II. Risk 9. Capital Budgeting and
beta was well below 1 in the previous period, while Dell’s estimated beta was well
above 1. Nevertheless, there is always a large margin for error when estimating the
beta for individual stocks.
Fortunately, the estimation errors tend to cancel out when you estimate betas of
portfolios.
6
That is why financial managers often turn to industry betas. For example,
Table 9.1 shows estimates of beta and the standard errors of these estimates for the
common stocks of four large railroad companies. Most of the standard errors are
above .2, large enough to preclude a precise estimate of any particular utility’s beta.
However, the table also shows the estimated beta for a portfolio of all four railroad
stocks. Notice that the estimated industry beta is more reliable. This shows up in
the lower standard error.
The Expected Return on Union Pacific Corporation’s Common Stock
Suppose that in mid-2001 you had been asked to estimate the company cost of cap-
ital of Union Pacific Corporation. Table 9.1 provides two clues about the true beta
of Union Pacific’s stock: the direct estimate of .40 and the average estimate for the
industry of .50. We will use the industry average of .50.
7
In mid-2001 the risk-free rate of interest r
f
was about 3.5 percent. Therefore, if
you had used 8 percent for the risk premium on the market, you would have con-
cluded that the expected return on Union Pacific’s stock was about 7.5 percent:
8
226 PART II Risk
Standard

equity
Error
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe .64 .20
CSX Transportation .46 .24
Norfolk Southern .52 .26
Union Pacific Corp. .40 .21
Industry portfolio .50 .17
TABLE 9.1
Estimated betas and costs of (equity) capital for a
sample of large railroad companies and for a
portfolio of these companies. The precision of the
portfolio beta is much better than that of the
betas of the individual companies—note the lower
standard error for the portfolio.
6
If the observations are independent, the standard error of the estimated mean beta declines in propor-
tion to the square root of the number of stocks in the portfolio.
7
Comparing the beta of Union Pacific with those of the other railroads would be misleading if Union
Pacific had a materially higher or lower debt ratio. Fortunately, its debt ratio was about average for the
sample in Table 9.1.
8
This is really a discount rate for near-term cash flows, since it rests on a risk-free rate measured by the
yield on Treasury bills with maturities less than one year. Is this, you may ask, the right discount rate
for cash flows from an asset with, say, a 10- or 20-year expected life?
Well, now that you mention it, possibly not. In 2001 longer-term Treasury bonds yielded about
5.8 percent, that is, about 2.3 percent above the Treasury bill rate.
The risk-free rate could be defined as a long-term Treasury bond yield. If you do this, however,
you should subtract the risk premium of Treasury bonds over bills, which we gave as 1.8 percent in
Table 7.1. This gives a rough-and-ready estimate of the expected yield on short-term Treasury bills
over the life of the bond:
The expected average future Treasury bill rate should be used in the CAPM if a discount rate is
needed for an extended stream of cash flows. In 2001 this “long-term r
f
” was a bit higher than the
Treasury bill rate.
⫽ .058 ⫺ .019 ⫽ .039, or 3.9%
Expected average T-bill rate ⫽ T-bond yield ⫺ premium of bonds over bills