Tsutsui W.M. A Companion to japanese histоry

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temperate vision of Japanese diplomacy. Although progressive historians long identi-

fied the conflict as the start of Japanese mon opoly capitalism, it has not received the

attention among Japan specialists typically lavished in historiographies of modern

Europe and the United States. There is an array of studies on specific aspects of

Japanese wartime diplomacy (Japan’s entrance into the war, the ‘‘Twenty-one De-

mands,’’ Nishihara Loans, Siberian Intervention, Paris Peace Conference, etc.), and

US–Japan relations specialists have written a handful of classic analyses of wartime

US–Japan negotiations.

But only recently have mainstream Japan specialists looked

to the conflict as a transformative event in the twentieth century. Hirama Yo

ichi finds

Japanese wartime naval operations (ferrying troops to the Indian Ocean, hunting

German U-boats in the Mediterranean) confirmation of Japan’s pivotal cooperative

role on the early twentieth-century global stage. Frederick Dickinson highlights the

dramatic political and ideological impact of the Great War on Japan but characterizes

the ‘‘Twenty-one Demands’’ not as an unusually aggressive prelude to conquest in

the 1930s (the orthodox contention), but as an extension of the pattern of great-

power competition in China after 1895.

Since the appearance of the classic multi-volume diplomatic history of the Pacific

War, Taiheiyo

senso

e no michi in the 1960s, the story of Japan’s ultimate road

to conflict in the 1930s has, like the tale of Japanese foreign relations from the

Tokugawa period through the early twentieth century, moved well beyond a discus-

sion of internal turmoil and inevitable strife. By highlighting the intricate details

of military and diplomatic decision-making from 1931 to 1945, the eight-volume

series stressed the highly contingent nature of Japanese relations with the powers

and planning fo r war.

Akira Iriye followed soon after with his classic tale of

the difficulties of great power cooperat ion in China in the interwar period. For a

more general readership, Iriye described Japanese attempts to adapt to a new

world order only to see the economic foundations of that order collapse.

Thomas

Burkman found a genuine ‘‘internationalist’’ bent in interwar Japan in the country’s

active participation in the League of Nat ions. Ian Nish privileged the professionalism

and good intentions of both Japanese and Wester n diplomats even in a tale of

the ultimate failure of international cooperation over the Manchurian Incident,

and David Lu’s study of Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka Yo

suke stressed

the difficult external pressures on Japanese policy-makers in the 1930s, an ‘‘agony

of choice.’’

Recent studies of Japanese policies toward China in the first half of the twentieth

century accentuate the image of a difficult international environment. Usui Katsumi

describes the escalation of Japanese aims in China in the latter 1930s as primarily a

response to the rise of Chinese nationalism. Other studies of China ‘‘experts’’ in both

the Japanese Foreign Ministry and army tell the tale of good intentions ultimately

derailed by more aggressive visions of expansion.

The early 1980s witnessed an influential series of conferences on Japanese coloni-

alism that carried important implications for the study of Japanese external affairs.

The principal contribution of the three conference volumes was to highlight details of

the construction and management of Japan’s formal, ‘‘informal,’’ and ‘‘wartime’’

empires from 1895 to 1945.

Regarding foreign policy, the series did for English-

speaking audiences what Taiheiyo

senso

e no michi had done for Japanese debates,

dealing a decisive blow to the idea of a direct line from ‘‘feudal’’ Tokugawa to

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 209

‘‘fascist’’ Sho

wa. It not only described Japan’s first colonial te rritories in the wider

context of ninete enth-century imper ialism: it characterized Japan’s presence in China

until the formal outbreak of war in 1937 as primarily a commercial venture . And like

its Japanese predecessor, coverage of the Sino-Japanese and Pacific Wars stressed the

contingent nature of Japanese wartime planning.

Kajima Morinosuke once quipped that Japan had no diplomacy between 1941 and

1945. International historians have since found a silver lining in the most sinister era

of moder n Japanese history. Just as some political historians have long attempted to

downplay the severity of Japanese wartime authoritarianism by rejecting parallels with

European ‘‘fascism,’’ international historians have found in wartime Japanese rela-

tions with Germany encouragement in evidence of only patchy bilateral ties.

The

most intriguing positive portrayal of wartime Japanese diplomacy shows Tokyo not

only not cooperating with Berlin, but directly opposing the most nefariou s Nazi

policies. Both David Kranzler and Hillel Levine offer a picture of compassionate

Japanese diplomats aiding Jewish refugees from Nazi Ger many. Although dismissive

of the idea of a ‘‘pro-Jewish’’ policy in Tokyo, Pamela Sakamoto exposes the ad hoc

nature of Japan’s response to Jewish migration, which enabled some Japanese diplo-

mats (most notably, Sugihara Chiune in Kaunus, Lithuania) to provide invaluable

assistance to refugees.

Revisiting Aggressive Intent

If, since the 1960s, Anglo-American and Japanese specialists of international history

have increasingly stressed the open and ‘‘civilized’’ nature of modern Japan’s rela-

tionship with the outer world and the cont ingent character of cont inental expansion,

they have sparked a new debate about the relative degree of aggressive intent in

Japan’s diplomatic posture. Unhappy with either the accusatory tone of the earlier

progressive orthodoxy or the overwhelmingly benign portrait of Japanese external

relations promoted by early postwar international historians, a younger group of

scholars have constructed a new vision of culpability divorced from the tale of internal

political and economic ‘‘contradictions.’’ Reiner Hesselink stresses bakufu suspicion,

contempt, and torture of Dutch captives in a bid to restore some sense of Tokugawa

era ‘‘seclusion.’’

And recent coverage of the nineteenth cent ury increasingly pushes

back the timetable of Japanese plans for conquest. Whereas Peter Duus dates Japanese

aims for empire to the post-Sino-Japanese War years, Ochiai Hiroki reveals active

discussions of conquest in the first decade of Meiji, and Robert Eskildsen finds clear

Japanese intent to colonize Formosa in 1874. Brett Walker, in his innovative coverage

of Tokugawa–A inu trade, pushes the boundaries of Japane se expansion back to the

early modern period.

As for Japan’s continental policy and wars of imperialism, Takahashi Hidenao

reacted to the new positive spin on the Sino-Japanese War and Foreign Minister

Mutsu with a sardonic tale of political intrigue. Although eschewing the class-based

narrative of Japanese progressives, Takahashi describes Mutsu as an opportunist, who

spurred brinkmanship abroad to overcome a fragile political base at home. Kobayashi

Michihiko balks at the nuances in early twentieth-century ar my policy delineated by

Kitaoka Shin’ichi and finds, instead, impressive plans for continental development by

210 FREDERICK R. DICKINSON

army elder Katsura Taro

and prote

Goto

Shinpei. While locating in the diplomacy

of Kato

Takaaki resonances with acti ons of the great powers, Frederick Dickinson

finds in the worldview of members of the ‘‘Yamagata faction’’ during World War I

glimpses of the pan-Asianism of the 1930s. Michael Barnhart similarly finds a link

between World Wars I and II in mobilization plans developed within the imperial

army in anti cipation of another ‘‘total war.’’

Erik Esselstrom contests the sharp

distinction long made between civil and military interests and developments before

and after the Manchurian Incident. Pre-1931 efforts within the Foreign Ministry to

expand the jurisdiction of Japanese consular police ultima tely led to active civil–

military cooperation to apprehend Chinese and Korean ‘‘rebels’’ in Manchuria.

Despite the centrality of Anglo-Japanese relations in the two above-mentioned multi-

volume series edited by Ian Nish, other studies have begun to downplay both the

utility of the pact and its importance relat ive to developments on the Europe an and

Asian continents.

Among the most intriguing ‘‘incriminating’ ’ coverage of the Pacific War is work on

the imperial Japanese navy. Since his 1962 Yale doctoral dissertation on the Washing-

ton Conference, Asada Sadao has offered the most influential counterpoint to the

notion of a cautious navy hamstrung by aggressive ground forces. In the latest

compilation of his work, Asada delineates the critical role played by the Fleet Faction

in destroying the legitimacy of the cooperative ‘‘Washington system.’’ In a similar

vein, John Stephan counters the image of Admiral Yamamoto Iso

roku as merely a

brilliant strategist doing the bidding of a belligerent government. By the Battle of

Midway, Yamamoto had forged a consensus within the armed services to pursue the

occupation of Hawaii. More recently, J. Charles Schencking has exposed the impres-

sive scale of Japanese ‘‘navalism’’ long before both world wars.

Domestic Context

As we have seen, younger specialists of Japanese external affairs have begu n a slight

swing of the pendulum back toward the early postwar progressive orthodoxy by

spotting more long-term trends of aggressive intent. Similarly, current scholars are

increasingly amenable to linking external relations with domestic developments.

Although these specialists reject the dialectic ties between internal politics/economy

and foreign policy argu ed by Japan’s progressive historians, they equally object to the

overwhelmingly external context of much of the postwar international history.

Kitaoka Shin’ichi set the standard in 1978 with his meticulous coverage of debates

within the imperial army over early twentieth-century Japanese continental policy.

More recently, Komiya Kazuo has highlighted the late nineteenth-century effort to

revise Japan’s unequal treaties as a pivotal domestic political event. Ito

Yukio sees the

Russo-Japanese War less as the inevitable result of an expanding Russian empire than

as the product of the declining domestic authority of diplomatic ‘‘moderate’’ Ito

Hirobumi. Hattori Ryu

ji describes the Manchurian Incident as a tragedy generated

by the loss of conservative politicians of the stature of Hara Takashi.

Some historians have taken the story of domestic factors even further to place

foreign policy within the larger context of nation-building. Robert Eskildsen sees

Japanese initiatives in Taiwan in 1874 as critical in the formulation of a new modern

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 211

national identity. Hiya ma Yukio highlights the cultural and structu ral integration

spurred by the Sino-Japanese War. And Frederick Dickinson describes Japan’s prin-

cipal political and policy debates during World War I as focused upon the larger effort

to redefine the nation.

Part of the new turn toward internal developments is an active debate over the role

of the imperial institution in Japanese foreign affairs. Although it was central to the

progressive orthodoxy of the early postwar years, the institution became the focus of

intense general interest with the passing of the Sho

wa emperor in 1989 and the

publication of his occupation-era testimonial about the Japanese road to war.

Following a vibrant debate in Japan over the implications of the Sho

wa emperor’s

‘‘confessions,’’ several English-language works featured the emperor’s wartime role.

The most conspicuous of these was Herbert Bix’s biography, which won a Pulitzer

Prize for describing the emperor’s early education as military training and for impli-

cating the emperor in practically all of Japan’s wartime activities, including gas

warfare in China and the Nanjing Massacre.

Meanwhile, a group of Japanese

researchers pursued a more modest agenda of precisely locating imperial authority

in specific political and policy decisions in the first half of the twentieth century.

As is evident from Bix and others, a salutary effect of the focus on internal

developments has been to restore a sense of agency to Japanese foreign policy

decision-making. One area of Japanese external affair s where such a restoration has

constituted the principal new historiographical development is in the study of the

Allied occupation of Japan. Our understanding of the period, traditionally the do-

main of specialists of American foreign policy, has greatly benefited from growing

interest in and creative use of materials that highlight indigenous Japanese efforts at

reform. Through extensive coverage of Japanese–American interaction under occu-

pation, Takemae Eiji set an early standard.

More recently, Gary Tsuchimochi argues

that education reform under US occupation proceeded largely upon Japanese initia-

tive. John Dower won a Pulitzer Prize in 2000 for an exhaustive and absorbing

portrayal of everyday Japanese life under occupation, from abject defeat to ‘‘Japaniz-

ing’’ democracy.

Economy

Just as they have long promoted contingent external factors in Japanese decisions

for war, international historians have rejected the postwar Japanese progressive em-

phasis upon the internal economic origins of foreign aggression. But, as we have

seen with the general attitude toward Japanese expansion and the relationship be-

tween external and internal events, current scholarship on Japanese external affairs no

longer suffers the same allergy to economic exigencies as it used to. Much of the new

work o n Tokugawa era external relations highlights Japanese trade in the early

modern period.

Rejecting his predecessor Conroy’s dismissal of commercial con-

siderations, Peter Duus argues that economic underdevelopment in Korea played a

key role in luring Japanese involvement on the peninsula in the late nineteenth

century.

Economic factors also loom large in recent studies of Anglo-Japanese and Japan-

ese–American relations in the early twentieth century. As noted above, Ian Nish has

212 FREDERICK R. DICKINSON

shepherded a multi-volume project on Anglo-Japanese ties, which includes one

volume devoted to economic affairs.

On Japanese–American relations, a Japanese

study group in 1994 offered powerful refutation of the presumed connection be-

tween economic distress and Japanese aggression in the 1930s. Growing bilateral

political tensions curbed economic opportunities, not vice versa. The same lesson

emerges from Iguchi Haruo’s intriguing study of the founder of Nissa n, Ayukawa

Yoshisuke, and his ties to Detroit and Wall Street.

Perception

If historians of Japanese external affairs have, in recent years, gradually incorporated

concerns of early postwar progressive scholarship, they have, similarly, adapted well to

the growing popularity of social, cultural, and intellectual history. There is, for

example, increasing recognition of the importance of perception in inter national

history. Akira Iriye pioneered the approach in his classic 1967 analysis of American–

East Asian relations, Across the Pacific. And ever since Marius Jansen identified

Tokugawa Japan’s intellectual break with China as a critical turning point in the rise

of a modern nation, specialists of Japanese diplomacy have attempte d to delineate the

effect of attitudes vis-a

-vis China on policy-making.

There is now a cottage industry

of studies that chronicle Japanese disparagement of Korea in the ultimate lead-up to

annexation, and we know much more today about Japanese perceptions of the enemy

during the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars.

We have numerous antholog ies and

analyses of observations by some of modern Japan’s early sojourners West.

And in

an interesting biographical approach, Seki Shizuo compares perceptions of the

United States, Russia, Germany, and China of seven prominent interwar policy-

makers and opinion leaders.

A decade after Across the Pacific, Akira Iriye edited the classic work that paved

the way for the study of ‘‘mutual images’’ in US–Japan relations. Asada Sadao’s

analysis of the Japanese navy reveals disparaging views of Wilson’s new world

order among members of the Fleet Faction in interwar Japan. Kurosawa

Fumitaka has found similar discontent within the impe rial army regarding ‘‘democ-

racy’’ in interwar Japan. Hasegawa Yu

ichi et al. locate a complex ‘‘ambivalence’’

in prominent Japanese civilian and military leaders’ reactions to perceived American

racial exclusionism in the 1910s and 20s. By contrast, Kitaoka Shin’ichi finds

favorable views of the United States in an earlier era, during the Russo-Japanese

War.

The most celebrated study of mutual perceptions in the last two decade s covers the

darkest period of bilateral ties, the Pacific War. John Dower’s absorbing tale of mutual

hatreds and racism at once confirms the virulent anti-Western bias of Japanese

wartime propaganda and places it within the context of equally problematic Ame rican

images of a ‘‘subhuman’’ enemy. Although Dower makes the tenuous argument that

American hatred for a fearsome wartime enemy delayed the conclusion of the Pacific

War for several months, younger scholars are increasingly able to locate tangible

connections between domestic images of the Other and foreign policy decision-

making on both sides of the Pacific.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 213

Culture

In tandem with his leadership in the study of perception in external affairs, Akira Iriye

pioneered the inve stigation of culture in foreign policy. Under his editorship, an

authoritative group of Japan and China specialists in 1980 produced a rich study of

Sino-Japanese political and cultural exchange in the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries. Iriye followed this with a study of the Pacific War that found similar cultural

aspirations in the war aims of the United States and Japan.

Iriye’s disciples have produced several intriguing studies of the conf luence of

culture and diplomacy in recent years. Foll owing the movement away from early

postwar indictments of Japanese continental aggrandizement, See Heng Teow high-

lights interwar Foreign Ministry ‘‘cultural policy’’ toward China (aimed at remitting

to China funds originally earmarked as an indemnity for the 1900 Boxer Uprising) as

a well-meaning effort, parallel with similar efforts by Britain and the United States, to

foster Sino-Japanese friendship, not Japanese hegemony. Izumi Hirobe details the

complex debate among non-governmental groups on both sides of the Pacific over

the 1924 American Immigration Act.

Closely related to the study of culture and diplomacy are analyses of the activities

of international cultural and political organizations and of international cultura l

events. International historians have long highlighted the role of the Hsin-min hui

(Peoples’s Renovation Society) and the To

aDo

bunkai (East Asian Culture Society)

in both creating a common East Asian cultural sphere and ensuring Japanese hegem-

ony in twentieth-century Sino-Japanese relations.

Regarding Japanese relations

with the Western world, we now have studies of the International Red Cross in

Japan, the Center for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinko

kai),

and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Ayako Hotta-Lister accentuates the image of

strong early twentieth-century ties with an analysis of the 1910 Japan-British Exhib-

ition.

Although less tied to investigations of actual policy-making, there are a growing

number of titles focusing upon ‘‘cultural encounters’’ across borders. Joshua Fogel

has been the most prolific student of Sino-Japanese cultural encounters since his

biography of Japanese Sinologist Naito

Konan in 1984.

Russo-Japanese cultural

contacts have also increasingly attracted Western scholars in recent years.

Memory

Closely related to analyses of both perception and culture is a new fascination among

international historians with memory in policy formation. A wave of scholarship on

the Russo-Japanese War marked the lead-up to the hundredth anniversary of the

conflict. Among those works were a significant number of analyses of the war in

Japanese public memory. Nomura Minor u’s Nihonkai kais en no shinjitsu describes

the interwar exaltation of Admiral To

go Heihachiro

and his decimation of the

Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of the Japan Sea. Hara Takeshi speaks of the larger

strategic significance of the war and its milita ry application in the 1930s. Tak Matsu-

saka looks at the Battle of Port Arthur and its refashioning after Portsmouth. And

214 FREDERICK R. DICKINSON

Frederick Dickinson highlights the role of Russo-Japanese War commemorations in

fighting liberal inter nationalism in interwar Japan.

The political and cultural implications of memories of World War II have been the

subject of an increasing number of intriguing studies. Scholars have paid considerable

attention to postwar debates over the two most controversial symbols of wartime

atrocity, the Nanjing Massacre and Hiroshima.

Less well-known is the April 1945

American sinking of the Japanese merchant ship Awa Maru, which Rog er Dingman

highlights as a formidable symbol of American treachery in postwar Japan. Laura

Hein and Mark Selden place contemporary Japanese textbook controversies in valu-

able comparative context. And Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama

accentuate World War II in Asia as a wide assortment of personal reflections in Japan,

the USA, China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands, Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea.

Conclusion

The popularity of international history has declined precipitously over the last two

decades, particu larly among English-speaking specialists of modern Japan. Interest in

related fields, on the other hand, has soared. Spurred by postcolonial discourse, the

culture of Japanese imperialism has attracted significant attention in recent years.

Many have, likewise, begun to probe the pivotal impact of Japan’s modern wars upon

Japanese society and culture.

There is, finally, an exciting new trend that highlights

political, social, cultural, and economic convergences across national borders –

‘‘transnational’’ history.

Although international historians increasingly engage issues of culture, few of those

working on the culture of Japanese war and imperialism have much to do with

international history. ‘‘Transnational’’ historians, moreover, investigate develop-

ments outside of the principal unit of analysis for international historians, the state.

In this context, on e wonders whether there is a future for specialists of Japanese

external affairs.

Since the 1960s, international historians have stood at the vanguard of efforts to

refute the early postwar progressive vision of modern Japan. Our current sense of the

Tokugawa regime as seriously engaged with the outer world, of imperial Japanese

leaders striving to adapt to international norms and of the highly c ontingent nature of

Japanese overseas expansion all come from the painstaking work of international

historians. These scholars are uniquely capable of engaging such fundamental issues

as the role of politics and economy in Japanese continental expansion. They repos-

ition questions of perception, culture, and memory from the realm of theory to the

tangible context of real-world events, and they add to the new vogue of ‘‘transna-

tionalism’’ a substantial factual ballast.

Although one cannot hope that all future specialists of Japanese external affairs, the

culture of war and empire, and/or ‘‘transnational history’’ enjoy equal competence in

Japanese culture, politics, and foreign affairs, we could feasibly ask for greater synergy

across intellectual boundaries. International historians profit by placing Japanese

external relations within larger domestic and ‘‘transnational’’ contexts. Students of

the culture of war and empire and transnational history in Asia, likewise, could benefit

by more attention to the basic outlines of polit ics and foreign affairs. Collaboration

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 215

will ensure that our understanding of such fundamental questions as the causes and

consequences of war are less obscured than enhanced by the more fashionable

investigations into society and culture.

NOTES

1 Rekishigaku Kenkyu

kai, ed., Taiheiyo

senso

shi, vol. 1, p. 1.

2 Toby, State and Diplomacy.

3 For a recent study in English, see Laver, ‘‘A Strange Isolation.’’

4 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism.

5 Eskildsen, ‘‘Of Civilization and Savages.’’

6 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea; Duus, The Abacus and the Sword; Patterson, The

Korean Frontier in America; Ishikawa, ‘‘Meiji ishin to Cho

sen, taima kankei’’; Unno,

Kankoku heigo

shi no kenkyu

; Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea.

7 Hagihara, Nihon no meicho; Berger, trans. and ed., Kenkenroku.

8 Okazaki, Mutsu Munemitsu to sono jidai; Perez, Japan Comes of Age.

9 Tsunoda, Manshu

mondai to kokubo

shin; Kitaoka, Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku;

Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan.

10 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. See also Nish, Alliance in Decline.

11 The series covers 400 years of history and over 100 Japanese and British personalities who

played critical roles in the bilateral relationship. Nish, ed., Britain and Japan, and Nish

and Kibata, eds., The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, are just two volumes in a five-

volume series covering military, economic, and sociocultural relations as well.

12 Two of the most recent of this genre are Kawamura, Turbulence in the Pacific, and

Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality.

13 Hirama, Daiichiji sekai taisen to Nihon kaigun; Dickinson, War and National Reinven-

tion.

14 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo

Senso

Gen’in Kenkyu

bu, ed., Taiheiyo

senso

eno

michi.

15 Iriye, After Imperialism; Iriye, Nihon no gaiko

and Japan and the Wider World.

16 Burkman, Japan, the League of Nations, and World Order; Nish, Japan’s Struggle with

Internationalism. Lu’s study, originally published in Japanese in 1981, appeared in

English in 2002, entitled Agony of Choice.

17 Usui, Nitchu

senso

, and, more recently, Nitchu

gaiko

shi kenkyu

. For the Foreign Ministry,

see Brooks, Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy, and for the Japanese army, see Tobe, Nihon

rikugun to Chu

goku.

18 Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire; Duus, Myers, and Peattie, eds., The

Japanese Informal Empire in China; Duus, Myers, and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime

Empire.

19 Meskill, Hitler and Japan; Morley, ed., Deterrent Diplomacy. More recently, see Martin,

Japan and Germany in the Modern World; Krug et al., Reluctant Allies.

20 Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, and Jews; Levine, In Search of Sugihara; Sakamoto, Japanese

Diplomats and Jewish Refugees.

21 Hesselink, Prisoners of Nambu.

22 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword; Ochiai, ‘‘Meiji shoki no gaiseiron to higashi Ajia’’;

Eskildsen, ‘‘Of Civilization and Savages’’; Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands.

23 Takahashi, Nisshin senso

e no michi; Kobayashi, Nihon no tairiku seisaku; Dickinson, War

and National Reinvention; Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War.

24 Esselstrom, ‘‘The Japanese Consular Police in Northeast Asia.’’

25 O’Brien, ed., Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922.

216 FREDERICK R. DICKINSON

26 Asada, Ryo

taisenkan no Nichi-Bei kankei; Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun;

Schencking, Making Waves.

27 Kitaoka, Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku; Komiya, Jo

yaku kaisei to kokunai seiji; Ito

Rikken kokka to Nichi-Ro

senso

; Hattori, Higashi Ajia kokusai kankyo

no hendo

to Nihon

gaiko

1918–1931.

28 Eskildsen, ‘‘Of Civilization and Savages’’; Lone, Japan’s First Modern War; Hiyama, ed.,

Kindai Nihon no keisei to Nisshin senso

; Dickinson, War and National Reinvention.

29 Terasaki, Sho

wa tenno

dokuhakuroku.

30 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor; Wetzler, Hirohito and War; Bix, Hirohito and the

Making of Modern Japan.

31 Ito

, Seito

seiji to tenno

; Ito

and Kawada, ed., Niju

seiki Nihon no tenno

to kunshusei.

32 Takemae’s 1983 study was published in English in 2002 as Inside GHQ, trans. and

adapted by Ricketts and Swann.

33 Tsuchimochi, Education Reform in Postwar Japan; Dower, Embracing Defeat.

34 See Nagazumi, Shuinsen.

35 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword.

36 Hunter and Sugiyama, The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, vol. 4.

37 Kamiyama and Iida, eds., Tairitsu to dakyo

; Iguchi, Unfinished Business.

38 Jansen, Japan and Its World, later elaborated in more detail in Jansen, China in the

Tokugawa World

. See Toby, ‘‘Kara no kanata yori.’’

39 See Asuka, ‘‘Seikanron no zentei.’’ For the Sino-Japanese War, see Lone, Japan’s First

Modern War, and for the Russo-Japanese War, Shimazu, ‘‘Love Thy Enemy.’’

40 See Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian; Duus, ed., The Japanese Discovery of Amer-

ica; Nish, ed., The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe.

41 Seki, Taisho

gaiko

42 Iriye, ed., Mutual Images; Asada, Ryo

taisenkan no Nichi-Bei kankei; Kurosawa, Taisen-

kanki no Nihon rikugun; Hasegawa, ed., Taisho

ki Nihon no Amerika ninshiki; Kitaoka,

‘‘Shoki Taiyo

ni miru Amerika zo

.’’

43 Dower, War without Mercy. See Kane, ‘‘Hammering Down Nails.’’

44 Iriye, ed., The Chinese and the Japanese; Iriye, Power and Culture.

45 Teow, Japanese Cultural Policy toward China; Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Preju-

dice.

46 Iriye, ‘‘Toward a New Cultural Order,’’ stresses the genuine bases for Sino-Japanese

cooperation, whereas Reynolds, ‘‘Training Young China Hands,’’ describes the To

bun Sho

in as an ‘‘enabling arm’’ of Japanese imperialism. The most recent work

stresses both the ‘‘civilizing’’ aims of the To

aDo

bunkai and its hegemonic activities

(see Kubota, ‘‘To

aDo

bunkai no ‘shimei’ to ‘manazashi’ ’’).

47 Checkland, Humanitarianism and the Emperor’s Japan; Shibasaki, Kindai Nihon to

kokusai bunka ko

ryu

; and Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, respectively.

48 Hotta-Lister, Japan-British Exhibition of 1910.

49 Fogel, Politics and Sinology. Other important studies by Fogel on Sino-Japanese cultural

encounters include The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations, The Literature of

Travel and the Japanese Rediscovery of China, Nakae Ushikichi in China, and his transla-

tions of Life Along the South Manchurian Railway and of Yosano Akiko, Travels in

Manchuria and Mongolia

50 See, for example, Rimer, ed., A Hidden Fire, and Wells and Wilson, eds., The Russo-

Japanese War in Cultural Perspective.

51 Nomura, Nihonkai kaisen no shinjitsu; Hara, ‘‘Nichi-Ro

senso

no keikyo

’’; Matsusaka,

‘‘Human Bullets, General Nogi, and the Myth of Port Arthur’’; Dickinson, ‘‘Commem-

orating the War in Post-Versailles Japan.’’

EXTERNAL RELATIONS 217

52 See Fogel, ed., Nanjing Massacre; Kasahara, Nankin jiken to Nihonjin; Hein and Selden,

eds., Living with the Bomb; Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces.

53 Dingman, Ghost of War; Hein and Selden, eds., Censoring History; Fujitani, White, and

Yoneyama, eds., Perilous Memories.

54 See Ching, Becoming ‘‘Japanese’’; Oguma, ‘‘Nihonjin’’ no kyo

kai.

55 For the important impact of war on twentieth-century Japanese politics and culture, see

Mitani, Kindai Nihon no senso

to seiji. For the specific impact of the Sino-Japanese War,

see Lone, Japan’s First Modern War, while for that of the Manchurian Incident, see

Young, Japan’s Total Empire.

56 Watanabe, Higashi Ajia no o

ken to shiso

; Hamashita and Kawakatsu, eds., Ajia ko

ekiken to

Nihon ko

gyo

ka.

57 See, for example, Azuma, Between Two Empires.

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