The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368

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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND Gt)Y(JG

371

Liao-yang

(Liao-tung Hsing-sheng)

KANGHWA

Seat of royalcourt

(1232—70)

Invasion of 1231

Invasion of 1236-39

"* Invasion of 1253-54

MAP

28. The Mongolian invasions of Koryo

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372 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

would have to be devised and additional forces gathered to deliver the coup

de grace. The Mongols therefore reorganized their armies and in 1231 put

into action a new strategic plan. The left wing of the army, led by Siibetei,

took up position in Shantung, the center, under Ogddei, moved into Shansi,

and the right wing, commanded by Tolui, advanced into Shensi. The latter

force subsequently entered northern Szechuan and asked the Sung govern-

ment's permission to cross its territory preparatory to a surprise attack on

K'ai-feng from the southeast. This huge enveloping movement was designed

primarily to avoid the necessity of reducing the formidable T'ung-kuan forts

that commanded the western approaches to the Chin capital.

Their request for rights of transit denied, the Mongols simply forced a

passage along the Sung border. In early 1232 Tolui's troops routed a major

Chin force at San-feng and then resumed their march on K'ai-feng. By

summer all three columns were concentrated around the capital, and Siibetei

assumed control of the combined Mongolian armies. Following the transfer

of command, both Ogodei and Tolui became seriously ill. The khaghan, who

was on his way back to Mongolia when the sickness struck, recovered, but his

brother, who had accompanied him north, weakened and died later that year.

Siibetei, in the meanwhile, increased pressure on the beleaguered city

throughout the fall, and in February 1233, the Chin emperor, Ai-tsung, fled

the capital. Several weeks later, the abandoned and demoralized garrison

capitulated, and in May the gates of K'ai-feng were opened to the Mongols.

The Chin emperor, now in desperate straits, took refuge in Ts'ai-chou in

southwest Honan and appealed to the Sung court for assistance. The latter,

hoping to regain territories long lost to the hated

Jurchens,

rejected the Chin

overtures and instead negotiated an alliance with the Mongols. Despite

increased pressure, the city continued to hold out. In the fall of 1233 the

combined Mongolian—Sung armies converged on Ts'ai-chou; after several

months of resistance Ai-tsung, realizing that there was no escape and no hope

victory,

killed

himself.

Shortly thereafter, on 9 February 1234, Ts'ai-chou

fell and, with it, the Chin dynasty.

In the aftermath of the fighting, the Sung, eager to benefit from the

Jurchen collapse, made an ill-advised attempt to occupy the whole of Honan.

The Sung forces, woefully inadequate to the task, were soon put to flight by

the Mongols, who had no intention of sharing the spoils of victory with their

recent ally.

Administrative

restructuring

To govern this huge and continually expanding domain, the new emperor,

following precedent, fashioned his central administrative apparatus from the

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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND

GOYOG

373

personnel of the guard/household establishment, the majority of whom came

to him as part of his father's legacy.

At the head of his central chancellery,

Ogodei selected the Nestorian Christian Chinkhai (Chen-hai), originally a

chamberlain in his father's household establishment. A Kereyid (though in

some sources he is said to be a Uighur), he had been in Mongolian service at

least since 1203. In his early career he was given a series of military and

administrative commissions, which he successfully discharged. It was not,

however, until the beginning of Ogodei's reign that Chinkhai suddenly rose

to prominence as chief minister of the empire. Many other key officials in his

administration, most notably Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai, were recruited in a similar

manner. Not surprisingly, then, the style of government at the center none-

theless remained much as it had been under Chinggis khan. On the regional

level of government, however, the acquisition of numerous sedentary sub-

jects,

both urban and rural, necessitated some significant adjustment of the

machinery through which the empire was administered. In Chinggis khan's

day the Mongols had been content to place newly conquered sedentary popula-

tions under the control of the responsible theater commander, who func-

tioned as an all-powerful governor-general, as, for example, Mukhali had

done in north China. Nonnative specialists, for example, Uighurs in China

and Chinese in Turkestan, were brought in to assist the Mongolian adminis-

tration, but this did not eliminate the conquerors' heavy dependence on

native administrative institutions and personnel, which they systematically

co-opted for their own purposes.

To ensure that these local elites loyally obeyed orders and advanced impe-

rial interests, the Mongols placed special officers, darughachi, in key popula-

tion centers, in auxiliary military commands, and at the courts of dependent

states.

In the early years of the empire these officers, who oversaw census

taking, tax collection, military recruitment, and the like, were selected from

among the grand khan's

nokod.

The first

darughachi

mentioned in the sources

is Jabar Khoja (Cha-pa-erh Huo-che), who was posted to Peking sometime

between June 1214 and May 1215.

The institutional roots of this office are

not known with certainty, but it has been connected with the Chin office of

hsing-sheng

and with the

basqaqs

of the Khara Khitai kingdom, whose duties

paralleled those of the later

darughachi.

A word of Turkic origin,

basqaq

is an

Secret

history, sec. 269 (p. 204), says that those who guarded Chinggis khan were transferred to

Ogodei upon his elevation. Although it is true that the bulk of the kesig went to Ogodei, the Shu

'ab-ipanjganah (an unpublished genealogical supplement to Rashld al-DIn's_/am/ 'al-Tavarikh), folio

105I—

io6r and

I27r-1,

which provides a lengthy list of the individuals inherited by all four sons,

makes it clear that the "personal thousand" of Chinggis khan, the most elite contingent in the

imperial guard, was transferred to Tolui. Compare also Rashid/Karimi, vol. 1, p. 555; and Rashld/

Boyle,

p. 163.

61 YS, 120, p. 2961.

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374

THE

RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

exact semantic equivalent of the Mongol

darugbachi,

both of which words

mean "one who presses."

Ogodei's major innovation in the system that he inherited was to reduce

the administrative responsibilities of

the

theater commanders, whose primary

duty after all was military conquest, and to turn over these tasks to full-time

"civilian officials," who could devote their energies exclusively to fiscal and

administrative matters. In 1229 he created the first two such civilian-led

Branch Secretariats, one for eastern and western Turkestan and the other for

occupied north China. Later on, once a firm Mongolian bridgehead had been

established in the Middle East in the 1240s, a third secretariat was estab-

lished in northern Iran.

The purpose behind this restructuring was to assert the grand khaghan's

primacy over the riches of the empire's sedentary sector, particularly over

tribute and revenues that were being siphoned off by members of the impe-

rial family at the local level. The interests of the latter, though certainly

subordinated, were by no means ignored under the new system, and by the

end of Ogodei's reign it had become established practice to allow interested

regional khans and other imperial princes to place their personal representa-

tives on the staffs of the Branch Secretariats and to have a voice in the

selection of their chief executive officers. The work of these administrations

was thus to some extent a joint undertaking of the entire Chinggisid line,

with the grand khan enjoying the status of

primus inter

pares.

This joint

system of governance, it appears, first evolved in the Turkestan administra-

tion, in consequence of disputes that arose between Ogodei and the regional

khan, Chaghadai, and was later applied in China and Iran.

The first head of the Turkestan chancellery was Mahmud Yalavach, a

Turkish-speaking Khwarazmian merchant who entered Mongolian service in

1218 as a diplomatic envoy (hence his name, Yalavach, Turkic for messen-

ger).

All of the sedentary regions between the Aral Sea and the Tangut lands

fell within his jurisdiction. Mahmud Yalavach's appointment established an

enduring family tradition of administrative service to the Chinggisid dy-

nasty; for at least four generations his numerous descendants were continu-

ously in the employ of various Mongolian princely lines in Turkestan and

China.

62 On the office of darugbachi, see Francis W. Cleaves, "Darugba and

gerege,"

Harvard Journal of Asiatic

Studies, 14 (1951), pp. 493-526. On the possible relationship between darughachi and basqaq, see

Istvan Vasary, "The origins of the institution of basqaqs," Ada Orientalia Acadtmiae Scitntiarum

Hungaricae, 32 (1978), pp. 201-6.

63 Paul Buell, "Sino-Khitan administration in Mongol Bukhara," Journal ofAsian History, 13 (1979), pp.

121—

51,

was the first to point out the collegial nature of these Branch Secretariats, which he calls

"joint satellite administrations," and to trace their evolution.

64 For a brief history of this family, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mahmud Yalavach," in vol. 1 of Yuan

personalities, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz and Hok-Iam Chan (forthcoming).

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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND

GOYOG

375

Mahmud Yalavach's counterpart in north China was the renowned Yeh-lii

Ch'u-ts'ai, a sinicized Khitan descended from the Liao ruling house. A man

of broad intellectual and spiritual attainments, he was an adherent of both

Confucianism and Ch'an Buddhism. Like his father before him, he led an

active public life, serving the Chin dynasty in a variety of administrative

capacities. Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai was in Chung-tu when it fell in 1215, and three

years later, by imperial command, he traveled to Mongolia for an audience

with Chinggis khan. Greatly impressed with the Khitan, the Mongolian

ruler placed him in his retinue as a scribe

(.bichechi)

and court astrologer.

In 1219 Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai accompanied his master to Central Asia and did

not return to China until 1226. During the interregnum the regent, Tolui,

sent him to the former Chin capital to quell a disturbance that had broken

out in the vicinity. He soon accomplished his mission and returned to Mongo-

lia in time for Ogodei's enthronement. Here, in 1229, north China was

given into his charge.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai and his

reforms

As a loyal servitor of the Mongols for over a decade and as a man intimately

familiar with the Chinese scene, Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai possessed all of the requi-

site qualifications for the new post of chief tax collector for north China

created by Ogodei. His appointment, however, did not sit well with some

elements of the Mongolian hierarchy, who rightly feared that the khaghan's

main purpose in placing a man with Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's background and

views into such an office was to assert direct imperial control over revenue

collection at the expense of their own interests. This concern was shared as

well by the Chinese military commanders in Mongolian service. Even though

the latter at times actively supported Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's efforts at reviving

Chinese cultural life, they, too, had become accustomed to governing their

domains with minimal external interference in the chaotic conditions of the

1220s. Like their Mongolian counterparts, they therefore tended to view

with deep suspicion any attempt at administrative or fiscal centralization.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's disturbing proposals for fiscal reform first emerged

during debate concerning the general direction of imperial policy that devel-

oped at the beginning of Ogodei's reign.

? At these discussions Begder (Pieh-

tieh),

a court official and spokesman of an extremist faction, seriously put

65 Igor de Rachcwiltz, "Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243): Buddhist idealist and Confucian statesman," in

Confucian

personalities,

ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, 1962), pp. 189-201.

66 Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yen Shih, 1182—1240,"

Papers

on Far

Eastern

History, 33 (1986), pp. 119—22.

67 On Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal and administrative reforms, see Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai," pp.

201-7; and Nikolai TS. Munkuev, Kitaiskii

istochnik

0pervykh

mongol'skikh

kbanakh (Moscow, 1965),

pp.

34-6.

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376 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

forward a plan to depopulate north China and convert its agricultural lands

into pasture for Mongolian

herds!

Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai was able to turn aside this

appalling proposal by arguing forcibly that if a regular scheme of taxation

were introduced into the area, revenues would increase dramatically, much to

the long-term benefit of

the

imperial coffers. Persuaded that such a program,

if successful, would enhance his power as khaghan, Ogbdei offered the

Khitan an opportunity to implement his policy recommendations on a trial

basis.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai had won this round in what proved to be an ongoing

debate at court and now had to demonstrate that his measures would generate

revenue at the promised levels.

The first formal step in the implementation of Yeh-Lii Ch'u-ts'ai's plan was

taken toward the end of 1230, when Ogbdei appointed revenue commission-

ers

(cheng-shou

k'o-shui shih) for each of the ten circuits (lu) in occupied

China.

All were of Chinese origin, for the most part former officials of the

Chin dynasty. They were to oversee the collection of taxes on the basis of

entirely new system devised by Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai. Under the new regime

every adult would pay a fixed tribute

(ch'ai-fa)

assessed in silk yarn, the rate

for villagers being considerably higher than that levied on urban dwellers.

Cultivators also had to pay a set amount of grain per household, regardless of

the amount and quality of their land, whereas those in the cities paid a

supplemental levy in silk yarn to provide food for official couriers in transit.

For the most part, taxes assessed in silk yarn were commuted into silver for

payment to the government. Though hardly equitable, this system did estab-

lish firm categories of taxation and did specify clearly the basis of assess-

ment.

As intended by their author, taxes - at least in theory - were now

regular and predictable. More important from the Mongolian point of view,

they did indeed produce more revenues.

Ogodei was so delighted with the results that in 1231 he named Yeh-lii

Ch'u-ts'ai his chief of the Secretariat

{chung-shu

ling);

that is, he was given

responsibility for the overall administration of north China. In his new

capacity, however, he was still subordinate to the Central Secretariat headed

by Chinkhai, who had to countersign all official documents issued by the

chung-shu

ling before they could be considered valid.i° Nevertheless, Yeh-lii

Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal success had strengthened his hand, and he used his in-

creased influence to push for yet more reforms.

68 YS, 2, 36.

69 The fullest account of early Mongolian fiscal practices is contained in the Hei la shih liieh, in Meng-ku

shih liao ssu

chung,

ed. Wang Kuo-wei (1926; repr., Taipei, 1962, 1975), I3a-b, a work prepared by

P'eng Ta-ya and Hsu T'ing, two Sung envoys who traveled in north China between 1234 and 1236.

For a translation and analysis of the relevant passages, see Herbert F. Schurmann, "Mongolian

tributary practices in the 13th century," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 19 (1956), pp. 312—18.

70 P'eng, Hei ta shih liieh, 10a; and

Cbinesische

Gesandtenbericbte,

p. 133.

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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND GOYOG

377

Although conditions

north China had been improved somewhat

these early measures, many problems remained unresolved, and new ones

soon surfaced. For one thing, the Mongols were not long satisfied with the

tax rates as originally set; between 1231 and 1234, for example, the grain

assessment jumped from two

four bushels per household. Further, the

Mongols were unable to refrain from their old habit of exacting extraordinary

levies above and beyond the regularly scheduled taxes. These difficulties

arose in part because it was the practice of the Mongolian authorities first

calculate state expenditures and then to establish tax quotas to meet their

budgetary requirements. As expenses increased, new tax rates were set,

special levies were introduced at short notice to make up the expected short-

fall.

Such deficits could be generated by changes in imperial policy, by new

military campaigns, for example, but many were simply the result of the

personal greed of the Mongolian leadership. Tribute in the form of silver that

came into their possession was regularly invested with Hui-hui (Inner and

Central Asian Muslim) merchants, who then either used this capital to buy

goods for trade or lent

to the populace

extremely high interest rates.

These partnerships (called ortaq in Turkic, wo-t'o in Chinese, and

ortogh

Mongolian) between princes and merchants were frequently very profitable,

and so members of the Mongolian hierarchy were always anxious to acquire

additional capital for new commercial ventures.

Among the Mongolian leadership there was no worse offender

this

regard than the khaghan

himself.

Ogodei freely gave huge sums of cash

ortogh

merchants

for

investment. On several occasions he reportedly gave

individual merchants five hundred ingots of gold or silver (balhh in Persian)

for this purpose. To indicate the magnitude of this sum,

must be remem-

bered that in 1230 Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai collected only ten thousand silver ingots

(Chinese: ting) from his entire jurisdiction. Despite the protests of his minis-

ters,

particularly Mahmud Yalavach, the khaghan continued this practice to

the end of his reign.

With monies leaving the treasury at this rate, it is not

surprising that there was always pressure to readjust the tax quotas upward.

The misery caused by higher taxes was not, however, the only mischief

caused by the

ortogh

merchants. As agents of the khaghan or of a powerful

prince, they used their connections

extort goods and monies from the

population.

frequent trick employed by these merchants in north China

was to claim falsely but vociferously that goods they had purchased with

prince's money had been stolen and thus to force the local population, who

feared official retaliation, to make good their "losses."

71 P'eng, Her la shih liieh, I5a-b; and

Chinaische

Gaandtenberichtt, p. 152.

72 Juvaynl/Qazvlni, vol. 1, pp. 166—6, 170—7; and Juvayni/Boyle, vol.

pp.

209-10, 213-15.

378 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

The fact that there continued to be a large floating population in north

China after 1231 was a further and sure sign that conditions had not yet

returned to normal. Despite the reforms, many people (one contemporary

estimate says 50 percent of the total population) still had a great incentive to

abandon their homes simply to avoid the seemingly endless demands of the

state and the depredations of its agents. Others had disappeared from the tax

rolls because they were made slaves and retainers of high Mongolian officials.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai, sensitive to this problem, proposed to Ogodei in 1234

that a census be taken in north China to discover the hidden and floating

population in order to return them to their homes and the tax rolls. The

khaghan agreed and deputed Shigi Khutukhu, the original keeper of

the Blue

to conduct an enumeration. The census, which got under way in

1234,

occasioned new debate at court over future revenue policies. Even

though he was satisfied with the established categories of

taxes,

Yeh-lii Ch'u-

ts'ai argued for fundamental changes in the methods of assessment. In his

opinion, tribute should henceforth be collected on the basis of

the

household,

not individual adults, as had been the practice in China since 1231. The

Mongols, however, preferred the system of individual assessment, a method

that was still in effect in Turkestan, where Mahmud Yalavach had introduced

his own fiscal reforms in the early 1230s. In the end, a compromise was

reached whereby the older poll tax assessed on individual adults was greatly

diminished and a new household tax, also to be paid in silk, was introduced.

On the whole, Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai had won his point. In regard to the agricul-

tural tax, his suggested revision was accepted as it stood. The levy on grain,

initially assessed at a flat rate on each household, would now be based on the

quantity and quality of land owned.

When the census was completed in 1236, the new system was introduced.

The results were gratifying: With more equitable methods of assessment in

place, the burden on individual households was substantially reduced, in

some cases by as much as 90 percent. But thanks to the expansion of the tax

base following the conquest of Honan in 1234 and the registration of the

hitherto hidden or floating population, total government revenues were main-

tained. Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai was now at the height of his power and influence,

but trouble was brewing on the horizon.

The

eclipse

Yeh-lti

Ch'u-ts'ai

Following an initial period of imperial activism, from the mid-i23os on-

ward, Ogodei became less and less interested in the administration of his

realm. As he began to devote himself to drinking, dalliance, and extrava-

gance, local and regional interests energetically reasserted their influence.

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND

GOYOG

379

The turning point in this struggle between the proponents of princely auton-

omy and the partisans of centralized imperial control were the years 1236 and

1237.

The first unmistakable indication that Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai was beginning to

lose the khaghan's ear came in 1236, when Ogodei decided to enlarge dramati-

cally the system of princely appanages (Mongolian: khubi; Chinese: fen-ti) in

north China. By imperial decree all senior princes and princesses were to

receive large tracts of agricultural land as a supplemental sources of personal

income. The sons of Jochi, for example, were granted 41,302 households in

P'ing-yang, and Chaghadai was given 47,330 households in T'ai-yiian.

Although Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai did manage to extract another decree from

Ogodei that stipulated that tax collection and military recruitment within

individual appanages were to remain under the jurisdiction of the imperial

court, the granting of khubi on this vast scale constituted a major setback for

the advocates of centralization. As Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai had no doubt foreseen,

the central government, without an active and energetic khaghan intent on

enforcing his will, did not in practice exercise much authority within the

appanages, and the members of the attached households, lacking any form of

protection, were subject to endless abuse and exploitation.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai had undeniably lost a vital battle but persisted nonethe-

less in his efforts at reform. This time he turned his attention to administra-

tive reorganization. The Mongols themselves had already taken a step in

this direction. With the collapse of the Chin dynasty in 1234, the Mongols

soon became aware that their own law, the jasagh of Chinggis khan, had

limited utility in regulating a sedentary society, and they therefore decided

to apply throughout their Chinese territories the Chin statutory code, the

T'ai-ho lii, first promulgated in 1201 and designed on the basis of T'ang

models. Although this was a welcome development, Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai now

had in mind plans of much greater scope that would lead eventually, he

hoped, to the full restoration of Confucian-style government in north

China.

achieve this objective, Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai first sought Ogodei's permission

in 1237 to hold civil service examinations throughout the north as a means of

restoring the Chinese literati, who had suffered great privation and loss of

status in the preceding decades, to their accustomed role in government. The

khaghan gave his blessing for this phase of the program, and Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai

in the following year organized examinations in all circuits. Over four thou-

sand applicants passed (one-fourth of whom were slaves or prisoners of war at

the time of the examination), but few of the successful candidates, much to the

73 YS, 2, p. 35195. P- 24I4-

380 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

Khitan minister's bitter disappointment, were ever called for actual service.

Instead, for the most part they were used as administrative advisers in their

home localities. The Mongols had no intention of turning over the governance

of north China (or any other conquered territory) entirely to indigenous offi-

cials.

In fact, the role of foreign administrative specialists, principally Uighur

and Turkestanis, in the government of north China continued and

even

grew in

the coming years.

Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's inability to gain acceptance of his administrative pro-

gram was a further demonstration of

the

limits of his influence. Future events

would show that not only was he unable to extend his reforms but that the

measures already in place also were by no means immune from attack,

particularly his fiscal policies so painfully implemented over the preceding

decade. At the center of this assault stood the Inner and Central Asian

merchants whose exploitative practices Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai had never been able

to curb effectively. Their influence among the Mongolian hierarchy, always

strong, steadily increased at Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's expense, and in 1239 Ogodei

was persuaded to farm out the taxes of north China to a Muslim merchant,

Abd al-Rahman (Ao-tu-la-ho-man, An-tu-la-ho-man), thus bypassing the

regular system of revenue collection. The tax quota established for that year,

not unexpectedly, was raised substantially to 44,000 ingots of silver. Early in

the following year, the khaghan, pleased with the merchant's results, placed

the tax farmer in charge of the tax bureaus of north China.

The victory of

the merchant faction was now temporarily complete.

Some idea of the baleful impact of the new policy on China's population

can be gleaned from an edict that Ogodei felt constrained to issue toward the

end of 1240. According to this document, the populace and officials had

been compelled to borrow large amounts of money from the ubiquitous Inner

and Central Asian

(Hui-ho)

merchants in order to meet their increased tax

obligations. The rates charged were so high that the interest often equaled

the principal within a year's time. In light of this, the khaghan "magnani-

mously" decreed that henceforth the interest could not legally exceed the

original amount borrowed.

Under Abd al-Rahman's regime, the

ortogh

merchants - operating simulta-

neously as tax farmers and moneylenders - were clearly reaping huge divi-

dends at the expense of the Mongols' Chinese subjects. It is difficult, in fact,

to imagine a more ruinous and exploitative economic system than the one

74 On the plight of the Confucians in this period, see Makino Shuji, "Transformation of the shih-jen in

the late Chin and early Yuan," Ada Asiatica, 45 (1983), pp. 1—26.

75 YS, 2, p. 36; and Shmg wu

ch'in cbeng

cbiao

cbu, in Meng-ku shih liao

ssu

chung,

ed. Wang Kuo-wei

(1926; repr. Taipei, 1962, 1975), p. 106b.

76 YS, 2, p. 37.