THE RENAISSANCES OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY 233
this delight had a special attraction for the people of the twelfth century who had
grown weary of heavy Augustinian moralism. A philosophy of existence based
on sense-perception inescapably validates the senses. With the rediscovery of Ar-
istotle, philosophy became a matter of joy.
One of the earliest examples of sense-based thinking, and one that symboli-
cally represents the start of the philosophical renaissance, came from a northern
cleric named Berengar of Tours (d. 1088) who published a controversial work that
argued against transubstantiation. At that time, the Church had not yet dogmati-
cally asserted the idea that the bread and wine of the Mass become completely
and absolutely the body and blood of Christ, although popular belief tended in
that direction. Berengar argued that since our senses recognize no essential differ-
ence between the bread and wine prior to their sacralization and afterward, then
it is logically impossible that such a change has taken place. The Mass is therefore
merely a symbolic celebration, not a renewed sacrifice. This conclusion set off an
intellectual firestorm, and theologians rushed into the debate. Lanfranc of Bec, who
later became the archbishop of Canterbury, attempted to neutralize Berengar’s
argument by emphasizing the difference between substance and accidents—Aris-
totelian terms, both, indicating the difference between essence and mere external
form. Lanfranc’s successor in Canterbury, St. Anselm, took up the case, too, and
in so doing made sure that the debate over universals would dominate the phil-
osophical activity of the new age.
This needs a bit of explanation. By universals medieval philosophers meant
those ideal qualities that all members of a particular class or group share and that
define their essence. Consider, for example, two chairs. They may have different
shapes, be made of different materials, have different masses and weights, be of
different colors, be used for different purposes, and yet there is no doubt that they
are both indeed chairs. They both possess some quality—let us call it chairness—
that identifies and defines their essence. But does chairness, the universal quality
of all chairs, actually exist? Or is it merely an abstraction, a concept that has a
certain intellectual utility but no practical meaning? The meaning of this analogy
for the debate raised by Berengar is obvious, for the question he raised centered
on whether or not the real essence of anything was determined by its physical
characteristics. Does the fact that something looks like, feels like, smells like, and
tastes like bread necessarily mean that it is bread? But if those characteristics do
not signify bread, then of what good are our sense-data? And if all our knowledge
derives from our senses, how can we possibly know anything?
These are critical philosophical questions, and medieval thinkers devoted
many thousands of pages to trying to puzzle them out. No one “won” the debate—
that is not the way philosophy works—but as the debate progressed a number of
major factions began to emerge. The realists insisted that universals really did exist
as sensible and meaningful constructs, even if only in the mind of God. The nom-
inalists held the opposite position, that universals were mere names or categorizing
tools used by men to try to impose order on the world and were themselves
essentially meaningless. Both positions were problematic. The realists, if they held
true to their convictions, were vulnerable to charges of pantheism, since if indi-
vidual people, for example, were real only to the extent that they formed part of
the universal “mankind” in God’s mind, then realism failed to distinguish ade-
quately between God and His creation. The nominalists, on the other hand, if they
traced the implications of their position out to their logical conclusion, were in the
position of having to deny the Trinity, the Real Presence, and the divinity of Christ.
Both schools produced a number of brilliant and challenging, if not altogether