Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
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The
Long
French
War
g
5
parties.
The
British
agreed
to
return
the
whole
harvest
of
conquests
their
sea
power
had
gathered,
except
Trinidad
and
Ceylon,
captured
from
the
Spaniards
and
the
Dutch
respectively;
while
France
not
only
regained
her
colonies
but
also
remained
mistress
of
Belgium,
the
Netherlands,
the
left
bank
of
the
Rhine,
Switzerland,
and
Italy.
Napoleon
had
gained
for
France
position
and
power
such
as
even
the
ambitious
Louis
XIV
had
never
attained,
but the
more
he
got
the
more
he
wanted.
As
he
later
admitted,
he
could
not
keep
the
peace
because he
had
to
keep
his
glory
warm.
Like
Hitler in
a
later
day,
the
demon
within
him
would
not
let
him
stop.
Having
set
his
foot on the
path
of
aggression,
the
unscrupulous
master
of
France
pressed
on,
characteristically
trying
to
browbeat
England
with
blustering
threats
and with
accusations
that
she
was
a
warmonger,
until in
the
spring
of
1803,
seeing
that
he
was
bent
on
war,
she
declared it.
Never
again
could
England
trust
Napoleon.
Never
would she
make
peace
with
him.
She
would
fight
till he
was
done or
she
went
under.
It was
a
life
and
death
struggle
for
her,
and he
realized it
was for
him
too.
Through
the
dozen
years
of war
that
followed,
he
saw
in
England
his
principal
foe,
the
one
power
that he
had
to
destroy
or
it
would
destroy
him.
One
by
one
the
continental
powers
that
dared to
face
him in
the
field
had
to
bite
the
dust
until in
five
years'
time he
brought
the
whole
of
the
continent,
including
the
Russian
Empire,
within
his
system.
But
he
knew
he
could never
consolidate
it
so
long
as
he
could
not
subdue
England.
He
knew
that,
while
she
continued to
defy
him,
his
vassal
states
would look
to her
for
aid
and
get
it.
Her
submission
was
essential for
their
submission.
To
hold them
down
until he
could
bring
her
down,
he
had
to
press
more
and
more
heavily
upon
them,
until
the
time
came
when
he
had not
enough power
to
maintain his
position.
With the
directness
of
genius,
Napoleon
concentrated
his
attention
for the
first two
years
of
the
war
upon
plans
for a
gigantic
invasion
of
England.
At the
Channel
ports
nearest
to
that
island,
he
collected
the
largest
army
that
western
civilization
had
ever
seen
and
built
enough
flat-bottomed
boats to
carry
it
all across
the
narrow
Strait
of
Dover
so
many
boats
that
they
had to
be
piled
in
tiers
when
not
in
use for
training
maneuvers
on
the
beaches.
All he
needed
to
get
this
enormous
army
to its
destination,
where it
could
have
made
short
work
of
any
resistance,
was
command
of that
little
body
of
water
for
a
couple
of
days
or
so;
this he
calculated
was
possible
by
concentrating
at
that
point
a
French fleet that would be
just
sufficient
to
hold off the
86
CHAPTER
six:
British
navy
during
the short
time
necessary
for
the
operation.
This
concentration
upon
which
everything
turned
was
the
one
thing
he
could
not
accomplish
because
British sea
power
prevented
him.
And
now
it
is
time we
turned
to
examine that vital
factor.
It
was British
sea
power
that,
in the
last
analysis,
dragged
Napoleon
down to his
doom,
and he never understood
it.
This
greatest
master
of
land
warfare,
in
which
he
could read
his
enemy's
mind
like an
open
book and
could
even make his
enemy
do
what he
wanted,
was
utterly
baffled when he
applied
himself
to the
problems
of
warfare
on
the sea.
That was not his
element.
Indeed,
until
Captain
(later
Admiral)
A.
T.
Mahan
began
to
expound
the
influence
and
principles
of
sea
power
in
1890,
they
were clothed
in
mystery;
and
it
is
rather
curious that the
British,
the
greatest
maritime
people
of all
time,
had
to wait
for
an American
naval
officer
to
explain
the
secrets of
their
own
power.
His
classical
works,
by
the
way,
have
been
translated
into
many
languages
and
have
been
very
much
better known
and
appre-
ciated
outside the
United States
than in
it.
He
is an
outstanding
modern
example
of
the
prophet
"not without
honor
save
in
his
own
country."
Mahan it was
who revealed
that,
from the
ancient
wars
between
the
Greeks
and
the
Persians,
the
history
of
western
civilization
has
been
profoundly
changed by
conflicts at
sea
more
often
than
by
the
much
more
frequent
clash
of arms on
land. It
was sea
power
that
saved
the fine flower
of Athenian
civilization from
being
destroyed
in
the
bud
by
oriental
despotism.
It
was
sea
power
that
gave
Rome
the
victory
over
Carthage.
It
was
sea
power
that
enabled
Islam
to
sweep
across northern
Africa,
over
Spain,
and
up
into
France.
It
was
sea
power
that
transferred
the
fight
between
Christian
and
Moslem
back
into the east with
the
Crusades.
And
so it
continued
down
through
the
ages
to
our
own time.
The
French
Revolution
was
fatal to
French
sea
power,
which
was
nearly
a
match
for
the
British
in
the
summer
of
1789,
the
proportion
being
roughly
five
to
six.
Then
the
French
navy
lost
almost
all its
officers
and
all
its
discipline,
and
this
loss
was
much
more
serious
than
that
suffered
by
the
land
forces.
The
navy
was
a
much
more
highly
trained
technical
service;
it
required
a
much
longer
training;
and
this
training
could not
be
conducted,
like
that
of
a
new
army,
safely
out
of
reach of
the
enemy,
for it
had
to
be
on
the
open
sea.
Therefore,
though
the
French
still
had the
ships,
which
were
often
better
than
the
British,
the
companies
that
manned
these
ships
were
now
inferior
as
fighting
units,
despite
all
French
efforts
at
recovery.
Spain
was
the
next
The
Long
French War
8 7
strongest
power
at
sea,
with
about
half as
many good
ships-of-the-line
as
Britain,
and
the
Dutch
were
not far
behind
the
Spaniards.
It
will
thus
be
seen
that
the
British
had
something
to
think
about
when
the
French
got
the use of
these
two
navies
in addition
to
their own.
Unlike
the continental
fleets,
the
Royal Navy
of
Britain
grew
in
size
and
efficiency
as
the
war
progressed;
and
at
this time
it
had
the
supreme genius
of
its
history:
the
naval
genius
that balances
the mili-
tary genius
that
commanded
France,
the man whom
Mahan
has called
the
embodiment
of sea
power.
In
all
English
history
by
far
the
greatest
national
hero is
Horatio Nelson.
This
son of
a
country
parson
entered the
navy
when he
was
twelve
years
old
in
1
770,
the
year
after
Napoleon
was born
and
during
the
next
twenty-odd
years
his
training,
spread
widely
over
the
ocean,
was
comparatively
uneventful. The
proverbial
sailor,
he
was
always
falling
in
love,
and once
in the
West Indies he went so far as to
marry
a
young
widow,
but it was
not a
serious affair. More
serious,
he won
the
confi-
dence
of
those above
him and the
devotion of
those under
him. When
war came
in
1793,
the
Admiralty
fitted out
a fleet
for the Mediter-
ranean.
There Nelson
served as
captain
of a
battleship,
and it
was
during
an attack on
Corsica in 1794 that
he
lost
his
right
eye,
which
kept
him off
duty
for
just
one
day.
But it was not
until
after
Spain
had deserted
England
and
joined
France,
forcing
the British
to aban-
don
the
Mediterranean,
that
the
first
major
battle was
fought
at sea
and
Nelson
leaped
into fame.
Nelson
was the
deciding
factor
in the four
most
important
naval
engagements
of the
whole
war,
and
this was
the
first
of
them. It
was
the
Battle of
Cape
St.
Vincent,
off
the southwest
corner
of
Portugal,
which
occurred
in
February
1797
in the midst
of
England's
darkest
hour.
Half the
effective
Spanish
ships-of-the-line,
twenty-seven
in
all,
having
emerged
from
the
safety
of
the
Mediterranean,
fell
in
with
fifteen
British
under
Admiral
Jervis.
Despite
his
numerical
inferiority,
he flew
at
them.
The
Spaniards
fled
and all
might
have
escaped
had
not
Nelson,
who
commanded
a
ship
in
the British
line,
caught
them
by
a bold stroke.
To
execute
it he had
to
disobey
a
general
order
of the
admiral.
At
the
end
of
the
day,
which
he thus
saved,
Nelson
was
accused
of
disobedience
by
a
jealous
rival;
and
the
wise
Jervis
curtly
replied:
"It
certainly
was
so,
and if
you
commit
such a breach of
your
orders,
I
will
forgive
you
also."
The
Spaniards
had
lost five vessels
and
the British
none,
but
much
more
important
was the
revelation of
the
fact
that the British
had
nothing
to
fear
from
the
Spaniards.
The
88
CHAPTER
six:
rejoicing
in
Britain
was
immense,
and
Nelson
became
a
rear-admiral.
A
year
and a half
later,
Nelson
won
another
triumph,
which
raised
him
high
above all
his
contemporaries.
In the
spring
of
1798,
the
Admiralty
ordered a return to the
Mediterranean,
with
Nelson in
command,
to check
the
great
maritime
expedition
that
Napoleon
was
preparing
in
Toulon.
Unfortunately
the order
was
given
a
fortnight
too late
to
prevent
the
escape,
and when
Nelson
arrived
to
find the
French
gone
he
knew not
whither
heavy
weather
had blown
away
his
frigates,
the
eyes
of
his fleet. Nelson had
Napoleon's
uncanny
power
of
knowing
what his
enemy
would do.
Though
most
of
the
reports
had
credited
the French
with
aiming
their
blow
at the
British
Isles,
he discarded
this
possibility
because the
prevailing
winds
would
prevent
them from
making
for
Gibraltar,
and
he calculated
that
Egypt
must be the
objective. Straight
as
an
arrow
he
sped
to
the
mark,
and
he beat
the
French
to
it. When he
found
no trace
of them
there,
he
feared
he had made
a
fatal blunder. So back
he doubled
to
Sicily,
where he
got
information
that
convinced
him he was
right
in
the first
place. Again
he
pressed
all sail
for
Egypt.
Being
still without
scouting
vessels,
he had twice
passed
his
prey.
This time
there was
no
escaping
him. In the Battle
of the
Nile,
on
1
August
1798,
the French
admiral
was
killed
and his fleet was annihilated.
Napoleon
and his
army
were
marooned
in
Egypt,
while
Nelson's fleet
was
at
last
free
to
scatter and
"mop up"
the
Mediterranean. Nelson had
changed
the
whole course
of
the
war.
Incidentally,
on the
way
back,
he met his
Cleopatra
in
Lady
Hamilton,
the
wily
wife of die
aged
British
ambassador
in
Naples;
but Nelson
was
more a Caesar than an
Antony,
for he
did not
lose
his head with his heart.
Nelson's third
great
exploit
was to
break
open
the
Baltic
in
the
spring
of
1801.
Though
he
was now a
vice-admiral,
considerations
of
rank made
him
second
in
command of this
expedition.
Yet
everyone
knew
who was the real
leader,
and it is
characteristic
of
the
confidence
reposed
in
him that
when he
sought
instructions
from
the
head of the
Admiralty
the latter
replied,
"Damn
it,
Nelson,
send
them
to
the
devil
in
your
own
way."
The
Danes
had
erected
strong
fortifications at
Copenhagen
to
keep
the
British
out,
and
when
Nelson
began
the
attack
according
to
his own
plans,
his
superior
thought
it
such
a
hopeless
task
that
he
signaled
to leave off
action.
Nelson
refused.
Turning
to the
captain
of his
flagship,
he
remarked
that
he
had
a
right
to
be
blind
sometimes,
and then
to
the
amusement
of
all
around
he
put
the
glass
to
his
right
eye
and
exclaimed,
"I
really
do not
see the
signal/'
Contrary
The
Long
French
War 89
to
the
popular
interpretation
of this famous
incident
that
led
to a
famous
victory,
he was
not
playing
the British
bulldog
hanging
on
with
his
teeth. He was
using
his brain.
The
movement
of his
force
was
so
confined
by
shoal water
and
the
direction of
the wind
that he
could
not
obey
without
facing
almost certain destruction.
The fourth
and
final
triumph
of
Nelson
was the Battle
of
Trafalgar,
just
outside the Strait
of
Gibraltar.
Long
and
highly
important
ma-
neuvers
preceded
it,
and in
these Nelson's
part
was
as decisive
as
in
the
battle
itself.
Napoleon
thought
to
cover
his invasion
of
England
by
an
intricate
scheme,
the main
features of
which
were
quite simple.
His
various
fleets,
the
chief
of
which were
in Brest
and
Toulon,
would
dash
out
and
away
as
if
bound for the East
Indies.
Much of the
Royal
Navy
would
then
go
off on this
wild-goose
chase
around
Africa,
while
the
French
would
secretly
rendezvous
in
the
West Indies
and return
to
seize
temporary
control of
the Strait of
Dover.
The
Brest
fleet never
got
out,
however,
and the British
were not
to be deceived.
Admiral
Villeneuve
escaped
from Toulon
in
the
spring
of
1805 and
by
a succession
of
lucky
breaks not
only
eluded
Nelson,
then com-
manding
in the
Mediterranean,
but
also
got
clear
of Gibraltar
long
before
Nelson
could follow.
Then,
with
unerring
judgment,
Nelson
penetrated
the
enemy's design,
chased
the
French
to
the
West
Indies
and back
again,
once more
outstripping
them.
Villeneuve,
on
returning,
had
a stiff brush
with
the British
and did
not
dare make for
Brest to
release
the
French
fleet
there.
He
put
into
Spain,
on the northwest
corner,
where
he
effected
a
junction
with
a
Spanish
squadron
on
which
Napoleon
counted,
for
Spain
was
again
the subservient
ally.
In the
middle
of
August,
Villeneuve
sailed
with
his
enlarged
fleet.
But
in-
stead
of
steering
north,
to
carry
out
Napoleon's plan,
he
headed south
for Cadiz
because
the
swarming
British left
him no alternative.
This
move turned
the
crisis,
for when
Napoleon
heard
of it he
could
wait
no
longer
lest
he be
caught
in
the rear.
Pitt had
recently
organ-
ized
the third
coalition,
and
already
Russian and
Austrian
armies,
for
which
England
paid
so
much
per
man
per year,
were on
the move.
The Grand
Army
that had
been
destined
for
England
was
suddenly
snatched
away
from
the Channel
ports
and marched across
the conti-
nent
to
smash
Austria
at the
great
Battle of Ulm on
20
October 1805.
Not
until
the
following
day
was
the Battle of
Trafalgar
fought,
which
may suggest
that
it was
unnecessary.
It
was for
the
French,
but
not for
the
British.
Until
a decision was
reached at
sea,
Napoleon
could
resume
his
plans
for
an invasion
of
England.
The
reason
for the
90
CHAPTER
SIX:
battle
was Villeneuve's
desperation.
He knew he was
a
ruined
man
because
the
wrathful
emperor
held
him
responsible
for
wrecking
the
great
plan
to
conquer
England.
So the
French admiral
came out
of
Cadiz
with
thirty-three
French
and
Spanish ships-of-the-line
to
face
Nelson,
who
was
waiting
for
him
with
twenty-seven
British
ships.
About
noon,
when the
opposing
fleets
were
almost
within
range,
a
string
of
flags
on
Nelson's
ship Victory
fluttered out a
signal
that
was
greeted
with loud
cheers and has ever
since been celebrated:
"England
expects
that
every
man
will
do
his
duty."
In
a
few
hours
the
battle
was
finished,
and so was the
combined
sea
power
of France
and
Spain.
But
Nelson
lay
dead
in
the
cockpit
of his
flagship,
having
been
carried
below
when shot
through
the
spine.
For three hours he
had
lingered
in
agony
until he knew
the battle was
won,
and
then
he died.
The
leaden
coffin in which
the
body
was
brought
home
was cut
up
and
distributed as "relics
of
Saint
Nelson,"
as
a
gunner
of the
Victory
reverently
called
them;
his
flag,
when
about
to be
lowered
into
the
grave,
was
suddenly
rent in
pieces
by
the
sailors,
that
each
of them
might
preserve
a
precious
fragment
as
long
as he
lived.
What
these
sacred relics were
to
those
rough
but
honest
men,
Nelson's
flagship
Victory
has
been
to the
whole
nation.
To
our own
day
his
ship
has
ridden at
anchor in
Portsmouth
harbor,
whence
he
sailed for
his
last
and
most
glorious
fight.
National
heroes
are the
greatest
asset
a
coun-
try
can
have,
and
England
is rich in
possessing
Nelson. To
all
English
people
he
still
lives,
for
the
truly
great
hero
never
dies.
He
is
immortal,
living
on
in
the
lives
of his
countrymen
whom
he
inspires
from
genera-
tion to
generation.
Nelson's
final
triumph
changed
the
course
of
history.
As
Mahan
has
pointed
out,
"Moscow
and
Waterloo
are
the
inevitable
conse-
quences
of
Trafalgar."
This
battle
shattered
all
possibility
of
Na-
poleon's
conquest
of
England,
and
without
the
conquest
of
England
his
empire
was
doomed. He
knew
he
had
to
take
the
citadel
of
sea
power
in order
to
hold his
empire
together;
therefore,
when
he
saw
he
could
not take
it
by quick
assault,
he
determined
to
take
it
by
slow
siege,
by
the
steady pressure
of his
great
land
power.
Hence
his
Conti-
nental
System,
which
only
hastened
his
own
downfall
by
stretching
his
power
until it
broke.
The
Continental
System
aimed
at
the
economic
strangulation
of
England.
Theoretically
this
was
possible,
because
her
most
valuable
market
by
far
was
on
the
continent
and
there
Napoleon
was
supreme.
If
he
could
only
shut
her
out
of
this
market,
he
might
choke
her
into
The
Long
French
War
91
submission.
Such
was
the
plan
that
Trafalgar
forced
upon
him as the
only
means
of
encompassing
the
fall of
his
archenemy.
It was
impossible
to
enforce
this
system
without
causing widespread
distress
on
the
continent,
because
Britain
possessed
a
practical
monop-
oly
of
supplying
the
people
of
Europe
with
some
very important
arti-
cles.
Her
monopoly
sprang
partly
from her
unique
industrial
develop-
ment
and
partly
from
her
naval
supremacy.
The
list
included
products
of
her
own
manufacture,
such
as
textiles,
and
also the
produce
of her
own or
conquered
possessions,
sugar
being
a
prominent
item.
Even
Napoleon
himself
could
not
refrain
from
violating
his
own
system,
and that rather
frequently.
On
one
occasion he
procured
from Britain
a
consignment
of
fifty
thousand
greatcoats
for his
troops.
How
could
Napoleon
seal
the
whole continent?
How
could
he
deprive
all the
people
of
Europe
of
British
goods?
He
might clamp
his
system upon
France,
but
what
about
the
other
countries? He
had to
persuade
them
to
adopt
and,
what
was
much more
difficult,
to
enforce
his decrees that
outlawed all
trade with
Britain,
whether in British or
neutral
ships.
How could he
persuade
them?
Only
by
force. Thus he
was
led
on,
step
by step,
to
extend
his
power
and to make it
more
oppressive
everywhere.
By
1808,
having
got
even
Russia
into his
system
after
thoroughly
defeating
Czar
Alexander
in
the
field,
he saw
only
one
area
on the continent
where British
goods
were
leaking
in
badly.
That
was the
Iberian
peninsula,
and he could not
tolerate the
breach.
To
plug
the leak
effectually,
he
at
once overran
the
peninsula
with his
armies.
There
Napoleon's
empire
began
to crack. There
occurred the first
national
uprising
on
the
continent
to
shake
off the
yoke
of the
con-
queror.
By overthrowing
the
governments
of
Spain
and
Portugal,
he
opened
the
markets
of
all
Latin America
to the
British,
affording
a
welcome
relief from
the
pressure
of the Continental
System;
and
he
gave
the British
a
foothold
on
the mainland from
which
he was
never
able
to
dislodge
them
because
he had overreached
his
own
power.
That
this
was what
he had
done,
soon
became
more
and
more
apparent.
In
the
following
year,
1809,
the
Spanish
revolt
encouraged
Austria
to
rise
again.
To
suppress
Austria for the
fourth
time he
had
to
withdraw
troops
from
Spain,
with
the result that
the
revolt
there,
aided
by
the
British,
flamed
up
worse
than
ever.
When
the
sup-
pression
of
Austria
freed
him on
the
east,
he threw
mightier
forces
into
the southwestern
peninsula
to crush
the
national
resistance
and
expel
the invader.
He
smothered
the
rising
and
pushed
the
British
92
CHAPTER
SIX:
back to
Lisbon,
but
he
could not
penetrate
the
strong
lines
of
defense
prepared
by
Wellington.
While
Napoleon's army
was
held
there,
he
heard
that his
Continental
System
had
broken
down
in
the
east,
with
the
defection of
Russia. That
was
many
times worse
for
him
than
leaving
a
little
corner of
Portugal
to
the
British,
and so
he
turned
to
force
his
system
back
upon
Russia in 1812.
Thus
Trafalgar
drove
him
into
a
course
of action
that involved
him
in
ever-widening
difficulties.
In the
mighty
struggle
between the
sea
giant
and
the land
monster,
neutrality
was
quite impossible.
It
had
disappeared
from
Europe,
and
no
nation
that
had
dealings
with
Europe
could
preserve
it.
Hence
the
American War
of
1812,
to
which
more
attention
will be
given
in
another
chapter.
Here
we
need
only
observe
its
place
in
the
larger
setting.
Though
the
United
States
had
plenty
of
justification
for
de-
claring
war
on Britain
and
for that
matter
against
Napoleon
too
the
British
could
see
things
then
only
in
relation to
the much
greater
European
struggle
that
had so
long
absorbed them and
seemed
to
be
approaching
its
climax.
What
they
saw
was the
United
States
stabbing
them in
the
back
to
rob
them
of
Canada
and
relying
on
Napoleon
to
finish
them
off
when he
had
finished
Russia.
Naturally
they
were
very
bitter
at
the
time;
but
they
soon
got
over
it. The
United
States
was
so
unprepared
to
fight,
and
contained so
many
people
who
would
have
preferred
to
fight
on the
other
side,
that the
War
of
1812
never
amounted
to much.
Though
it
is
still
well
remembered
in
the
United
States
and better
still
in
Canada
it
has
long
since been
so
forgotten
on the
other
side
of the
Atlantic
that
today
only
a
very
small
percent-
age
of
even
well-educated
Englishmen
have
ever
heard
of
it.
What
pushed
it
into
the
background
almost
immediately
was
the
victory
over
the
greatest
power
that
had
ever
risen
on
the
European
continent.
To
return to
our
story,
Napoleon
had
to
withdraw
many
of
his
best
troops
from
Spain
for
his new
Russian
campaign,
with
the
result
that
the
British
penetrated
Spain
while
he
invaded
Russia.
There
he
com-
pletely
lost
the
largest
army
he
ever
commanded;
and
though
he
rushed
back
to
France
and
collected
another
army,
he
had
left
his
strength
behind
him.
Prussia,
having
waited
years
for
this
opportunity,
leaped
to
arms
and
joined
the
advancing
Russians.
Austria
soon
joined
too.
Meanwhile
Wellington,
the
British
"Iron
Duke,"
having
developed
the
most
efficient
army
then
in
existence,
completed
his
liberation
of
Spain
and,
mercifully
dismissing
his
insurgent
Spanish
forces
at
the
border,
pushed
on
into
France.
That
was
in
1813,
when
Napoleon
lost
every-
thing
east
of the
Rhine.
In
the
following
spring,
the
armies
of
the
re-
The
Long
French
War
93
formed
European
alliance,
again
cemented
with British
gold,
closed
in
on
Paris,
and
Napoleon
abdicated
under
pressure
from his
marshals.
Napoleon's
overthrow
in
1814
had to be
repeated
in
1815,
when
he
escaped
from
Elba,
his
first
place
of
exile,
and
France
rallied to
him
again.
The
end
came
on
June
18
just
south
of
Brussels,
at Water-
loo,
where the Duke
of
Wellington
and his
peninsular
veterans won a
resounding victory.
Again
the
emperor
abdicated,
and
this
time
he
fled
to
the
west coast
of
France,
fee
hoped
to
escape
to the United
States,
and one is
tempted
to
speculate
on what
might
have
happened
had
he
managed
to reach
it.
But
British
ships
were
waiting
for
him,
and
when he
heard
that the
allies
had
again
occupied
his
capital,
he
threw himself on
the
mercy
of his
archenemy by
going
on
board
H.M.S.
Bellerephon.
So
began
his
long
last
journey
into exile at
St.
Helena.
The
terms
of
peace
were
dictated to France
as
they always
are to
any enemy
that
is
completely
crushed,
which France had to be. Prussia
demanded
the
dismemberment
of
France,
beginning
with the
northeast
corner and
the
provinces
of
Alsace
and
Lorraine. This
is
what
would
have
happened
to the
prostrate
country
if the
governments
of the
allied
powers
had been
democratic
such
was
the
popular passion
against
France,
particularly
after
she
had torn
up
the
treaty
of
1814
by
wel-
coming
the
conqueror
back
again.
Even the
majority
of
the British
cabinet
favored this
policy
for a
while.
The
greatest living
Briton,
whom Waterloo
had made the
most
influential
person
in
Europe
the
Duke of
Wellington
would
have
none of
it, however,
and
this
was decisive. The
policy adopted
was
security
without
vengeance.
France
was
occupied
for three
years
the
treaty
allowed five
by
an
international
army
commanded
by
Wellington;
a moderate war
indem-
nity
was
imposed,
for the collection
of
which he
was also made
respon-
sible;
and the
country
was left with the
boundaries
of
1
789.
More
than
that,
she
got
back
almost
everything
she had lost overseas.
Britain
was the
only great power
that
gave up any territory
held
at
the
end of
the
war,
and what she restored was enormous. It
was
almost
all the harvest
of
possessions
reaped
by
her
sea
power
during
the
Napoleonic struggle.
She
kept only
a few
little French
islands,
Mauritius and
the
Seychelles
in
the
Indian Ocean
and
Tobago
and
St. Lucia
in
the
Caribbean;
the
Danish
Heligoland,
which
she
ceded
to
Germany
in
1890;
the
Ionian
Islands,
which she
presented
to
Greece
in
1864; Malta,
an invaluable base
in the
Mediterranean;
and
three
former
Dutch
possessions,
British
Guiana,
Cape
Colony,
and
Ceylon,
for
which
she
paid
the
Dutch
6,000,000.
She
restored
to France
her
94
CHAPTER
SIX
West India
Islands,
her
fishing
rights
and
possessions
on
the coast
of
Newfoundland,
and
her
trading
posts
in
West
Africa
and in
India.
She
restored to
the
Dutch
their
enormously
wealthy
empire
in
the
East
Indies.
Britain
could well
afford to
be
generous.
1
She
had
got
something
no
treaty
could
give
her,
even
by way
of
compensation.
Her
prestige
was
the
greatest
in the
world.
She
had
never
bowed
the knee to
Napoleon,
and
she
had
saved
Europe.
Her naval
supremacy
was
absolute so absolute
that
another
world
war
was
impossible
for a
century.
1
For a discussion
of
why
Britain was
so
generous
see
infra, Chapter
IX.