Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
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Salvaging
What
Was
Left
of
the
American
Wreck
55
soon
proved
to
be
less
profitable
than
anticipated.
The local
merchants
blamed
the
foreign
duties
collected
in
Britain,
for
only
what
was
certified
as the
produce
of British
colonies
could
enter
the
mother
country
free of
duty
in
British
ships;
and,
working
through
the
council,
these
merchants
inspired
the
governor
in 1790 to
plead
for
the
removal
of
this
discrimination.
If,
he
wrote to the
secretary
of
state,
the
mother
country
admitted
on the same
terms as colonial
goods
"all
the
produce
of
America
. .
.
which
shall come into the
ports
of
Quebec
and
Montreal
by
land
or
inland
navigation
.
. .
three considerable
advantages"
would
surely
follow:
"Canada must
gain
by
the
passage
of
all
commodities
through
the
country,
Great Britain
by
an increase of
her
carrying
trade,
and both
by
interesting
our
neighbors
to
preserve
in the
hands
of
Great
Britain
this
outlet
to
the sea and to
the
most
profitable
markets
for
all
their
produce."
Quebec
rather than London
should
control
the
extension
of the
indulgence.
It should be
gradual,
he
thought,
so
"that
our
settlers
on
the north side of
the
lakes
may acquire
strength
and
get
the
start
of
those
on
the
opposite
shore."
He even
looked
forward
to
the
time
when
there would be no
restriction
whatever
on
the
impor-
tation
of
American
produce
across the
border.
His
reference
to
the
lakes
shows
that he was
thinking
of
much
more
than
Vermont,
and
his
concluding
words recall
the
query
of
the
neglected
instructions:
"It
appears
to
me
highly
proper
to form
alliances
with our
neighbours,
as
soon
as all
things
are well
matured
. . . Their own
interest
alone can
render
them
zealously
attached to
us."
His
appeal
was
superfluous.
Three
weeks
before
he
penned
these
words in
Quebec,
London
had
removed
the
discrimination.
A Vermont
agent
had been
busy
in
England,
with
Spain
as his un-
witting
ally.
The Nootka Sound
affair,
stirring
British
fears of latent
American
hostility,
had moved
the
secretary
of
state to
urge
the
gover-
nor
to cultivate
the
friendship
of
Vermont;
and
parliament
had
passed
an
act,
which
came
into force
on 1
July
1790,
giving
American
produce
legally
imported
into
the
province
the same favorable treatment
as
colonial
produce
on
entering
Britain.
Here,
however,
we should
observe
that
temporary
expediency
only
hastened
an action
that the
government
favored
on
general
principle,
the
privy
council committee
having
advised
the
encouragement
of this inland
intercourse
as a means
of
promoting
the
sale of
British
manufactures
and
increasing
British
commerce
and
navigation,
the
prime
purpose
of the old colonial
system.
To this
end,
also,
the
British
government
was
soon,
under
new condi-
tions
created
by
the
war with
Revolutionary
France,
to
negotiate
a
56 CHAPTER
FOUR:
reciprocity agreement
for traffic across this
novel
inland
frontier,
where
reciprocity
did
not conflict
with the sacred
navigation
laws.
Turning
to
the
machinery
of
government,
we find
a distinct
retro-
gression
in
London
at
the
close of
the American
Revolution.
The
pre-
vious
century
had seen a
considerable
development
that
culminated
in
the
creation of a
real
colonial
department.
Colonial
affairs
were
long
the
charge
of the
Secretary
of
State
for the
Southern
Department,
who had
other
important
duties
to
perform.
He was one of
the
two
principal
secretaries
of
state who were
responsible
for
foreign policy,
his
province
being
southern
Europe
while
that
of
his
colleague
was
northern
Europe.
Differentiation of function
within the
Southern
Department,
to
look after colonial
affairs,
was not
necessary.
The
old
Board of Trade
and
Plantations,
an
advisory
body
established in
1696,
had
general supervision
over colonial
administration;
and
as
colonial
affairs
grew
in
importance,
so
did
this
board.
By
1768, however,
the
pressure
of
colonial business
had so increased that it
produced
a
re-
organization.
A
third
principal
secretary
of
state was then
added
to
the
cabinet,
the
Secretary
of State
for the
American
Department,
to
look after the
colonies,
and he
became
president,
or first
lord
of
the
Board of
Trade.
At last the
imperial
government
had
a
colonial
depart-
ment
headed
by
a
member of
the cabinet
but not for
long.
The
need
for it
seemed
to
disappear
with the
loss of
the
best
part
of the
colonial
empire;
and
so
out
of
regard
for
economy
at
home,
the
reforming
Whigs
had
parliament
abolish
the
new
American
secretaryship
and
the
old
board in
1782.
What
colonial
business
remained
was
transferred
back
to
one
of the
two
historic
principal
secretaries
of
state,
whose
duties
were
then
rearranged.
The
Northern
Department
became
the
Foreign
Office;
and
the
Southern,
the
Home
Office,
to
which
was
attached
responsibility
for
Ireland
and
the
colonies.
The
reorganiza-
tion
act
also
provided
for a
Committee
of
the
Privy
Council
for
Trade
and
Plantations,
which
has
already
been
mentioned.
Two
years
later,
in
1784,
its
members were
appointed;
and
in
1786 it
was
reorganized
on
a
permanent
basis,
with
an
efficient
clerical staff.
This
committee
is the
lineal
ancestor
of the
modern
Board
of
Trade of
the
British
government,
which
has
nothing
to
do
with
colonies,
but
in
those
days
it
performed
much
the
same
services
as the
defunct
Board
of
Trade,
except
that
the new
body
rarely
conducted
a
direct
correspondence
with
colonial
governors.
It was
a
long
time
before
there
was
another
specialized
colonial
secretary.
Meanwhile
the
colonies
were
a
minor
Salvaging
What Was
Left
of
the
American
Wreck
5 7
care
of the
Home
Office
until
1801,
when
they
were
transferred
to
the
War
Office.
The
only
reform
in
colonial
government
that
was
made at the close
of
the
American
Revolution
was
another
piece
of
Whig legislation
in
1782,
an act
of
parliament
"for
preventing
certain
offices
in the
plan-
tations
from
being
executed
by
deputy
or
granted
for
life."
4
It had
been
a
recognized
custom
for
secretaries
of
state to
give
lucrative
colonial
offices
to
relatives
and
friends as
permanent
sinecures,
the
duties
being performed
by
deputies
appointed
by
the
principals
who
made
private
arrangements
for
their
emolument.
The
act
struck at
this
abuse
but
hardly
scratched
it,
for
the
law was
inapplicable
to
previous
appointments
and was
commonly
evaded in
subsequent
ones. The
abuse,
however,
was
by
no
means
peculiar
to
colonial
offices;
there
the
burden
rested more
on
the
mother
country
than on the
remaining
colonies because
they
paid
only
part
of the
cost
of
their
governments
and
the
imperial
exchequer
had
to
make
up
the
difference.
In
the
colonies
themselves
there was
remarkably
little
change
of
governmental
forms
and
practices
on
the
morrow of
the
Revolution.
There was no
denying
in
governmental
circles at home that
something
had
gone
wrong
with the
working
of the
traditional
system
of
governor,
council,
and
assembly.
Nor
was there much
doubt
of
what this
was:
the
machine had
broken
down and
jumped
the
imperial
track in
the
lost
colonies
because
there
the
assembly,
by
gaining
too much
power,
had
upset
the
balance.
One
might
have
expected,
therefore,
a move-
ment
to
improve
the machine
by discarding
the
troublesome
part.
Yet
no
such
movement
followed,
despite appearances
in
Cape
Breton,
which
was severed from Nova
Scotia
in
1784
without
being given
an
elected
chamber.
The
self-denying
ordinance
adopted
by
parliament
in 1778
made assemblies more
necessary
than
ever,
for colonies
must
have
revenues.
This,
as we
have
seen,
was the
prime
cause
of the
establishment
of
representative
government
in
the two Canadas
by
the
act
of 1791.
Thus the American
Revolution,
instead
of
eliminating
the
popular
chamber,
actually
fixed it more
firmly
in
the
system
of
British
colonial
government.
The
acceptance
of
this fact was
easy
because
it harmonized
with the
prevailing
conception
of
the British
constitution.
Britons
believed it
was the
best
in the
world
because
it
held the
three
great
principles
of
government
monarchic,
aristocratic,
22
George
IH,c.
75.
58
CHAPTER
FOUR:
and democratic
in
perfect
balance.
To
them
it seemed that
there
could be
nothing
better
in the
colonies,
where
the
governor
represented
the
king,
the
council
the
House
of
Lords,
and
the
assembly
the
House
of Commons. This
opinion
was
repeatedly
expressed,
without
chal-
lenge,
in
the
parliamentary
debates
on
the bill
providing
for
the
government
of
the two Canadas.
What
was
required,
according
to
the
lesson
drawn in London
from
recent
experience
in
America,
was
greater
care
to
preserve
the
proper
proportion
between the three
elements
of
government
in
the
colonies,
so that
the
democratic
would never
again
encroach
upon
the
aristo-
cratic
and
the
monarchic.
Wherever
possible,
these two
were
to
be
strengthened
as
a
check
upon
the other
one;
and the
opportunity
seemed
greater
in British
North
America,
where new
settlements
necessitated new
provisions
for
government,
than
in
the West
Indies,
where
British
institutions
were
much older
and
more
fixed.
To
make
the
monarchical
principle
more
effective,
there was a
union
of
North American
colonies under one
executive
head,
first on a
small
scale
in
1784,
and
then
on
a
larger
one in 1786.
In the
former
year
Prince
Edward
Island had its
governor
demoted to
the rank
of
lieu-
tenant
governor
and
placed
under
the
governor
of
Nova
Scotia;
and
Cape
Breton,
though
erected
into
a
separate
colony,
was
made
subordi-
nate to
the
government
in
Halifax. In
the
latter
year,
1786,
the
governors
of
Nova
Scotia
and
New
Brunswick
were likewise
demoted;
and Sir
Guy
Carleton,
raised
to
the
peerage
as
Lord
Dorchester,
was
sent back to
Quebec
as
governor
in
chief of
all
the
North
American
colonies
except
Newfoundland
and
commander-in-chief
of
all the
forces in
them,
including
Newfoundland.
London
regarded
him
very
highly
as
the one man
who
might
consolidate
the
imperial
power
in
this
half of
the
colonial
empire;
and
five
years
later,
when
Upper
and
Lower Canada
were
established,
each
was
given
a
lieutenant
governor
while
Dorchester
remained
governor
of
all.
Another
device
to
uphold
the
authority
of
the
Crown
was
introduced
into
the
two
Canadas
when
they
were
separated.
It
was
the
reservation
of
two
sevenths
of
the
land
in
every
new
township
as
an
endowment
that
would
increase
in
value
with
the
growth
of
settlement.
One
of
these
sevenths
was
for
the
Church
of
England,
whose
constitution
was
monarchical,
and the
other
seventh was
to
provide
the
executive
with
an
independent
income.
Concern
for the
aristocratic
principle
appears
clearly
in
the
careful
preparation
of
the
legislation
of
1791 for
the
two
Canadas.
It
was
the
work
of
Pitt's
cousin
and
cabinet
colleague,
William
Grenville,
who
Salvaging
What
Was
Left
of
the American
Wreck
59
observed
that the
colonial
counterpart
of
the
House of
Lords
had
never
been
allowed
to
develop
properly
because
it
had
been bound
in its
infancy
by
the
imposition
of
another and
quite
incompatible
function
that
of an executive
council
whose
function
was to advise
the
gover-
nor.
In
this
capacity
its
members
had been
necessarily
subject
to
removal
at
will,
which
made
it
impossible
for
them
to
become
an
independent
upper
chamber
of
a
legislature
after the
English
pattern.
Therefore
he
sought
to
free the
aristocratic element
by
cutting
it loose
from
the executive
incubus. He
also
proposed
to
elevate the
prestige
of
this
body
by
attaching
hereditary
titles to holders
of seats
in it.
Dorchester,
who
was
more
familiar with
new world
conditions,
scoffed
at
the idea of
a
title
aristocracy
in
an American
colony,
and therefore
the
act's
provision
for
this
distinction
was
merely permissive,
not
com-
pulsory.
But
the
differentiation
according
to
function
was
adopted.
When
Upper
and Lower
Canada
began
their
existence,
they
were
the
first
colonies
in which the
legislative
council
was
separated
from
the
executive
council,
and
the
members of the
former
were
appointed
for
life.
This innovation was later
copied
in
other colonies.
A further check
upon
the
democratic
element was
the
partial
appli-
cation
of
the
principle
of divide et
impera
which,
in contrast to the
consolidation
of
the
monarchical element
in 1784
and
1786,
granted
the
Loyalists'
prayers
for
a
separate
New Brunswick
before
ever these
prayers
were heard
by
the
government
in London.
Two
small assem-
blies
with
a
long
distance between them
would
be
less
dangerous
than
one
big
chamber. The same
calculation,
though inspired
by
a more
distant
prospect,
seems to have been at least
partly
responsible
for the
simultaneous
amputation
of
Cape
Breton;
and
it
may
have
assisted
in
bringing
about
the
division of
tie
old Province of
Quebec
into
Upper
and
Lower
Canada,
which was dictated
by
other
considerations. This
calculation
also
explains
what
happened
to
an
interesting
plan
that
Dorchester
forwarded to London before
the act
of 1791 was
passed.
The
author of the
plan
was
his
alter
ego
whom he had
brought
out as
chief
justice
of
Quebec.
He was
William
Smith,
a
Loyalist
from New
York,
where
he and his
father
before
him had
been
chief
justice.
Long
pondering
over
the American
tragedy
had
convinced him
that
it
might
have
been
avoided
if
a
common
government
for
the
colonies
had been
formed.
While
he
was in London he seems
to
have
been
the
prime
inspiration
of
the
design
to draw the
remaining
North
American
colonies
together
under
one
resident
head;
but he
would
go
much
further.
He
would endow
the whole of
British
North
America with a
60
CHAPTER FOUR:
superlegislature.
Naturally
this
plan
met
with
short
shrift
in
the
empire's
capital.
The American
Revolution
thus
induced
the British
government
to
tune
up
the
old
machine
in
the
North American
colonies
so that
it
would
operate
more
perfectly
in the
days
to
come.
The
new
adjust-
ments,
which were
specifically
designed
to
give
freer
action
to
the
monarchical and
aristocratic
parts,
seem to have
made
no
more
prac-
tical
difference
than
those of
many
a
wayside
mechanic
to
a
modern
traveler's car.
The
appointment
of one
governor
for
all
the
colonies,
each with a
lieutenant
governor
to act
during
his
absence,
accom-
plished
nothing
because conditions held
the
former
official in
his
principal
province.
The
endowment of
the executive in
the
two
Can-
adas
acquired
no value until
too late
to
be
of
use;
and the
only
political
effect
of
the
clergy
reserves was the
very
opposite
of
what
was
intended,
for
they
became a
popular
grievance
against
the
Church
of
England
and
the
government.
The
Canadian
divorce
of the
legislative
from the
executive council was
largely deceptive,
because the
members of
the
latter
body
were
almost
always
the
leaders in
the
former.
But
all
these
failures
took
years
to
prove,
and meanwhile the
practice
of
fission
and
the
prohibition
of fusion
undoubtedly
provided
an
effective brake
upon
the
democratic
part
of the
machine.
The
effect
of the American
Revolution
upon
colonial
policy
is less
evident
in
the
government
of
the
West
Indies,
not
only
because
there
was
less
scope
for
adjustments
such as
were
attempted
in the
North
American
colonies,
but
also
because
there was
less
need for
them.
The
society
of British North
America
was
wholly
one of
freemen,
and
the
Loyalists
who
had
so
greatly
reinforced
it
loved British
liberty
no
less
than the
British
Crown.
Indeed
their
attachment to
the
king
was
largely
a
loyalty
to British
institutions,
which
they
believed
guaranteed
the truest
liberty.
The
society
of
the
Caribbeans,
on
the
other
hand,
was
predominantly
one of
slaves;
and
the
Loyalists
who
went
thither
did not make it
less
so,
for
they
too
were
slave
owners
and
they
took
their
black
property
with them.
Liberty
in
the
West
Indies
was
the
privilege
of the
few
to
oppress
the
many,
and
this
perversion
of
liberty
was
itself such a
blight upon
the
popular
element
in
government
that
the
latter
could not
grow
to
subvert
British
control.
Nevertheless,
the
problem
of
maintaining
imperial
guidance
over
the
administration
of
these
islands
was
a
real
one,
for
there the
assemblies were
older
and
stronger
notably
in
Barbados
and
Jamaica
and
the
power
of
the
governor
was
weaker
than in
British
North
America.
Salvaging
What
Was
Left
of
the
American
Wreck
61
On
the
whole,
the
policy
of the
mother
country
was
not
so much
to
introduce,
as
it
was
to
prevent
constitutional
innovations
in
the
colonies
particularly
on
the
part
of
assemblies.
It
was
essentially
a
conservative
policy
that
would
improve upon
the
past
by adhering
more
strictly
to
what was
regarded
as the
old ideal of colonial
government,
though
some
compromises
might
still be tolerated
out of
necessity
or
convenience.
This
old
ideal,
or
theory,
was a
growth
rather
than
a
creation.
It had
taken
shape
through generations
of commissions
and
instructions
issued
to
colonial
governors,
and
its features
were
plainly
discernible
in
these
and other
official
documents
related
to
them.
Because
it was the
ideal
after which
official London strove
until
well
on
into
the
nineteenth
century,
a
summary
sketch of
it
is
essential for
an
understanding
of
colonial
policy
during
this
period.
According
to this
model,
the
assembly,
elected
by
a liberal
fran-
chise,
voted
the
necessary
taxes and
appropriations
for the
support
of
the
colony
and
passed
other
legislation
to
meet the needs of
the
people.
This
assembly
was
nothing
more
than
the
lower
chamber of the
legis-
lature.
The
upper
chamber was the
council,
whose
members
were
appointed
by
the
home
government
on the recommendation
of the
governor
and
might
be
suspended by
him.
Every
bill
passed by
the
assembly,
even
one
imposing
taxes or
appropriating
public
funds,
had
also
to
pass
the
upper
chamber and receive
the assent of
the
governor
before
it
acquired
the
force of
law;
even
then
the home
government
might
disallow
it.
Moreover,
the
governor
was forbidden to
give
his
assent
to
certain
types
of
bills.
These included bills
touching
a
specified
subject,
such
as
shipping
or
the
royal
prerogative;
any
bill
re-enacting
one
that had
been
disallowed,
or
repealing
one that had been
specifi-
cally
sanctioned
by
the
home
government;
and,
except
in
emergencies,
any
measure
that
was to
expire
within two
years,
because
otherwise it
might
defeat
the
purpose
of the third hurdle
in
London.
Any
bill
of
which
the
governor
was
doubtful,
he would
refer
to
the
home
government
to
decide
whether it should become law or not.
London
would
thus
keep
a
tight
rein on colonial
legislation.
It could
guide
as
well
as
check,
for
a
governor
was
occasionally
instructed to
have
some
particular
piece
of
legislation
passed
in
his
colony.
London,
according
to this
model,
would also
keep
a
tight
rein in
the administration
of each
colony.
The
assembly
was
to
have no voice
whatever
in
it. That was
tie
business of
the
governor,
who
was
appointed
and
sent
out for
this
purpose
and
invested with
ample
authority
for
it. To assist
him,
he had
the council
which,
because
of
62
CHAPTER
FOUR:
subsequent
developments,
deserves
special
attention.
In
striking
con-
trast
to the
assembly,
it
was
much
more
than
just
the
upper
chamber
of
the
legislature.
It
had also
an
executive
and
even
a
judicial
function.
It was
the
highest
civil
court
of
appeal
in
the
colony,
from
which there
was
no
recourse
except
to
the
privy
council
in
London.
There
was
no
criminal
appeal
from
the
regular
courts,
the
only
hope
of
a condemned
man
being
a
petition
to
the
governor
to
exercise
the
royal prerogative
of
pardon
or
reprieve.
To
return
to
the
council,
most
of
the business it
handled
was
executive.
Its
concurrence
was
necessary
for
the exercise
of
some
gubernatorial
powers,
such
as
the erection
of
courts
of
justice,
the
issuance
of warrants
for
payment
of
monies
out
of
the
public
purse,
and
the
granting
of
public
lands;
and
its
advice,
though
not
essential,
was
commonly
sought
by
the
governor
on
other
matters
pertaining
to
the
civil
administration.
The
membership
of
this
important
body
was
small,
and
there
was
seldom
any
change
in
it.
Most,
if not
all,
of
the
few
principal
civil
officials
in
the
colony,
notably
the
chief
justice
and
the
receiver
general,
or
treasurer,
were
ex officio
members;
while
the
other
members,
who
usually
formed
the
majority,
were selected
from
the
community
for
their
personal
merits
and
were
commonly
allowed
to
retain
their
seats
for
life,
though
their tenure
was
legally
at will.
One
and
all,
they
were answerable
to
the
governor,
who
could
suspend
any
of
them,
even
those who sat
ex officio.
He
could
also dismiss and
appoint
any government
official
in
the
colony except
the few
top
ones,
who
received
their commissions
or
delegations
from
London;
and even
these
he could
suspend
and
replace
temporarily,
as he could the
coun-
cilors,
pending
a final
decision
by
the
secretary
of
state,
to
whom he
had
to
report.
As
all
were
thus
responsible
to
him,
so
was he
respon-
sible for all
to
the
government
in
London,
which
might
recall him
at
anytime.
The weakest
point
in
this
theory
was finance. How could
British
colonists,
bred
in
the
tradition of
parliament,
be
expected
to tax
them-
selves
without
attempting
to control
the
government
that
spent
the
proceeds?
The
example
of the old
colonies,
where
assemblies
had
effectively
used the
power
of
the
purse
over
local
administrations,
was
a
warning
of
what
might happen
in
the
remaining
colonial
empire.
Here
was
a
problem
that the
mother
country
was
never
able
to
solve
satisfactorily
but
managed
to
put
off
by
various
makeshift
arrangements.
Bungling
in
past
generations
had
ruined
what
might
have
been
a
solution
in
the
Leeward
Islands
and
Barbados.
More
than a
century
before the
American
Revolution,
these
islands
had
got
rid of
proprie-
Salvaging
What Was
Left
of
the
American
Wreck
63
tory
claims
upon
them
by
imposing
a
perpetual
charge
of
4.5
per
cent
upon
the
export
of
their
produce.
The
colonists
later claimed
that
their
assemblies
had
granted
this
revenue
to the
Crown to
provide
for
the
government
of the
islands,
for
which
it
would
have
been
ample,
but
die
home
government
squandered
most of it in
pensions
at home and
used
some
of
it to
pay governors'
salaries in
other
colonies.
In
1764,
by
an exercise of the
royal
prerogative,
the
home
government
imposed
the
same duties
on
the
ceded
islands,
just acquired
from France. There
they
were collected for ten
years,
until a
court
in
England
declared
them
illegal.
On
the
restoration
of British
rule
in
these islands
at
the
close
of the American
Revolution,
the home
government
proposed
to
straighten
out the
whole
business
of the
4.5
per
cent duties.
The
gover-
nors
of the ceded
islands were
instructed to
press
their assemblies to
make
the duties
legal
by
enacting
them,
in return for
which two thirds
of
the
proceeds
would be
applied
for
the
benefit
of these
islands.
The
Barbados
and
the
Leewards were
to receive the same
concession.
But
they
did
not
get
it
because
the
assemblies of
the
other islands
refused
to
adopt
the
duties,
thereby
upsetting
the nice
plan.
Already
the
4.5
per
cent
fund was
bankrupt,
the
pensions
and
governors'
salaries
charged
against
it
being
much
greater
than
the
income;
the
only
reform
was
the restoration of its
solvency
in 1785
by
a
parliamentary
grant
to
discharge
the arrears and
by
the
removal
of
a
very
heavy pension
to
another
fund. More
than
fifty
years
were
yet
to
pass
before this mill-
stone
was
removed
from the neck
of
the
Leewards
and
Barbados.
Three
other colonies had
permanent
revenues enacted
by
their
legislatures
and earmarked
for
the
support
of
their
governments.
Bermuda
had
a
small
one,
granted
in 1698 and administered
by
a
joint
committee
of
the
council and
the
assembly
under
the
presidency
of
the
governor,
but
it fell
short
of what
it
was
supposed
to
cover.
The
provision
in
Jamaica,
dating
from
1728,
was somewhat different
In
return
for
the
assembly's
granting
of
a
permanent
revenue
from
import
duties
and
wine
licenses,
and
its
promise
to make
good
any
deficit,
the
government
had
turned
over
the
quit
rents
and
casual
revenues
of the
Crown
to
form
a combined
fund.
The whole
was
charged
with
perma-
nent
appropriations,
and
any surplus
was
placed
at
the
joint disposal
of
governor,
council,
and
assembly.
But
quarrels
arose,
and
were
re-
newed
in
1783,
over
whether
the
assembly
should share
with the
governor
and
council
the
disposal
of its
annual
grants.
The
home
government
prudently
refrained
from
intervening,
and
a
compromise
was reached
in
1788,
when
the
assembly
increased the
permanent
64
CHAPTER
FOUR:
revenue
and
got
control of
any surplus.
In
1785
Prince
Edward
Island
became the
third
colony
where a
local
act established
a
permanent
revenue.
It
was
very
small and was
administered
by
the
governor.
The
British
Treasury
paid
a
goodly
share of the
cost
of
government
in
a
number of
the
colonies
in either of
two
ways.
In
1748
parliament
had
begun
to
appropriate
money
for Nova
Scotia,
the settlement
of
which
served
an
imperial
strategic
purpose;
and now the
principal
official
salaries
of the
Bahamas and all the
North American
colonies
except
Lower
Canada were
provided
for in
this
fashion,
partly
out
of
regard
for
the
Loyalists.
The other method was
by
allowing governors
to draw
bills on
the
British
Treasury,
which
paid
them
out
of
the
annual
grant
for
army
extraordinaries.
This
practice
was born
of neces-
sity
during
the
Seven
Years'
War as
the
only
way
to meet
emergencies,
and it
was
continued
afterward
out
of
convenience.
To
prevent
abuses,
certain
regulations
were laid
down
in
1764
and
again
in
1785.
It was
used in the
ceded
islands,
the
Leewards,
Barbados,
the
old
Province of
Quebec,
and
Lower
Canada.
In
every
colony
the
court fines
and other
casual
revenues
were
at
the sole
disposal
of
the
executive,
except
in
Jamaica.
This
income,
how-
ever,
never
amounted
to
much;
nor
did
quit
rents or
other
land
revenue
payable
to the
Crown
give
much
security
to
the
local
administration.
But there
was another
custom
of those
days
that
did
make it
unneces-
sary
to
apply
to
the
assemblies for
grants
that
would
have
given
these
bodies
more
power.
Public
officials
from
high
to
low
had
a
legal
right
to collect
fees
for
services
they
performed,
and
with
few
exceptions
they
availed
themselves
of
this
right
to
the
utmost.
While
fees
were
only
an
incidental
part
of
the
emolument
that
governors
received,
they
were
a
large part
and
sometimes
the
whole
of
what
other
public
servants
got;
and
while
some
fees
might
be
charged
to
the
govern-
ment,
the
bulk
came
from
the
private
purses
of
the
community
in
return
for
specific
services
rendered.
By
one
or
more
of
all
the
above
arrangements,
the
permanent
civil
list in
almost
every
colony
was
pretty
well
provided
for;
and
this
con-
stituted
the
main
cost
of
government,
which
was
then
expected
to
do
little
more
than
preserve
law
and
order.
Here
and
there
in
the
West
Indies
an
assembly
might
refuse
to
vote
some
salaries,
but
the
recalci-
trant
members
made
their
own
public
pay
for
this
parsimony
by
having
to
put
up
with
incompetent
functionaries,
such
as
judges
who
had
never
studied
law
even
as
amateurs.
In
any
colony
it
was
not
the
government
but
their
own
constituents
who
suffered
if
assemblymen