Tsutsui W.M. A Companion to japanese histоry

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concentration of high-technology and heavy industrial ventures emerged in colonial

and other subject territories.

Colonial studies of the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the importance of the

‘‘Western imprint’’ on Japanese practices, but they also pointed to the significanc e

of Japan’s own experience with transfor mative upheaval during the Meiji era.

Japan

began managing an empire and pursuing a ‘‘civilizing mission’’ while itself a relatively

poor, developing country whose acquaintance with Western-style ‘‘civilization’’

remained callow. Insofar as colonial social engineering entailed an authoritarian

state dragging a reluctant population kicking and screaming into a non-indigenous

modernity, such a characterization might also fit Meiji Japan. Indeed, as late as the

1930s, the discourse of ‘‘uplifting the benighted n atives’’ could be found in com-

mentaries emanating from urban intellectuals on the crisis in the impoverished

villages of Japan’s internal rural periphery.

In this context, it is not surprising that

the Meiji reform program offered, perhaps, an even more important model for

colonial management than Western practice. Agricultural policies in Taiwan and

Korea drew much from the Meiji pattern, as did education. The role of the policeman

as the prime interface between state and civil society, which might be exp ected in a

colonial society, was also the reality in rural Meiji Japan.

The Meiji model for social

and economic transformation would appear particularly suitable because the societies

that the colonial rulers sought to reconstruct were not so different from Japan in the

middle of the nineteenth century, and the ‘‘level’’ of civilization to which the

Japanese sought to ‘‘uplift’’ their subjects was likewise separated from their own by

less than a generation of experience. The potential for a very rapid ‘‘catch-up’’ was a

problem inherent in the colonial relations hip. In Taiwan, members of the settler

community and the colonial bureauc racy lived in fear of the possibility that, given

greater educational opportunities, well-educated ‘‘natives’’ would readily close the

gap and destroy the hierarchy that defined colonial privilege. Not surprisingly, pol-

icies aimed at rapid assimilation and legal integration enjoyed greater support within

metropolitan circles than they did among the Japanese elite in the colonies.

Transformative management was most promin ent in territories under direct rule

where both opportunity and need were greatest, but it was also relevant to other parts

of the imperium. Social engineering and economic reconstruction found particularly

pronounced ex pressions in Manchukuo, which Louise Young appropriately dubs

‘‘the brave new empire.’’

If the structural arrangements of the ‘‘puppet state’’

represented a revision of traditional colonial forms, then management strategies in

Manchukuo reflected a parallel revision of colonial policies devised in Taiwan and

Korea. Moreover, in the same manner as the Meiji program informed the transforma-

tive project in the older colonies, radical reformist or ‘‘renovationist’’ currents in

metropolitan Japan of the 1920s and early 1930s, which favored planned economies

and managed societies, influenced policies in Manchukuo. In economic matters, for

example, the managers of the Manchurian state challenged the traditio nal division of

labor between colony and metropole and argued in favor of applying the principle of

comparative advantage under a system of comprehensive, empire-wide planning. In

their efforts at social reconstruction, Manchukuo’s designers combined pan-Asianism

and corporatist concepts with older paradigms of multicultural empire rooted in

Chinese imperial practice. The resulting framework of ‘‘racial harmony’’ displaced

the borrowed models of assimilation and separation previously used to structure

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE 229

colonial relations. Transformative initiatives could also be found in Japanese districts

in China’s treaty ports which were, for most intents and purposes, urban ‘‘micro-

colonies.’’

In Manchuria before 1931, the Japanese-owned South Manchurian

Railway linked a large number of such micro-colonies into an industrial corridor

that hosted the first experiments in the making of a ‘‘brave new empire.’’

Institu-

tions such as the South Manchurian Railway Company played a vital role in the

systematic exercise of Japanese power in non-colonial environments. Telecommuni-

cations agencies facilitated the high-speed flow of information througho ut the im-

perium and greatly facilitated its integration.

Colonial banks based in Taiwan and

Korea as well as the Oriental Development Company extended their operations into

China and contributed to building a region-wide financial infrastructure, whi le

trading companies such as Mitsui Bussan made parallel contributions in the field of

commerce. Working in concert, these transportation, communication, financial, and

commercial networks endowed even the indirectly managed portions of the empire

with a significant measure of structural coherence. The Foreign Ministry’s consular

apparatus, nominally charged with the responsibilities of formal diplomacy, strength-

ened that coherence through the exercise of extraterritorial administrative and judicial

powers. Diplomats thus came to serve essentially colonial functions in the manage-

ment of power, people, and imperial interest on ground.

Any conside ration of the developmental aspects of the imperial project cannot

avoid the question of whether these transformative efforts had any positive effects

on the lands and peoples toward which they were directed. This is an old and bitterly

contested issue inseparable from the pol emics of North–South conflict. It may be

possible to offer a qualified answer to this question, however, if we were to address it

in very narrow economic terms, setting aside the broader problem of the overall

effects of imperialism, and, further, if we were to separate from consideration the

destructive effects of World War II, an intellectual exercise certainly open to question.

Given such qualifications, most Western historians would agree that development

under the empire did contribute to improv ements in agricultural productivity in the

colonies and promoted significant industrialization in some areas, notably northern

Korea and northeast China. It also created a cadre, albeit smaller than opportunities

and circum stances allowed, of administrators, skilled workers, business managers,

teachers, and other professionals that would play an important role after liberation,

a factor contributing to the remarkable economic success of some of Japan’s former

colonies.

State and Civil Society

Given the importance of defense in the imperial project as well as its operative focus

on political control, the state was the dominant actor. At the same time, it was by no

means the only important player, as expansionist undertakings tended to gather

around them a growing constellation of interests in Japanese civil society as well.

The emphasis on non-state actors represents one of the most important new trends in

the study of Japanese imperialism. Peter Duus explores this dimension of the Korean

project in detail, highlighting the activities of business interests, individual entrepre-

neurs, emigration promoters, and settlers. He also describes the contradictory ways in

230 Y. TAK MATSUSAKA

which Japanese came to imagine Koreans, as alien and inferior on the one hand and,

on the other, as a people sharing ancestry and culture with the Japanese and thus

susceptible to uplift.

One of the distinguishing features of Louise Young’s study of

Manchukuo lies in her examination of the ways in which the Japanese public was

drawn into the Manchurian venture, transforming imperialism into a mass cultural

phenomenon. Mobilizing public opinion was, to be sure, a function of the state, but

civil society also played an active and independent part as a wide variety of interests

found creative ways to appropriate Manchuria for their own purposes.

The high level of popular support enjoyed by the Manchurian venture in the early

1930s, however, had little precedent. Although the problem has received relatively

little attention in English-language scholarship, attitudes within the political middle

class toward the project of empire before 1931 appear to have been uneven and

inconsistent and, averaged over the long term, might be characterized as lukewarm.

Expansionist ardor unmistakably spiked during the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars,

but such enthusiasm proved to be short-lived corollaries of an equally transient war

fever. There is no doubt that deep reservoirs of militant nationalism c ould be found

within the Japanese public, but su ch sentiment, most readily aroused in response to a

perceived injury or threat, was not unequivocally expansionist. California no less than

China might be a target of popular nationalist demands that the government ‘‘show

the flag’’ with the deployment of warships and naval infantry. The fiscal conservatism

of the middle class and its parliamentary representatives, moreover, acted as a power-

ful brake on public support for a potentially costly imperial undertaking. Such a

tendency might explain popular enthusiasm for expansion in wartime, when outlays

for empire could be subsumed under the costs of waging war in the name of national

defense.

A special aspect of the imperial project engaging both state an d civil society was

emigration. The government encouraged permanent settlement in the colonies and

Manchuria first and foremost as a means of securing Japan’s position in these

territories by creating ‘‘facts on the ground’’ and secondarily as a way of resolving

the country’s ‘‘population problem.’’ Most ordinary Japanese who responded to the

call to ‘‘go east,’’ howeve r, migrated in pursuit of fortune or ‘‘dreams of brocade,’’ as

Duus puts it, rather than in conscious service of empire.

Not surprisingly, the level

and make-up of migration to the impe rial periphery fell well short of what the

government sought, drawing more sojourners than settlers as well as significant

numbers of the more marginal members of Japanese society. Insofar as fortune and

opportunity provided the primary incentives to migrate, Hawaii and California,

where Japanese immigrants might pursue ‘‘dreams of extravagance,’’ represented

competing destinations.

Significantly, a preponderance of migrants to both contin-

ental Asia and North America came from an overlapping group of prefectures in

southwestern Japan, a pattern reinforced by chain migration.

Ironically, these two

sets of e

migre

s, sharing similar origins and dreams, encountered very different fates

upon reaching their destinations. Those who crossed the Pacific to settle in North

America became enmeshed in the struggles of an embattled minority on the subaltern

side of a color line whose experiences resembled those of colonial subjects. Those

who crossed the Straits of Korea or the Yellow Sea became actors in a dramatically

different narrative as members of an imperial elite lording it over subject Koreans and

Chinese.

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE 231

The emigration of Japanese to the imperial marches, however, was only one current

in the complex patterns of migrat ion generated within the empire. The movement of

large numbers of imperial subjects to metropolitan Japan was another and represents

one of the many ways in which empire transforme d the metropole in ways not entirely

anticipated.

Whereas the nation-builders of the Meiji era had expended extraordin-

ary effort toward homogenizing Japanese culture and reducing its diversity, immi-

gration from the colonies, and from Korea, in particular, represented a countervailing

force. The impact was particularly significant among the working classes who had the

most direct interaction with Korean immigrants, which partly helps to explain the

explosion of bloody violence against Korean immigrants in Tokyo’s working-class

neighborhoods in the aftermath of the Kanto

earthquake in 1923. The complexity of

the relationships generated, however, is highlighted by the election from Tokyo, less

than ten years later, of Boku Shunkin, the one and only ethnic Korean member to

serve in the lower house of the Imper ial Diet.

Subject Societies under Imperial Rule

The shift in emphasis from state to civil society in the study of the Japane se empire has

been paralleled by increased attention to subject societies. It has long been recognized

that empire cannot be understood from a Japanese vantage point alone but must

account for the agency of subject peoples. The development of Korean studies has

contributed significantly to illuminating the experience of people under imperial rule as

other than passive objects or victims of Japanese policy.

At the same time, in the view of

a growing number of historians of colonial era Korea, it is important to avoid oversim-

plifying that agency into the duality of resistance and collaboration favored by nation-

alist historiography.

This new trend in scholarship highlights the contingency of

identities generated within the empire. Gender, class, and ethnicity were not subsumed,

let alone obviated, by imperial rule into the simple dialectic of colonizer and colonized,

nor was contention over the associated issues of civil rights, social equality, and eco-

nomic opportunity displaced by the reductionist binary of resistance and collaboration.

Subject peoples instead ‘‘negotiated’’ their identities in a colonial framework of

relations. The dynamic between Korean workers and Japanese managers at the Onoda

Cement factory was, as Soon-won Park argues, a worker–manager as well as a

Korean–Japanese issue.

To strike against management might be regarded as an act

of anti-imperialist resistance, but by extension, did the subsequent settlement of a

dispute and the resumption of cooperative relations mean collaboration? The prob-

lem of ‘‘identity’’ confront ing Korean business magnates such as members of the Kim

family studied by Carter Eckert were no less complicated.

Business people chafed,

on the one hand, against constrained opportunities and discrimination as well as the

humiliations faced by all Koreans under Japanese rule, but they also depended on the

Japanese authorities for the institutional and legal infrastructure that made modern

business possible, for contracts and special opportunities, and, most problematic, for

support against labor unrest among fellow Koreans. The expansion of the Kim family

enterprises into Manchuria during the 1930s raises yet another dimension of the

contingency of coloni al identities. Where did Koreans stand as colonial subjects in

relation to Japan’s imperial project in China? Shoul d they join in solidarity with the

232 Y. TAK MATSUSAKA

Chinese nati onalists against a common foe, or, confronted with repeated acts of anti-

Korean violence in Manchuria, seek out the protection of the Japanese authorities and

the advantages that came with being treated as a Japanese national? Similar questions

confronted Taiwanese who enjoyed Japanese nationality and, in theory, concomitant

protection in setting up businesses in mainland China.

There were no simple answers to these kinds of questions, and individuals negoti-

ated their identities in a variety of ways. At the same time, the complex response of

subject peoples produced, in aggregate, a dynamic phenomenon described by some

scholars as ‘‘colonial modernity.’’

Colonialism transformed peasants into Koreans

and produced a Korean bourgeoisie. A variant of modern labor relations likewise

emerged under enterprises such as the Onoda Cement Company. So too did a modern

media, initially driven by politics but, very much like the press in Meiji Japan, increas-

ingly reined in by the demands of the media market.

The observation that modernity

and colonialism might coexist would seem little different from arguing against the

mutual exclusivity of development and imperialism, noted above. What is especially

significant about this concept, however, is that it highlights the agency of subject

people in constructing that modernity in a colonial setting. Colonial modernity was

considerably more than the received outcome of a Japane se ‘‘ci vilizing mission.’’

Studies of the colonies have led the way in this line of inquiry, but its concerns and

approaches are, once again, readily applicable to non-colonial parts of the empire.

Prasenjit Duara considers the role of women’s organizations that legitimized the state

in Manchukuo while, at the same time, asserted a more active role for women in the

public sphere than for their counterparts in Japan or China proper. He also identifies

a special role for Manchurian redemptive societies in the shaping of an ‘‘East Asian

modern.’’

Rana Mitter explores Chinese responses to the Manchurian Incident and

the creation of Manchukuo and, in doing so, illumina tes the messier realities under-

lying the binary of collaboration and resistance central to the ‘‘Manchurian myth’’

entrenched in the Chinese nationalist narrative.

Interactions between the South

Manchurian Railway Company and Chinese communities in Manchuria before 1931

offer additional examples of complex and contingent relationships generated under

the empire. The officials of the Japanese railway company and local Chinese engaged

one another as imperialists and subject peoples on the one hand, and as business

managers and clients on the other. Cooperation under these circumstances was not

necessarily collaboration, nor confrontation, a reflection of consciously anti-imperi-

alist resistance.

Complexity and contingency may be seen in particularly sharp relief

in occupied Southeast Asia during World War II. To nationalist leaders who had

fought against colonialism, such as Aung San in Bur ma or Sukarno in Indonesia, the

Japanese presented themselves at one and the same time as liberators and as new

conquerors. The fact that their responses entailed a shifting mixture of cooperation

and resistance, under these circumstances, is hardly surprising.

Future Directions

A concern with colonial modernity and an emphasis on more contingent analyses of

imperial relationships represent important trends shaping future scholarship. Con-

sistent with these trends and the emphasis on imperial civil society, the topic of gender

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE 233

and empire will undoubtedly receive greater attention.

So, too, will migration and

urban development.

In addition to new themes and topics, further research on the

Japanese empire is likely to place increasing emphasis on interdisciplinary, and in

particular, transnational approaches.

Of particular interest is the development of

transnational interest groups in the empire, which might involve large business

organizations, such as Mitsui Bussan or federations of small-scale Chinese, Japanese,

Taiwanese, and Korean entrepreneurs.

A new emphasis on the transnat ional does not diminish the continued importance

of studying empire as an aspect of ‘‘national’’ histories. Some of the most important

contributions to the field of Japan’s imperial history have resulted from the growth of

studies in modern Korean history. Much remains to be done on Taiwan, not to

mention the Nan yo

In a similar vein, the study of late Qing and Republican

China and its experience under Japanese domination constitutes an expanding field

of great relevance to understanding the empire. Imperialism as an integral part of the

Japanese experience, moreover, is far from played out. Popular opinion and imperial

identity before 1931 remains an area that warrants attention. Japanese settler com-

munities deserve further study as well, along with a framework of investigation for

Japanese migration that transcends the traditional divide between a ‘‘diaspora’’ in the

Americas and ‘‘empire’’ in East Asia. The cultural impact of the imperial endeavor

offers a particularly promising field of inquiry. Kobayashi Hideo hints at the role of

Manchuria, for example, in popularizing ice skating in Japan and nurturing some of

the n ation’s early international competitors. Food and empire is another intri guing

area of investigation.

One of the most interesting possibilities for future work lies, perhaps, in the

historical geography of the empire. Peattie’s observation about Japan’s expansion

exclusively in the near abroad pointed early on to the notion that contiguous,

continental models of empire, rather than the European overseas paradigm, might

be more appropriate for an analysis of the Japanese case. The pursuit of this idea has

been further encouraged by a renewed comparative interest, following the fall of the

Soviet Union, in the Russian, Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Qing realms as imperial

polities.

A conventional framework of inquiry, informed by deeply ingrained def-

initions of a ‘‘new imperialism’’ linked to modern nationalism and industrial capital-

ism, would discourage any tendency to think of the Japanese and Qing empires as

belonging to comparable categories of polity, yet there are good reasons to breach

these conceptual constraints.

Ronald Suny has noted, for example, that contiguous as opposed to overseas

empires exhibit a number of distinct features.

Among the more intriguing of

these differences lies in the fact that expanding contiguous polities present difficulties

in any attempt to draw sharp lines between empire-building, in which an expansionist

state transforms neighboring territories into a subject periphery, and nation-building,

in which a centralizing state integrates and consolidates its borderlands into a unified

national polity. When one state engages in both processes simultaneously, the bound-

aries between internal consolidation and external expansion become blurred. During

the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan’s nation- builders forged the Meiji

nation-state out of an older, heterogeneous Tokugawa realm, integrating semi-au-

tonomous domain states into a unified political community.

At the same time, while

this nation-state remained a work in progres s, a greater Japan, spilling beyond its

234 Y. TAK MATSUSAKA

Tokugawa confines, began to take form. Hokkaido

, conventionally regarded as one of

the four main islands of metropolitan Japan but incorporated and settled only in the

modern era, offers a good example of the ambiguity generated by this dual process. In

many respects, Hokkaido

was no more or less a settlement colony than Karafuto and

provided essential lessons in colonization and the management of newly acquired

territories. The Ryu

kyu

Kingdom, annexed in 1879 following a dispute with China

and reorganized as Okinawa prefecture, also lay in a no-ma n’s-land between empire

and nation. Much of Okinawa’s moder n history entailed a process of transforming a

peripheral colony into a metropoli tan subdivision.

The assimilation of Okinawa

might be regarded as an outlying case of the integration of elements of Japan’s

internal periphery into a nation-state. At the same time, it may also be seen as

anticipating assimilationist policies in Taiwan and Korea that culminated in the full-

scale attempt to absorb these colonies into metropolitan Japan in the late 1 930s.

The blurring of lines between metropole and periphery and b etween empire-building

and nation-building, as seen in the case of Okinawa, resonates with the application of

the Meiji model in early colonial management noted above. This, in turn, suggests

the potential value of a broader examination of Japan’s domestic social, economic,

and political history through the analytical lens of empi re.

Conclusion

Broad shifts in historiography have facilitated new trends in the study of the Japanese

empire. Such trends are likely to flourish in the imme diate future if only because they

have broadened the marketplace of ideas and brought the problem of empire to a

wider intellectual audience. At same time, it would be unwise to abandon all older

themes and topics, bearing in mind that English-language research on the Japanese

imperium still lacks the depth and breadth of study devoted to European empires.

Much remains to be done, including continued work on institutions of the state. The

emergence of a newer historiography has also benefited from the relaxation of the

cold war mindset and the gradual removal of some of the political snares that have

long constrained this field of scholarship. It would be important, however, not

overlook the fact that old polemics are being replaced by new. At least to some

degree, a once universally condemned imperialism is undergoing rehabilitation,

particularly as applied to the hegemonic role of the United States, which, in turn, is

producing a reinvigorated critique. The study of history cannot isolate itself from its

political environm ent, and those who practice this craft must be aware of its many

uses and of the context in which they convey their knowledge to a wider public.

NOTES

1 John Dower, ‘‘E. H. Norman, Japan, and the Uses of History,’’ in Norman, Origins of the

Modern Japanese State, pp. 3–101.

2 Marius Jansen, ‘‘Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,’’ in Myers and Peattie,

eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, pp. 61–79.

3 Peter Duus, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Duus, Myers, and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal

Empire in China, pp. xi–xxix.

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE 235

4 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. 1–13.

5 For a discussion of ‘‘fascism’’ in Japan, see Duus and Okimoto, ‘‘Fascism and the History

of Prewar Japan.’’

6 Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 92–100.

7 Mark Peattie, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire,

pp. 7–9, 13–15.

8 Ronald Robinson, ‘‘The Excentric Idea of Empire,’’ in Mommsen and Osterhammel, eds.,

Imperialism and After, p. 269.

9 Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 22–30.

10 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, esp. pt. 1. On the logic of annexation, see also Dudden,

Japan’s Colonization of Korea.

11 Discussed in Conroy and Wray, eds., Japan Examined, pp. 122–40.

12 Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 267–304. See also McCormack,

Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China.

13 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, pp. 9–34.

14 Ramon and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire. See also Nahm, ed., Korea under

Japanese Colonial Rule.

15 On military industrialization, see Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, and Barnhart, Japan Prepares

for Total War.

16 This is a theme developed in Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire.

17 ‘‘ ‘Hyakusho

’ kaisetsu an,’’ Tokyo Asahi shinbun (Dec. 9, 1933).

18 Westney, Imitation and Innovation, pp. 92–9.

19 Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 79–106.

20 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 241–303.

21 Mark Peattie, ‘‘Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China,’’ in Duus, Myers, and Peattie,

eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China , pp. 166–209.

22 Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 250–8.

23 Yang, Technology of Empire.

24 Brooks, Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy. I am grateful to Anne Reinhardt for her notion of

‘‘semicolonial infrastructures’’ (Reinhardt, ‘‘Navigating Imperialism in China’’).

25 Bruce Cumings, ‘‘The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,’’ in Myers and Peattie,

eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, pp. 478–96.

26 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pt. 2.

27 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 55–114. See also Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis.

28 Mark Peattie, ‘‘Attitudes toward Colonialism,’’ in Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese

Colonial Empire, pp. 80–127.

29 In Japanese, an informative study on this subject is Miyachi, Nichi-Ro sengo seiji shi no

kenkyu

30 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 289–323.

31 Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore, p. 31.

32 Alan Moriyama, ‘‘The Causes of Emigration: The Background of Japanese Emigration to

Hawaii, 1885–1894,’’ in Cheng and Bonacich, eds., Labor Migration under Capitalism,

pp. 248–75.

33 Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan.

34 Shu

gi in, Gikai seido 70-nen shi, p. 440.

35 For example, Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea. On Taiwan, see Ka,

Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan, and Ching, Becoming ‘‘Japanese.’’

36 This trend is well represented by the contributors to Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial

Modernity in Korea.

37 Park, Colonial Industrialization and Labor in Korea.

38 Eckert, Offspring of Empire.

236 Y. TAK MATSUSAKA

39 Barbara Brooks, ‘‘Peopling the Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of

Inclusion,’’ in Minichiello, ed., Japan’s Competing Modernities, pp. 25–44; Harold Lam-

ley, ‘‘Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,’’ in

Rubenstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, pp. 201–60.

40 Michael Robinson and Gi-Wook Shin, ‘‘Rethinking Colonial Korea,’’ in Shin and Robin-

son, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, pp. 1–18. For more on the concept, see Barlow,

ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia.

41 Michael Robinson, ‘‘Broadcasting, Cultural Hegemony, and Colonial Modernity in Korea,

1924–1945,’’ in Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, pp. 54–69.

42 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, pp. 103–20, 131–69.

43 Mitter, The Manchurian Myth.

44 Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 139–48.

45 Goto Ken ichi, ‘‘Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of South-

east Asia in the Wartime Empire,’’ in Duus, Myers, and Peattie, eds., The Japanese

Wartime Empire, pp. 274–301.

46 Wartime sexual slavery has been treated, for example, by Hicks in The Comfort Women.

Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, contains several articles on women

and gender. The broader history of gender dynamics in the Japanese empire awaits further

study, a project being undertaken by, among others, Barbara Brooks.

47 For example, William Sewell, ‘‘Railway Outpost and Puppet Capital: Urban Expressions

of Japanese Imperialism in Changchun, 1905–1945,’’ in Blue, Bunton, and Croizier, eds.,

Colonialism and the Modern World, pp. 283–98.

48 Joshua Fogel is a pioneer in transnational studies of modern East Asia. See for example,

Fogel, The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations.

49 Uchida Jun is currently working on aspects of this topic as part of her Ph.D. dissertation at

Harvard University.

50 Peattie, Nan yo

, is one of the few studies of this part of the Japanese empire.

51 Kobayashi, Mantetsu, pp. 170–3; Michael Schneider, ‘‘Limits of Cultural Rule: Inter-

nationalism and Identity in Japanese Responses to Korean Rice,’’ in Shin and Robinson,

eds., Colonial Moder nity in Korea, pp. 97–127.

52 For example, Lieven, Empire.

53 Ronald Suny, ‘‘The Empire Strikes Out,’’ in Suny and Martin, eds., A State of Nations,

pp. 23–66.

54 Ka

ren Wigen, in The Making of a Japanese Periphery, argues that this process produced a

new center and periphery within the Japanese home islands.

55 Koji Taira, ‘‘Troubled National Identity: The Ryu

kyu

ans/Okinawans,’’ in Weiner, ed.,

Japan’s Minorities, pp. 140–77.

56 Chou Wan-yao, ‘‘The Ko

minka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and

Interpretations,’’ in Duus, Myers, and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire,

pp. 40–68.

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