THE CRISES OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 383
Isabelle of France, he held a legitimate claim to the French throne as well. It hap-
pened this way. Philip IV, the Fair, the man who had set in action the dissolution
of the Templars and who had shocked Europe by issuing an arrest warrant for
Pope Boniface VIII, had died in 1314. His crown passed to his first son Louis X
(1314–1316), then to his second son Philip V (1315–1322), and then to his third son
Charles IV (1322–1328), each of whom died without a legal heir. Charles’ death
put an end to the Capetian dynasty that had ruled France since 987. But Philip IV
had a fourth child, his daughter Isabelle who had married Edward II of England.
Edward III therefore claimed the French throne as the nearest surviving relative
of Philip IV. Technically, he was correct, and the crown should have been his.
However, the idea of an English king of France was as much anathema to the
French in 1328 as the idea of a French king had been to the English in 1066—only
this time the French were in a position to do something about the situation. The
Estates General quickly found a rival to Edward: Philip VI (1328–1350), the
founder of the Valois dynasty. Philip was the son of Philip IV’s younger brother
Charles, and he and his successors eagerly stepped into the self-styled role of
preservers of all things French. The Hundred Years War, then, would continue
beyond Edward III and Philip VI and would engulf (with many peaceable lapses)
the reigns of the next five generations on each side of the family dispute.
Of course, other factors played a role. The Franco-Flemish war mentioned
earlier resulted from a struggle to control the wool trade that passed between
England and the Continent, while struggles to dominate the wine trade that passed
through Gascony (another English-held French territory) provided another source
of contention. Edward’s claim to the French throne offered England an irresistable
opportunity to put an end to nearly three hundred years of Anglo-French bick-
ering, and the Hundred Years War began, within England, as a very popular affair
indeed. It was a fascinating struggle, one in which England won nearly every
battle, yet in which the French ultimately triumphed.
The most important thing about the Hundred Years War, though, was not its
outcome but the way in which it was fought. At the start of the conflict, both sides
still relied heavily on feudal military might, with armored aristocratic cavalry
providing the most important fighting force. But the English quickly recognized
that they had to change their tactics significantly: The French, after all, outnum-
bered them at least twelve-to-one. The idea of meeting the French in pitched battle
between knights on an open field seemed ludicrous. Therefore, the English grad-
ually began to implement several new tactical lessons they had learned from their
struggles with the Scots, Welsh, and Irish. Those Celtic fighters, faced with En-
gland’s mounted knights, had fought back with some very simple and inexpensive
yet highly effective new weapons: the longbow, the crossbow, and the pike.
Most earlier bows had been mobile cavalry weapons, designed to be slung
over a knight’s shoulder as he rode into battle and shot as he galloped over,
around, and through the melee. These bows were relatively short in length and
had limited force. Longbows, on the other hand, were conceived as weapons of
the infantry and were much longer and more powerful than their horse-bound
precursors. By the thirteenth century, the highland Celts had learned to carve
longbows as long as six feet out of yew trees.
14
Their force was so great that the
14. The kind of tree mattered a great deal. Yew trees, when felled, offer lumber that comes in three
distinct layers: under the bark lies a layer of white sapwood that is highly pliable and ideally suited to
the outer shell of a bow, but immediately behind it is a hard core of red heartwood that remains re-
markably rigid and gives enormous force to the drawn bow.