forcing his geopolitical position. To balance the ex-
pansive strategy of the German church, he asked his
closest neighbor, the Bohemian prince Boleslav I, to
send a Christianizing mission together with his
daughter, Dobrava. The first bishop, Jordan, was
responsible directly to the pope, which made the
Polish church independent of German supervision.
The interdynastic marriage of Mieszko and Dobrava
in 965 obliged both courts to maintain political sol-
idarity, which was reflected in their support for the
anti-Ottonian opposition.
This alliance lasted as long as Dobrava lived.
Mieszko took political advantage of her death in
977 to break the Polish-Bohemian partnership. In
979 he married Oda, daughter of the Saxon mar-
grave Dietrich, and became a close ally of the Ot-
tonian empire. His strategic goal was to challenge
Bohemian domination in central Europe. Sometime
in the ninth decade he invaded Silesia and Little Po-
land and included them as southern provinces of his
state, despite diplomatic actions taken by the prince
of Prague, Boleslav II, the son of the Bohemian
prince Boleslav I and Mieszko’s own former broth-
er-in-law.
The Piasts’ strategy of geopolitical isolation of
Bohemia is well reflected in the sequence of quick
marriages arranged for Mieszko’s oldest son, also
named Boleslav. In 984 this Boleslav married the
daughter of the Meissen margrave Rikdag. The
death of this mighty Saxon aristocrat made possible
the annulment of that marriage, which opened the
way to finding a new wife for the young prince in
986/87. This time it was a Hungarian princess,
who was herself replaced in 988/89 by Emnilda,
the daughter of a western Slavonic prince, Do-
bromir. This clever policy restricted potential part-
ners of Bohemia to pagan Polabians and resulted in
Bohemia’s loss of its former dominant position.
After Mieszko’s death in 992, his son, now
Boleslav I, continued the strategy of further ex-
panding and reinforcing his inherited state. Active
in all directions, he ran a complex game of military
and diplomatic actions. His sister was married first
to the Swedish king Eric the Victorious and later to
the Danish king Svein Forkbeard. His daughter was
sent to Rus as the wife of the prince of Kiev, and his
son, Mieszko II, married the German princess Ri-
chesa, the niece of the emperor Otto III.
Boleslav’s real masterpiece, however, was a
summit with emperor Otto III, who came to Gniez-
no in
A.D. 1000. The official reason for this unprece-
dented visit was a pilgrimage to the grave of St. Ad-
albert of Prague (originally called Vojtech), who
had been killed in 997 during a mission to the pagan
Prussians. The emperor substantially reinforced
Boleslav I, however, because he brought with him
Archbishop Radim (Gaudentius), the half-brother
of St. Adalbert, and established an independent
church province with a metropolitan seat in Gniez-
no. Four new bishoprics (in Poznan´, Kołobrzeg,
Wrocław, and Kraków) formed an administrative
network that covered all the lands between the Bal-
tic Sea and the mountain belt. The Polish prince
also was freed from the obligation of paying yearly
tributes and was elevated to the position of a
“brother of the empire,” effectively a monarch
equal to any other in Europe. Since that time the
political name Polonia has been used for the state
that has survived to the present.
A review of the origins of the other early states
(Bohemia, Hungary, Rus) that constituted eastern
central Europe during the tenth century shows a
common strategy applied by their leaders, who all
achieved stable territorial power. None of them had
an overview of the geopolitical situation, and none
could foresee the long-range results of their actions.
Their ability to organize broad support, their deter-
mination in applying coercion, their capacity to
muster the necessary means to sustain power, their
intelligence in borrowing solutions from more de-
veloped neighbors, and simple good luck led to
their supreme successes as first monarchs and cre-
ators of their states.
One may conclude that Poland emerged in the
tenth century as a “private” venture of the Piasts,
who managed to defeat local challengers, stop ex-
pansion of their neighbors, impose Christian ideol-
ogy that legitimized monopolistic rules, organize
effective exploitation of subjugated territory, and
achieve geopolitical acceptance. That state was not
an “emanation” of the political striving of a nation.
It was just the opposite—the Polish nation was a
much later “product” of a state that imposed cultur-
al unification.
See also Iron Age Poland (vol. 2, part 6); Slavs and the
Early Slav Culture (vol. 2, part 7); Russia/Ukraine
POLAND
ANCIENT EUROPE
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