Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
The
Establishment
of
the
British
Empire
in
India
1
2
5
may
have
lost
at
Yorktown.
His
appointment
was
a
new
departure,
in
keeping
with
the
India
Act
of 1784
and the
public purpose
in
the
impeachment
of
Hastings.
Not a
Company
man
at
all
but
a
leading
noble
who,
both in
and out
of
parliament,
had
long
devoted
his life to
the
service
of
his
country,
the
new
governor
general
embodied
the new
sense
of
responsibility.
High
above
the reach of
Company
jealousies,
he
had
a free
hand
to
develop
the
administrative reforms of
his
pred-
ecessor.
His
separation
of the
functions of
collector
and
judge
was
only
one of the
many improvements
he
made
in
the
system
of
govern-
ment
of
Bengal,
which
then
became
a sort of model
for other Indian
territories
when,
in
later
years,
they
came under British
rule.
One
reform
that
Cornwallis
effected,
however,
was
to
be
given
little
application
elsewhere because it
did
more harm than
good.
For
this he
was
not to
blame,
because in
this
particular
he was
simply carrying
out
the
orders
of
parliament
and the home
government.
These
orders,
which
called
for a
permanent
settlement
of
the
land
revenues,
were
well
intentioned but
wholly
mistaken. The error
was
not
peculiar.
It
has
been
common in
America, Africa,
and the
East,
wherever western-
ers
have
imported
their
notions of
private property
in
land
into
their
dealings
with
a
native
society.
Private
property
in land was
utterly
foreign
to India.
There
from
time
immemorial
the state
shared with
the cultivator
the
right
to
appropriate
the
produce
of the
soil;
the
Mos-
lem
conquerors
had
added a
third
party,
the
zemindar;
and
it was the
custom,
from
time
to
time,
to
make
a new
assessment
of what the land
could
produce
and
a new division of
the
income.
Now,
on
the
supposi-
tion
that
the
zemindar was the familiar
landlord
who would
develop
his
property
best
if
his taxes were not to be raised
every
few
years,
there
was
a
new assessment and
a
"permanent
settlement" of what
he
had to
pay
to
the
government.
The latter thus
got
a secure
revenue and
put
an
end
to the
possibility
of
oppression
by
its own
agents,
while it
delivered
the
poor peasants
over
to
worse
native
oppression
at the
hands
of
a
new class of
rapacious
landlords.
The other
principle
laid down
in
1784 that
there was to
be no
intervention
in
native Indian
politics
was likewise
good
in
intention
and bad
in effect.
Tipu
Sahib,
the
son and
successor of
Hyder
Ali in
Mysore,
had
made
peace
with
Hastings
in
1784,
but he was
itching
to
break
it. He
threatened
other
native
states
even
more than he
did
the
British
Company,
and
they
appealed
to Cornwallis
for defensive alli-
ances,
which
the
governor
general
had
to
refuse
in obedience to the
act
of
parliament
and
instructions
from
the home
government.
His
126
CHAPTER
EIGHT:
enforced
isolationism,
designed
to
prevent
the
British
from
becoming
involved
in
war,
had
the
very
opposite
result. It led
the
lawless
Tipu
to
think he
had
nothing
to
fear,
and
he
plunged
ahead
on the road
of
conquest.
His
aggressions
provoked
a
two
years'
war
in
which
the
Nizam
of
Hyderabad
and the Mahrattas were
leagued
with the
British,
whose
forces were led
by
Cornwallis
in
person.
It
ended
in
1792
when
Tipu,
besieged
in
his
own
capital,
had
to
sign
a
punitive
treaty.
It
stripped
him
of half
the
realm
which he
and
his
father
had
greatly
expanded,
and this was
divided
among
the
allies. It
also bound
him
to
pay
3,000,000
sterling
toward the
cost of
the
war.
Though
the
British
thus
gained
some
territory,
it was
nothing
to
what
they
were
soon
to add.
The news of the French declaration
of
war
against
Britain in
1793
reached
India about
the time
Cornwallis left
it,
and
at once
French
influence
became
a
disturbing
factor
that
within
five
years
threatened
to undermine
if
not to
destroy
the British
position
in
India.
What
made this
threat
serious
was the
British
doctrine of
nonintervention,
from which
Cornwallis had
departed
only temporarily
and
under
necessity.
His
successor
followed
it
faithfully, thereby
driving
the
rival
native
powers
to the
conclusion that
none
could
place
any
faith
in
the
British
as a
possible
ally
against
attack.
Each
then
turned to
the
French,
from whom
they
got
officers
and
equipment
with
which
they
developed
modern armies
and a
disdain
for the
British.
Such
was
the
explosive
situation
in
1798,
when
Napoleon
sailed for
Egypt
with
India
as one
of his
contemplated goals,
and
there the
tide
began
to
turn with
the arrival of a new
British
governor
general,
who
threw
the
paralyzing
doctrine
to
the
four
winds and
boldly
grasped
the
empire
of India.
This
outstanding
empire
builder was
Lord
Wellesley,
the
eldest
brother
of
Arthur
Wellesley,
the
future
Duke
of
Wellington,
who
accompanied
him
and
supported
him
most
ably
during
the
next
five
momentous
years
in
the
East.
Almost at
once
Lord
Wellesley
broke
the
hostile
ring
by
winning
over
the
Nizam
of
Hyderabad,
who
was
wedged
in
between
dangerous
neighbors
the
Mahrattas
on
the
north
and
Tipu
of
Mysore
on
the
south.
In
return
for a
guarantee
of
British
protection,
the
Nizam
bound
himself
to
support
the
Company
in
war,
disbanded his
French
battalions,
and
undertook
never
to
take
any
European
into
his
service
without
British
consent
a
condition
that
thenceforth
became
the
rale
in
British
treaties
with
native
princes.
By
making
this
pact,
which
became
tighter
as
the
years
passed,
and
by
The
Establishment
of
the
British
Empire
in India
127
inviting
the
peshwa,
or
princely
head
of
the Mahratta
confederacy,
to
renew
the
alliance of
Cornwallis*
day,
the
governor
general
isolated
the
reckless
tyrant Tipu,
whom
only
death could
tame.
Early
in
1799,
this
adventurer announced
his alliance
with
Napoleon
and
the
war
was
on.
It was
over
in a
month,
Tipu
falling
as
the British
stormed
his
capital.
A transformation
of
southern
India
followed,
establishing
British
sway
over
almost
all of
it.
Mysore
was
partitioned,
one
block
going
to
the
Nizam
and
the rest to the
Company,
with
the
exception
of
the
old
nuclear
kingdom.
There
Wellesley
restored
the Hindu
dynasty
whom
the
Moslem
Hyder
Ali
had
dethroned,
and
the
new
ruler
entered into
what
was now
to
be the
typical dependent
alliance
with
the
Company.
The
latter
promised
to
provide
a force
that would
protect
him
and
keep
him
dependent
in return for his
paying
the cost
and
pledging
himself
to
have no
relations
with
any
other
power
without
the
consent
of
the
Company.
Two
years
later
Wellesley
took over
the
Carnatic,
pensioning
the
nawab,
who
had
intrigued
with
Tipu
and
shamefully
misgoverned
his own
people;
and
about
the same
time
he
acquired
Tanjore,
retiring
its
rajah
with
a
tempting
pension.
These additions
of
territory
created
the extensive
modern
presidency
of
Madras,
which
Wellesley
endowed
with a British
administration
comparable
to
that
of
Bengal,
except
that
the
tragic
"permanent
settlement"
of
the revenue
was
not
repeated
in
the south.
Up
in
the
north
the
governor
general
also
made
great
changes,
beginning
peacefully
in
Oudh.
The old
policy
of
using
that
native
state
as
a
protecting
buffer
for
the
British
province
of
Bengal
had
failed,
the
shocking
misgovernment
of
the
nawab
having
reduced Oudh
to such
a
weak
and
disordered
condition
that it invited
attack and
was certain
to
collapse
at
the first
blow. To
avert
this
danger
to
Bengal,
Wellesley
imposed
a
new
treaty
upon
Oudh,
which
greatly
diminished
its size and
completely
reversed
its
position.
The ceded
territory,
in which
direct
British
rule
was
established,
interposed
a barrier
between
the
Com-
pany's
enemies
and
what
was
left
of Oudh. At
the
same time
the
terms
of
the alliance
were
revised
to fit
the
new
pattern
that had
just
been
traced
in
the
treaty
with
the
rajah
of
Mysore.
The
nawab,
like
the
rajah,
was left
free
to
govern
his
state
as
he
might
choose,
but
his
external
relations
were
wholly
under
the control of
the
Company.
By
these
rearrangements
in
the
north,
Wellesley
extended British
power
until
it
nearly
reached
Delhi
and
covered
almost
all the rich
plain
of
the
Ganges.
128
CHAPTER
EIGHT:
The
Mahrattas
were
the one
power
that
might
have
challenged
and
perhaps
checked
this sudden
rise of
the British
Empire
in
India.
But
their
empire,
which
covered
the
great
central
region
of
the
country,
was
periodically
torn
by
internal
strife,
and
this
was
convulsing
them
while the
British
were
husy
on either
side of them.
Their
civil war
reached
a
crisis
in
the
fall
of
1802,
when one of their
chiefs,
Holkar,
defeated
the
combined forces of
his
rival,
Sindhia,
and
his
superior,
the
peshwa,
and
placed
a
puppet
on the latter's
throne in
Poona.
The
fugitive peshwa
appealed
to
Wellesley,
who
refused
to
help
him
unless
he
signed
an
alliance
of
the
kind
just
made
with Oudh
and
Mysore;
seeing
no
other chance of
recovering
his
throne,
he
accepted
the
British terms in a
treaty
of
December
1802.
In the
following May,
a
British
force
restored
him
as
a vassal of
the
Company.
The
news
of
the
treaty
struck the
Mahrattas and
the
authorities
in London
like
a
thunderbolt.
The British
government
and the directors
of
the
Company
denounced
the
governor general's
bargain
with the
peshwa
as
almost
certain to
bring
on
a
war,
but
they
could
not
prevent
it
because
com-
munications
between
England
and India
were
then
so
slow at least
six months each
way. Wellesley
knew what he was
doing
and
was
prepared
to
face
the
consequences,
for
he
was
convinced
that
the
only
way
to establish
peace
in
India
was to
establish
undoubted
British
supremacy
there.
The Mahratta
war
8
broke
in
the
summer
of 1803.
The
confederacy
was
still not
united,
and
this
condition
played
into
the
hands
of the
British.
They
had to face the
two
strongest
of the
five
Mahratta
princes,
Sindhia of
Gwalior and
Bhonsla of
Nagpur
and
Berar,
while
the
third,
Holkar of
Indore,
jealously
remained aloof. Before
the
year
was
out,
the
forces
of
Wellesley
smashed the
French-trained armies
that
opposed
them;
the
two
princes
bought peace by
surrendering
considerable
territories
to
the
Company
and
becoming
subject
allies
of
it;
the
British
occupied
Delhi,
and the
decrepit
Mogul
emperor,
after
being
thirty
years
in the hands
of the
Mahrattas,
again
came
under
the
protection
of
the
Company.
Then
Holkar,
realizing
his
danger,
flew
to
arms
and
put
up
a
desperate
fight,
inflicting
more
than
one
severe
defeat
upon
the
British.
But
the
latter
captured
his
capital,
pursued
him
into
the
Punjab,
and had him
practically
at their
mercy
in
1805,
when
he
was
rescued
by
orders from
London.
Out
of
patience
with
Wellesley's
aggressive
policy,
and
shrinking
8
Known as
the
Second Mahratta
War,
that
fought
by
Warren
Hastings
being
the
First.
The
Establishment
of
the
British
Empire
in
India
129
from
the
responsibility
he
was
incurring,
the
directors of
the
Company
and
the British
government
had
firmly
decided to call a
halt.
Wellesley
was
summoned
home
and
threatened with
impeachment,
while Corn-
wallis
was sent
back to
India
with
instructions
to
make
peace
at
any
price.
Two
months
after
his
arrival in
Calcutta,
an
old
man broken
in
health,
he
died
while
rushing up
country
to
take command.
His
authority
devolved
upon
a
civil
servant
of the
Company,
who
obeyed
the instructions
literally.
He
restored
all Holkar's territories
and inde-
pendence
to
him,
even
pledging
the
Company
to
give
no
aid
to the
princes
of
Rajputana
who,
having long
been
the
prey
of the
Mahrattas,
had
joined
the
British
against
Holkar.
This
sudden
return
to
the
policy
of
nonintervention,
and its
rigid
enforcement
for
almost
a
decade,
released in central
India the
wild
anarchy
that
Wellesley
had
just
chained. The Mahratta
powers
had
always
existed
by
plunder,
and now
they
harbored
new swarms of
marauders.
Some
of these
were
Pathans,
fierce Moslem
warriors
from
the hill
country
of the
northwest.
More
numerous
and
destructive
were
the
Pindaris,
outlaws
of diverse
races and
religions.
These
murderous
gangs,
sometimes of
many
thousands,
spread
their terror
far
and wide
for
hundreds
of
miles,
not
only
in
territories
beyond
British control but
also
in native
states under
British
protection.
They
did
it
with
impunity,
for
orders from London
sternly
forbade
any
measures
against
them,
out
of fear of
provoking
another
Mahratta
war. At
the same
time
and
because
of the same British
policy,
the
ravages
of the
Gurkhas,
who
some
forty
years
previously
had
migrated
from
the
west and
conquered
Nepal,
became
a
nightmare
in Oudh and
northern
Bengal.
Conditions
in
India
being
what
they
were,
London's insistence on
nonintervention,
though
designed
to
avert
war with
native states and
to
stop
the
expan-
sion of British
power,
was
actually inviting
war which would lead
to
a
new British advance.
Again
the
tide of
empire
was reversed in
India
with
the
arrival in
1813 of
a
new
governor
general,
whose ten
years
of office saw the
completion
of
Wellesley's
work of
conquest
and reform.
He was
Lord
Hastings,
apparently
no relative of Warren
Hastings,
and at
once
he
examined
what the
little Gurkhas
had done
with their
big
knives.
They
had wrested
territory
from
Oudh,
and
he
demanded
its
return.
Their
reply
was
war. It
was
a
difficult
war,
along
a
frontier of
600
miles and
in mountainous
terrain on
the
edge
of the
Himalayas.
It
lasted
until
1816
when,
with most
of
their
country
overrun,
these
sturdy
tribesmen
made
peace by abandoning
the
lands
they
had taken
from
Oudh,
ced-
130
CHAPTER
EIGHT:
ing
some
of
their
own
territory, accepting
a British
resident,
and
be-
coming
an
ally
of
the
British,
whom
they
staunchly
supported
from
that
day.
Meanwhile
the
havoc
wrought
by
the
Pindaris
grew
until,
in
this
year,
one of
their
raids
destroyed
some
three
hundred
villages
in
the
British-ruled
Circars,
and
the
governor
general
got
permission
from
home to deal
with
this
pest
once
and
for all.
At the
same
time
he
was
cautioned
to
avoid,
if
possible,
any
war with
the
Mahrattas,
and he
tried
his
best
to
win
their
cooperation
in
stamping
out
the
nests
of
marauders
in their
midst.
The
peshwa
of
Poona,
Bhonsla
of
Nagpur,
Holkar of
Indore,
and Sindhia
of
Gwalior,
representing
a combination
of
two hundred
thousand
fighters,
all
promised
their
aid
and
then,
at
the
end
of
1817,
they
4
struck
at the
British.
But
the
British
were
fully
prepared
for such
treachery.
In
a few
months
they completely
crushed
its authors
and
wiped
out
the
Pindaris.
The
peshwa
paid
with all
his
lands,
most of
which
were
annexed to
form
the modern
presidency
of
Bombay,
and
he was
paid
with
a
pension
of
80,000
a
year.
The
other
princes
were
restored,
with substantial
territorial losses
and
as vassals
of the
Company.
Lord
Hastings
followed
up
his victories
by
treaties
with all
the
numerous
princes
of
Rajputana
and
central
India,
whom his
predecessor
had
perforce
betrayed
to the
Mahrattas
in 1805. Now
these rescued
princes,
in return
for a
guaran-
tee of
British
protection,
willingly
accepted
British
supremacy.
^At
last
the whole
of
India,
with
the
exception
of
Sindh on
the
Indus,
was
brought
under
effective
British control
right
up
to the line of the
Sutfej,
two
thousand miles
north
of
Cape
Cormorin. Qfice
more the
directors
in
London
grumbled
at
the additional
responsibility
and
criticized
the
governor general
for
driving
their
organization
along
the
path
of
empire.
They
were never reconciled
to
following
this
course,
but
this
time it
was too
late for
them to
act. The
deed
was
done,
the
war
was
won,
and
for the
first time in all
its
long
history
peace
was
established
in this
teeming
ancient land. Nor
was
peace
the
only
boon
brought
by
British
conquest.
There was a vast
change
in the
nature of
government...
This
was little evident
in the
remaining
native
states,
where oriental
despotism
was still
rampant,
but there the
worse
abuses
of
this
evil kind
of
rule
were
liable at
any
time to be
checked
by
the
4
Bhonsla
having
just
died,
his
place
was taken
hy
the murderer of
his
imbecile son
and
heir.
The
earlier Holkar was also
dead,
and this Holkar
was a minor
for
whom
a
regent
was
acting.
The
Establishment
of
the
British
Empire
in
India 1 3
1
overlord.
The
great
change
was
in
the
other
parts
of
India.
There'the
British
conquest
swept
away
the
old
corrupt
native
despotism,
substi-
tuting
for
it
the
reign
of
law
and
an efficient administration
that
in-
terfered
with the
time-honored
customs
of
the
population
as little as
possible,
that
employed
native
officials as much as
possible,
and that
consciously
and
conscientiously
preserved
the
only self-government
existing
in
India that
of the
village
community.
CHAPTER IX
The Colonial
Empire
during
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
THE LONG
FRENCH
WAR
wrought
a
profound
change
in the
size and
die
character of
the
British
Empire.
It
was the third such
change
in
little
more
than half
a
century.
The Seven
Years' War
had
enlarged
the
old
English
empire
into a British
empire;
the
War
of
American
Independ-
ence had cut it down
again, leaving
it
an
empire
that was
still
American
in
extent but no
longer predominantly English
in
population;
and now
the
struggle
against
Revolutionary
and
Napoleonic
France
expanded
it
into
a
world
empire.
The harvest
of
colonial
spoils
that
Britain
gathered
from
her
Euro-
pean
foes
during
those
tumultuous
years
was
immense. All of
these
foes,
with
the
exception
of
Spain
1
whose
people
became allies of
the
British
against
Napoleon,
lost all of their
overseas
possessions
before he
was
overthrown.
At the end of
the
war,
however,
Britain
restored most
of
these
possessions
in
order to consolidate
the
peace.
What she
kept
was
for
security
reasons rather than for economic
exploitation.
This
was
particularly
true
in
the eastern
hemisphere,
where
the
conquered
colonies
to
which she
clung
had then no value to
her
except
as
strategic
supports
of
her
empire
in India. This
was the one
really profitable
part
of
die
empire;
and its
rise,
which
both
the
government
and the
East
India
Company
in
London
vainly
tried
to
check,
was
pulling imperial
interest from
the
west to
the east.
The
transformation
that
the
long
French
war
effected in
the
charac-
ter
of the British
Empire
was
a
continuation and
enlargement
of the
1
Portugal
was
not one of
these foes.
During
the
Long
French
War:
(I)
The
Western
Hemisphere
133
change
that
began
with
the
conquest
of
Canada and became
pro-
nounced
with the
loss
of
the
old
thirteen
colonies. The
new additions
to
the
empire
made
it
even
less
English.
It became multiracial
and
polylingual,
a
world
empire
demographically
as well as
geographically.
The
problem
presented
by
the
acquisition
of Canada
in
1763,
that
of
incorporating
a
foreign
body,
was
multiplied
manifold.
This
gave
rise
to
a
new
form
of
British
colonial
government
that
of the crown
colonies
which,
borrowed
from
the
despoiled empires, greatly
ac-
centuated
the
tendency
to
concentrate
control
in London.
It
appeared
even
in
Australia,
the
only
quarter
where
the
British
Empire
was
gain-
ing
new
territory by
settlement
instead
of
by
conquest;
the
peculiar
nature
of
that
English
settlement
assimilated it
to
the
new
type
of rule.
Meanwhile
repercussions
of
the
French Revolution
were
felt
throughout
the
British
Empire,
and nowhere
more
than in North
America.
The
effect on
French
Canada
was
deep
and
lasting.
It
took
the
form of
a
revulsion first
from France and then
from Britain.
The
French of
Canada
have
never
recovered from
the
shock
administered
by
Revolutionary
France
when it
turned on their beloved
church
and
rent
it. That
completed
their
alienation from their old
mother
country
and
so,
as
it
were,
set
the
seal
to
the
British
conquest
of
Canada.
The
validity
of the
seal was soon
tested
by
the
war
against
France.
French
emissaries
entered Canada via
the
United
States and
sought
to revolu-
tionize
the French on the St.
Lawrence,
but
they might
as
well
have
tried
to
reverse
the flow
of that
mighty
river.
The
desire of
these
French
subjects
of Britain to return to their former
allegiance
was forever dead.
Their
other
revulsion,
which
was no
less
distinct
and
permanent,
began
during
the
Napoleonic
period,
when
they
were
caught
in a
world
movement
that the French Revolution
precipitated.
It
was
the
spread
of
a new
phase
of
nationalism,
whose
dynamic
force was
to become
dominant
in
the nineteenth
century,
substituting
the
national state
for
the
dynastic
state
and
the divine
right
of nations
for the divine
right
of
kings.
Though
French Canadian
nationalism
has not been so
violent as
the
nationalism
of
some
other
peoples,
its
awakening split
Canada
forever.
The
local
condition
that
precipitated
this
awakening
was a
political
revolution
released
by
the
introduction
of
representative
government.
The
English-speaking
minority
in Lower
Canada had
long aspired
to
rule
through
an
assembly,
which had
been denied
them
until
its con-
trol
was
placed
permanently
beyond
their
reach
by
the
separation
of
Upper
Canada,
with
its
British-American
electorate. The
prospect
of
134
CHAPTER
NINE:
having
to live under
a French
assembly
frightened
the
minority.
Their
fear
turned
their
political
principles
inside
out
and
welded
them
into a
Tory
party.
Rallying
behind
the
administration
in
Quebec,
which
was
composed chiefly
of men of
their own
blood
who
were likewise
appre-
hensive
of
what the French
assembly
might
do,
the
leaders
of
the
minority
captured
the ear of
the
governor
and
entrenched
themselves
in the executive
and
legislative
councils.
Thus,
at
long
last,
by
a
com-
plete
reversal
of
principle,
they
came
into
power.
While
this revolution
was
occurring,
the
French
majority
felt no
particular
alarm.
For
nearly
a
generation
a British
government
had
ruled them
much as
the
previous
French
government
had
done
as a
benevolent
autocracy.
They
knew no other
kind of
rule
until
the
British
took
them into
partnership
by
granting
an
assembly.
Their
political
education
was
just beginning,
and it took them
nearly
fifteen
years
to
discover
that
they
were
worse off instead of
better off
than
before.
Then
they
too
were
frightened
by
what
they
saw.
Their
assembly
was
blocked
by
the
upper
chamber of
the
legislature,
and the
administration
was
no
longer
their
sympathetic
friend. The actual
rulers of
the
colony
were
hostile
to
their
language,
their
religion,
their
laws,
their economic
interests,
and would
treat
them as an inferior
conquered
people.
In 1806 the
newly
established
minority
organ,
The
Mercury,
boldly
declared
that
the
province
was
too French
for a
British
colony
and
ought
to be
made
English;
and in the
same
year
the French founded
their first national
newspaper,
Le
Canadian,
whose defiant
motto
was
"Nos
institutions,
notre
langue
et
nos
lois."
There is
nothing
like strife
for
inflaming
national
feeling,
and
the strife
was on.
It
continued
until
the middle of
the
century
with
only
one short
respite,
in the
early
years,
but
with
no
resort to
physical
violence
except
in
the thirties.
It
was
a
bitter
political struggle
between the French
in
possession
of the
assembly
and the
British
oligarchy
in
possession
of
the
other branches
of
government,
each side
being
convinced
that it was
fighting
for
self-
preservation.
The
conflict
obstructed the erection
of
a
public
school
system
for half
a
century,
retarded the economic
development
of the
province,
and
hardened French
Canadian nationalism.
The
only
res-
pite
was
during
the
War of
1812,
when the two
factions
in
Lower
Canada
pulled together against
the
United
States;
for French
Canadi-
ans had
no desire to
jump
out
of the British
frying pan
into the
Ameri-
can
fire,
and much as
they
might
revile
the
British,
they
relied on them
for
defense
against
a
foreign
foe.
The
French
Canadians
then
gave
the lie to the accusation that
they
were traitors at
heart,
which
their