Tsutsui W.M. A Companion to japanese histоry

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between demanding, often viol ently, a minimally humane lifestyle due to a citizen of

Japan and, at the same time, remaining loyal to the state and the emperor.

Whereas Weiner, Tsurumi, Lewis, and Gordon focus primarily on the worlds of

the protesters, an obvious yet often overlooked part of the story of modernity’s

underside is the response of the powerful, whether state minister, factory manager,

or individual landlord, to the plight of the disaffected. Scholarship by Sheldon Garon,

Kathleen Uno, and Jeffrey Hanes has begun to address this lacuna and, in the process,

offers important insights into the management of modernity’s underside. The most

important work is Sheldon Garon’s Molding Japanese Min ds. In an analysis of the

prewar regulation of groups ranging from prostitutes to new religions, Garon makes

two important points: first, how not just the state but also the middle classes, often in

collaboration with the state, worked to monitor and manage society’s underclass and,

second, how the management of social problems was executed more through mor-

ality campaigns than repressive force. Kathleen Uno’s work supports and extends

Garon’s thesis, as she examines the role of female middle-class reformers in the

establishment and management of day-care facilities that served to scr utinize and

socialize the poor, both parents and children. Jeffrey Hanes’s biography of Seki

Hajime makes a different yet important point: modernity’s social ills were global

ones, and urban reformers like Sek i both drew upon and contributed to a ‘‘trans-

national progressivism’’ that attempted to comprehend and cure social sicknesses

such as urban poverty and public health problems. This emphasis on the global

aspects of Japan’s social transformation is a welcome addit ion to the historiography

of prewar Japan, for it steers scholars away from an overemphasis on the except ion-

ality of Japan’s modern development. As Hanes and other historians remind us,

Japan’s modern social transformation, including the evolution of state–society rela-

tions, the rise of the middle classes, and the appearance of modernity’s underside,

possessed both national peculiarities and global commonalities.

Agriculture and Modern Economic Growth

Several questions concerning Japan’s economy before World War II continue to spark

lively debate among specialists. One long-running but still unresolved controversy

centers on the contribution of agricult ure to modern economic growth. A group of

economists at Hito tsubashi University who in the 1950s bega n preparing long-term

statistics on Japan’s economy from the early Meiji period

estimated that between

1880 and 1920 agricultural output in Japan grew at an average annual rate of 2.4

percent. In the mid-1960s James Nakamura disputed their findings: correcting for

what he claimed wer e widespread concealment and underreporting of yields in early

Meiji, he arrived at a dramatically lower rate of growth of about 1 percent. The debate

has major implications for Japanese economic development. According to the older

explanation, agriculture was at a low level of productivity in 1868. Then, with the

Meiji unification and the spread of traditional best practice, it took off at a rapid pace

concurrently with industry; this agricultural spurt created a substantial surplus, the

bulk of which the government throug h its land tax transferred out of agriculture and

into industry. By contrast, in Nakamura’s view, agriculture had grown considerably

before the Meiji period, so the key to Japan’s successful indust rialization was not the

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN PREWAR JAPAN 179

creation of a surplus during the development process but the redistribution of already

existing wealth from non -productive sa murai to a modernizing regime and invest-

ment-minded landowners. Taking into account Nakamura’s caveats, Japanese

scholars reworked the data to come up with an average growth rate for agriculture

of 1.7 percent a year. The downward revision reflects acknowledgment of a much

higher starting point for agriculture in 1868 but still allows for concurrent agricul-

tural and industrial expansion, together with the generation of an agrarian surplus, in

the period to World War I.

Recent articles by E. Sydney Crawcour, however, suggest that the debate over

agriculture’s contribution may be far from settled. Citing Nakamura’s thesis that the

growth rate of the early Meiji economy was ‘‘not particularly high,’’ Crawcour states

that Japan’s economic transition required the government to reallocate ‘‘existing

resources’’ as well as ‘‘to restrict consumption in the interests of industrial and

military investment.’’

He notes that ‘‘agricultural progress in the initial phase of

Japan’s modern economic growth may not have been as fast as was once thought,’’

but that the performance of agriculture was ‘‘ad equate,’’ as ‘‘food production kept up

with demand until 1900 and thereafter did not lag far behind.’’

He thus appears to

echo Nakamura’ s contention that during the Meiji era the growth of agricultural

output merely coincided with the expansion of population. Like Nakamura, Craw-

cour emphasizes the transfer of assets into the hands of landlords with ‘‘a high

propensity to save and invest in both local and national enterprises.’’

Yet, compli-

cating the story, recent research in Japan suggests that scholars have heretofore

exaggerated the role of landlords, pointing to the land tax and to noble and merchant

wealth as more significant sources of capital for industrial investment than private

landowner savings.

Traditional Industry and the Industrial Takeoff

Crawcour downplays the contribution of agriculture to make a more important point

about the centrality of traditional industry to Japan’s pre-1914 economy. This point

relates to another issue concerning the timing and chronology of Japan’s industrial

takeoff. A standard interpretation is that the breakthrough to modern economic

growth represented a transitional period during which the new Meiji government

laid the groundwork for industrialization by eliminating obstacles such as the semi-

autonomous ‘‘feudal’’ domains and promoting the development of modern financial

and communications systems. The transition culminated with the Matsukata financial

reform of 1881–5, which, in Henry Rosovsky’s words, ‘‘cleared the decks’’ for

modern economic growt h to begin.

After 1885, then, two successive booms in

private company formation led by railroads and textiles helped propel the economy

into industrial overdrive.

According to an opposing view, in quantitative terms, Japan’s industrial revolution

did not really begin until after the turn of the century. In fact, a recent trend among

Japanese scholars such as Nakamura Takafusa has been to emphasize the continued

importance of the traditional sector of the economy, and particularly traditional

industry, well into the twentieth century. Granted, industrial production grew sub-

stantially before 1900, but the vast majority of that output came not from modern

180 MARK JONES AND STEVEN ERICSON

factories but from traditional cottage industries like sake brew ing and handweaving.

Indeed, it was not until World War I that modern factory production exceeded half of

total manufacturing output.

Before then, as Crawcour puts it, ‘‘the modern sector

was still an infant nurtured by the traditional economy rather than the engine of

growth that it later became.’’

Like Japan, the Western followers also witnessed the survival of their traditional

sectors into the early decades of the twentieth century, but Japan was somewhat

exceptional in the extent to which ‘‘traditional industries not only survived but in fact

prospered’’ until the 1920s.

Moreover, in some cases, such as the manufacturing of

matches and other consumer goods, the Japanese actually transformed modern

factory-based industries they had imported from the West in the late nineteenth

century into small-scale ‘‘traditional’’ industries rely ing on labor-intensive, putting-

out methods of production. Emphasizing the sustained growth and vitality of the

traditional sector through World War I, Saito

Osamu even goes so far as to label the

entire century leading up to the 1920s as one long, protoindustrial period, with

Japan’s industrial revolution breaking out only in the interwar years.

A counterargument advanced by William Wray is that this interpr etation under-

estimates the significance of Japan’s modern indus trial development prior to World

War I. Besides the leading sector of prewar industrialization, cotton spinning, most of

the modern growth industries of the interwar period, including steel and chemicals,

had started before 1914. Further more, the case for delayed industrialization in Japan

overlooks various ‘‘non-quantifiable engines of growth’’

– technical and institu-

tional innovations in transportation and communication, finance and trade, and

business organization – that appeared in the last three decades of the nineteenth

century. These changes, together with the introduct ion of numerous modern indus-

tries, suggest that an industrial revolution may well have gotten under way in Japan in

the decades preceding the First World War.

The Role of the State

Another divergence of opinion centers on the contribution of the government to

industrial development in Japan. In every follower nation , the stat e has played a lar ger

role in launching and sustaining industrialization than was the case in Britain, but the

question is, how much larger? Depending on one’s view of the relative ‘‘backward-

ness’’ of Japan on the eve of modern economic growth – and, according to one rough

estimate, its per capita GNP was little more than a quarter that of the United States

and less than half that of Germany at the respective starts of their industrial revolu-

tions

– one might expect the government to have played a particularly sizeable role

in the Japanese case. Indeed, an older interpretation popularized by Thomas Smith

depicted the Japanese state as the grand initiator of industrialization, attaching special

importance to the path-breaking enterpr ises it founded in the 1870s in a wide range

of modern industrial fields.

Since the 1970s, however, scholars have tended to minimize the direct contribu-

tion of the government to Japan’s industrial revolution. Kozo Yamamura has bee n a

leading proponent of this revisionist view. The early state enterprises may have helped

introduce modern technology, but in many cases they were managerial and technical

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN PREWAR JAPAN 181

failures, and the ones that succeeded usually did so only after the government sold

them off to privat e interests beginning in the 1880s. The most telling evidence comes

from the crucial field of textiles. The breakthrough in cotton spinning, when it finally

occurred in the 1880s, was almost entirely the result of private initiative: the model

for all successful spinning mills came not from the poorly run state plants, which were

too small to capture economies of scale, but from a private firm, the larger and more

efficient Osaka Spinning Company, established in 1882. In the case of silk reeling,

Japan’s premier export industry until the 1920s, the problem was just the opposite:

the government’s celebrated Tomioka Fila ture was too large and sophisticated to

serve as a mod el for private silk producers, who, even if they mechanized, tended to

adopt smaller-scale, simplified versions of Western technology. Admittedly, through

the disposal of its industrial works, the Meiji state contributed directly to the rise of

big business, as several forerunners of the zaibatsu, the private business combines that

dominated the pre-1945 economy, capitalized on their acquisition of state enterprises

to expand and diversify their operations.

In the case of Mitsui and Mitsubishi, the

purchase of government properties, especially mines and shipyards, played a vital role

in determining the way in which they developed into combines. But the other two of

the ‘‘Big Four’’ zaibatsu – Sumitomo and Yasuda – bought no enterprises from the

state and yet grew into giant diversified combines; the sale, therefore, was not

indispensable to the emergence of the zaibatsu. Critics of the early state initiatives

in the industrial field go on to argue that the main economic function of the

government was merely to prov ide a favorable environment for largely private devel-

opment of modern industry.

A rebuttal to the revisionist argument is that even this primarily indirect role was

extensive and critical. The Japanese state had to resort to a variety of measures to

promote industrialization in a setting where, because of the unequal commercial

treaties the Western powers had imposed in the late 1850s, Japan was unable to

employ protective tariffs until the very end of the Meiji period. Ironically, even as

Japan was joining the Western nations as a treaty power in China and creating the

bulk of its own colonial empire between 1895 and 1910, it was still technically a semi-

colony, for it got rid of the last of the unequal-treaty restrictions, low fixed tariffs,

only in 1911. As a result, the Japanese government had some four decades of

experience with non-tariff barriers to industrial imports, including preferential buying

from domestic producers and manifold financial and technical assistance to them,

before it could even begin to use formal tariffs to shelter fledgling industries at home,

a course it followed with a vengeance after 1911. In this context, ‘‘providing a

favorable environment’’ was no small matter.

One could further argue that the more recent view understates even the direct role

of the Japanese government. True, the state privatized most of its industrial enter-

prises in the 1880s and 1890s, but the ones it reta ined, especially arsenals and railroad

workshops – to which it added when it bought out the major private railroads in

1906–7 – became leading disseminat ors of advanced technology and management

methods to the private sector, proving crucial to the rise of the modern Japanese

machinery and machine-tool industries in the early twentieth century. The govern-

ment also contributed directly to heavy industrialization after the turn of the century

by establishing the country’s first and largest steel mill, the Yawata Iron and Steel

Works, which began operations in 1901. Despite its significant entry into heavy

182 MARK JONES AND STEVEN ERICSON

industry, the state in general followed a quasi-laissez-faire policy from the 1890s to

the 1920s, as the zaibatsu increasingly took the lead in industrial development. Th en,

as Japan moved towards a wartime ‘‘controlled economy’’ in the 1930s, the govern-

ment began to intervene extensively in the private sect or, in the process setting

precedents for the industrial policies, such as control over foreign exchange, that

officials used to promote growth industries in the immediate postwar years.

Militarism and Industrialization

A related issue concerns the role of militarism and empire in Japan’s industrial

revolution. Did wars and colonies provide the mainspring for industrialization in

Japan before 1945, or did they primarily act as a drag on the Japanese economy? The

positive view would underscore the centrality for Japan’s industrial revolution of

military demand, colonial markets, and technological spin-offs from strategic enter-

prises. In particular, the hothouse created by government military expenditures and

captive sources of supply in the empire proved vital to the growth of heavy industries,

helping them overtake textiles as the leading sector of Japanese industrialization by

the 1930s. That decade also saw the emergence of business combines with close ties

to the military, the so-called ‘‘new zaibatsu,’’ from which many of the leading high-

tech industries of postwar Japan such as Nissan, Hitachi, and Ricoh descended.

Other economic benefits of Japanese militarism included the acquisition of the huge

China indemnity following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, which largely paid for

the pioneering Yawata Iron and Steel Works, as well as the diffusion of advanced

technology from state arsenals and naval yards to private manufacturers throughout

the pre-1945 era.

In the negative view, both military spending and empire-building proved a net

drain on the Japanese economy, taking resources away from more productive uses at

home. In addition, although the older explanation of Japan’s ra pid recovery from the

Great Depression stressed expanded armaments budgets, a more recent interpret-

ation places the emphasis squarely on the nation’s phenomenal consumer export drive

fueled by the drastic devaluation of the yen after 1931. According to Nakamura

Takafusa, after exports, the biggest contributor to Japan’s rebound was private

investment; meanwhile, under the proto-Keynesian ‘‘Takahashi finance’’ of

1932–6, government expenditure on rural relief ‘‘may . . . have had a stimulating

effect on the economy surpassing even that of military spending,’’

which did not

increase significantly until 1937. Moreover, many would contend that, whatever

economic benefits Japan may have derived from military and colonial exploits, one

must balance these gains against the disastrous consequences of Japanese military

expansion into the Pacific War years.

New Directions

This essay has generally observed the convent ional ‘‘prewar’’ boundaries of 1868 and

the late 1930s. But, just as historians of twent ieth-century Japan have increasingly

taken up topics cutting across the Pacific War, Howell and Wigen, in their works

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN PREWAR JAPAN 183

published in 1995, traverse the usual Restoration divide by treating the nineteenth

century as a whole.

They offer original critiques of the standard mod ernization

narrative by locating the indigenous origins of industrialization and capitalism in the

protoindustrial economies of ‘‘peripheral’’ areas, the Shimoina Valley of present day

Nagano prefecture and the west coast of Hokkaido

. Painting a picture of eventual

decline and subordination, they underscore the need to study not only growth and

industrial progress but also distribution and unequal development among different

groups and regions. Finally, both author s suggest the rich possibilities of combining

social and economic history to broaden and humanize the story of Japan’s mod ern

transformation.

NOTES

1 For the debate on entrepreneurship, see Yamamura, A Study of Samurai Income and

Entrepreneurship, pp. 137–87, and Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan,

pp. 104–11.

2 Harvard’s Council on East Asian Studies spearheaded this movement, with publications

such as Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.; Molony, Technology and Investment; and Ericson,

The Sound of the Whistle.

3 Howell, Capitalism from Within; Wigen, The Making of a Japanese Periphery.

4 Passin, Society and Education, p. xi.

5 On the minshu

shi school of history, see Gluck, ‘‘The People in History.’’ For an example

of minshu

shi scholarship, see Irokawa, The Culture of the Meiji Period.

6 Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan; Passin, Society and Education.

7 Platt, Burning and Building, p. 19.

8 Ibid., p. 2.

9 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths.

10 Lincicome, Principle, Praxis, and the Politics of Educational Reform.

11 Fru¨hstu¨ck, Colonizing Sex.

12 Kinmonth, The Self-Made Man; Huffman, Creating a Public; Sato, The New Japanese

Woman; and Sand, House and Home in Modern Japan.

13 Roden, Schooldays in Imperial Japan,p.6.

14 Kinmonth, The Self-Made Man.

15 Sievers, Flowers in Salt ; Bernstein, ed., Recreating Japanese Women.

16 Sato, The New Japanese Woman,p.9.

17 Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcastes.

18 Smethurst, Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes.

19 Pratt, Japan’s Protoindustrial Elite.

20 Smith, A Time of Crisis.

21 Weiner, ed., Japan’s Minorities, p. xvii; see also Howell, Geographies of Identity.

22 Tsurumi, Factory Girls.

23 Lewis, Rioters and Citizens

, p. xix.

24 Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy, pp. 206–7.

25 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds ; Uno, Passages to Modernity; Hanes, The City as Subject.

26 This ‘‘Long-Term Economic Statistics’’ project provided the raw material for a number of

quantitative analyses, including Minami, The Economic Development of Japan.

27 Crawcour, ‘‘Economic Change in the Nineteenth Century,’’ pp. 615–16.

28 Crawcour, ‘‘Industrialization and Technological Change,’’ pp. 411, 413.

29 Ibid., p. 413.

30 Rosovsky, ‘‘Japan’s Transition to Modern Economic Growth,’’ p. 135.

184 MARK JONES AND STEVEN ERICSON

31 Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan, p. 80.

32 Crawcour, ‘‘Industrialization and Technological Change,’’ p. 390.

33 Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan, p. 86.

34 See the discussion of Saito

’s argument in Wray, ‘‘Afterword,’’ pp. 365–8.

35 Ibid., p. 368.

36 Minami, The Economic Development of Japan, p. 13.

37 The best source in English on the combines is Morikawa, Zaibatsu.

38 For the interwar roots of postwar industrial policy, see Johnson, MITI and the Japanese

Miracle. For earlier antecedents in the shipping and shipbuilding fields, see Wray, Mitsu-

bishi and the N.Y.K.

39 The ‘‘new zaibatsu’’ differed from the old main-line combines in being publicly held

rather than family owned and less diversified in non-manufacturing fields like trade and

finance. For a case study of a new zaibatsu, see Molony, Technology and Investment.

40 Nakamura, ‘‘Depression, Recovery, and War,’’ p. 470.

41 Howell, Capitalism from Within; Wigen, The Making of a Japanese Periphery.

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