Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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physicalism alike), and if instances of these mental

properties may be independent higher-level causes

and effects of lower-level physical (e.g., bodily)

events, then some physical events cannot be fully

explained in terms of physical antecedents and

laws alone. This result, however, would violate

two highly respected and important philosophical

principles: the principle of the causal closure of the

physical domain and the closely related principle

of the completeness of physics. That is to say, as-

suming causal interaction between higher-level

processes on the one hand and processes at the

basic level of physics on the other (as presupposed

in all of the above philosophies with stratified on-

tologies), there can no longer be a complete phys-

ical theory of physical phenomena.

An alternative account of the relation between

various ontological levels may be possible, allowing

one to avoid the above dilemma. Levels of reality

are not just related by the mereological relation of

being part of. That would render organisms mere

aggregates of cells, and cells mere aggregates of

molecules. In addition they are related by higher-

level principles organizing lower-level events into

systemic patterns of interaction. As a result, certain

context-dependent causal pathways of physical ac-

tivities will be selectively activated, rather than oth-

ers. In view of this alternative relationship of so-

called multiple supervenience, causal processes

may come to be seen as highly patterned systemic

processes discernible only at higher levels of reality.

Reflecting upon this relationship of multiple

supervenience may thus make clear that higher-

level patterns of organization are themselves gen-

uine causal factors actually operative in channel-

ing and orchestrating the lower-level flux of

microphysical events to yield stable recurrent pat-

terns of macrocausation that are self-sustaining or

self-reproducing as a result of the systemic organ-

ization of their parts. In other words, given multi-

ple supervenience, downward causation will

occur in consonance with the principles of

physics, rather than in violation of them. To be-

lieve in downward causation, therefore, need not

be tantamount to a belief in brutely emergent fun-

damental laws proprietary to a certain level of in-

tricately organized systems of physical events and

processes, such as organisms or minds, with con-

comitant causal interference at lower levels of or-

ganization in violation of the laws of microphysics.

Hence, downward causation may be assigned a

stable place in the picture of how the world is or-

ganized without upsetting the conception of the

various domains of physics as constituting a

closed and complete system of physical events at

the physical level of description.

See also CAUSALITY, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY;

AUSATION; DIVINE ACTION; PHYSICALISM,

EDUCTIVE AND NONREDUCTIVE; SUPERVENIENCE

Bibliography

Kim, Jaegwon. “‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism

and Non-reductive Physicalism.” In Emergence or Re-

duction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive

Physicalism, ed. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr,

and Jaegwon Kim. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992.

Kim, Jaegwon. “The Non-reductivist’s Troubles with Mental

Causation.” In Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and

Alfred Mele. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Meyering, Theo C. “Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Au-

tonomy of the Person.” In Neuroscience and the Per-

son, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo

Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib. Berkeley, Calif.: Vati-

can Observatory and Center for Theology and the

Natural Sciences, 1999.

Meyering, Theo C. “Physicalism and Downward Causation

in Psychology and the Special Sciences.” Inquiry 43

(2000): 181–202.

THEO C. MEYERING

DUALISM

This term dualism is used to describe any system

in which there are two realities. The term is some-

times used to express the existence of two gods or

the existence of God and the cosmos, but its most

common usage is in the philosophy of human na-

ture. A dualist holds that a human person is con-

stituted by a body and what may be called a mind

or soul or consciousness. Some dualists hold that

persons are nonphysical concrete subjects who are

embodied contingently. That is, a person may sur-

vive the destruction of his or her body, or one’s

body may continue to exist (as a corpse) after one

has ceased to be. The greatest competing philoso-

phy of human nature is materialism. While repre-

sentatives of dualism in contemporary philosophy

are in the minority, dualism is not easily uprooted

philosophically, religiously, or culturally.

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On the philosophical front, materialists often

have difficulty capturing the evident existence of

consciousness or felt experiences. Human think-

ing, sensing, and feeling appear to be different in

kind from brain processes and other bodily activ-

ity. At a minimum, there is a profound causal rela-

tion between the two (one’s thinking is contingent

on neurological events), and yet a causal relation is

not the same thing as identity. The mental and

physical may be causally interdependent without

being identical. Since 1980, a range of philoso-

phers who are materialists either in their convic-

tions or inclinations (e.g., Thomas Nagel, Colin

McGinn, Jaegwon Kim, and John Pollock), have

insisted that there are serious problems with iden-

tifying consciousness with physical states and

processes.

A shift in contemporary science has also bol-

stered the case for dualism. So long as a strictly de-

terministic physical science dominated the view of

nature, it appeared that something nonphysical

(states of consciousness or the soul) would have

no causal role in explaining events in the world.

This would render a dualist account of action ab-

surd. But quantum mechanics has advanced an in-

determinist view of the cosmos, and it is more dif-

ficult to rule out dualism.

From a religious point of view, dualism is in

play with most but not all traditions that acknowl-

edge an afterlife. Some religions believe in a resur-

rection of the dead in which a person survives

death by their material body being either reconsti-

tuted or re-created. But even these religions often

preserve some immaterial locus or referent to se-

cure a person’s identity; in between physical death

and resurrection a person might still be thought of

as present to God. Virtually all religions that in-

clude a belief in reincarnation allow that there is

some immaterial aspect to a person’s or a soul’s

identity. If persons are identical with their bodies,

then what happens to persons and bodies are the

very same; dualism allows persons and souls to

share a different fate from their bodies.

Dualism also receives some support from cul-

tures that routinely adopt different methods for

studying and talking about persons as opposed to

studying and talking about their bodies. Consider a

modest example in English: It can make sense to

say that someone is in class but that his or her

mind is far away.

History of the concept

Historically, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato

(428–347

B.C.E.) was a key advocate of a form of

dualism. Dualism is integral to his case for the im-

mortality of the soul, as expressed in the Phaedrus,

Phaedo, and Republic. Plato posited not just a

postmortem existence but life before material em-

bodiment (prenatal existence). Plato thought of a

person’s material embodiment as good but also as

something that impedes the soul’s longing for the

good, the true, and the beautiful. Compared with

the beauty and glory of disembodied life, material

existence can be like a prison. The early Christian

leader Augustine of Hippo (354–430

C.E.) devel-

oped a Platonic form of Christianity, rejecting some

of Plato’s beliefs (Augustine rejected pre-natal ex-

istence, as well as Plato’s view of the divine as a fi-

nite reality) but preserving his dualism and the

centrality of the good.

Some Platonic Christians in the medieval pe-

riod speculated that God creates a host of various

forms of intelligence in either embodied or disem-

bodied form. This formed part of the principle of

plentitude in medieval thought. The philosopher

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) preserved much of

the Platonic, Augustinian tradition but he more

firmly insisted that human beings are comprised of

matter and form. He still allowed that a person’s

soul persists after death, so Aquinas’s reservations

about radical dualism were limited.

Modern philosophy in Europe focussed on

three philosophies of human nature. Dualism was

championed by René Descartes (1596–1650); Carte-

sian dualism was advanced based on the conceiv-

ability of the self without the body. Thomas

Hobbes (1588–1679) was very much on the other

side. According to Hobbes, only matter exists and

the very notion of there being something immate-

rial was nonsense. Hobbes insisted that even God is

a material reality. A third position was championed

by George Berkeley (1685–1753) who held that

matter was not a fundamental, mind-independent

reality. The cosmos is made up of minds and their

sensory experiences. Berkeley’s thesis that only

minds and their states and activities exist is called

idealism. In the eighteenth century it was possible

to see dualism as a mediating, moderate choice be-

tween the extremes of materialism and idealism.

Many contemporary Christian theologians see

dualism as part of an undesirable body-hatred;

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dualism is accused of foisting on people an exces-

sively fragmented view of embodiment. Moreover,

dualism is thought to reflect a vain attempt by hu-

mans to distinguish themselves from the rest of

creation. These objections all seem answerable.

There is no necessity for dualists to see embodi-

ment in negative terms. And while a person’s psy-

chological and physical life can be fragmented,

there is no need for dualism to regard human em-

bodiment as always laden with bifurcation. Dual-

ists may see the embodied person as a functional

unity. As for the question of human pride,

Descartes famously denied nonhuman animals

were like humans in possessing (or being) minds.

Descartes read nature in mechanical terms while

he tried to secure an exception for human life. But

most contemporary dualists see the emergence of

consciousness as something involving nonhuman

animal life; people share with some nonhumans in

having experiences and possessing psychological

abilities. Dualists tend to see the emergence of

consciousness as something that prevails through-

out the animal world and not something limited

exclusively to human beings.

See also AUGUSTINE; EMBODIMENT; MATERIALISM;

IND-BODY THEORIES; MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION;

ONISM; PLATO; THOMAS AQUINAS

Bibliography

Cooper, John. Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical

Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.

Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989.

Foster, John. The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Carte-

sian Dualist Conception of the Mind. London: Rout-

ledge, 1991.

Hart, W. D. The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge, UK: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1988.

Hasker, William. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 2000.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of

the History of an Idea (1936). Cambridge, Mass.: Har-

vard University Press, 1970.

Nagel, Thomas. “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophi-

cal Review 83 (1974): 435–450.

Smythies, John R., and Beloff, John, eds. The Case for Du-

alism. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,

1989.

Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1986.

Taliaferro, Charles. Consciousness and the Mind of God.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

CHARLES TALIAFERRO

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ECOFEMINISM

The term ecofeminism was first used by French

radical feminist Françoise d’Eaubonne (b. 1920) in

1974 to synthesize two movements previously

thought of as separate: ecology and feminism.

D’Eaubonne saw clear interconnections between

the domination of women and that of nature, and

she hoped, by making these interconnections ex-

plicit, to rescue the planet from the destructive ef-

fects of “the male system” and restore it for the

benefit of humanity’s future.

Ecofeminism offers a range of theoretical posi-

tions in which the prefix eco signifies the whole

household of life. These positions include stringent

critiques of reductionist ecological science because

of its destructive effects on the whole. Ecofemi-

nism is defined, however, by politically and so-

cially multivalent feminist analyses that seek a pos-

itive understanding of the dialectic between nature

and humanity in order to move beyond masculine

domination of both women and nature.

The relationship between nature and human

culture remains problematic for ecofeminists be-

cause the feminization of nature has contributed

conceptually to downgrading women’s cultural role

and status. Ecofeminists reject a male elite model of

human culture that inferiorizes and excludes groups

of people, as well as nature. Within industrially de-

veloped societies, ecofeminists debate the issue of

gender difference within cultures in dialogue with

movements such as deep ecology, antimilitarism,

animal liberation, antiracism, and environmental

justice. Globally, ecofeminists consistently critique

the environmental effects of gendered science and

resource management, together with economic de-

velopment models that have a disproportionate and

often disastrous impact on women.

Ecofeminism also offers a potentially transfor-

mative philosophy of the self and of society. Influ-

enced by process thought and Gaia science, every

entity is seen as internally related to all aspects of

its environment, with that relationship as part of

what the entity is in itself. This awareness of eco-

logical interdependence calls for an essentially

nonviolent ethic of care within societies. It includes

care for the fundamental elements of life in recog-

nition of their limits, as well as attention to their

present and future ecological and social costs.

Worldwide, ecofeminism focuses on relation-

ships between global economic policies and global

ecological crises, arguing that addressing the first

in the form of a radical transformation of capitalist

production, from an overwhelmingly competitive

system to a cooperative one, benefits the global

environment. Therefore ecofeminists unite with so-

cial justice organizations in order to reach out and

care for those statistically most at risk from, but

powerless to avert, environmental degradation: the

poor, women, children, and indigenous peoples.

Ecofeminism encourages, indeed, requires a re-

shaping of the image of God from a hierarchical

God above and beyond Earth to one continuously

involved with, while not confined by, the evolu-

tionary history of life on Earth. Therefore, ecofemi-

nism fosters a sense of our belonging within, rather

than being in control of, the community of life. The

insights of process theology, feminist theology,

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non-traditional spiritualities, and the spiritualities of

indigenous communities with a strong matriarchal

tradition are used to highlight ecological interde-

pendence and the value of biodiversity in all its

forms. Many of these insights demonstrate a diver-

sity of response to what is called sacred or divine.

See also ANIMAL RIGHTS; DEEP ECOLOGY; ECOLOGY;

COLOGY, ETHICS OF; ECOLOGY, RELIGIOUS AND

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS; ECOLOGY, SCIENCE OF;

COTHEOLOGY; FEMINISMS AND SCIENCE; FEMINIST

COSMOLOGY; FEMINIST THEOLOGY; GAIA

HYPOTHESIS; WOMANIST THEOLOGY

Bibliography

d’Eaubonne, Françoise. “The Time for Ecofeminism,”

trans. Ruth Hottell. In Ecology: Key Concepts in Criti-

cal Theory, eds. Carolyn Merchant and Roger S. Got-

tlieb. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press Inter-

national, 1994.

Merchant, Carolyn. Earthcare: Women and the Environ-

ment. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Mies, Maria, and Shiva, Vandana. Ecofeminism. London

and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1993.

Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. Lon-

don and New York: Routledge, 1993.

Primavesi, Anne. Sacred Gaia: Holistic Theology and

Earth System Science. London and New York: Rout-

ledge, 2000.

Sturgeon, Noël. Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Femi-

nist Theory, and Political Action. London and New

York: Routledge, 1997.

Warren, Karen, ed. Ecological Feminism. London and New

York: Routledge, 1994.

ANNE PRIMAVESI

ECOLOGY

The term ecology is, etymologically, the logic of liv-

ing creatures in their homes, a word suggestively

related to ecumenical, with common roots in the

Greek oikos, the inhabited world. Named in 1866

by German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919),

ecology is a biological science like molecular biol-

ogy or evolutionary theory, though often thought

to be less mature. Ecosystems are complicated; ex-

periments are difficult on these open systems,

often large, that resist analysis. Ecology has never-

theless been thrust into the public arena, with the

advent of the ecological crisis. Ecology has also

become increasingly global, and still more com-

plex, as when planetary carbon dioxide cycles af-

fect climate change.

Ethics, policy, theology, and ecology

Ecology mixes with ethics, an ecological (or envi-

ronmental) ethics urging that humans ought to find

a lifestyle more respectful of, or harmonious with,

nature. Ethics, which seeks a satisfactory fit for hu-

mans in their communities, has traditionally dwelt

on justice, fairness, love, rights, or peace, settling

disputes of right and wrong that arise among hu-

mans. Ethics now also concerns the troubled

planet, its fauna, flora, species, and ecosystems.

American forester Aldo Leopold urged a new

commandment in “The Land Ethic,” a chapter in his

1968 book A Sand County Almanac: “A thing is

right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stabil-

ity, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong

when it tends otherwise” (pp. 224–225). Since the

United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development, held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,

the focus of environmental policy, often referred to

as ecosystem management, has been a sustainable

economy based on a sustainable biosphere.

Theologians have argued that religion needs to

pay more attention to ecology, and perhaps also

vice versa. Partly this is in response to allegations

that Christians view humans as having God-given

dominion over nature; they dominate nature and

are responsible for the ecological crisis. An eco-

logical theology may hope to find norms directly in

ecological science, but often an ecological per-

spective rather freely borrows and adapts various

goods thought to be found in ecology into human

social affairs, such as wholeness, interrelatedness,

balance, harmony, efficiency, embodiment, dy-

namism, naturalness, and sustainability.

Leading concepts in ecological science

Leading concepts in ecology involve ecosystems,

succession of communities rejuvenated by distur-

bances, energy flow, niches and habitats, food

chains and webs, carrying capacity, populations

and survival rates, diversity, and stability. A main

claim is that every organism is what it is where it is

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because its place is essential to its being; the “skin-

out” environment is as vital as the “skin-in”

metabolisms. Early ecologists favored ideas such as

homeostasis and equilibrium. Contemporary ecol-

ogists emphasize a greater role for contingency or

even chaos. Others emphasize self-organizing sys-

tems (autopoiesis), also an ancient idea: “The earth

produces of itself [Greek: automatically]” (Luke

4:28). Some find that natural selection on the edge

of chaos offers the greatest possibility for self-or-

ganization and survival in changing environments,

often also passing over to self-transformation.

The stability of ecosystems is dynamic, not a

frozen sameness, and may differ with particular sys-

tems and depend on the level of analysis. There are

perennial processes—wind, rain, soil, photosynthe-

sis, competition, predation, symbiosis, trophic pyr-

amids or food chains, and networks. Ecosystems

may wander or be stable within bounds. When un-

usual disturbances come, ecosystems can be dis-

placed beyond recovery of their former patterns.

Then they settle into new equilibria. Ecosystems

are always on historical trajectory, a dynamism of

chaos and order entwined.

Michael E. Soulé and Gary Lease have demon-

strated in their 1995 book, Reinventing Nature? Re-

sponses to Postmodern Deconstruction, that ecol-

ogy as a science has not proven immune from

postmodernist and deconstructionist claims that

science in all its forms—astrophysics to ecology—

is a cultural construct of the Enlightenment West.

Science is pragmatic and enables scientific cultures

to get what they want out of nature; science is not

descriptive of what nature is really like, apart from

humans and their biases and preferences. Accord-

ing to this view, humans should make no preten-

sions to know what nature is like without them,

but can choose what it is like to interact with na-

ture, living harmoniously with it, which will result

in a higher quality life. This fits well with a biore-

gional perspective. Environmental ethics is as

much applied geography as it is pure ecology.

Some interpreters, such as Mark Sagoff, con-

clude that human environmental policy cannot be

drawn from nature. Ecology, a piecemeal science

in their estimation, can, at best, offer generaliza-

tions of regional or local scope, and supply various

tools (such as eutrophication of lakes, keystone

species, nutrient recycling, niches, succession) for

whatever the particular circumstances at hand. Hu-

mans ought to step in with our management ob-

jectives and reshape the ecosystems we inhabit

consonant with our cultural goals.

Other interpreters, such as David Pimentel,

Laura Westra, and Reed Noss, argue that human

life does and ought to include nature and culture

entwined, humans as part of, rather than apart

from, their ecosystems. Ecosystems are dependable

life support systems. There is a kind of order that

arises spontaneously and systematically when

many self-actualizing units interactively pursue

their own programs, each doing its own thing and

forced into informed co-action with other units.

In culture, the logic of language or the inte-

grated connections of the market are examples of

such co-action. We legitimately respect cultural

heritages, such as Judaism or Christianity, or

democracy or science, none of which are centrally

controlled processes, all of which mix elements of

integrity and dependability with dynamic change,

even surprise and unpredictability. We might wish

for “integrity, stability, and beauty” in democracy

or science, without denying the elements of plu-

ralism, dynamism, contingency, and historical de-

velopment.

Ecosystems, though likewise complex, open,

and decentralized, are orderly and predictable

enough to make ecological science possible—and

also to make possible an ethics respecting these

dynamic, creative, vital processes. The fauna and

flora originally in place, independently of humans,

will with high probability be species naturally se-

lected for their adaptive fits, as evolutionary and

ecological theory both teach. Misfits go extinct and

unstable ecosystems collapse and are replaced by

more stable or resilient ones (perhaps rejuvenated

by chaos or upset by catastrophe).

This ecosystemic nature, once flourishing in-

dependently and for millennia continuing along

with humans, has in the last one hundred years

come under increasing jeopardy—variously de-

scribed as a threat to ecosystem health, integrity,

or quality.

Ecosystem management

Since the 1990s, emphasis has been ecosystem

management. This approach appeals alike to sci-

entists, who see the need for understanding

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ecosystems objectively and for applied technolo-

gies, and also to humanists, who find that humans

are cultural animals who rebuild their environ-

ments and who desire benefits for people. The

combined ecosystem/management policy promises

to operate at system-wide levels, presumably to

manage for indefinite sustainability, alike of

ecosystems and their outputs. Such management

connects with the idea of nature as “natural re-

sources” at the same time that it has a “respect na-

ture” dimension. Christian ethicists note that the

secular word “manage” is a stand-in for the earlier

theological word “steward.” Adam was placed in

the garden “to till and keep it” (Gen. 2:15).

Pristine natural systems no longer exist any-

where on Earth (the insecticide DDT has been

found in penguins in Antarctica). Perhaps 95 per-

cent of a landscape will be rebuilt for culture, con-

sidering lands plowed and grazed, forests man-

aged, rivers dammed, and so on. Still, only about

25 percent of the land, in most nations, is under

permanent agriculture; a large percentage is more

or less rural, still with some processes of wild na-

ture taking place. The twenty-first century prom-

ises an escalation of development that threatens

both the sustainability of landscapes supporting

culture as well as their intrinsic integrity.

Scientists and ethicists alike have traditionally

divided their disciplines into realms of the “is” and

the “ought.” No study of nature can tell humans

what ought to happen. This neat division has been

challenged by ecologists and their philosophical

and theological interpreters. The analysis here first

distinguishes between interhuman ethics and envi-

ronmental ethics. The claim that nature ought

sometimes to be taken as norm within environ-

mental ethics is not to be confused with a different

claim, that nature teaches us how we ought to be-

have toward each other. Nature as moral tutor has

always been, and remains, doubtful ethics. Com-

passion and charity, justice and honesty, are not

virtues found in wild nature. There is no way to

derive any of the familiar moral maxims from na-

ture: “One ought to keep promises.” “Do to others

as you would have them do to you.” “Do not cause

needless suffering.” No natural decalogue endorses

the Ten Commandments.

But, continuing the analysis, there may be

goods (values) in nature with which humans ought

to conform. Animals, plants, and species, inte-

grated into ecosystems, may embody values that,

though nonmoral, count morally when moral

agents encounter these. To grant that morality

emerges in human beings out of nonmoral nature

does not settle the question whether we, who are

moral, should sometimes orient our conduct in ac-

cord with value there. Theologians will add that

God bade Earth bring forth its swarming kinds and

found this genesis very good. Palestine was a

promised land; Earth is a promising planet, but

only if its ecologies globally form a biosphere.

Environmental science can inform environ-

mental ethics in subtle ways. Scientists describe the

“order,” “dynamic stability,” and “diversity” in these

biotic “communities.” They describe “interdepend-

ence,” or speak of “health” or “integrity,” perhaps

of their “resilience” or “efficiency.” Scientists de-

scribe the “adapted fit” that organisms have in their

niches. They describe an ecosystem as “flourish-

ing,” as “self-organizing.” Strictly interpreted, these

are only descriptive terms; and yet often they are

already quasi-evaluative terms, perhaps not always

so but often enough that by the time the descrip-

tions of ecosystems are in, some values are already

there. In this sense, ecology is rather like medical

science, with therapeutic purpose, seeking such

flourishing health.

Ecology in classical religions

Is there ecological wisdom in the classical reli-

gions? Religion and science have to be carefully

delineated, each in its own domain. One makes a

mistake to ask about technical ecology in the Bible

(such as the Lotka-Volterra equations, dealing with

population size and carrying capacity). But ecol-

ogy is a science at native range. Residents on land-

scapes live immersed in their local ecology. At the

pragmatic ranges of the sower who sows, waits for

the seed to grow, and reaps the harvest, the He-

brews knew their landscape. Abraham and Lot,

and later Jacob and Esau, dispersed their flocks

and herds because “the land could not support

both of them dwelling together” (Gen. 13:2-13;

36:6-8). There were too many sheep and goats eat-

ing the sparse grasses and shrubs of their semi-arid

landscape, and these nomads recognized this.

They were exceeding the carrying capacity, ecolo-

gists now say.

Here academic ecologists can learn a great

deal from people indigenous to a landscape for

centuries. Such ecological wisdom might be as

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readily found with the Arunta in Australia, or with

the Navajos in the American Southwest on their

landscapes. This would be indigenous wisdom

rather than divine revelation. Such wisdom is often

supported more by mythology than by science.

Such wisdom is also frequently mixed with error

and misunderstanding.

Christian (and other) ethicists can with consid-

erable plausibility make the claim that neither con-

servation, nor a sustainable biosphere, nor sustain-

able development, nor any other harmony

between humans and nature can be gained until

persons learn to use the earth both justly and char-

itably. Those twin concepts are not found either in

wild nature or in any science that studies nature.

They must be grounded in some ethical authority,

and this has classically been religious.

One needs human ecology, humane ecology,

and this requires insight more into human nature

than into wild nature. True, humans cannot know

the right way to act if they are ignorant of the

causal outcomes in the natural systems they mod-

ify—for example, the carrying capacity of the

Bethel-Ai rangeland in the hill country of Judaea.

But there must be more. The Hebrews were con-

vinced that they were given a blessing with a man-

date. The land flows with milk and honey (assum-

ing good land husbandry) if and only if there is

obedience to Torah. Abraham said to Lot, “Let

there be no strife between me and you, and be-

tween your herdsmen and my herdsmen” (Gen.

13:8), and they partitioned the common good eq-

uitably among themselves. The Hebrews also in-

clude the fauna within their covenant. “Behold I

establish my covenant with you and your descen-

dants after you, and with every living creature that

is with you, the birds, the cattle, and every beast of

the earth with you” (Gen. 9:5). In modern terms,

the covenant was both ecumenical and ecological.

See also ANIMAL RIGHTS; AUTOPOIESIS; CHAOS THEORY;

EEP ECOLOGY; ECOFEMINISM; ECOLOGY, ETHICS

; ECOLOGY, RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL

ASPECTS; ECOLOGY, SCIENCE OF; ECOTHEOLOGY;

EMINISM AND SCIENCE; FEMINIST COSMOLOGY;

EMINIST THEOLOGY; GAIA HYPOTHESIS;

OMANIST THEOLOGY

Bibliography

Golley, Frank. A Primer for Ecological Literacy. New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998.

Gumbine, R. Edward. “What is Ecosystem Management?”

Conservation Biology 8 (1994): 27-38.

Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” In A Sand County Al-

manac. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Northcott, Michael S. The Environment and Christian

Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

1996.

Pimentel, David; Westra, Laura; and Noss, Reed F., eds.

Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Con-

servation, and Health. Washington, D.C.: Island

Press, 2000.

Rolston, Holmes, III. “The Bible and Ecology.” Interpreta-

tion: Journal of Bible and Theology 50 (1996): 16–26.

Sagoff, Mark. “Ethics, Ecology, and the Environment: Inte-

grating Science and Law.” Tennessee Law Review 56

(1988): 77-229.

Soulé, Michael E., and Lease, Gary, eds. Reinventing Na-

ture? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction. Wash-

ington, D.C.: Island Press, 1995.

HOLMES ROLSTON, III

ECOLOGY,ETHICS OF

Ecological (or environmental) ethics is the study of

what humans, individually and corporately, ought

to value, ought to be, and ought to do in relation-

ships with all other beings and elements in the

biosphere. As in normative ethics generally, eco-

logical ethics involves evaluating, justifying (or

not), and prescribing values, norms, and standards

of character and conduct in view of the ecological

conditions that contribute to the well-being of hu-

mans and other life forms. This discipline is di-

verse in types, methods, values, problems, founda-

tional perspectives, and other elements of ethics.

Ecological ethics comes in both philosophical and

religious versions; the problems and values are

often the same, though the methods and ultimate

rationales are often different.

The topical agenda of ecological ethics is

molded by contemporary environmental problems.

The primary concerns are climate change, multiple

forms of pollution, human population growth,

scarcities of some renewable and nonrenewable

resources, human-induced losses in biodiversity,

the interactive dynamics of ecological degradation

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and economic patterns of consumption and distri-

bution, and, increasingly relevant, the environ-

mental effects of genetic manipulations.

Models and value systems

Much ethical thought about the environment has

been an expansion of the concern in traditional

ethics to cover the adverse effects of environmen-

tal conditions on human interests. Classical moral

values and norms remain basically unchanged.

Only humans count for direct moral consideration.

Other life forms are strictly instrumental values—

means—for human needs and wants, such as sci-

entific, aesthetic, and various economic purposes.

The basic moral assumption has been: Humans

ought to take care of the environment so that the

environment can take care of humans.

In reaction to this anthropocentric model, the

clear majority of contemporary ecological ethicists

interpret their discipline as a reformation of moral

values and duties. The bounds and rules of rela-

tionships are reshaped by a new consciousness of

three fundamental facts about planetary existence:

the biological, coevolutionary kinship of all life

forms; the systemic interdependence of all beings

and elements; and the biophysical limits of all

planetary goods. Ethics itself must change to fit

the reality that humans are not only social animals,

as recognized in classical ethics, but also ecologi-

cal animals.

Consequently, a prominent feature—some, in-

deed, would say a defining feature—of ecological

ethics is the extension of moral standing beyond

the human community. The questions are per-

plexing: Who or what has moral claims on hu-

mans for consideration of their interests? Are ani-

mals, plants, and other biological classes included?

What about individuals, species, and ecosystems

as the holistic interactions among organisms and

elements? Where is the line to be drawn, if at all?

What are the justifications or reasons for recogniz-

ing moral status?

Some ethicists limit this extension to organ-

isms that satisfy certain criteria, such as sentience

in the case of animal rights advocates. Critics

claim, however, that this limitation leaves the vast

majority of the biota with the instrumental status of

“things.”

Most ecological ethicists now argue that all or-

ganisms have some moral claims on humans, be-

cause they are intrinsic values, goods, or ends for

themselves. Many contend that species also have

moral claims as genetic lifelines that carry these

values. Only a few argue for equal value among

species; most allow for graded valuations in ac-

cord with significant and relevant differences. An

increasing number also claim that ecosystems are

values for themselves that warrant direct moral

consideration.

At this point, the field is split between so-

called biocentric and ecocentric value systems—or,

more accurately, individualistic and holistic per-

spectives on moral duties. The debate is sometimes

confused and polemical. Biocentrists focus on pro-

tecting or promoting the welfare of individual

lives, often mammals, but sometimes other species,

in a given context. Ecocentrists stress systemic val-

ues, arguing that our primary or only responsibility

is to the integrity of ecosystems.

These positions, however, need not be mutu-

ally exclusive. For a fully adequate ecological

ethics, some in the field propose, we need a basis

for respecting both life forms (individuals, popula-

tions, and species) and collective connections—

that is, diverse and whole ecosystems in a healthy

ecosphere, which alone provide the essential con-

ditions for the good of all individuals and species.

The individualistic and holistic poles may not be

contraries but rather complementary sides of a

comprehensive ecological ethics.

Sustainability

Sustainability has been a prominent norm in eco-

logical ethics—largely because of the perception

that present patterns of using the planet as source

and sink are unsustainable. Sustainability is living

within the bounds of the regenerative, assimilative,

and carrying capacities of the planet indefinitely, in

fairness to future generations. It seeks a just distri-

bution of goods between present and future gen-

erations, without sacrificing one for the other.

Human beings have obligations to future genera-

tions because what they are and do will have pro-

found effects on them for good and ill. Since they

do not yet exist but can reasonably be expected to

do so, future generations can be said to have an-

ticipatory rights, and every present generation has

anticipatory obligations to them.

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Sustainability is often interpreted as an anthro-

pocentric norm, but that limitation is not at all in-

herent in the idea. Ecological ethicists usually in-

terpret sustainability as responsibilities to future

generations of both humankind and other kinds.

This inclusive vision may significantly change the

prevailing principles and practices of sustainability.

Reflecting practitioners’ commitments to sus-

tainability, social equity, and ecological integrity,

two issues have been prominent on the agenda of

ecological ethics: high levels of human population

and consumption. From an ecological perspective,

these are intertwined problems. Population and

consumption are two interactive sides of a species’

impact on its environmental base, whether by too

many humans contending over a depleted base or

by an economic elite using that base dispropor-

tionately. The basic moral questions are: What are

the responsibilities of humans, individually and col-

lectively, to the rest of humanity, other species, and

future generations? What then are the material and

demographic conditions that humans must respect

to fulfill these responsibilities? Ecological ethicists

frequently urge moral limits on both economic con-

sumption and sexual reproduction for the sake of

the social and ecological common good.

Conclusion

From the perspective of ecological ethicists, their

discipline is not another branch or subdiscipline of

ethics, such as medical or business ethics. It is

rather the expansion of every branch of ethics, the

wider context for every ethical focus. Business

ethics, for example, must now think not only so-

cially and economically, but also ecologically—

considering moral responsibilities to other life

forms and their habitats, present and future, in eco-

nomic planning. Henceforth, all ethics must be

done in the context of ecological ethics—or else

they will be distorted and constricted ethics.

The intention of ecological ethicists, with rare

exceptions, is not to substitute biotic values for an-

thropic ones, but rather to weave these two sets to-

gether coherently for the enhancement of both—in

short, to integrate the quests for social justice and

ecological integrity, for the present and future.