Naive Set Theory
57
(a) The set of all cardinal numbers. For example, let A be the set of all cardinal
numbers. Then Theorem 2.5.16 implies that there exists a cardinal number
greater than all numbers in A
. That is,
This contradicts Theorem
2.5.33.
(b)
The set of all ordinal numbers. For example, Theorem 2.5.16 implies that
to every set of ordinal numbers there exists a still greater ordinal number.
Accordingly, the concept of “set of all ordinal numbers” is a meaningless
concept. This is the so-called Burali-Forti paradox.
(c)
The set of all sets which do not contain themselves as elements
(Zermelo–Russell paradox or simply Russell’s paradox). For this set X, as
for every set, only the following two cases are conceivable: either X
contains itself as an element, or it does not. The first case cannot occur
because otherwise X would have an element, namely, X, which contained
itself as an element. The second assumption, however, also leads to a
contradiction. For in this case, X would be a set which did not contain
itself as an element, and for this very reason X would be contained in the
totality of all such sets, i.e., in X.
(d)
The set of all sets. For if X is such a set, it would have to contain the set of
all its subsets. The set of all subsets of X
, however, has a greater power
than X
, according to Theorem 2.1.4.
From the list of paradoxes above, we can see that two concepts, or words,
appear in each of them. One of the two words is “set” and the other is “all.” The
concept “set” was introduced by Cantor as “a collection into a whole of definite,
well-distinguished objects.” The meaning of this definition might be too wide for
us to avoid these paradoxes. The concept “all” actually was never introduced in
the context, and the meaning of “all” we have been using contradicts some results
we get in set theory. Our analysis on the appearance of the paradoxes shows that
if we can narrow the meaning of the concept of “set” and if we can avoid using the
word “all,” we may be in good shape to establish a set theory without contradictory
propositions. In the next chapter, we will try along this line to study properties of
abstract sets and to set up a new theory of sets, called the axiomatic set theory on
ZFC.
For further study of naive set theory, the reader is advised to consult
(Kuratowski and Mostowski, 1976).