Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
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During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
1
3 5
domestic
enemies
had
already
leveled
against
them and
were to
renew
in
the
years
to come.
The
chain
of
reactions set
up by
the French
Revolution
in
North
America
was
by
no
means
confined
to Lower
Canada.
It
profoundly
affected
the
whole of British
North
America. The French declaration
of
war
in
1793
helped
to
pull
Britain back from the
verge
of
war
with
the
United
States
over
the
division
of the North
American
continent.
Brit-
ain
had
not
given
up
all the
territory
that she
had
signed
away
in
1783.
In
agreeing
to
run
the
international
boundary through
the
Great
Lakes,
she
neglected
to
protect
her
Indian allies who
occupied
the
region
south
of
this line.
On
learning
that their lands had
been
included
in the
United
States,
they
accused
the
British
of
betraying
them,
and
they
continued
the
war on their own
account;
while
the
British,
out
of re-
gard
for
them,
retained
the
garrisons
established
in
strategic posts
along
the
south
of the
lakes,
thereby
violating
their own
peace
treaty
and
aggravating
the
native
war
with
the
United
States. It
was
an
ugly
situation
that
grew
uglier
as
the
years passed
the
years
of
the so-called
"critical
period"
of tie
young
Republic,
when
there
were
grave
signs
that
it
might
break
up. By
1 793 the Indians
were still
fighting
savagely
and
successfully
against
American forces
sent
to subdue
them,
and
the
British
garrisons
still
held
the
keys
of
the
American
Northwest
with
orders
to
fight
if attacked.
London
had no fear
of such
an
explosion,
which
would
blow
up
the
boundary
agreement
of
ten
years
before and
lead
to
a
new division
of
the
continent.
At this
juncture,
France
un-
wittingly
came
to
the rescue
of
the United
States.
The
American
people,
now sure
of
an
ally,
shouted
for
war. President
Washington,
still
alarmed
by
the
possible
outcome,
dispatched
John
Jay
to
London
where
he found
the
government,
with
a French
war on its
hands,
less
willing
to face
an
American
war. The
result
was
Jay's
Treaty
of
1794,
by
which
Britain
promised
to
evacuate
the
posts
in return for
an
American
promise
not to
interfere
with the
British fur
trade in the
United
States.
Anglo-American
relations,
so vital
to British North
America,
thus
passed
a
dangerous
crisis;
and for
the
next few
years
they
grew
steadily
closer,
again
thanks
to
the French
war.
Jay's
Treaty
infuriated
the
government
in
Paris,
which
regarded
it
as the
betrayal
of
France
by
the
United
States;
and
the
consequent
reactions between
these two former
allies
tended to
push
the United
States
into the
war
on
the
side
of
Britain.
The
reconciliation
effected
by
the Franco-American
treaty
of
1800 reversed
the movement
of
the United
States,
the Peace
of
Amiens
136
CHAPTER
NINE:
checked
it,
and the
breach
of this
peace
in
1803
would
have
drawn
the
United
States
and
Britain
together again
if it had not
been
for
the
Louisiana
Purchase.
The
effects
that the
Louisiana Purchase
had
upon
the
history
not
only
of
the
United
States
but also of
the
British
Empire
in America
are
so
important
and
far-reaching
that it is difficult to
appraise
them
fully.
Here
we
should
note
that
it was
the first
step
the United States
took
toward
the War
of 1812
quite unconsciously.
This
was
as
Napoleon
planned
it.
That Louisiana
was then for sale was
utterly beyond
the
imagination
of
the American
government
and
people.
What
they
wanted,
and that
very
badly,
was
only
one
little corner of
it,
New
Orleans,
because it
controlled the
navigation
of the
Mississippi.
Spain
was
closing
this outlet
and France
threatened to
shut it
tight,
with
results that
would be
disastrous
to
the
United States.
Therefore
the
American
government
sought
to
buy
New
Orleans
and,
if
this
was
impossible,
was
prepared
to seek
an
alliance with
Britain
to
pull
the
plug
from
the
mouth of the
great
river. At the
same time
Britain
was
preparing
to
seize this
strategic spot
as
soon as
hostilities with
France
broke
out
again,
in order to
keep
it
out
of
French
hands
and
ultimately
to turn it
over
to the
United
States.
Such was
the
situation
when
Napo-
leon
surprised
the
American
mission
in Paris
into
purchasing
a
whole
empire
in
order to
buy
a
city.
It was
one of the
shrewdest
deals
of
his
career.
By
selling
what he
had
not
yet got
and could
not
hope
to
keep,
he
placed
this rich
prize
forever
beyond
the
reach
of his
great
foe;
he
strengthened
the United
States,
his
prospective
great
friend and
coun-
terweight
against
Britain;
and he
inserted
a
wedge
to
split
the
two
English-speaking powers
apart.
The
War of
1812,
which
left its
mark
upon
British
North
America
and
through
British
North
America
upon
British
policy,
was
a
by-
product
of
the
titanic war in
the
Old
World.
Belligerents
are
no
re-
specters
of
neutrals,
especially
when the
former are
powerful
and
the
latter
are
weak.
In the
life-and-death
struggle
between
Britain
and
Napoleon,
neither
side
could
tolerate
any
neutral
right
that
might
aid
the
other,
and
so
between
them
they subjected
the
United
States
to
intolerable
pressure.
Neither
side
would
yield
to
American
protests,
even to
gain
an
American
alliance,
which was
offered
in
the
vain
hope
of
playing
one off
against
the
other;
for
they
equally
scorned
the
poten-
tial
resistance of
the
United
States,
which
therefore
had
abundant
provocation
for
making
war
on
both.
This
was
unthinkable.
The
only
possible
escape
from
such an
impossible
position
was to
make
war
on
During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
137
one
or
the
other.
Which
would it
be?
Napoleon
finally
tricked
the
American
government
into
a
declaration
against
Britain,
but
we can
see
this
end
coming
independently
of his
deception.
Britain,
being
in
command
of
the
sea,
pressed
much
harder
than France
upon
American
neutral
rights;
and
France,
having
no foothold on
the continent
after
the
cession of
Louisiana,
was
much less vulnerable
to
American
attack.
Contrary
to
a
persistent
tradition,
British
tampering
with American
Indians
was
not a
cause of the war.
True,
there was
growing
trouble
with
the western
tribes;
but
this
was of American
origin
and
a careful
examination
of the
Canadian archives
reveals
that British
officials,
using
what
influence
they
still
had,
were
doing
their
best
to
check
it.
Another
common mistake
has
been the
assertion
that
the
war
was un-
necessary
and
might
have been averted if
there had
then
been
an
Atlantic
cable,
because
Congress
voted
for
war
not
knowing
that
Brit-
ain
had
just
repealed
the
offending
orders
in council.
As a
matter
of
fact
the
repeal
was not
effective,
for it was loaded
with conditions
that
the
American
government
could
not
accept.
Moreover,
Britain
refused
to
budge
on
the other
great ground
for
quarrel,
the
right
of
search
and
impressment.
Indeed,
there is now
little
doubt
that
the
war
would
have
come
long
before
it did
if
the United
States
had been
better
prepared
for
it.
The
issues on
which
the
United States
went
to
war
were
maritime,
and
yet
it is a
notorious
fact
that the
maritime
interests
of
the
country,
which
were concentrated
in New
England,
were
almost
solidly opposed
to
the
war.
The
apparent
contradiction,
which
has
given
rise
to
the
erroneous
but
plausible
theory
that the
effective
cause
of the
war
was
an
American
desire
to
conquer
Canada,
is
easily
explained
and
has
an
important
bearing
on
the conduct
of
the
war.
New
England
faced
economic
starvation
unless
her
ships
were
free
to
ply
the
ocean,
and
was therefore
willing
to submit
to the
conditions
imposed
by
the
mistress
of
the seas.
In
the
eyes
of
the
South,
whose
superior
voting
strength
carried
the
resolution
for
war,
New
England
would
betray
the
country's
honor,
which
had
to
be
maintained.
Also,
the South's
bread
was
buttered
on
the
other
side.
Being
engaged
in the
production
of
staples
that
were
mostly
consumed
on
the
continent
of
Europe,
the
South
faced
economic
suffocation
if
it could
not
get
its
goods
through
the
British
barrier
to
the
markets
controlled
by
Napoleon.
Here
was
another
reason
for
championing
the
maritime
interests
in their own
despite.
To
New
England,
on
the
other
hand,
it was the
South
that
was
betraying
the
honor
and
ruining
the
prosperity
of
the United
States.
138
CHAPTER
NINE:
The
war
itself
was
one of
the
strangest
ever
waged,
and
stranger
still
have
been
the
conflicting
accounts
of
it
in the
school
texts
of
Canada
and the
United
States,
which
until
recent
years
taught
the
children on
each side of the
line
that
their
country
won
the
war.
The
nature of the
war
at sea
was
simple.
No
battle
between
fleets
was
possible
because
the
United States
navy
was
then
negligible
and
the
Royal Navy
in-
vincible.
So
each side
struck
at
the
other
in the
only
way
it
could,
the
Americans
by raiding
and
the British
by
blockade;
and
the
one
was
as
futile as the other
was decisive.
Americans
have
fondly
cherished the
memory
of
single-ship
engagements
in which
their
government's
frig-
ates
captured
a handful
of
British
war vessels
and
American
privateers
gathered
a
harvest of
British
merchantmen,
but
these
engagements
had
no
military
value
because
the
consequent
reduction
of
British sea
power
and ocean-born
commerce
was
infinitesimal.
From
early
in
the
conflict
the
British blockade
of the
American
coast,
with the
exception
of
friendly
New
England,
grew
steadily
tighter,
paralyzing
the
Ameri-
can
economy
and
thereby
strangling
the
ability
of
the
American
gov-
ernment
to
continue
the war on
land;
and,
what has sometimes
escaped
attention,
this
effect was
nearing
completion
when
the fall of
Napoleon
released
a
mighty
British
army
of veterans
for use
in America. Nor
should
it be overlooked
that,
as
a last
resort,
British
sea
power
could
have been
applied
to
make the
United States
disgorge
even a
consider-
able
land
conquest.
Here
was
an ultimate
guarantee,
not
called
upon
because not
needed,
that
British
North
America
would
survive the war.
It was not
at
sea but
on
land that
the war was a
strange
affair.
In
the United
States
there had
been
great
confidence,
and in
England
grave
fears,
that American forces would swarm over
most of
British
North
America,
conquering
it
easily.
At
the outbreak
of hostilities the
British North
American
colonies
had less than five
thousand
regulars
in scattered
garrisons,
and
they
could
get
no
reinforcements
from
the
mother
country
while she
was locked
in
a
death
grapple
with
the
European
monster.
These
colonies had a
total
population
of
scarcely
half
a
million,
as
against
seven
and three
quarters
million in
the
United
States;
and of
this
half million
the
majority
were
French,
who were
now
openly
resenting
the rule
of their
British
masters,
while
the
minor-
ity
contained
a
large
proportion
of
Americans,
who
formed the
bulk of
the
Upper
Canadian
population.
Moreover,
British
North
America
was a
thin line
of settlement that
was
not
even
continuous,
and it
stretched for
a
thousand miles and
more
along
an
indefensible
border.
Here was
the
vulnerable
part
of the
great
power
that
the
United
During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
1
39
States
had
challenged,
but
the
United States
was
incapable
of
seizing
it.
New
England's
bitter
opposition
to
the
war
shielded
the
Maritime
Provinces
and withheld
the
support
of
the
most
solid
part
of
the
Repub-
lic.
This,
together
with
the
British
blockade,
crippled
the
American
war
effort,
while
an
almost
unbelievable
incompetence
in
Washington
weakened
this
effort still further
and misdirected
it
completely.
Instead
of
being
all focused
in a
drive on
Montreal,
the
capture
of
which
would
have
delivered
everything
above,
the
military
resources
at
the
disposal
of
the
American
government
were
dissipated
over
the wide
region
of
the
Lower
Lakes,
where
there
should
have been
no
fighting
at all.
Such
weakness
and
folly
redressed
the balance
on land.
The
extent of
the
American
conquest
was
the
little southwest
corner
of
Upper
Canada,
whereas
the
British were
able
to take
and hold
the
whole
territory
between
the Great Lakes and the
Mississippi.
This
small
American
war,
thus
brought
to
a
stalemate,
was
turned
upside
down
by
the
collapse
of the
big
European
war
in
1814.
Now
the
military
issue
was
not
whether
the
United
States
would
conquer
some
of
British North
America,
but
whether
Britain would
reconquer
some
of
the United
States.
The
government
in
London
was set
on
this
reconquest,
partly
as a
punishment
for
the attack on
the
empire
in
its
hour
of
peril
and
partly
to
gain
a more
defensible
North
American
frontier.
The
great
Duke
of
Wellington
was
invited to
undertake
the
task,
and
a
large
army
of
his
veterans
was sent
across
the Atlantic.
But
Wellington
persuaded
his
government
to end
the
war in another
fash-
ion.
He
suggested
that
he
might
soon
be
wanted
in
Europe,
a
possibility
that
became
a
reality
in the Hundred
Days;
and
he
frankly
stated
that
a
conquest
of
any
value
to
British
North
America
would
require
con-
siderable
time and
effort.
It
was
better,
he
advised,
to
make
peace
right
away by
accepting
the
old
frontier.
This
was done
six
weeks
later,
on
Christmas
Eve,
1814,
when
the
Treaty
of Ghent
was
signed.
So,
in
a
way,
France
came
to
the
rescue
of
the United
States
for
a
third
and
last
time.
The effect of
the War
of
1812
upon
British
North
America
was most
evident
in
Upper
Canada.
The
war
suddenly stopped
the
peaceful
American
invasion
of
that
province,
and
it
checked
a
renewal
of this
invasion
afterward,
for
it
opened
British
eyes
to
what had
been
happen-
ing.
It also
stifled
the
potentially
American
character of
the
Upper
Canadian
population
by purging
it of
the
small
minority
who
were
incorrigible
republicans
and
by
corraling
within
the British fold
the
great
majority
who were
not.
These
changes
draw added
significance
140
CHAPTER
NINE:
from the
fact
that
the
tide
of British
immigration
to
this
province
was
relatively
small
until
fifteen
years
or so
after the outbreak
of
hostilities
in
America. Then
it
might
have been
too late for
these
newcomers,
themselves
not
very
self-conscious
politically,
to
impress
a
British
character
upon
Upper
Canada
if the
war had
not
cut,
as
with
a
knife,
its
growing
connection with the United States.
Taking
British
North America as
a
whole,
the
war
accentuated
its
British
spirit
by
reinforcing
the anti-American
prejudice
that
dates
from
the
American Revolution and the settlement of
the
Loyalists.
To
this
very
day
Canadians have
not been able to
forget
the
fight
to
save
their
country
from the
United
States,
and
they
react
against
the
anti-
British
prejudice
that
American memories of
this
war
have
strength-
ened in
the
United
States.
Nevertheless,
the
experience
of
the war
brought
into
clear relief a
fundamental condition
that
made
another war between
the
British
Empire
and the American
Republic
something
to
be
avoided
at
almost
any
cost.
The
American commissioners at
Ghent
pointed
it
out
in
a
reply
to
the
British
demand,
later
withdrawn,
for
a
drastic
revision
of
the
boundary.
The
British said
they
must have it
in order to
give
secu-
rity
to British
North
America,
exposed
as
it
was to
an
American
attack
by
land.
The
reply pointed
out
that this was not
necessary
because
Britain
already
had
ample
security
in
her
undoubted
ability
to strike a
more
damaging
blow on
the
Atlantic seaboard of
the
United
States.
That this balance
of
vulnerability governed
the
relations
of the
United
States
with British
North America and
through
it the
relations
between
Washington
and
London,
becomes
more
apparent
if
one
glances
at
the
relations between the United
States and
its
neighbors
on
the
southwest,
where
there was no
such balance.
Thus did the revelation of
the
War
of
1812
dictate
permanent peace
between
the
British
Empire
and the
United
States
until the
latter
became a
world
power,
when
world
considerations confirmed
it.
The British West
Indies
were
much
more
affected
by
the French
Revolution
than
by
the
long
French war
that
followed.
The
terrible
explosion
in San
Domingo,
which
the
explosion
in
France
touched
off
in
1791,
struck terror
into the
hearts of the
British
island
planters
and
put
enormous
profits
into their
pockets.
The
western
third
of San
Domingo,
which
belonged
to
France,
has been
called the
jewel
of the
French
colonial
empire.
It
was
the richest
tropical
colony
that
any
country possessed
until this
revolution
ruined it
by
releasing
perhaps
the most
hideous race war in
history
and
by
producing
chronic
anarchy.
During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The Western
Hemisphere
141
The
whites
who did
not
escape
were
exterminated.
Some
of
the
lead-
ing
fugitives
sought
a
refuge
in
England,
and
there
they begged
for
intervention
that would make the island
British.
The
British
lent
their
ears
but
not
their
arms until
after
the
outbreak
of
the
Anglo-French
war
in
1793.
In
the autumn
of
that
year
an
expedition
from
nearby
Jamaica
invaded
the turbulent
Negro
republic,
gaining
a
promising
foothold;
but
the
yellow
fever
wrecked
this
army
and others
sent
after
it
until
their
miserable
remnants
were
withdrawn
from
a
much-
shrunken
foothold
in
1798.
Whatever
danger
there was that
the
dreaded
black
contagion
might
spread
to
the
British
islands was
checked
by
the
dispatch
of
naval
and
military
forces
from
England
to eliminate
French
power
from
the
West
Indies.
Jamaica,
however,
had
a bad
scare
in
1795,
when
the
flame
of
revolt
burst
forth
in
its own
mountains.
There
dwelt
the
Maroons,
descendants
of
runaway English
slaves
and,
more
particularly,
of
the
Spanish
slaves
who
had fled
thither
when the
English
took
the
island
nearly
a
century
and
a half
before.
They
were
savage
outlaws
who
defied
all
attempts
to subdue
them until
nearly
1740,
when
their
free-
dom
was
guaranteed
and
they
were settled
on
reserves
under
their
own
chiefs
assisted
by
white
superintendents.
Now,
in
1795,
occurred
the
last
Maroon
war,
in which
some but
not all of
these
wild
men
joined,
and
as
in
previous
generations
English
troops
could
make little
headway
against
the rebels
in their
mountain
fastnesses.
Would
this
fire
in
the
interior,
so
much
closer
than
San
Domingo,
which
was
dangerously
near,
drop
sparks
into the
huge
powder
keg
of
the
Jamaican
slave
population?
In
desperation
the
authorities
at
once
procured
effective
fire
extinguishers
from
the
sympathetic
governor
of
neighboring
Cuba
a
hundred
man-hunting
bloodhounds.
These
ferocious
beasts
turned
the
terror
inward,
and
before
the
year
was out
the
rebel
chiefs
concluded
a
treaty
which,
in
return for
the immediate
surrender
of
their
followers,
promised
that
they
would
not be
banished.
Scant
time
was
allowed
for
all
to
make
their formal
submission,
and
several
bands
failed
to
appear
on
the
appointed
day.
Their
delay
served
as
a
pretext
for
the lieutenant
governor
to declare
the
treaty
broken.
When
the
stragglers
arrived
they
were
promptly
imprisoned,
and
shortly
afterward
they
were
deported
to Nova
Scotia,
six hundred of
them.
Feelings
in
England
were
outraged
by
the
inhuman
method
of
cowing
the
rebels,
and
orders
were
sent
out
to
extirpate
from
the island
the whole
breed
of
the
horrible
animals.
From
England pity
also went
out
to
the exiles
in
Nova
Scotia,
where
many
of these
sons
of the
tropics
142
CHAPTER
NINE:
succumbed to
the
harsh
climate
of the
north,
and
in
1800
English
humanitarians
had
the
survivors
removed
to
the more
congenial
en-
vironment
of
Sierra
Leone. So
strong
was
the
storm of
disapproval
in
the
mother
country
that
it
stung
the
Jamaican
legislature
into
publish-
ing
a
set
of official
papers
to
present
a
complete
justification
of the
whole
nasty
business.
The
only
British West
Indian
colonies
that were
touched
by
the
fighting
in the
French
war were
Dominica,
St.
Vincent,
and
Grenada,
which had
been ceded
by
France
in 1763 and
reoccupied by
France
during
the American
Revolutionary
War.
This
reoccupation
had
not
improved
the
relations
between
the French and
the
English
elements
in their
population,
and
the
new war
made
them worse.
In all
three
colonies the French
residents
appealed
to
arms
in the
very year
of
the
Jamaican
Maroon
war. In
Dominica
the
rising
coincided
with
a
French
attack from
Guadeloupe,
but a
small
body
of British
troops,
aided
by
British
planters, quickly repelled
the
attack and
repressed
the
rebellion.
In Grenada
and
St.
Vincent, however,
the
French
insurgents
found
local allies
the free colored
people
in the former and
the
Caribs
in
the
latter
and the
British
had to
fight
with their backs to
the wall
until
they
regained
control
in the
following year.
Meanwhile
civil war
ruined the
crops
and
blighted
the trade
of
these
two
little colonies.
With
these two
exceptions,
the
British
West
Indies were
enjoying
a
period
of
abounding prosperity.
What caused
this
prosperity
was
the
fury
in San
Domingo.
The
normal
production
of this
French
colony
was about
equal
to that
of
all
the British
Caribbean colonies
combined,
and
the
sudden
destruction
of
this
source of
supply
of
tropical
produce
created
a
void that
took
years
to fill.
Prices
on
the
continent of
Europe,
which
had
been
steadily
lower than
those
in
England, jumped
above
them,
pulling
them
upward.
The
British
planter
economy,
which
had
been
barely
saved
from
bankruptcy
by
its
monopoly
of
the
British
market,
was
called
upon
to
help
supply
the
continental market at
scarcity
prices.
As
there
was little new
land
to
be
exploited
in
the
British
West
Indies,
they
expanded
their
production
by
introducing superior
varieties
of
cane,
with the
result
that
their
average
annual
sugar
export
to
the mother
country
increased
by
about
70
per
cent
in
ten
years.
Coffee
production,
particularly
in
Jamaica,
also
leaped up
to meet
the
unprecedented
demand
caused
by
the
destruction of the
plantations
in
San
Domingo.
That
destruction
gave
the
British
West Indies
a
decade
of
high
returns
During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
143
which
injected
new
life
into
their
tottering economy
and
thus
"delayed
its
total
collapse by
a
quarter
of a
century."
2
Great
as were their
profits,
the
British
planters
reaped
nothing
like
the
full
advantage
of
the
havoc
wrought
by
the
blacks
in San
Domingo.
The
British
government
had
to think
of the British
consumer,
whom
it
had
long
forced to
pay
monopoly prices
for
colonial
sugar,
and so it
felt
no
compunction
in
passing legislation
to check
the
export
of this
article
to the continent
as
the
price
soared.
Also,
the
East India Com-
pany
began
to
import
sugar
from
Bengal,
and this in considerable
quantity
despite
a
much
higher duty
than that
charged
on
British
Caribbean
sugar.
This sweet invasion from the
Orient alarmed
the West
Indians,
as
well
it
might,
for
it
demonstrated how much
cheaper
production
was
in
the
East,
and
it
started
an
ominous
argument.
The
Company,
backed
by
British
consumers,
pressed
the
government
to
eliminate
or reduce
the
tariff discrimination
that
favored
the
West
Indian
product.
To this
end
it
was
pointed
out that the British Caribbeans
could not
meet
the
demand
for
sugar
whereas India
could;
that
their demand
for
British
manufactures
had reached
its limit whereas
the Indian
market
was
in-
satiable;
that
their
defense was
a
heavy
burden
on Britain
whereas
native
troops guarded
India
at no
expense
to
the mother
country;
and
that
the
much
longer
voyage
to
India
would
give
more
employment
to
British
shipping,
and
training
to
British
seamen.
Such
reasoning
threw
the West
Indians
on
the defensive.
They
appealed
to
the unwritten
compact
that
gave
mutual
monopolies
to the
mother
country
and the
colonies,
and
they
asserted
that
they
would
be
ruined
if
they
lost
the
existing preference.
Apparently
they
were
in little
danger
of
losing
it,
for
they
were
strongly
entrenched
in
the
political
life
of the mother
country,
public
opinion
there was
decidedly prejudiced
against
the
Company,
and the
producer
mentality
did
not
yield
the control
of
policy
to
the
consumer
mentality
until the
coming
of free trade.
What
the
war added
to
the
British West
Indies
raises
a
nice
question,
The
British
conquered
all
the
French West
Indies
except
San Dom-
ingo,
on
which
they
turned
their
back
in
1798,
all
the Caribbean
possessions
of
the
Danes
and
the
Dutch
when
Denmark
and Holland
were
French
satellites,
and
the
Spanish
island
of
Trinidad
when
Spain
2
L.
J.
Ragatz,
The Fall
of
the
Planter Class
in the
Carilobean,
1763-1833
(New
York,
1928),
p.
206.
144
CHAPTER
NINE:
was a
subservient
French
ally.
At
the
close of
the
long
struggle
Britain
could
have
easily
kept
all these
conquests,
which had
been
in her
pos-
session for
years
and
were
being
exploited by
British
capital;
but
she
did not.
She
deliberately
restored
all the Danish
and Dutch
islands,
Dutch
Guiana,
and
most
of the
French islands
including
the rich
ones
of
Martinique
and
Guadeloupe. Why
did
she
return such
valuable
spoils
of war?
This
question
becomes
very
much
bigger
when we
con-
sider that
she
also restored the Dutch
East
Indies,
which were
worth
many
times
everything
she
yielded
in the
West
Indies. In
magnitude
at
least,
it
was
a
splendid
renunciation.
The
answer
to
the
question
is
simple
and there is
no
mistaking
it.
It is
plainly
set
forth in the
confidential British
government
documents
of the
day
the minutes of the
cabinet
and
the
correspondence
be-
tween the
prime
minister
and
the
foreign
secretary,
who
represented
the
British
government
in
the
peace
negotiations.
It was to
get
a
lasting
peace.
The
government,
said
a
cabinet minute
of
early
in
1814,
"do
not desire to
retain
any
of
these
colonies for their mere
commercial
value
too
happy
if
by
their
restoration
they
can
give
other
states
an
additional
motive to
cultivate the
arts
of
peace."
3
Britain
had
just
signed
a
treaty
with
Denmark,
which then
deserted
Napoleon
for
the
allies,
whereby
all the
Danish islands
were to be
returned
and
Danish
troops
were
taken
into
British
pay.
Sweden
had been
promised
Guad-
eloupe
to
bring
her
into
line,
but
was
later
persuaded
to
accept
a
million
pounds
instead,
which
Britain
paid,
in
order that
this
island
might
be
given
back
to
France.
Why
any
consideration
for
France,
the
scourge
of
Europe
for
a
quarter
of a
century?
First,
to
persuade
her
to
release her
hold on
Belgium,
so
that
it
might
be
annexed
to
Holland
to
make a
strong
kingdom
that
would
stand on
guard
against
France;
and
then,
to
bolster the
restored
Bourbon
monarchy,
which
was
regarded
as
a
guarantee
against
future
French
aggression.
The
restoration
of
the
Dutch
colonies was
to
strengthen
this new
and
greater
Holland,
the
creation
of
which
was
one
of
the
two
cardinal
points
of
British
policy
in
the
peace
settlement.
The
other
was
the
perpetuation
of the
war-
born
alliance
as
an
international
peace
agency.
To
this
end it
was
necessary
to
prevent
mutual
jealousies
from
dissolving
the
victorious
Quoted
in
C.
K.
Webster,
Foreign
Policy
of
Castlereagh
(2nd
ed.;
London,
1934),
pp.
195-196,
There
is no
evidence
that the
British
West
Indian
planters,
whose
desire
to
preserve
their
vested
interest
opposed
them
to
any permanent
acquisition
of
sugar
islands,
had
any
influence
upon
British
policy
in
the
peace
settlement.