 March 1918, Beilage 5; Fasz. 445, Na Nr 716, 6AK to

Boroevic

, Op.Nr 540/Ev., 30 April 1918, Beilage 10.

90. KA, 11AK

Op.Abt, Fasz.444, Na Nr 428 (Beilage 8); Fasz.445, Na Nr 609 (Beilage 8);

Fasz.445, Na Nr 756 (Beilage 11).

91. Ibid., Fasz.445,

Na Nr 735, AOK to 11AK, Op.Nr 766/122, 8 May 1918.

92. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/25, 10AK to Conrad, Op.Nr 1128/2

Prop., 28 January 1918.

93. KA, 11AK

Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.444, Na Nr 427: 10AK propaganda report, February

1918.

94. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/97, 10AK to Conrad, Op.Nr 1983/5,

7 March 1918: enclosing photographs of the meetings on Cimone-Ost.

95. KA, 11AK

Op.Abt, Fasz.444, Na Nr 595, Beilage 1: 10AK propaganda report, March

1918. Prior to this the propaganda officer, Jerkowitz, had been demonstratively

speaking to at least 20 Italians during his visits to their trenches.

96. See, for

example, the 10AK cigarette orders for the month of April: 1500 `better

cigarettes' were required in order to resume contacts on Cimone (KA, HGK Conrad,

Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/136, 10AK to Conrad, t.Op.Nr 2450/5, 3 April 1918).

97. KA, HGK

Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nrs 400a/262, 264, 334.

98. This seems

to be the incident described by Tullio Marchetti in his memoirs: Ventotto

Anni, p. 303.

99. In terms

of the leaflets produced by the 10AK, the following number were dis-

tributed on

the 10AK front: January ± 442 000 copies; February ± 357 000; March ±

367 000; April ± 144 000 (the number was limited by bad weather). These figures

seem to be inclusive of 10AK propaganda newspapers, but exclude material sent in

from other armies, the HGK or the AOK.

100. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2002, 2039, 2132.

101. Ibid., Fasz.448, Pr.2058, IKK to 11AK, Op.Nr 60/13, 14 February 1918;

Fasz.449, Pr.2109, 22SchD Kmdo (GM Rudolf Mu

ller)

to 11AK, Op.Nr 73/10, 15

March 1918.

102. Ibid., Pr.2120, 11AK Propaganda report for March 1918.

103. Ibid., Pr.2160, I KK to 11AK, Na Nr 101/7, 14 April 1918.

104. Ibid., Pr.2168, 11AK (Frydman) to the four corps, 21 April 1918.

105. Ibid., Fasz.448, Pr.2015/1, Conrad to 11AK, Na Nr 400a/34, 18 February 1918.

106. Ibid., Pr.2047, 11AK to I, III, VI and XXVI corps, 11 February 1918. For example, the

10AK held

such meetings on 4 February and 23 March; the 11AK on 24±6 January

and 26 February (at Levico); the 6AK on 23 March (at Vittorio).

107. Ibid., Pr.2200: minutes of meeting at Levico, 15 May 1918.

110 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

108. See

KA, 11AK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.445, Na Nr 609, KISA Monatsbericht u

ber den

Feind, Op.Nr 5400, Beilage 8 [March 1918].

109. `E

noi?', Corriere della Sera, 14 March 1918.

110. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2168, 11AK to I, III, VI, XXVI corps, 21 April

1918.

111. For

the respective views of Conrad and Boroevic

, see KA, 11AK Op.Abt 1918,

Fasz.444, Na Nr 427, Conrad to 11AK, Na Nr 8650/14, 8 March 1918: propaganda

report; and ibid., Na Nr 593, Boroevic

to 11AK, Op.Nr 300/847, 13 April 1918.

112. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2168.

113. Ibid.,

Pr.2171, AOK (Waldsta

tten) to Conrad, Boroevic

and armies, Op.Nr 766/96,

18 April 1918.

114. Ibid.,

Pr.2168, 11AK to Koluft, 21 April 1918.

115. KA,

11AK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.445, Na Nr 609, KISA monthly report: Beilage 8, Op.Nr

5060/21, propaganda report for March 1918.

116. Ibid.,

Fasz.444, Na Nr 593, Boroevic

to 11AK, Op.Nr 300/847, 13 April. For the

rewards offered: KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2078, IKK to 11AK, Na Nr

50/18, 26 February 1918.

117. At

least according to the 10AK: KA, 11AK, Fasz.445, Na Nr 706, 10AK propaganda

report for April 1918. Therefore the CS on 20 May felt obliged to repeat the

warning: Procacci, Soldati e Prigionieri, p. 146 note 230.

118. See

the prisoner statements in KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.442.

119. IWM,

Sir Henry Wilson MSS, [File] 22/2, Delme

-Radcliffe to Wilson, 7 January 1918.

120. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, p. 282.

121. Alessi,

Dall'Isonzo al Piave, p. 166.

122. Alberto

Monticone, Nitti e la Grande Guerra (1914±1918) (Milan, 1961) pp. 263±4.

Monticone's work details the close contact between Diaz and Nitti during 1918.

123. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, p. 281.

124. Finzi,

`I.T.O.', p. 219. There is now a substantial Italian literature on efforts to raise

army and civilian morale: see, for example, N. Della Volpe, Esercito e Propaganda

nella Grande Guerra (Rome, 1989); A. Fava, Fronte Interno. Propaganda e Mobilitazione

Civile nell'Italia della Grande Guerra (Rome, 1988); M. Simonetti, `Il Servizio ``P'' al

Fronte', Riforma della Scuola (August±September 1968).

125. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, pp. 298±306.

126. On

this subject generally, see Mario Isnenghi, Giornali di Trincea 1915±1918 (Turin,

1977).

127. One

of the most important British memoirs is that of Norman Gladden, Across the

Piave: A Personal Account of the British Forces in Italy, 1917±1919 (London, 1971); but

see also IWM, diary of L.I.L. Ferguson (entry, 16 December 1917), and memoirs of

V.G. Ricketts.

128.

Edmonds and Davies, Military Operations Italy, p. 145.

129. PRO, WO 79/67, Cavan MSS, Appendix F, Cavan to CIGS, 10 November 1917;

WO 106/852,

Cavan to CIGS, 25 May 1918.

130. CCC,

Cavan MSS, 1/3, Memoirs, part 1, pp. 3±4.

131. PRO,

WO 106/799, British expeditionary force in Italy. Summary of events from

5 November±3

1 December, by C.H. Harrington [6 January 1918], pp. 6, 14.

132. PRO, AIR 1/2127/207/80, Summary of the Royal Air Force in Italy, November

1917±November 1918; H.A. Jones, The War in the Air (Oxford, 1937) VI, pp. 274ff.

133. IWM, Delme

-Radcliffe MSS [hereafter DRP], diary, entries for 4 and 5 January; IWM,

Wilson MSS, 22/2, Delme

-Radcliffe to Wilson, 7 January 1918.

Austria-Hungary's Campaign against Italy 111

134. PRO,

WO 106/799, Summary of events by C.H. Harrington, p. 16; CCC, Cavan

MSS, memoirs, 1/3, p. 7.

135. PRO,

WO 157/634, Daily Intelligence Summary [DIS], no. 93 (from French and

Italian sources), 5 March 1918. The confession of these Austrian pilots was well

known: see Ugo Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie 1915±1919, ed. Fernanda Ojetti (Florence,

1964) p. 490.

136. Captai

n Wedgwood Benn, In the Side Shows (London, 1919) p. 221; PRO, AIR

1/2127/207/80, Summary.

137. PRO,

AIR 1/2282/209/73/2, H.C. Swan (British vice-consul at Venice) to J.H. Town-

sey (consul

at Milan), 28 February 1918. In reply a flight of Italian seaplanes

bombed Pula and distributed leaflets with the words `reprisal for Venice': Luigi

Villari, The War on the Italian Front (London, 1932) p. 193.

138. See,

for example, KA, HGK Conrad Evid.Gruppe, Fasz.57, Na Nr 5500/32, KISA

Monatsbericht, Na Nr 422, January 1918; KA, 11AK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.444, Na Nr

400, 6AK to HGK Boroevic

, Op.Nr 207/Ev, 26 February 1918.

139. PRO,

WO 106/814, Delme

-Radcliffe report on the morale of the Italian army,

11 April 1918. Suggestions here on how morale might be raised owed much to

the ideas of the editor of Il Popolo d'Italia, Benito Mussolini, who Radcliffe had met

in Milan on 21 March to discuss this very issue: see DRP, Mussolini to Delme

Radcliffe, 26 March; and entry in Delme

-Radcliffe's diary for 21 March (describing

Mussolini as a `most interesting and able man').

140. IWM,

Wilson MSS, 28A/1A, Cavan to Wilson, 24 March 1918. For a similar view at

this time, see G.M. Trevelyan, Scenes from Italy's War (London, 1919) p. 207.

141. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2200: notes by Frydman for speech in

Levico, 15 May 1918.

142. Ibid.,

Fasz.448, Pr.2030, AOK Op.Nr 766/21, `Die Propagandaverha

ltnisse

an der

russ. Front im Vergleiche zu jenen an der ital. Front'.

143. KA, HGK Conrad 1918, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/34, minutes by Captain Erich Rodler.

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign

5.1 Obstacles to effective propaganda

When the new Italian Comando Supremo began a propaganda campaign

against Austria-Hungary in the spring of 1918, it was acting partly in response

to Austria's own campaign, partly in response to the shock of Caporetto. The CS

realized increasingly that scruples ought to be set aside and weapons of any

kind might justifiably be employed against a dangerous enemy. The propa-

ganda weapon,

in Italy's hands, had an explosive quality precisely because it

could exploit Austria-Hungary's nationalist tensions, either through manifestos

or through propaganda patrols. In the latter case, the Austro-Hungarian forces

would eventually be faced with patrols composed of Czech or Yugoslav volun-

teers, men

who had deserted or been captured by the Italians and then returned

to the front to influence or subvert their former comrades. As the events at

Zborov in June 1917 had shown, the very presence of such units, as propaganda

patrols or even as combatants, could have a devastating effect.

Yet Italy's

ability to make a success of front propaganda by fully pursuing the

`nationality principle' in the front line, had been and always would be ham-

pered by

deep-seated political qualms. In essence, Italy's adoption of what

became known as `nationality politics' ( politica delle nazionalita

) was always

obstructed by its foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino. On the Eastern Front, the

Central Powers' campaign had, arguably, been weakened because the DOHL

had a secret annexationist agenda which had to be excluded from propaganda;

in other words, propaganda was not wholly squared with policy. In Italy's case

the same was true, but here it was always the Yugoslav question which was the

Achilles' heel of the Italian campaign. Italy had entered the war in May 1915

after signing the Treaty of London with the Triple Entente, a treaty which

promised the Italians not only the prime irredentist goals of Trento and Trieste,

but also all of Istria and northern Dalmatia. By including these southern Slav

regions, the Treaty of London clashed head-on with Yugoslav aspirations and

112

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 113

those who espoused them: firstly, the Serbian government (in its Nis

declara-

tion of

war aims of December 1914), and secondly, the Yugoslav Committee of

southern Slav e

migre

s from the Habsburg lands. Since the London treaty was

Italy's only international bargaining counter for a future peace conference, the

Consulta (the Italian foreign ministry) rigidly refused to repudiate it or weaken

it by actions which might have positive Yugoslav implications. On this point,

as on so many others, Sonnino's `mind was as narrow as his forehead, his will as

obstinate as his chin'.

Furthermore, his commitment to Italian supremacy

in the Adriatic did not mean that he favoured or envisaged the dissolution of

the Habsburg Empire. On the contrary, Sonnino felt that Austria-Hungary's

destruction could bring Italy some unsavoury neighbours: Russia on the Adriatic

and Germany on the Brenner Pass. It was far better therefore if the Empire,

despite various territorial amputations to Italy, survived into the postwar world.

Thus it was that, at the very moment, 25 October 1917, when the Austrians and

Germans were advancing from Caporetto, Sonnino was to be found proclaim-

ing to

the Italian Parliament that `neither the dismemberment of enemy states

nor the changing of other peoples' domestic arrangements figure in our war

aims'.

A speech like this ± which quickly found its way into the Viennese press

± could only undermine the image of Italy as a supporter of Austria-Hungary's

`oppressed nationalities'. If such views continued to be officially voiced, they

would, when coupled with the Treaty of London, effectively sabotage any front

propaganda built on the nationality principle. In particular, enemy Croat and

Slovene soldiers, already alarmed at Italy's nationalist aspirations in the Adri-

atic, might

simply have their prejudices and hostility reinforced in the sure

knowledge that, behind all the propaganda, the Italians had a secret agenda.

Until the

summer of 1917, there had been few public figures in Italy who

openly questioned Sonnino's point of view. The most notable exceptions from

1915 were Leonida Bissolati, reformist-socialist politician (and later minister

without portfolio in the Boselli and Orlando governments), and his friend

Professor Gaetano Salvemini, historian and editor of the Rome weekly, L'Unita

Both had been influenced, among others, by Cesare Battisti, a former socialist

deputy to the Austrian Reichsrat, who in September 1914 had been the first

Italian to state publicly that Austria-Hungary should be liquidated. In the

spring of 1915, Bissolati and Salvemini both came round to the idea that Italy

should intervene in the war and invoke the nationality principle to destroy

Austria, while claiming only ethnically Italian territory. Musing on the altern-

ative of

Sonnino's policy, Salvemini, an historian of the Triple Alliance, vividly

expressed his conviction `that the nationalists' Adriatic programme is disgrace-

ful and

ruinous, and must serve simply as a trampoline to achieving Austria's

salvation and Italy's return to eating German vomit again'.

If in 1915 these views carried little weight, not least because of vigilant Italian

censorship of anything which deviated from the nationalist line, by late 1916