Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: A New Tour
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inconsistent. This means that there are systems (for example, mathematics based
on ZFC) in which we do not know whether there exist propositions with contra-
dictory meanings. Therefore, this fact implies that perhaps not every system is
consistent or that not every system has no contradictory relations.
The application of mathematics has showed us that mathematics is extremely
effective in describing, solving, and predicting practical phenomena, problems, and
future events, respectively. That means that in practice a subsystem of ( M,T
∪
K )
can always be found to match a situation under consideration. For example, a
hibiscus flower has five petals. The mathematical word “five” provides a certain
description of the flower. This description serves to distinguish it from flowers
with three, four, six, . . ., petals. When a watch chain is suspended from its ends, it
assumes very nearly the shape of the mathematical curve known as the catenary.
The equation of the catenary is where a is a constant. At
the same time, this equation can be used to predict (or, say, answer) the following
problem: Suppose someone holds his 10-inch watch chain by its ends with his
fingers at the same height and are 4 inches apart. How far below his fingers will
the chain dip? Now, the following amazing question can be asked (this question
was not originally posed by me).
Question 8.3.3. Why is mathematics so “unreasonably effective” when applied
to the analysis of natural systems?
In order to discuss this question, we must go back to Axioms 1–6’. As a
consequence of our discussion, the whole structure of mathematics might be said
to be true by virtue of mere definitions (namely, of the nonprimitive mathematical
terms) provided that the ZFC axioms are true. However, strictly speaking, we
cannot, at this juncture, refer to the ZFC axioms as propositions which are true or
false, for they contain free primitive terms, “set” and the relation of membership
“
∈
,” which have not been assigned any specific meanings. All we can assert so far
is that any specific interpretation of the primitives which satisfies the axioms —i.e.,
turns them into true statements—will also satisfy all theorems deduced from them.
For detailed discussion, see (Kuratowski and Mostowski, 1976; Kunen, 1980).
But the partial structure of mathematics developed on the basis of Peano’s axioms
has several — indeed infinitely many — interpretations which will turn Peano’s
axioms, which contain the primitives “0,” “number,” and “successor,” into true
statements, and therefore, satisfy all the theorems deduced from them. (Note
that this partial structure of mathematics constitutes the theoretical foundation for
almost all successful applications of mathematics.) For example, let us understand
by 0 the origin of a half-line, by the successor of a point on that half-line the
point 1 inch behind it, counting from the origin, and by a number any point
which is either the origin or can be reached from it by a finite succession of steps
each of which leads from one point to its successor. It can then be readily seen
that all Peano’s axioms as well as the ensuing theorems turn into true propositions,