Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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144 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Our task, especially the task of propaganda in enemy trenches, demanded

intelligent and in every respect reliable and self-sacrificing volunteers.

Therefore, we chose carefully so as to preserve our expanding unit at a

level qualitatively close to that of the original Carzanci.

127

Although among the 18 new `Yugoslav' volunteers, there might be some who

glowed with `a lively desire to enter the fight against the Austrian oppressor',

these were usually Bosnian Serbs or those who had been active in the prewar

Sokol clubs. Many of the Croat or Slovene prisoners who passed through

Verona or the Dolfin villa were found to be `hardened Austrians', while others

simply had no wish to continue any military role.

128

They were all sent off to

prison camps in the south, while the `Yugoslavs' and 53 new `Czechoslovaks'

donned Italian uniform (with Slav cockades and red, white and blue colours

on the collars) and began a vigorous training under Stane Vidmar in the Procolo

fortress.

For Finzi

and Marchetti, as we will see, this expansion was one element in

their overall campaign to exploit Austria's nationalist tensions in the months

after Caporetto. Since lst army Intelligence needed CS permission to employ

Slav volunteers more systematically as patrols in the front line, on 17 January

Finzi wrote a memorandum on the subject and dispatched it to the new CS

headquarters at Abano. In it he claimed bluntly that most subject peoples of

Austria-Hungary were `nationalist' and anti-Austrian, and that therefore the

presence of Slav patrols on the Italian side would provoke widespread desertion

and considerable embarrassment for the enemy AOK. Since, Finzi admitted,

many of the Italian lower commands were still diffident, it would be necessary

to present the patrols as special allied units. But he pointed to the experience

of Carzano as evidence of what might be achieved with a committed group of

ex-Austrians, who could be moved around the front, fully at the disposal of

the Intelligence service.

129

It was Pivko's unit which was the natural forerunner

and model for such activity. In early February, the CS approved Finzi's request

for `Czech propaganda patrols'.

130

On 25 March 1918, Finzi was able to inform

Pivko that Abano wished to establish Slav units for propaganda and Intelligence

work in every Italian army.

In the

intervening period, Pivko's novices had required extensive training in

Verona until 21 March when the whole unit was transferred to a new head-

quarters, an

open camp at Tugurio near Sandrigo. This was in keeping with a gen-

eral reorganization

of Italian forces through which a new 6th army was being

created (to include British and French divisions); Pivko's unit moved in order

to remain subordinate to Finzi who became the head of 6th army Intelligence at

Breganze. Four days after its arrival, the unit, with the mountains looming in

the background, staged an impressive gymnastic and cultural display on the

plain for the benefit of French and Italian officers. Among those present were

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 145

the Intelligence heads of the neighbouring 4th and 8th armies, Vigevano

and Dupont, who received an education in what they too might achieve

with Slav deserters. For the volunteers the formal, public display signalled

something of an initiation in the war zone, for the next day they were driven

northwards into the mountains for their first experiment in front propa-

ganda.

131

According to Pivko, it was with the express purpose of countering Austria's

propaganda that his unit was sent to the front at Stoccareddo, north of Col

d'Echele (see Map 4). During March in this sector, Nachrichtentruppen of the

Austrian 26 Schu

tzendivision

[26SchD] had been particularly active, depositing

material about peace in the East and the German offensive in the West, and

claiming for itself `generally favourable results'.

132

The Italians in turn may

have been alarmed at some desertions to the enemy in this area and speculated

incorrectly that Austrian propaganda was responsible.

133

If so, their suspicions

about enemy intentions were perhaps confirmed when in mid-March they

captured near Val Frenzella a member of the opposing Austrian propaganda

team. This individual was Franz Kreuz, who gradually revealed all to Mate

Nikolic

when he was slipped into his prison cell as an Italian `pigeon'. Besides

supplying illuminating details about Austria's propaganda work on the Eastern

and Isonzo fronts in 1917, Kreuz claimed that around the river Brenta Austria

was engaged in vigorous propaganda specifically in order to prepare for a

forthcoming and decisive offensive with its main thrust on the mountain

front: `We are learning to use again the methods with which we were successful

against the Russians and at Caporetto in order to open some doors for the

army.'

134

If Pivko's unit was now despatched to close this particular door, it

also had a definite offensive role to play. Finzi undoubtedly felt that the pre-

dominantly Czech

26SchD was itself ripe for demoralization, for earlier in the

month there had been a steady trickle of Czech desertions to Italy from Schu

zenregiment 9

[SchR9]. The troops' dire material position at a high altitude was

probably enough to cause these, cut off as they were in the snow with wholly

inadequate shelter.

135

But the Austrian 11AK still speculated that `Italian pro-

paganda' might

have played a part, for one of those involved was known to

have trafficked with the enemy before desertion and Italian aeroplanes had on

several occasions distributed manifestos over the sector. Clearly it was an area

which seemed to offer both sides the prospect of some propaganda coup.

136

For a fortnight from 28 March Pivko's unit was active opposite the Austrian

positions, singing Czech songs such as Hej Slovane

and Kde domov mu

j, hoisting

bread on bayonets, and proclaiming the liberationist message that they were

soldiers of the `free state of Bohemia'. Besides calling out, they threw or shot

over hand-written and printed manifestos, sometimes using newly invented

rockets (razzi manifestini) which could store leaflets and travel up to 500

metres:

146

38HID

161D

42HID

18ID

EdwD

GALLIO

STOCCAREDDO

VAL FRENZELLA

SAN

FRANCESCO

26SchD

SASSO

RIVER BRENTA

COL D’ECHELE

COL DEL

BELLA

0 5

(EdwD

ASIAGO

M. SISEMOL

ROSSO

M. DI VAL

Austrian line

Italian/French line

Rivers

Austrian division

Edelweiss-division)

Key

Map 5.2 The Front east of Asiago ( June 1918)

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 147

Czech officers and soldiers! Do you know who throws you these appeals? We

are Czech volunteer officers and soldiers who have begun to fight for your

freedom. Come out of the trenches and come across to us so that your

German and Hungarian officers don't see you. Just think how happy we

will be when we can welcome and embrace you here in Italy.

Tell your

comrades too that we are on this part of the front, so that they

too can come over with confidence to us. Italy and the other Allies are with

us; they are helping us to victory.

137

Pivko claimed later that this activity had completely thwarted Austrian propa-

ganda in

the sector, but this was only partially true. On Col del Rosso, where

there were French troops, the Nachrichtentruppen did temporarily halt their

propaganda excursions, for Czech calls that the French would soon be reli-

eved by

Slavs made the 26SchD uncertain about the nationality of their oppon-

ents. Elsewhere,

however, the efforts of Pivko's unit seem chiefly to have

stimulated a propaganda duel. The Austrians continued to scatter their mater-

ial regularly,

employing new rifle grenades, opening a new propaganda post

at Stoccareddo (overhanging the Italian positions) and even concluding in

mid-April that their work was having `very favourable results' in some

places.

138

Pivko's other major claim about his unit's success must also be treated with

reserve in view of Austrian evidence. He suggests that through turning the

Austrians' `weapons against them, they had to withdraw SchR12 from the

line'. In fact, it is clear that, although rumours abounded in the regiment itself

that it would have to be exchanged, this did not occur; it was simply reinforced

with more reliable elements and remained in position until after Austria's June

offensive. Pivko's claim should therefore be taken as grandiloquence in front of

the local Italian commander.

139

But where, apart from this, the Czech propa-

ganda may

well have had a noticeable impact was in the lingering impression it

left on the opposing Czech garrison. One Czech deserted and mumbled, before

dying of his wounds, that the whole garrison at Stoccareddo was ready to

follow. This was not, however, what Finzi desired. Instead of encouraging a

mass desertion which the Austrians might be able to hush-up, Finzi wished the

Czechs for the moment to stay on the Austrian side and spread more widely the

demoralizing propagandist message which they had heard. It is impossible to

determine the results of this strategy. All that can be said is that the impact of

Pivko's unit was undoubtedly tempered at this time by an experience which

Austrian propagandists had themselves had to suffer in recent months, namely

their own forces' mistrust of the propaganda weapon. In this particular case, it

was the French troops on Col del Rosso who, with the view that `a Boche is a

Boche', proceeded to direct flanking fire on anything which moved out of the

enemy trenches (including the unfortunate Czech).

140

While Pivko was in

148 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

despair at French behaviour, Finzi was able immediately to contact the new

commander of the 6th army ± the `energetic, capable and tactful' General

Montuori

141

± and secure an order on 4 April that troops ought to be careful

when firing so as not to disturb valuable propaganda activity or place propa-

ganda patrols

at risk.

142

This early problem of Allied coordination does not appear to have been

noticed by the Austrian divisional commander, Brigadier Klein. And Klein's

later report for his superiors also, rather typically, gave no indication that

Czech propaganda had made any impact on his own men or besmirched the

reputation of his division:

At the

end of March and in the first half of April, it was confirmed fairly

certainly through frequent observation that on Col del Rosso there were

Czech propaganda troops which, now here, now there, sang Czech songs

from the Italian trenches opposite our outposts, and attempted to entice our

men with shouts. This seems to have caused quarrels with the Italians,

because our side always opened fire under which, naturally, the Italian

posts had to suffer and not the well-hidden propaganda troops.

143

From 10 April nothing more was heard. Rain was interrupting the propaganda,

and Pivko's unit after inspection by General Montuori was returned to Tugurio

for a rest.

The Stoccareddo

events are a useful example of how difficult it is to unravel

the influence of propaganda at the front. Often the rumours of what happened

were even more important than the actual reality. We can perhaps safely judge

that at this time the work of Pivko's unit was having a greater impact on Italians

than on the enemy. The incidents at Stoccareddo seem to have increased local

Italian officers' trust of propaganda, and were soon to be reported in the Italian

national press.

144

Even the Prime Minister, Orlando, on visiting the war zone in

early April seems to have been alerted by Finzi to the significance of Stoccar-

eddo as

a concrete example of the benefits of `nationality politics'.

145

In this

way, the Carzanci's original role in Italy's war had considerably expanded. In

the summer of 1917 they had suddenly offered to the Italians a singular

opportunity to strike at the enemy. At the same time, they had strengthened

a growing belief among the influential leaders of 1st army Intelligence that the

nationalist virus was spreading in the Austro-Hungarian forces and that Italy

might provide a catalyst in that process. It was after Caporetto that the wider

Intelligence service, the new CS, and Italy's journalists and politicians all began

to move in this direction, sensing the benefits which might accrue from picking

up and wielding the nationalist weapon. Pivko's expanding unit contributed to

the new mentality by its very presence in the Italian war zone, by posing as a

pioneer for the employment of Slav volunteers and therefore as a precursor for a

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 149

properly constituted Czechoslovak or Yugoslav legion. According to Pivko's

memoirs, both Finzi and Hlava

ek had predicted that his unit could play an

influential role `and get Italy on his side'. And to some extent by the late spring

they had been proved right.

146

5.4 The propaganda duel

The propaganda contest which took place in microcosm at Stoccareddo

reflected the propaganda duel which was developing on all parts of the Italian

Front from the turn of the year. For the new CS of Diaz and Badoglio, an

increase in propaganda distribution over the enemy was very much a response

to Austria's own campaign in the wake of Caporetto. It was a defensive reaction

and therefore, not surprisingly, many of Italy's early leaflets were concerned

with countering Austrian arguments. However, as we have seen, Italy's cam-

paign was

also rooted in the Italian military's growing appreciation of this

weapon, and particularly the lessons which military Intelligence had learnt at

Carzano and thereafter. The Intelligence officers, especially Tullio Marchetti,

who was an old acquaintance of Diaz, found a more receptive ear at the new CS

when they paid their weekly visits to Abano. If they were already demonstrating

their own commitment to `nationality politics' by unilaterally making more

use of Slav volunteers, they now pressed for Italy to establish a Czechoslovak

legion in order further to undermine enemy morale. In fact, Marchetti and

Finzi were pushing at an opening door. After Caporetto, in the new atmosphere

of resistance and a commitment to victory in political and journalistic circles, it

was far more feasible for the Czech (and later the Yugoslav) cause to make rapid

headway in Italy. As the country under Orlando's government seemed, ostens-

ibly at

least, to be adopting nationality politics, so a firmer and more genuine

base was created for adopting such a stance in Italy's propaganda at the front. In

the spring, Orlando himself would be brought, by Luigi Albertini in particular,

to understand the military advantages of this new course. And it was thus that

in March 1918 the Prime Minister directly intervened with the CS to coordinate

a proper campaign of propaganda against the enemy.

On 11

January, Diaz had ordered leaflet distribution to be intensified as a

response to Austria's campaign.

147

For the Italians this tended to mean distri-

bution from

the air. While the Austrians' campaign had been characterized

from the start by `trench propaganda' and an ingenious range of methods to

disperse material, such techniques were rarely used by Italy in the spring. Only

occasionally did the Austrians encounter Italian patrols on their own model, as

on the Lower Piave in March when the cries opposite ranged from `We have

much good wine and bread!' to `Ukraine has forced you to make peace!'; by this

time, the Italians were occasionally experimenting with wooden mine shells

and rockets of the kind used by Pivko's unit.

148

150 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

If Italy propagated chiefly from the air it would probably produce unquantifi-

able results

and certainly limit any precise targeting of enemy nationalities. But

on the other hand, the air would soon be a zone dominated by the Allies and

evacuated by the Austrians. It also enabled the Italians to send uplifting propa-

ganda to

those Italian citizens who had been left behind in Venetia and the

Trentino when the Central Powers invaded. They were quickly reminded in

manifestos scattered over Feltre, Vittorio and other large towns that mother

Italy was not abandoning her dearest sons; she knew all about the suffering

which they endured at the hands of the occupier: `your scream of pain has

reached us, has pierced our heart, has tortured our soul'.

149

They should `scorn-

fully oppose

everything which the enemy says or does to diminish [their]

confidence or power of resistance', for `the moment of victory and liberation

cannot be far off'.

150

These were appeals which the Austrian occupiers tried to

suppress, both by announcing severe measures against anyone concealing

the brightly coloured leaflets and by feeding the Italian population with their

own `truths' in the shape of the official Gazzetta del Veneto (the work of the

KPQ ). In the words of a poster which was affixed in all public places:

The army

command regularly informs the public about the war situation. It

puts up our own and the Italian war reports in all the larger towns where

there are military commands, and allows the Gazzetta del Veneto to be sold

publicly. Thus, nothing is concealed and anyone who reads the reports can

construct a picture of the situation on the front which most interests them.

Nevertheless, it is the case that some malevolent individuals dare to circulate

intentionally false news about the war ± fantastic news about the success

of Italian arms ± which tends to arouse hopes which can never become

reality.

151

Despite a threat of military discipline, the local population maintained a

passive resistance to their occupiers and seem to have been stimulated by the

Italian appeals. One imprudent woman, Elvezia Erveso, who lived near Con-

egliano, even

went so far as to express publicly her joy that according to

manifestos the Italians would return in 20 days; she boldly told the authorities

that this was indeed her wish ± and was promptly arrested and imprisoned for

spreading lies.

152

Her conviction was probably representative of many others

whom the occupiers alienated immediately through their mass confiscation of

food and property. The Gazzetta del Veneto, even if it might have some impact

when sent over to Italian soldiers in the enemy trenches, could never overcome

in Venetia what one Austrian observer termed the `horrific memory and feeling

of hatred and enmity' which the occupation engendered. Nor of course would

the Austrians find it easy as the year progressed to fill the Gazzetta with news

which favoured the Central Powers.

153

Italy could always play on these realities,

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 151

with a steady flood of manifestos and later even with its own falsified Gazzetta

del Veneto.

154

So, the contest for the minds of those in the occupied territories

was always weighted in Italy's favour.

The same

was not true, at first, for Italy's campaign at the front. Here in

January 1918 the initiative lay with the Austrians, with the Italians on the

defensive, exerting much effort in countering Austrian arguments about the

desirability of peace or the rosy prospects of the Central Powers. There were no

Italian military successes to match the conquest of the Bainsizza plateau the

previous summer, the last major coup to be trumpeted in Italian leaflets.

155

Italy's new material might often contain an `offensive' note, but it was only

really noticeable from March 1918 in tune with the Italian army's growing

confidence. Similarly, it was at that time that the manifestos began to exploit

the nationality principle more demonstratively, by channelling ideas to parti-

cular nationalities

instead of, as in 1917, usually issuing translations of the

same text. As in the past, however, the breadth of material in these months still

reflected the lack of clear guidelines and the decentralization of Italy's propa-

ganda campaign

among the Intelligence offices. Likewise, the quality of mater-

ial varied

from crude to sophisticated depending on the outlook of the local

propagandist.

156

Responding to Austrian approaches, some Italian manifestos simply offered a

rebuff, dismissing the enemy's `polite offers' of establishing correspondence

links with relatives in the occupied territories.

157

But most material proceeded

to challenge Austria's main contention that Italy after the events of late 1917

should conclude peace. For instead of arousing defeatism or even revolution,

Caporetto had produced a union sacre

e of all classes and parties and `generated

in full force the cooperation of France, England, Italy and America', determined

to fight on to the bitter end.

158

The Allies did not want a peace without victory,

and certainly not the kind of peace which the Central Powers had imposed on

Russia. That peace in any case had not really materialized ± the peace with

Ukraine was a `comedy' ± and the main cause was Germany's voracious

appetite.

159

It was perhaps the major theme in this Italian material (and a parallel

to Austrian propaganda's persistent attack on Italy's allies) to question why

Austria-Hungary was continuing the war for the interests of Prussian militar-

ism. The

Germans were alternatively portrayed as the old `Prussians of Sadowa',

as the barbarians who `leapt like wolves on the defenceless Russian population',

or simply as the personification of death; the manifestos emphasized that peace

could never come if Austria-Hungary continued at Germany's side.

160

Peace

would only come if Austria's soldiers turned away from barbarism and revolted

or deserted to Italy. Here it was occasionally implied that the Entente had a

monopoly on Christian morality: it was they who had entered Jerusalem in

December 1917 and `liberated the holy tomb from its centuries-old desecra-

tion'.

161

At times, the Italian propaganda was even less subtle, comparing

152 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Italian unification to the Holy Trinity,

162

or ± in one widely distributed leaflet ±

making wildly immodest assertions:

Austrian soldiers

. . . do you know what it means to be Christians? Come to

Italy to learn, to Italy who created the civilization of the world, to Italy who

made you Christians and whose venerable sanctuaries you

now seek to

destroy with shells. Don't ask those who lead you and piously attend Holy

Mass, but do not live with Christ . . .

Do you know

now why Italians entered the war and why they are resisting

you? They are fighting and resisting you because your gracious government

prevented them from living freely among other nations, because it stopped

them breathing, just like today German imperialism prevents you from

accepting the proposals of Lloyd George and Wilson, and enslaves you to

a megalomania which treats the civilized peoples of Europe, and begins

to treat you, like negroes. . .

. Do you understand at last, after the recent

examples which come out of Russia, where there is civilization and where

barbarism, and who are the real enemies of European peace?

163

This was the kind of material which would be singled out as unsuitable by

those who later helped to coordinate Italy's campaign.

164

Nor were the Aus-

trians themselves

impressed. It is possible to follow their opinions in the

monthly reports which each Austrian army propaganda officer composed,

since these always contained a section on `enemy counter-propaganda'. In

the spring of 1918 the reports were overwhelmingly scathing about Italy's

manifestos, assessing them as badly translated, unconvincing and amateurish.

As the 10AK propaganda officer noted in his summary for March, `the leaflets,

with their hollow phrases and clumsy language, at least when it comes to texts

in German and Hungarian, show little understanding for the average outlook

and psyche of our soldiers'. He was unsure whether the Italian efforts signified

an organized campaign, and suspected correctly that such organization was

emerging but was as yet in its infancy.

165

Certainly there were danger signs in

certain manifestos, in hints of propaganda patrols, in the demands of the

Italian press, that Italy was about to play the `national card'. Already in Febru-

ary, FM

Boroevic

warned that Austria-Hungary had to be vigilant since it was

clear that the Italians, supported by their allies, now believed that they had a

new means to hand with which to paralyze the Austrian army and stir up a Slav

rebellion in the Monarchy.

166

The only consolation was that Austria's own

propaganda campaign still seemed to be far superior.

It would

be wrong, however, to consider Italy's efforts in the spring as wholly

unpromising. They formed a crucial basis for the coordinated campaign which

began in April 1918. Many of the Italian propagandists were beginning to assess

their opponent in an increasingly sophisticated manner, exploiting any small

The Seeds of Italy's Campaign 153

signs of unrest in the Empire and targeting specific nationalities with new

messages of hope or despair. Admittedly, some of the propaganda only edged

in this direction. In early February a revolt occurred on ships of the Austro-

Hungarian navy at Cattaro, and three sailors ± a Croat and two Poles ± escaped

to the Italian coast by seaplane. There they were received with suspicion and

were imprisoned, but not before they had put their signatures to manifestos

which announced their marvellous reception, `a brilliant testimony to the

noble civilization and humanism of the Italian people'.

167

In a range of Slav

leaflets, but also by wireless telegram, their plea that others should revolt and

follow their example was spread by Italian naval Intelligence over the Adriatic

coast and was even intercepted by a British steamship which took it to be

Austrian propaganda.

168

In the Italian front line, propaganda which exploited enemy unrest in this

way was pursued rather more subtly. There, Intelligence officers like Finzi were

weighing up what might appeal to different nationalities but also what might

entice the rank and file and the officers respectively. On the one hand, the

leaflets might gnaw at basic instincts by comparing the rations or the family

allowance for soldiers in Italy and Austria-Hungary; Slav soldiers were targeted

as `you are the only real victims of the Germans and Hungarians'.

169

On the

other, the Slav officers were told to revolt against their German and Austrian

masters, and were provided with examples to follow. In a novel development

which would later be standard practice, the fiery speeches which some Czech

and Polish MPs were now delivering in the Austrian Reichsrat were quoted

directly from the Austrian press. One manifesto recalled the Czech MP Isidor

Zahradnõ

k's notorious words of 6 February that treason was only committed by

those who sinned against their own nation. It concluded that for Czech sol-

diers: `your

parliamentary delegates are telling you that it is your duty to fight

against Austria, and not for the Austria which exploits you, limits your rights

and wildly persecutes your brothers'.

170

Thus, in a few leaflets directed to the

so-called `oppressed nationalities' it was already possible for the Italians to play

on signs of unease in the Monarchy, evidence which they chiefly acquired from

the enemy press or from their Intelligence sources.

By March

some propagandists, Finzi included, further extended the scope by

aiming at Magyar troops. In a series of cleverly composed and accurately

translated leaflets, the Hungarians were chiefly reminded that they were not

fighting for their own interests. Instead of using the war to pursue Hungarian

independence in the tradition of 1848 (of Kossuth, Peto

and the Arad mar-

tyrs), Hungarians

had been betrayed by Count Tisza, the servant of the Vien-

nese camarilla,

who with his `cronies' had tied them into Prussian service and

bled them white.

171

The result was that Hungarians were continuing to die in

their thousands on fronts far from home at a time when Russia was no longer a

threat to Hungary's borders, and when there was serious unrest and famine in