ECONOMICS
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known cultures, and in the West the blend of bib-
lical themes and Greek philosophy has decisively
shaped the social and ethical perceptions of eco-
nomic life and policy. That is so despite the fact
that economics in its modern mode has sought to
differentiate itself from these social, ethical, and
spiritual philosophies. Indeed, it has become a
truly autonomous science on the model of the nat-
ural sciences since, at least, the French physiocrats
and the English post-mercantilist economists from
Adam Smith (1723–1790) through the utilitarians to
John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) and the Ger-
man socialists and the Austrian libertarians. It is
these modern Western sets of perspectives and de-
bates that have most shaped what is today under-
stood as the discipline of economics.
Economics as a discipline, for all its achieve-
ments, is not identical to economic life. The heirs
of Adam Smith, and those of Karl Marx
(1818–1883) or Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), have
developed refined theories that describe how the
“rational choices” of persons, families, classes, gov-
ernments, businesses, or market mechanisms (such
as a stock exchange, employment and wage rates,
or a futures market) typically manifest themselves,
although economists know that they are working
with abstract models. The great advantage of such
models is that they can be developed and applied
in many concrete circumstances by ruling out idio-
syncratic and extrinsic contingencies that may also
influence decisions or policies but are not directly
economic factors. The best economic theories not
only have a mathematical and philosophical mark
of elegance, they also have a high degree of relia-
bility when applied to specific questions and ad-
justed to specific contexts.
These models work best in an environment
that shares a common society, a common culture,
and, since they deeply influence the perceptions
and expectations of persons and communities,
something of a common set of religious convic-
tions. That is because the “conditionalities” of be-
havior, what strict economic theory considers to
be idiosyncratic or extrinsic contingency, are dif-
ferent where divergent cultural, social, or religious
convictions shape morality in distinctive ways. It is
true that no one wants to be cheated and that steal-
ing or exploitation is recognized as wrong in every
culture, even if it occurs. And it is true that people
seek the well-being of the persons or groups that
are most important to them in all sorts of social,
cultural, or religious conditions. But it is also the
case that a polygamous tribal person, for example,
or a Hindu caste member, a dedicated leader of an
Islamic brotherhood, or a Buddhist nun will have
different senses of what constitutes the well-being
of persons and groups. It is, thus, not at all sur-
prising that the banking systems in different parts
of the world are operationally different, that cor-
porations are formed in distinctive ways and led
with diverse understandings of the proper role of
leadership, and that workers variously evaluate
their obligations to firm, family, nation, political
ideology, and faith.
Basic disputes and issues
The attempts to account for these contextual dif-
ferences are among the key subjects of cultural
studies, the sociology of religion, and comparative
religious ethics to the extent that these fields bear
on economic matters; the issues are paralleled by
political, legal, and aesthetic studies. In the West,
John Locke (1632–1704) and Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1679) can be considered exemplars of a pri-
mal disagreement about how economic life works
in society. For Locke, persons have a right to their
“proprium,” that property that they appropriate
from nature by honest labor and that is necessary
both for their individual existence and for the sup-
port of their family. On these bases, people form a
civil society with others and construct a political
society for the protection of their own and others’
well-being. They are aided in this effort by the fact
that all persons can, in some measure, recognize
the “self-evident truths” of a universal moral law,
guaranteed both by reason and by Christian scrip-
ture. If the political society does not work, or vio-
lates the moral law, the people have a right to alter
it to restore their economic and social well-being.
For Hobbes, perpetual conflict over scarce re-
sources could not be resolved by either reason or
religion, and thus a sovereign had to impose a col-
lective order by force. Politics must control eco-
nomics, and no rebellion was allowed. The obvi-
ous and brutal conflicts of interests, ideologies, and
religions demanded state power so that economic
well-being could be obtained beyond the natural
state of war. In this paradigmatic dispute, one finds
not only the question of the relationship of the bee
to the hive in economic life, but the issue of the
relative priority of civil society to political society
as determinants of economic existence.