The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 361
tering hsien (counties) and
chou
(prefectures). Their principal responsibilities
were to maintain order and mobilize the resources of their areas for the
benefit of the Mongolian military machine.
Chinese and Khitan military commanders who switched sides participated
in operations against the Chin either independently or in association with
Mongolian armies. Such commanders were confirmed in office by Chinggis
khan or later by Mukhali. They received official titles in Chinese or Mongo-
lian and were given emblems of authority (Mongolian:
gerege
or baisa; Chi-
nese:
p'ai-tzu)
as an indication of their new status.
To coordinate their military and administrative efforts, the Mongols, draw-
ing on Chin precedents, created a series of Hsing-t'ai-chung-shu-sheng,
Branch Secretariats. Formed initially in the early twelfth century as branches
of the Shang-shu sheng, the Secretariat of State Affairs, the supreme adminis-
trative organ of the Chin government, the Hsing-sheng, as they were called
for short, were established mainly in newly conquered territories and later on
in frontier areas threatened with attack. The officer in charge, also termed a
hsing-sheng,
was given plenipotentiary powers within his jurisdiction, which
in Chin times normally corresponded to a lu, or "circuit" (which was divided
into several prefectures, or
chou).
The Mongols were quick to adapt this institution to their needs. In 1214 the
first Branch Secretariat was established, whose head was the Mongolian gen-
eral Samukha Baghatur. The Khitan Shih-mo Ming-an was appointed hsing-
sheng
ofYen-ching (Chung-tu) in 1215 following its capture. After 1217 when
major campaigning was resumed, there was another wave of Chinese defec-
tions,
and for the first time some Han Chinese were made
hsing-sheng.
Like their Chin counterparts, the Mongolian-appointed hsing-sheng re-
ceived full discretionary powers upon assuming office. Most were military
men, and given the importance of the post, they were carefully screened
before being appointed. Although the office of
hsing-sheng
was, on the surface
at least, alien to the Mongolian tradition, it was effectively integrated into
the Mongolian sociopolitical system.
46
Chinese or others appointed to this
office were given an appropriate military rank and, in some cases, granted a
commission in the guard, becoming thereby a companion
(nb'kb'r)
to Chinggis
khan or his prince of the realm, Mukhali. To guarantee their fidelity, the sons
of such officials were held as hostages in units of the
kesig.
Thus a Chinese
hsing-sheng, in terms of the extent of his combined military—administrative
authority, formal rank, and relationship to the court, was a rough equivalent
to a senior Mongolian commander
(noyan)
of a
mingghan
or
ttirnen.
Because ties of loyalty in the Mongolian system of governance were highly
46 Rachewiltz, "Personnel and personalities," pp. 128—32.
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362 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
personal, an office of any type or importance was normally hereditary. This
was true of the
hsing-sheng:
Sons succeeded fathers, and over time these
commands were transformed into private domains. In the long run this
process of "feudalization" was to have undesirable consequences from the
standpoint of the Mongolian court, but in the short term it was an efficient
way of consolidating its hold on newly won territories in north China.
At the apex of the Mongolian administrative system in occupied China
stood the viceroy, Mukhali. He undoubtedly communicated with Chinggis
khan, but on the whole he enjoyed extensive autonomy. Chao Hung, a Sung
emissary who visited Mukhali's camp in 1221, compared him with a Chinese
emperor, though he knew that in truth he was not a sovereign ruler. *~*
Certainly no other Mongolian commander was ever entrusted with as much
authority and freedom of action as that granted to the
kuo-wang.
In the course of his lengthy campaign against the Chin, Mukhali naturally
became familiar with some aspects of Chinese culture. Chao Hung noted that
the
kuo-wang's
clothes and regalia were Chinese, as were the court procedures
followed at his camp. On the other hand, the same observer reported that
women were conspicuous at Mukhali's court and that they drank and con-
versed freely with men, all of which testifies to the strength and persistence
of Mongolian social customs.
48
Not surprisingly, the Mongolian regime in
north China as it developed in the first half of the thirteenth century was
composed of a complex blend of Chinese, Jurchen, Khitan, Uighur, and
Mongolian administrative techniques and social usages, which was typical of
the hybrid polities that had formed along China's steppe frontier since the
collapse of the Han dynasty.
Mongolian policy
in north China
The Mongolian campaigns against Chin caused widespread destruction, loss
of
life,
and social dislocation. Their tactic of isolating major cities by devastat-
ing their hinterlands meant that both urban and rural populations suffered
grievous casualties and privation. An envoy of the Khwarazmshah Muham-
mad who reached Chung-tu shortly after its surrender in 1215 encountered
there a most grisly scene: The area around the former Chin capital for the
distance of several days' march was strewn, he reports, with the bones of
uncounted dead, and disease, spread owing to the great number of unburied
corpses, continued to claim new victims, including members of his own
47 Chao Hung,
Meng-ta pei
In, in Mtng-ku
shih liao ssu
dung, ed. Wang Kuo-wei (1926; repr. Taipei,
1962,
197;), 5b; and Erich Haenisch and Yao Ts'ung-wu, ed.,
Meng-tapci-lu
undHti-ta
shib-liieb:
Cbinesische Gesandtenberichte iiber ditfriihen Mongoltn, 1221 und 1237 (Wiesbaden, 1980), p. 35 (here-
after ciced as Cbinaische
Gesandtenbericbte).
48 Chao Hung, Meng-ta pei tu, 13a; Cbinaische
Gesandtenbericbte,
p. 79.
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 363
party.
49
As Chinese officials entered Mongolian service in greater numbers
after 1217, conditions improved somewhat, especially after Mukhali was
persuaded to order his armies to cease the wanton destruction of life and
property. Nevertheless, throughout the 1220s, north China was still an
active theater of operations, and the death toll among the civilian population
remained extremely high.
Those who survived the military onslaughts, pestilence, and food short-
ages and who came under Mongolian administrative control faced many new
trials.
The Mongols, from the inception of their state, always made heavy
demands on their subjects. One of the chief obligations of surrendered peo-
ples was the provision of auxiliary troops to support further Mongolian
expansion. Because siege and blockading operations were new to the Mongols
and, moreover, needed a great deal of manpower, Chinese formations were
quickly mobilized and utilized for this task. Some of these Chinese units
came over to the Mongols intact with their officers, whereas others were
newly recruited from the civilian population by the Chin officials who had
retained their posts under the new regime. By 1213 Chinese auxiliaries,
variously called Han chiin (Han armies) or hei chun (black armies), were in
action against the Jurchens. These forces were steadily built up during the
campaign and at the time of Mukhali's death substantially outnumbered the
Mongolian contingents.
In addition to military conscription, the Chinese were forced to supply their
overlords with a lengthy list of goods and
services.
Before Ogodei's reign, there
is no evidence of the existence of a unified system of revenue collection in any of
the sedentary regions of the Mongolian state, including north China. Al-
though data on the situation in former Chin territories between
1211
—1227
are scarce, it appears that, as was their practice elsewhere in active combat
zones,
the Mongols simply demanded what they required from the surrendered
population as the need arose. Thus, tax collection was an ad
hoc,
irregular
arrangement, essentially an endless series of extraordinary requisitions and
exactions to meet the contingencies of war.'
0
For the most part, the Mongols
collected taxes in kind, for example, in grain, clothing, mounts, and weapons
(or metal implements that could be converted into weapons). In the terminol-
ogy of this era, all obligations to the state - whether military service, corvee,
or taxes in kind or coin
—
were subsumed under the name of requisition, alba
49 Minhaj al-DTn Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Ndiiri, ed. W. Nassau Lees (Calcutta, 1964), pp. 335—6; and
Minhaj al-Dln Juzjani, Tabaqal-i niiiri, trans. H. G. Raverty (New Delhi, 1970), vol. 2, p. 965.
50 YS, 153, p. 3609, records that Liu Min was placed in charge of tax collection in the Yen-ching
(Chung-tu) area in 1223. This may indicate that a more orderly and familiar system of exactions was
introduced into certain localities at this time, but it certainly provides no evidence for the existence of
a unified, centrally controlled program of regularized revenue extraction in north China as a whole
before the fiscal reforms of the 1230s.
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364 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
khubchiri
(Chinese: ch'ai-fa). The only category of the population of north
China exempt from these various imposts was religious dignitaries. In 1219
the Ch'an monk Hai-yiin obtained a grant of immunity for his Buddhist
followers, and in 1223 the Mongolian court extended this privilege to the
Taoist Ch'iian-chen sect and subsequently to other major religious groups -
Muslims, Christians, and so on in their domain.'
1
As we noted, the harsh conditions in north China were eased slightly when
Chinese influence in the administration increased after 1217. Attempts were
made to rebuild destroyed facilities, restore agriculture, and revive social and
educational institutions. But such efforts were local in nature and never
received the active backing of the Mongolian regime. Significant improve-
ments would have to await the final conquest of the Chin dynasty and the
reforms of Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai in the early and mid-12
30s.
The Tangut
campaign
and
the
death of
Chinggis
khan
When Chinggis khan departed for Khwarazm, he asked the Tanguts for
auxiliaries, a request that, contrary to their earlier pledge to the Mongols,
was not fulfilled. Several years later the Tanguts, having second thoughts,
sent troops to help Mukhali wrest Shensi from the Chin in order to restore
their standing with the Mongols. But in early 1223, in yet another reversal
of policy, which reflected deep divisions within their court, the Hsi Hsia
unexpectedly withdrew these formations. Such fickle behavior on the part of
a dependent state was both a military menace and a challenge to Mongolian
prestige and could not be tolerated; the Tanguts would have to be called to
account and brought permanently into line.
To test the mood of the Hsi Hsia court, or perhaps to divide it further,
Chinggis khan in the spring of 1225 made a proposal that afforded the
Tanguts a final opportunity to subordinate themselves peaceably to the Mon-
golian state: Their sovereign, Wei-ming Te-wang, was forthwith to send a
son to Chinggis khan's camp as a hostage to guarantee his future fidelity. The
Hsi Hsia, however, failed to respond to the offer and in the fall of 1225
further provoked the Mongols by signing a peace treaty with the
Chin.
'
2
War
was now inevitable.
Unlike the invasion of 1209, which saw a quick thrust toward Chung-
hsing, the campaign of 1226 had as its initial objective the conquest or
neutralization of the western portion of the Hsi Hsia kingdom in order to
51 Tao-chung Yao, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi and Chinggis khan," Harvard
Journal
of
Asiatic
Studies,
46 (1986),
pp.
201-19.
52 Martin,
The rise
of
Cbingis
khan, pp. 283-308; Pelliot,
Notes on Marco
Polo,
vol. 1, pp. 304-30; and
Evgenii I. Kychanov, "Mongolo-Tangutskie voiny i gibel' gosudarstva Si Sia," in
Tartaro-Mongoly
v
Azii i
Europe,
pp.
46—61.
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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND
GOYOG
365
isolate the capital and court from the rest of the country. Hostilities com-
menced in the spring of 1226 with an attack on Khara Khoto - the Etzina of
Marco Polo and the Hei-shui of the Chinese
—
an important Tangut outpost
in the western Gobi. The Hsi Hsia garrison there was soon overrun, and the
Mongolian forces moved south into the Kansu corridor to reduce the cities of
Su-chou and Kan-chou. By the end of summer both had fallen, the former
with great loss of life. Chinggis khan, who had been directing both opera-
tions from the coolness of his headquarters in the foothills of some nearby
mountains, now reorganized his forces, sending one column westward to
Kua-chou and the other eastward to Hsi-liang. The latter, one of the main
urban centers of the Hsi Hsia kingdom, capitulated without a fight in
August. The victorious and still-fresh Mongol force was then ordered to cross
the Yellow River and press toward the Hsi Hsia capital, Chung-hsing. In late
1226 they reached and besieged Ling-chou, an important fortified garrison
south of the capital. When the Tangut ruler, reacting to this threat, dis-
patched a large army to relieve the beleaguered city, Chinggis khan hurriedly
crossed the Yellow River with reinforcements and routed the advancing relief
force. By early 1227 Chung-hsing itself was under siege, and by the end of
the summer it was on the verge of collapse.
Once his troops had surrounded Chung-hsing, Chinggis khan struck south
in the direction of the Wei River valley, attacking positions along the west-
ern frontier of the Chin throughout the spring and summer of 1227. In
August, however, the Mongolian chieftain became ill and soon died, appar-
ently from complications arising from injuries that he had suffered in a riding
accident in the fall of 1225. His death, which occurred somewhere south of
the Liu-p'an Mountains, was temporarily kept secret, and in accordance with
his deathbed wishes, operations against the Hsi Hsia capital continued until
September, when the city was taken and sacked.
Once the Tangut kingdom was destroyed, the body of Chinggis khan was
taken back to Mongolia and buried on Burkhan Khaldun. Forces were left
behind to consolidate recent gains, but further offensive operations were
curtailed while the royal clan, their chief advisers, and commanders repaired
to the Mongolian homeland to mourn the loss of their leader and to put in
order the affairs of the realm.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE: THE REIGNS OF
OGODEIAND
GOYOG
The Chinggisid
dispensation
and
the
khuriltai of 1229
Chinggis khan had first faced the issue of succession in 1219 on the eve of his
invasion of Khwarazm. On the advice of a junior wife, Yesiii, who pointed
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366 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
out the many personal hazards he would face in the forthcoming campaign,
the Mongolian leader decided to resolve this crucial matter without further
delay. In the ensuing court discussion, a violent quarrel soon broke out
between the two leading candidates, his eldest sons, Jochi and Chaghadai.
The latter, seeking to advance his claim on the throne, openly questioned
Jochi's paternity, calling attention to the fact that his elder brother had been
born immediately after Bbrte's release from a period of captivity among the
Merkid. An altercation followed, and it was apparent to their father that
their personal differences were irreconcilable and that neither would ever
willingly accept the elevation of the other. To avoid a disputed succession,
Chinggis khan consequently turned to his third son, Ogodei, as a compro-
mise candidate. This solution proved acceptable to his other three sons, all of
whom publicly and solemnly swore to their father that they would respect
this decision and that at the appointed hour they would unhesitatingly give
Ogodei their loyalty and support. To eliminate any possibility of doubt on
this score, on his deathbed some eight years later Chinggis khan reaffirmed
Ogodei's right to the throne.
53
As an additional measure to minimize tension and conflict among his
descendants, in the years before his death Chinggis khan assigned each of
his
sons territories and peoples of their own. In theory each would maintain
himself on his respective lands but would recognize the sovereignty of
Chinggis khan's chosen successor and actively collaborate with the latter in
further expanding the empire's frontiers. Jochi, the eldest, as Mongolian
custom dictated, was the first to receive his territory, the Irtysh region,
sometime in 1207 or 1208. This, by order of
his
father, was later extended to
include the steppe regions of western Eurasia and the Russian principalities.
When the other sons were assigned their lands is not known, but it was
probably in the early 1220s. Under this dispensation Chaghadai received
west Turkestan, the Tarim basin, and the western Tienshan region. Ogodei
obtained Jungaria and the western slopes of the Altai, and Tolui, the youn-
gest son and therefore the guardian
(pdchigiri)
of his father's hearth, received
the Mongolian homeland.'* North China, as far as can be determined, was
not included in any of
the
assignments at this time; presumably it was among
the territories that Chinggis khan retained under his own authority and
subsequently passed on to his successor.
Of equal importance, Chinggis khan also made provisions to divide the
53
Secret
history,
sec. 254—5 (pp. 189-97); Rashid/Karimi, vol. 1, p. 443; and Rashld al-Din, The successors
of Genghis khan, trans. John A. Boyle (New York, 1971), p. 18 (hereafter cited as Rashld/Boyle).
34 'Ata Malik Juvaynl, Ta'rlkh-i jahan gusha, ed. Mirza Muhammad Qazvtni (London, 1912), vol. 1, p.
31 (hereafter cited as Juvayni/Qazvinl); 'Ata Malik JuvaynT, The history of
the
world
conqueror,
trans.
John A. Boyle (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), vol. 1, pp. 42—3 (hereafter cited as Juvayni/Boyle); and
Bartold, Turkestan down to the
Mongol
invasion, pp. 392-3.
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THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND GOYOG 367
native Mongolian component of his armies among his sons and other rela-
tives.
He bequeathed 4,000 troops to each of his three eldest sons and lesser
numbers to various other kinsmen. The remainder of the army, 101,000
men, not previously apportioned, came into the possession of Tolui, who, as
the
odchigin,
by nomadic convention received his father's residual estate.
55
Tolui, of
course,
was expected to place these armies, the heart of the Mongo-
lian military machine, at the disposaal of the empire and, initially at least,
did so. In later decades, however, Toluid control of this force would greatly
affect the power relations among the increasingly competitive Chinggisid
lines.
The most vexing issues of succession and inheritance having been antici-
pated and disposed of during Chinggis khan's lifetime, the first transfer of
power within the Mongol empire was accomplished with minimal discord.
Tolui was put forward as an alternative candidate, but his cause was not
pressed vigorously. It may well be that his candidacy was never intended as a
serious challenge to Ogodei but was advanced, rather, as a means of laying
the foundation for future Toluid claims on the Khaghanate. In any event, no
open breach occurred, and preparations for Ogodei's enthronement slowly
moved forward. First Chinggis khan had to be properly buried and imperial
kinsmen and military commanders called in from the far reaches of the
empire. For the duration of the interregnum, Tolui, as guardian of the
Mongolian homeland, was placed in charge of the affairs of state, that is,
became regent.
56
When the accord was achieved and the preliminaries were completed, the
khuriltai was at last convened at Kode'e Aral, an area near the Keriilen River,
sometime in the fall of 1229. Following Chinggis khan's directive, those
assembled formally offered the throne to Ogodei, who, after several polite
and ritualistic refusals, was finally "persuaded" to accept, assuming the old
Turkic title khaghan, or emperor, as a means of distinguishing himself from
his brothers, who now bore the title of
khan.
To demonstrate their acceptance
of his elevation, Ogodei was lifted onto the throne by his chief potential
rivals for the crown, his brothers Tolui and Chaghadai and his uncle Temiige
Odchigin. Then, in the words of the
Secret
history,
the guards and quiver
bearers were "delivered unto Ogodei khaghan"; that is, the reins of govern-
55 Rashid/Karlmi, vol. i,pp. 399—417, provides a complete breakdown of the division, unit by unit. It
needs to be emphasized, however, that this listing includes
only
those formations raised in Mongolia
proper. Although specifics are lacking, it is clear that in addition to the four thousand "Mongol
regulars," who served as a kind of cadre, each of the eldest three sons also had at his disposal locally
recruited auxiliary contingents. Thus, the strength of the armies under the ocntrol of Jochi, Ogodei,
and Chaghadai in 1227 was actually much greater than the figures reported by Rashid al-Din. For
further discussion,
see
John Masson Smith, "Mongol manpower and Persian population,
"Journal
of the
Economic and Social History
of
the
Orient,
18 (1975), pp. 273-5.
56 YS, 115, p. 2885.
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368 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
ment were placed in his hands. The enthronement ceremonies at an end, a
large celebratory feast was held at which the new khaghan dispensed gifts and
thanks to the assembled notables.
57
Renewed expansion
and the fall of the Chin
Ogodei, who had spent most of
his
life on campaign, began his reign with a
burst of martial energy. The frontiers of the empire, in accordance with the
decisions reached at the recently concluded khuriltai, were to be pushed
vigorously outward in a number of directions.
One of the most pressing tasks left over from his father's reign was the
conquest of the Qipchaq steppes and the Russian principalities. Chinggis
khan had given this important assignment to Jochi as early as 1221 or 1222,
but the latter, despite his father's mounting anger, never devoted his full
attention to the task. After Jochi's death in 1227,
a
^
ew
months before that of
his father, operations in this quarter, halfhearted as they had been, came to a
complete halt. Upon becoming khaghan, Ogodei immediately restarted this
campaign. In 1229 he dispatched three fresh
ttimen
to clear out the lower
Volga region in preparation for a major assault on the western end of Eurasia.
The eastern Qipchaq tribes who occupied the area between the Volga and the
Ural rivers put up unexpectedly fierce resistance to the invading armies, thus
disrupting and delaying for several years the Mongols' plans for follow-up
operations west of the Ural Mountains.
In 1235, after discussion at the highest levels, the old warrior Siibetei was
sent to the Volga with reinforcements. Arriving on the scene in 1236, he
soon overwhelmed the opposition and then struck westward into Russia and
the Qipchaq steppes, which were brought under Mongolian sovereignty by
1241
58
(see Map 27). In conformity with Chinggis khan's earlier directives,
Ogodei dutifully assigned this vast tract of territory to Jochi's
sons.
Orda, the
eldest, received the lands between the Irtysh and the Urals, and Batu, the
second son, the Russian principalities and the western Qipchaq steppe.
There were unfinished tasks, too, in the Middle East. In 1230 Ogodei
placed one of his guardsmen, Chormakhan, in charge of Mongolian forces in
the area and directed him to track down the elusive Jalal al-Din, who was
still trying to organize an anti-Mongolian coalition in western Iran. After
first consolidating his hold on Khurasan, Chormakhan moved into the
57
Secret
history, sec. 269 (p. 209); Juvaynl/Qajvinl, vol. 1, pp. 144—9; Juvaynl/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 183—
9; and YS, 2, p. 29. On Ogodei's new tide, see Igor de Rachewilez, "Qan, qa'an and the seal of
Giiyiig," in Documents
barbarorum:
Festschrift fiir Walter Heissig zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. K. Sagaster and
M. Weiers (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 272-81.
58 Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the western campaigns: Mongol military operations in the Volga-Ural
region, 1217—1237," Archivum
Eurasiae
Medii Aevi, 3 (1983), pp. 5—24.
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500 km
BATU assembles his
armies
in the \
Bulghar Steppe 1238
Vladimir
•Hii.1238
!S*V
BALTIC
SEA
Moscow*
Kolomna
Baidar annihilates Polish
and German army under
Duke Henry of Silesia
Chmielnik
Defeat
of
Polish Army
12.iii.1241
Pacification
of
Bulghars 1236-7
BAIDAR
&
KHAIDU
Southern army
KHADA'AN
SUBETEI
crushes
Hungarian army
Return route
1242
MAP
27.
Batu's invasion
of
Russia
and
Europe
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37° THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
Transcaucasus
in
pursuit of the last Khwarazmshah.
In
1231 when news
reached the Mongolian commander that this troublesome rebel had been
killed by bandits, he redirected his energies toward Asia Minor, where the
Seljuqs of Rum held sway. They, like the eastern Qipchaqs, gave
a
good
account of themselves, and it was only in 1243, following long and arduous
campaigning, that the Mongolian army in west Asia, now under the com-
mand of Baiju, Chormakhan's successor, could claim effective control of the
Seljuq domains.
In northeast Asia Ogodei mounted a sizable campaign against Korea (see
Map 28). The Mongols had first entered the peninsula in 1218 during their
conquest of Manchuria. Unable to withstand the invading force, the Koryo
court agreed to pay an annual tribute in return for the withdrawal of the
Mongolian army. Upon receipt of the first installment of tribute, the Mon-
gols,
as agreed, departed. In 1225, however, the Mongols' chief
tax
collector
died under mysterious circumstances, and so Ogodei used this incident to
justify launching
a
new attack on Korea in the fall of 1231. By December
Mongolian troops had surrounded Kaegyong, the capital, forcing the Korean
king to offer his submission. The Mongolian demands on their new subjects
were onerous and unending, and in the summer of 1232 the Koreans re-
volted, killing the Mongolian agents
(darughachi)
stationed in the north of
the country. The Korean ruler, realizing that Mongolian retaliation would
not be long delayed, abandoned Kaegyong for the security of Kanghwa, an
island just off the coast in the Yellow Sea. In response to these challenges, the
Mongols launched another series of campaigns to compel Korean acceptance
of their dominion. With time out for a truce between 1241 and 1247, the
struggle went on until 1259, when the Koreans finally acquiesced to the
foreign occupation."
Despite these heavy commitments elsewhere in Eurasia, Ogodei was also
determined to deal with yet another piece of unfinished business
-
the de-
struction of Chin. When Mukhali died in 1223, the Chin had rallied and
retrieved some territories occupied by the invaders. Intent at the time on
punishing the Tanguts, the Mongols were forced to restrict their operations
in north China. Although sporadic fighting continued through the later
1220s over various frontier regions, the Mongols made no attempts to deal a
death blow to the Chin dynasty in their last bastion, Honan.
Ogodei began preliminary operations against the Chin in 1230. The Mon-
gols were soon made painfully aware that the Jurchen state, though much
battered, was still capable of mounting a vigorous defense and that new plans
59 Gari Ledyard, "The Mongol campaigns in Korea and the dating of the Stcrtt history of
the
Mongols,"
Central Asiatic Journal,
9
(1964), pp.
1
—16.
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