Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
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Fragments of
Empire
35
the
rest
on
the
mainland
of
what is
still
Nova
Scotia.
For
the
most
part
they
were
city-bred
folk
from
the
northern
colonies,
chiefly
New
Eng-
land,
and
a
high
proportion
of
them
had
belonged
to
the
upper
class
of
the
society
they
left
behind
judges,
doctors,
lawyers,
and business
leaders. It
has been
said
that
a
list
of
them
reads
very
like an
honor roll
of
Harvard
graduates.
They
had
lost
all
their
property
but
they
retained
their
education
and
their
spirit.
It
was this
select
stock that
really
made
the two
provinces
of
Nova
Scotia
and New
Brunswick,
which have
sup-
plied
an
extraordinarily
large
proportion
of the
professional, political,
and
business
leaders
of
the
Dominion of
Canada.
In
1784 New Bruns-
wick was
cut off
from
Nova
Scotia
and
made a
separate colony
with
its
own
governor,
council,
and
assembly.
At the same time
Cape
Breton
was
severed
too,
but
it
had a
much
smaller
population
and was not
given
an
assembly.
It
was
finally
reannexed to Nova Scotia
in 1820.
In 1783 the
old
Canada,
whose
official name
from
1763 to 1791
was the
Province
of
Quebec,
had
a
settled white
population
of about
125,000
twice as
many
as
all the rest
of British
North
America and
more than
twice as
many
as
all
the
British
West
Indies and
it was
almost
entirely
confined within
the limits
of
the
modern
province
of
Quebec.
This
population
was
also
solidly
French
and
Roman
Catholic,
except
for an
English-speaking minority
of
scarcely
more
than
10,000.
A third of
the
latter had fitted
themselves into the
life of the
towns
of
Quebec
and
Montreal
during
the fifteen
years
before the Revolu-
tion.
The
remaining
two
thirds were
Loyalist refugees
who
were wait-
ing
to be
assigned
land on
which to live. In the
following
year
these
loyalists
received land
and
became the first
body
of
non-French
people
settled on
the
soil
of
the
country.
Almost
all
the French
drew
their
living
directly
from
the
land,
even
the
seigneurs.
These
seigneurs
were often
little
better off than
their
sturdy
tenants,
the
habitants,
whose feudal
payments
were
a
mere
pit-
tance,
for frontier conditions had
emasculated the
feudal
system
intro-
duced
by
France
in the
beginning.
With
the
growth
of
population,
the
holdings
of
the habitants were
squeezed
together
along
the banks
of
the
great
St.
Lawrence
and
a
few miles
up
its
tributaries,
giving
the
colony
the
appearance
of
a
continuous
village
that stretched for
nearly
250 miles.
Its
upper
end
was
just
above
Montreal,
where
the
rapids
had checked
the climb
of settlement.
In the other
direction the
line
of
cottages gradually
died
away
below
the
city
of
Quebec,
where the
climate
grew
harsher and
the land
poorer. Though
the
habitant and
his
family
produced practically
everything
they
consumed,
Canada had
36
CHAPTER
THREE:
a
thriving
commerce,
for
Montreal
was
the
North
American
capital
of
the
fur
trade,
and
this trade
had
to
he
fed
with
imports
to
supply
the
Indians
with
the
manufactured
goods
they
demanded
in
exchange
for
furs.
But
more
interesting
and
much
more
important
was
the
peculiar
problem
posed
by
Canada
and
how
this
problem
was
being
handled.
The national
character
of
the
colonial
empire
was
fundamentally
altered
by
the Revolution.
Now
it contained
practically
an
equal
number
of French
and
English
settlers.
Here
lies
the
problem,
which
began
with
the
acquisition
of Canada
by
the
treaty
of
1763.
Hitherto
the
empire
had
grown
gradually
by
more
or
less
peaceful
expansion
and
the
settlement
of
Englishmen
overseas.
An
occasional
conquest
had added
a
foreign
colony,
such
as
Dutch
New
York and
French
Acadia;
but
it had
always
been
a
young
and
small
one,
to which the
conqueror
had been able
to
give
an
English
character.
When
Britain
conquered
Canada,
it was
already
an
old
colony,
only
one
year
younger
than
Virginia,
her
oldest;
it
was
a
big
one,
with
a
European
popula-
tion of
some
65,000;
and
it
was
utterly
alien
in
language, religion,
laws,
political
institutions,
and culture.
Never
had
the
empire
swal-
lowed
anything
like this.
How
could
it
be
assimilated?
The
problem
was
so
foreign
to British
experience
that
officials
in
London could
not
grasp
it when
they approached
the task
of
providing
for
the
administration
of the
newly
conquered colony. They
were
also
blinded
by
two
expectations
that,
if
realized,
would
have
obviated
the
necessity
of
facing
the
problem. They
had
grounds,
not
wholly
unrea-
sonable,
for
believing
that Canada
might
soon lose
its French
character
and
its
Roman
Catholic
religion.
The
migration
of New
Englanders
was
changing
the face
of
things
in
Nova
Scotia,
and
London
looked
for
a
much
larger
movement of
surplus
population,
English-speaking
and
Protestant,
from the
old
colonies
into
Canada.
Then
too,
the
Catholic
Church
in
Canada was
without a
head,
its
bishop
having
died
on the
eve of the
French
surrender;
and without a
bishop
to
ordain
priests
the church
might
die with
its
clergy.
Moreover,
reports
from
the St.
Lawrence
confidently
asserted
that the
people
might
easily
be
converted.
So
the
British
government
proceeded
to
deal
with
Canada
on the
assumption
that
it
would
conform
to the
traditional
pattern
of
an
English
colony.
This
assumption
soon
turned
out
to
be
quite
false.
The
French
of
Canada,
fearful of
their
fate
under
the
rule of an
alien
conqueror
and
a
heretic,
instinctively
rallied
behind
their
church,
their
only
possible
shield;
and
the
lands
of
Canada,
though
officially
advertised
in
the
Fragments
of
Empire
3
7
newspapers
of
the
old
colonies,
attracted no
settlers
from the south
or
anywhere
else.
The
only
British
immigrants
were
those
who
went
to
engage
in
trade,
a
pushing
urban
minority.
To this
day
that
part
of
the
country
is still
overwhelmingly
French
and
Roman
Catholic.
It
was
impossible
to
govern
Canada as an
ordinary English
colony,
and
the
attempt
to
do
it
was a
tragic
blunder.
The
penal
laws of
the
mother
country,
which
expressly
applied
to all British
possessions,
rigidly
excluded all
Roman
Catholics from
public
office and
from
voting.
These
English
laws
made
a
mockery
of
English
forms
of
gov-
ernment
in
Canada. The
establishment
of
these forms
began
with the
appointment
of
a
governor,
a
council,
and other
ordinary
officials,
all
but
the chief of
whom
the
governor
had
to
pick
from
the handful of
adventurers who had
followed the
army
into
the
country
and
hoped
to
make their
fortunes
out
of
it.
The
governor
was also directed
to call
an
assembly
as soon as
possible,
but this was too
much for
him. The
surviving
senior
military
officer after the
capture
of
Quebec
in
1759,
he
had become
a warm
friend of the
Canadians,
and he would
never
subject
them to an
assembly
elected
by
and
from this
little band of
newcomers.
His
resolute
refusal threw
these newcomers
into such
an
uproar
that
they
soon forced the home
government
to recall
him,
only
to find that his
successor,
Guy
Carleton,
was
equally
resolute and
more
capable
of
bridling
them.
But
if
an
assembly
was
impossible,
so
also
was the situation created
by
the
governor's
refusal
to
call
one,
for the
colony
was
thus
left without
a
legislature
6
and without
a
revenue. The
penal
laws
also struck
at the
jurisdiction,
the
revenue,
and
the
property
of
the
Roman Catholic
church
in Canada
the institution
most
pre-
cious to
the
vast
mass of the
population.
Another
impossible
situation
arose
in
the
administration
of
justice,
where courts modeled after
those
of
England
were to
apply English
law
to
a
society
that
had been cast
in
the
very
different
mold of
Roman
law.
The
change
from
French to
English
criminal
law caused little
trouble
it affected
only
a few
per-
sonsbut
the
attempt
to
substitute
English
for French civil law
pro-
duced
hopeless
confusion
and
threatened
all the
property
in
the
colony.
Almost
at once
the
inequity,
or
iniquity,
of
the whole
governmental
system
prescribed
from
England
started
a reaction
that
began
with the
governor
in
Quebec
and
spread
to
the
government
in
London. The
governor
picked
councilors
and
judges
who
sympathized
with the
Cana-
6
Though
the council
operated
as
such,
it had
not
been
empowered
to do so.
38
CHAPTER
THREE:
dians,
and
the home
government
shrank
from
forcing
him
to
call an
assembly.
He backed
the
eager
prayers
of
the Canadians
for
a
bishop;
and
the
home
government,
after
swallowing
hard,
winked
at
the con-
secration
of their candidate
and
his
return
to
Canada
from
France,
where
the
ceremony
was
quietly
performed.
The
governor
counte-
nanced some continuance
of
the old
laws,
and
the
home
government
disavowed
the intention
of
sweeping
them
all
away.
He
objected
stoutly
to the exclusion
of Canadians
from
the
administration
of
their
own
country,
and the
home
government
promised
to
open
the doors of
office to
them. More
and more
it became
evident
that
this old
French
colony
could
not be
made
over into
a new
English
one
and
would have
to be
given
a
constitution
that
fitted its
character.
Only
thus
could
the
Canadians
become
loyal
British
subjects;
otherwise
they
would
yearn
after their
old mother
country
and
seize the
first
opportunity
to deliver
Canada
back
to France.
That such
an
opportunity
might
come at
any
time
was
then
clear. Britain and
France
were
still chronic
foes and
any
year
might
see them
at war
again.
The
urgency
of the
Canadian
problem
also
grew
with
the
gathering
of
the storm that
was soon to
burst
in the American
Revolution.
The
solution
adopted
was the
Quebec
Act of 1774. It
provided
the
colony
with a
legislature by empowering
the
council,
which it
enlarged
to become more
representative,
with
authority
to
pass
laws for the
country.
This
authority
did not extend to taxation
and was limited in
other
ways
as
well,
because it
was to be exercised
by
an
appointed,
not
an
elected
body.
At
the same
time
another act of
parliament,
the
Quebec
Revenue
Act,
imposed
customs duties
and
license fees to
pro-
vide
the
colony
with a
revenue.
The
rejection
of an
assembly
caused
much heart
searching
in
England,
much bitterness in
the
British
minority
on
the St.
Lawrence,
and much
alarm in the
old
colonies;
but
it
is difficult
to see how the
British
government
could have
decided
otherwise. The little
British
minority
in
Canada,
who
had
clamored
for an elected
chamber,
would not
have
one
at
all
unless
they
could
control
it,
which was
an
intolerable
condition.
As
for the
French
population,
an
assembly
was an
English
institution
which
they
neither
understood
nor
desired;
and
even
if
they
had
wanted
one,
they
were
not
to be
trusted with
it,
for
they
were
newly conquered
subjects
whose
loyalty
to Britain
was
doubtful in
the
event
of
another
French
war.
Though
an
assembly
was
thus
out
of the
question,
the
British
govern-
ment was
anxious
to
give
the
Canadians a
legislature
that
would
satisfy
them.
The
enlarged
council was to
include
some
of
their
leading
men.
Fragments
of
Empire
39
This
of
course
meant
admitting
Roman
Catholics,
which
the
govern-
ment
had decided should
be
a
general principle
in the Canadian
public
service.
Therefore,
by
the
Quebec Act,
Roman
Catholics
gained
politi-
cal
emancipation
in
Canada
more than
half
a
century
before
they got
it
in
the
mother
country.
The act also
confirmed
the
clergy's
old
legal
right
to collect
the tithe but
only
from
their
own
people
and
the
right
of
their church to
retain its
property.
This
the
act did
by
re-
storing
the
civil
law as it was
on
the eve of
the
conquest,
which covered
all
property
in
the
country.
English
criminal
law
was
retained.
Having
regard
for
the
exasperatingly
complex
and
novel
problem
that
the
conquest
of Canada had thrust
upon
Britain,
the
Quebec
Act
stands
out
as one
of the
greatest
pieces
of
statesmanship
in the
history
of
the
empire.
It
embodied
a
complete
reversal
of
traditional
policy.
Though
the French
of
Canada could
never
become
English,
they
might
develop
into
loyal
British
subjects
if
Britain
won
their hearts
by guaranteeing
them
their
religion,
their
laws,
their
customs,
by
opening
public
offices
to
them
on
equal
terms
with
British-born,
and
by giving
them
a
government
that would understand
them and
protect
their
interests
in
short,
by freely
according
to
them
the
liberty
to
be
themselves.
Such
was the vision
that
inspired
this
remarkable
act of
parliament.
The Canadians
were
the first non-British
people
to taste
this
new collective
liberty
which we
may
well
call
British,
to
distin-
guish
it
from
the
old
English
liberty
of the
individual,
because
this
larger
liberty
became
a basic
principle
of
the
greater
British
Empire
of
the
future
and
a
major
reason for its success.
As
British
officials had
to
wrestle for
years
with the
problem
of
Canada
before
they
worked out
this solution
of
1774,
it is
not sur-
prising
that
the whole business
was
beyond
the
comprehension
of
people
in
the
old
colonies;
and as the latter
were
then
suffering
from
British
statesmanship
at its
worst,
they
were all
the
more
incapable
of
understanding
this act of
British
statesmanship
at its best.
That the
same
government
at
the same
time
should show
so much consideration
for
strangers
within
the
imperial
family
and so
little
for old
members of
it still
puzzles
some
people,
who conclude
that the
good policy
was not
so
good.
But the
opposite
conclusion,
that the bad was not
so
bad,
is
just
as
logical
and
as
inconsequential,
for
such
glaring incongruity
is a common
failing
of
governments
all
over the
world,
even in
our own
enlightened
age.
Very
naturally, though quite
mistakenly,
Americans
at once
saw
in the
Quebec
Act
the
design
of
a
dastardly
blow aimed
through
Canada
at the back
of
the
old
colonies.
Therefore,
at
the
very
40
CHAPTER
THREE:
outset,
the
Revolution
thrust
a
fiery
arm
up
into
Canada,
the
only
surviving
colony
into
which
it could
reach.
If
the
American
forces
that
laid
siege
to
the
fortress
of
Quebec
at
the
close
of
1775
had
been
able
to
take
it
and
hold
it,
there
can
be
little
doubt
that
the
old
Province
of
Quebec
would
then
have
become
part
of
the
United
States.
But
the
invaders
were
not
strong
enough
to
take
it,
and
if
by
some
accident
or blunder
they
had
got
it,
they
could
not
have
held
it
against
the
powerful
expedition
that
arrived
from
Britain
in the
spring
of
1776
and
quickly
swept
them
out
of the
coun-
try.
Yet
this is
not
the
whole
explanation
of
why
Canada
survived
the
American
Revolution
as
a
British
colony.
If
the
newly
conquered
Canadians
had
risen
in revolt
when
the
invasion
gave
them
a
chance,
there
might
have
been
a different
story
to
tell;
but
they
preferred
to
remain
neutral,
because
they
had
less
love
for
the
Americans
than
they
had
for
the
British.
As
the
scope
of
the
war
widened,
it was
something
else
that
governed
the fate
of Canada.
The
entry
of
France
into
the
war
shook
the founda-
tions
of
British
rule
in
this French
colony
and
simultaneously
raised
the
prospect
of
a
combined
French
attack
by
sea
and
American
attack
by
land
to
conquer
Canada.
Whenever
such
a
plan
was
proposed,
how-
ever,
one
ally
or
the other
vetoed
it. It
was
first
put
off
by
American
suspicion
that
it would
establish
French
control
of
the St.
Lawrence,
which
would
work
with
Spanish
control
of
the
Mississippi
to throttle
the
United
States. When
the
American
desire for Canada
overcame
this
suspicion
and
revived
the
project,
France
vetoed
it twice fear-
ing
it would
establish
the United States
on
the St. Lawrence.
The
French
government
calculated
that
Canada
in
the
hands of Britain
would
keep
the Americans
dependent
on
France
just
as,
when in the
hands
of
France,
it
had
made
them
cling
to
Britain. As neither
ally
would
help
the other to
get
it,
preferring
to let
Britain
hold
it,
she
kept
it.
Thus
the alliance
that
rendered Canada almost
fatally
vulnerable
was
politically,
though
not
physically,
incapable
of
striking
the
com-
bined
blow
that
might
have
torn it from
the
British
Empire.
At the close
of
the war
the
Canadian
problem
entered
upon
a
new
phase.
The settlement
of the
Loyalist refugees upon
lands
above the
region
inhabited
by
the French was
the
beginning
of what
grew
to
be
Ontario. In
contrast
to
those of the Maritime
Provinces,
these
Loyal-
ists
were
mostly
backwoods farmers
from
the
old
colonies,
just
the
people
to
open
new
country;
and
they
were
only
the
vanguard
of
a
swelling migration
of
pioneers
from the
American
frontier,
which
they
Fragments
of
Empire
4
1
pulled
north of the
border.
At
last,
a
quarter
of
a
century
after
the
conquest,
a
rapidly
growing
English-speaking
population
appeared
beside the
French
but
separated
geographically
from
them.
The
colony
was
assuming
a
dual
character
that
called for
a
radical
revision
of the
Quebec
Act,
but
the
loud
cries
that
arose in
Canada
were so
conflicting
that the
government
in
London
was
again puzzled
by
what should be
done
in this
strange
colony.
The British
mercantile
minority
on the lower St.
Lawrence
once
more clamored
lustily
for
an
assembly.
They
knew
that the
great
majority
of
the
electorate
would be
French;
yet they thought
they
could
manage
the
chamber,
for
they
counted on the solid
backing
of
the
new settlers
in
the
southwest
and on
winning
enough
support
from
the
French.
Indeed,
they
got
many
of
the
latter
to
join
in
their
chorus.
On
the
other
hand,
the
seigneurial
class
shouted
against
an
assembly,
and
they
too
gathered
a
large
following.
Most
of
die French
in
each
camp
seem to have been
stirred
up
by
the leaders and
to have had
no
clear notion of
what
they
were
doing.
Then there
were
the
Loyalists
on
the
upper
St. Lawrence
and
beyond.
They
demanded
a
separate
government
for their
part
of the
country,
while the
opposing
camps
below
united
in
denouncing
this
demand.
The consideration
that
finally
brought
the home
government
to
a
decision
was
finance. The
proceeds
of
the
Quebec
Revenue
Act
had
fallen
far short of
what the
colony
needed,
and
the
governor
had to
meet
the
growing
deficit
by falling
back
upon
the method
used
before
that
act,
which
was
to
draw bills on
the
British
Treasury.
This
could
not be
continued
indefinitely,
for
the
taxpayer
in
the mother
country
would
object.
Nor could
parliament
impose
additional
levies
by
a
repetition
of what it had
done
in 1774.
It had
made this
impossible
in
1778
when,
in a vain
effort
to
stop
the American
Revolution,
it had
enacted
that
thenceforth
it would
lay
no tax
on
any
colony except
such
duties
as
might
be
necessary
for
the
regulation
of
trade,
in
which
event
the
net
proceeds
were
to be
turned over
to
the colonial
legisla-
ture
for
disposal
as
it
might
please.
The
only
way
left
to
provide
what
was
needed
was
to
have
the
people
tax themselves
through
their
elected
representatives.
An
assembly
had to
be
established.
This con-
clusion
led
to
another:
that
the
colony
would
have
to
be
divided
because
one
assembly
for
the
whole
would
be
unworkable.
The
country
was
too
large,
and
the
difference
between
the older
French
society
on the
lower
St.
Lawrence
and
the new
English-speaking
society
above
was
too
great.
Therefore,
in
1791,
an
imperial
order
in council
42
CHAPTER
THREE
divided the
country
into Lower and
Upper
Canada,
and
parliament
endowed each
with a
legislative
council
and
a
legislative
assembly.
7
The
only part
of the
Quebec
Act
that
was
repealed
was its
provision
for the
council.
Each
of
the
two Canadas was thus
freed
from
the
other so
that it
could maintain
and
develop
its
own
individuality.
7
The
passage
of the
act
preceded
the
issuance of the
order
in
council. The
concession
of
an
assembly
to Lower
Canada
is in
striking
contrast
to
the exclusion
of the French
inhabitants
of
Grenada in 1784
from seats in the
island
legislature,
which had
been
opened
to
them. This
exclusive
measure was the
work
of their
British-born
fellow
colonists,
who
were
embittered
by
the
attitude
of
the
French
inhabitants when
France
recovered the
island
for
the
duration
of the war.
CHAPTER
IV
Salvaging
What
Was
Left
of
the
American Wreck
IT
HAS BEEN
the
fond
belief
of
many
Americans
that
their
Revolu-
tionary
ancestors
taught
Britain a
wholesome lesson
on how
to
govern
colonies,
but
the
lesson that Britain
drew from
the
wreck
of the
first
empire
was the
very opposite
of
what
these
Americans
have
supposed.
Instead
of
loosening
the
bonds of
empire,
the mother
country
tried
to
tighten
them in order to
preserve
what was
left;
and
the reason
for
this
was
quite
natural. The
great
reduction
in the size of
the
empire
had
wrought
a
corresponding
change
in the character of
it. From
being
an
empire composed
chiefly
of
colonies
that
were
populous,
wealthy,
and
politically
mature
enough
for
the fullest measure of
self-
government,
it
suddenly
became
an
empire
of
small,
poor,
and weak
colonies
that were
unable to
stand on
their own feet.
From
maturity
it
was
plunged
back into
immaturity.
The
grown-up
family
was
gone,
and
the
mother
was
starting
over
again
with a
family
of
little children.
But
she was not
the same
parent,
for
a
great
change
had been
wrought
in
her too.
Something
had been
burnt
in
upon
her mind and heart.
It
was
the
fear
of another
American
Revolution,
which would rob
her
of still
more
colonies
as
they grew
up.
This
fear
inspired
a
reactionary
colonial
policy
that lasted for two
generations.
The
home
government
was
determined
to avoid
the
mis-
takes that
had
produced
the
tragedy
and that
might,
if
repeated, repro-
duce
it. What
were these
mistakes,
and
how could
they
be
summed
up?
To
the
British official
mind
the
answer
was
simple
and
obvious.
It
was
first
letting
the colonies
develop
practically
free of
control
and
then
attempting
to
tax
them.
Never
again
would
the
mother
country
tax
a
colony.
Never
again
would
she
let
her
children
get
out
of
hand.
44
CHAPTER
FOUR:
These
two resolves
then
became
cardinal
principles
of
colonial
man-
agement.
The
first,
which
had
already
been
proclaimed
by
statute
in
1778,
was of course not
reactionary
at
all;
but
the second
was
wholly
so. How were
the
colonies to be
kept
in
leading
strings?
By
falling
back
upon
the
traditional methods
that
had been
laxly applied,
and
by
making
them
more efficient:
particularly
the
old
colonial
system,
which
would
confine the trade of the colonies
to the
empire,
and the
old
machinery
of
government
in
the
colonies,
which
would
ensure
political
control from London.
The
old colonial
system,
to which Britain
clung
as
a
potent
means
of
holding
her
fragments
of
empire,
survived
the
American Revolution
by
a
narrow
margin.
It
seemed
to have
expired
during
the
peace nego-
tiations,
when
the Americans
suggested
and
the
British
agreed
that
there should be
complete
commercial
reciprocity
between the
United
States
and
the British
Empire.
The Americans were loath
to lose their
privileged
position
in
the
British
imperial
trading
system,
for most
of
the
world's trade
was then
tied
up
in this
and other
similar
systems.
They
also feared French
and
Spanish
intrigues
to combine with the
British to
exclude
the
United States
from
the interior of the
continent.
That
was
why
John
Jay,
not
long
after
he
joined Benjamin
Franklin
in
Paris,
held
out
to
the British
the
tempting
offer
of
the
commercial
empire
of
America
if
they
would be
generous
in
drawing
the
new
international
boundary.
The
British
were
no less
alarmed
over the
possibility
of
losing
the best
part
of their
trade
along
with the
best
part
of their
empire;
and
they
were
most
anxious
to
pull
the
United
States
away
from
the
alliance
with
France,
the
ancient foe
of
Britain.
In
their
mutual
eagerness
for
a
lasting peace
and
reconciliation,
both
American
and
British
negotiators
were
of
one
mind
in
believing
that
any
lingering
seeds
of
discord
should be
smothered
by
a
generous
application
of
reciprocity.
Therefore
the
fourth
article of
the
terms
they
drafted
in
October
1782
provided
for the
free
navigation
of
the
Mississippi
from
its
source to
its
mouth,
mutual free
navigation
of
other
British and
American
waters,
and
free
trade
between
the
United
States
and the
British
Empire.
This
interesting
article
would
have
buried
the
old
colonial
system
in the
peace
treaty.
Why
did
it
not?
In
the
first
place,
more
careful
examination
in
London
revealed that it
would
make
Britain
give
much
more
than
she
would
get.
It
would
turn
the
navigation
laws
inside
out
to
the
injury
of
British
trade
and the
ruin
of
British
shipping
by
leaving
the
British
to
bear
all
the
burden
of
these
laws
while
allow-