The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 351
afford to concentrate his forces against the Chin, his most powerful neigh-
bor.
39
The Mongolian formations departed from the Keriilen early in the year
and by spring reached the Onggiid territory, which they used as a staging
area for their forthcoming invasion. The center and left, that is, eastern,
wing of their army, led by Chinggis khan, assaulted and captured many
fortifications along the Chin's northern frontier, including Chii-yung kuan, a
pivotal garrison guarding the approaches to its capital, Chung-tu (modern
Peking). The Jurchen court dispatched sizable reinforcements to their endan-
gered borders, but these contingents were defeated piecemeal as they moved
to the north. The Chin defenses were so disorganized by these setbacks that
elements of the Mongolian army were able to reach and pillage the environs
of Chung-tu. In the meantime, the right, that is, western, wing of the
Mongolian army under Chinggis khan's sons advanced into Shansi, taking a
few cities, ravaging the countryside, and, most important, tying down en-
emy troops. When the order to withdraw came in the beginning of 1212,
both wings of the Mongolian army returned to the north, abandoning most,
if not all, of the Chin territories that they had occupied. By all available
indications, the campaign of 1211 had as its immediate goal booty and
information, not the acquisition of territory.
40
The Chin forces quickly reoccupied their northern frontier regions and
prepared for the next onslaught. In the fall of 1212 the Mongols returned and
began pressuring the.Jurchens' outer defenses. Key garrisons such as Chii-
yung kuan had to be reduced a second time, and this was achieved in 1213
only after Chinggis khan committed additional forces to the task. Once the
frontier defenses were pierced, the Mongols struck rapidly south, penetrating
much deeper into Chin territory than they had done previously. When they
reached the agricultural areas north of the Yellow River, the army divided
into three groups that spread devastation throughout Shantung, Hopei, and
shansi. Some cities were taken and looted, but in general the Mongols
concentrated their attention on the open countryside, bypassing strong
points whenever possible.
In late 1213 the Mongolian armies, having wreaked great destruction in
the Chin heartland, began moving back to the north. This time, however,
they retained control of all major frontier passes and left a force around
Chung-tu to enforce a close blockade. Efforts to invest the city proved
unsuccessful, but the alarmed Chin emperor was induced to negotiate. He
offered the Mongols much tribute
—
gold, silk, and horses
—
in return for an
39 On the campaigns against the Chin, see Henry D. Martin, The rise o/Chingis khan and hii
conquest
of
North China (Baltimore, 1950; repr. New York, I97i),pp. 113-219.
40
Secret
history,
sec. 248 (pp. 184—5); and Sechenjagchid, "Patterns of trade and conflict between China
and the nomads of Mongolia,"
Zentralasiatische
Studien,
11 (1977), p. 198.
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352 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
end
of
hostilities. They accepted these terms and, as agreed, discontinued
their blockade
in
the spring
of
1214. The Jurchen court, unnerved by the
experience, used this respite to depart from Chung-tu for K'ai-feng, which
they established as their new capital in the summer of 1214.
When the departure of the ruling house became known to Chinggis khan
later in the fall, he immediately ordered his forces back to the recently besieged
city. All attempts
to
take Chung-tu by storm failed, owing
to
the dogged
resistance of its garrison. Finally Chinggis khan arrived on the scene in January
1215 and took direct control of the operations. When it became apparent that
the Mongols had turned aside Chin relief
armies,
the garrison's morale gave
way, and the city surrendered to the attacking forces at the end of May. In the
weeks following
its
capitulation, the capital was systematically sacked and
partially destroyed by fire. His immediate military goal accomplished and the
vast booty properly inventoried, Chinggis khan left Chung-tu for Mongolia,
leaving behind garrisons in the captured Chin territories.
The loss of its capital was not, however, the only serious setback suffered
by the Chin at this time. In 1212 the Mongolian general Jebe penetrated the
Liao River valley and toward the end of the year temporarily seized Tung-
ching (modern Liao-yang), the eastern capital of
the
Jurchen.
The occupation
of this city,
a
major defeat
in
itself,
helped,
in
turn, ignite
a
widespread
rebellion among the Khitan (Ch'i-tan), another Manchurian-based people,
who had been unwilling subjects
of
the Chin since the fall
of
their own
dynasty, the Liao,
in
1115. Taking full advantage of the growing discomfi-
ture
of
their opponents, Mongolian armies
in
1214 successfully attacked
Chin positions east and west of the Liao River. Tung-ching was again occu-
pied
in
1215 and subsequently became the main base for the Khitan rebel
leader, Yeh-lii Liu-ko, who now formally acknowledged Mongolian suzer-
ainty.
41
By the following year a large part of Manchuria, the Jurchen home-
Land, was in enemy hands (see Map 25). A concentrated Mongolian assault at
this juncture might well have brought the Chin dynasty
to
the point
of
collapse, but events unfolding in Turkestan would soon cause Chinggis khan
to direct the bulk
of
the Mongols' military efforts westward
for
nearly
a
decade.
Campaign in the
west
Mongolian involvement in the Western Regions, the Hsi-yii of the Chinese,
began in 1208 when a punitive expedition was mounted against a coalition of
41 On Khitan uprisings against the Chin, see Sechen Jagchid, "Kitan struggles against Jurchen oppres-
sion: Nomadism versus sinicization,"
Zentralasiatische
Studim,
16 (1982), pp. 163-83.
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 353
Return route to
Chinggis's camp
ontheKerulenR."
Chinggis's
encampment
1214-15
Chinggis makes treaty
with Khitan rebel
Yeh-lii Liu-ko 1212,iii.
Rebellion of
Chang-chiu
n V
chung.
£
1215
,
TungChing
(Liao-yang)
eked by
Jebe 1212,ii.
•v
Taken
byYen-lu
X.*V—
A«
4
#^/
Peninsula
Jebe's campaign 1211,ii—1212.U.
Jochi Khasar's Northern campaign
1214,x—1215,
iii.
Mukhalis campaigns 1214—16
300 km
MAP
25. The campaigns in Manchuria, 1211—16
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354
THE
RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
renegade Merkid and Naiman tribesmen who had established a base of opera-
tions along the upper Irtysh in western Mongolia^
2
(see Map 26). The Mongo-
lian forces overwhelmed the rebels and killed their leader, Toghto'a,
Chinggis khan's long-time enemy. The surviving Merkid first fled to the
Uighur realm and subsequently to the Qipchaq steppe, while the remaining
Naiman escaped into the territory of
the
Khara-Khitan, or Western
Liao.
The
leader of the latter group was Giichuliig, whose father, Tayang khan, had
died fighting the Mongols in 1204.
At the time of Giichiiliig's flight, the Khara-Khitan state was engaged in a
struggle with Khwarazm, a Muslim state embracing most of western Turke-
stan and Khurasan (Afghanistan and northern Iran). The Naiman chieftain
fished in these troubled waters for a while, finally allying himself with the
Khara-Khitan sovereign. He soon emerged as the ruler's chief adviser and
used this position of trust to seize power within the Khara-Khitan realm in
1211.
The waning fortunes of the Western Liao revived rapidly under the
energetic leadership of Giichuliig. He forced the Khwarazmshah, Muham-
mad, to pull back in the region of the upper Syr Darya and in 1213—14
extended his sway over the predominately Muslim population of the Tarim
basin.
The success of the Naiman usurper began to draw Chinggis khan's atten-
tion westward just as word of the Mongolian ruler's triumphs in China
reached Sultan Muhammad. In 1215 the Khwarazmshah sent a diplomatic
mission to Chinggis khan in north China in order to gather intelligence
about the new power in the east. Chinggis khan cordially welcomed the
ambassadors, indicating his desire for peaceable relations and commercial
intercourse with his neighbor to the west. To this end, the Mongolian ruler
dispatched a return embassy to Muhammad that arrived in Khwarazm in the
spring of 1218. Negotiations commenced, and several days later the sultan
agreed to a treaty of
peace
and friendship with Chinggis khan. The amicable
phase of their relationship was, however, soon brought to an abrupt end by a
dramatic incident at Utrar, a Khwarazmian city on the upper Syr Darya.
Shortly after the treaty was concluded, the city's governor, apparently with
the foreknowledge of the sultan, massacred the members of a large Mongolian-
sponsored trade caravan and seized their merchandise. In response, Chinggis
khan hastened an embassy to the Khwarazmshah, demanding the punishment
of the offending official and the return of the confiscated goods. For reasons
that are hard to fathom, given his knowledge of the Mongols, Muhammad
42 The western campaign is discussed in detail by Wilhelm Bart hold, Turkestan down to the Mongol
invasion, trans. T. Minorsky, 3rd ed. (London, 1968), pp. 355—457; and Ilia P. Petrushevskii,
"Pokhod mongol'skikh voisk v sredniuiu Aziiu v 1219—1224 gg. i ego posledstviia," in Tarlaro-
Moagoly v Azii i Etmpe, ed. S. L. Tikhvinskii (Moscow, 1977), pp. 107-39.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Assembly
area for
Chinggis's armies
*?;
x
'•'•ft'*^Bemian»J\EBrwan ..- .. \, / ,
Region
controlled
by
Chinggis
Jebe's 1218 expedition
against
former
territories of Khara Khitai
Jebe andSiibetei pursue Mohammed of
Khwarazm. After
his
death (1220,xi) they
continue into the
Caucasus and
Southern
Russia,
returning to join
Chinggis in 1223.
Jebe dies during
return
through Qipchaq
in
1223.
Chinggis's main army
Subsidiary Mongolian armies
MAP
26. Chinggis's western campaigns
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356 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
rebuffed these entreaties and contemptuously put Chinggis khan's emissary to
death. The Mongolian ruler, infuriated by these outrages, prepared for war.
Before confronting his new enemy, however, Chinggis khan had to com-
plete operations on two other fronts. First,
in
the north,
a
rebellion of the
forest tribes
-
Oyirad, Tumad, and Kirgiz
-
required attention. The upris-
ing began
in
1217 and continued
to
spread until the winter
of
1218—19
when Jochi,
in
command of the right wing of the Mongolian army, reached
southern Siberia and quickly pacified the rebellious tribesmen.« Second, east
Turkestan had to be cleared of Giichiilug and the Khara Khitan. Operations
in this quarter had begun
in
1216 under Jebe, who was now ordered
to
dispose of the Naiman without further delay,
a
commission he carried out
successfully. By the end of 1218 Giichiilug was dead, and the Khara-Khitan
territories, which fronted on those of the Khwarazmshah, were occupied by
Mongolian forces.
His lines of communication to the west now secure, Chinggis khan assem-
bled
a
large force along the Irtysh. Composed
of
Mongolian regulars and
numerous auxiliaries mobilized from vassal states, the army moved against
Khwarazm
in
the summer
of
1219. The main force under Chinggis khan
advanced on the enemy's population centers south of the Syr Darya, while a
covering force
led
by Jochi entered the steppe regions north
of
the river,
engaging the nomadic Qipchaq and Qangli, who were closely allied
to
the
Khwarazmian ruling house. Rather than meet the invader in the open field,
Muhammad, contrary to the advice of
his
generals, used his army, which was
numerically superior
to
that of the Mongols, to garrison the major cities of
the realm. Although the decision probably cost him any chance of
victory,
it
did force the Mongols into a series of time-consuming and destructive siege
operations: The reductions of Utrar, Khwarazm, Harat, and Samarkand were
particularly bloody affairs, in which the Mongols drove unarmed prisoners of
war against heavily defended walls to provide "human camouflage" for their
assaulting forces. Moreover, to add to the carnage, once taken, several cities
rose up against their new masters and had to be subdued
a
second time.
In
such cases, savage reprisals, normally
in
the form of mass executions, were
visited upon the population.
When he became aware that his strategy had failed, Muhammad panicked
and fled to an island in the Caspian Sea, where he died around 1221. His son
and successor, Jalal al-Din, continued to offer
a
spirited resistance with the
meager forces at his disposal. In pursuit of
the
energetic and dashing Jalal al-
Din, Mongolian contingents tracked him from northern Iran through
Af-
43 The
Secret
history,
sec. 239 (pp. 173-4), mistakenly places Jochi's campaign against the forest peoples
in 1207. For
a
discussion
of
the confusion
in
the
Secret history's
chronology, see Paul Pelliot,
Notes
critique
d'histoire
Kalmouke
(Paris, i960), vol. 1, pp.
5,
57 (n. 39), 60 (n. 58).
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 357
ghanistan into India and then back to Iran and Azerbaijan. To the Mongols'
frustration he always managed to elude capture, but heroics of this nature
could not long forestall the collapse of the Khwarazmian state. By 1223
Turkistan and Khurasan had been subjugated and Mongolian garrisons and
governors
(darughachi)
installed in all urban centers. Despite the hopelessness
of his cause, Jalal al-Din refused to capitulate and continued his futile defi-
ance until his death at the hands of Kurdish bandits in 1231.
With organized resistance coming to an end in the Khwarazmian realm,
the Mongols began preparations for their next series of conquests. Siibetei
and Jebe, who were campaigning in Georgia and Azerbaijan at this time,
asked permission to cross the Caucasus and attack the Qipchaqs. Chinggis
khan readily consented, and in 1221 Siibetei commenced his famous raid, or,
more accurately, reconnaissance in force, into western Eurasia. Accompanied
by an army of three
ttimen,
he moved into the south Russian steppe and in the
late spring of 1223 defeated the combined forces of the Russian princes and
western Qipchaqs at the battle of the Kalka River (a small stream flowing
into the Sea of Azov). Siibetei next scouted the Russian principalities as far
west as the Dnieper and then turned back east, fighting a brief engagement
with the Volga Bulghars before returning to western Mongolia in 1224. The
necessary intelligence having been gathered, Jochi was ordered to launch a
follow-up campaign to bring the western steppe under Mongolian dominion.
Chinggis khan in the meantime had withdrawn the bulk of his armies
from Turkestan, reaching the Irtysh in the summer of 1224 and central
Mongolia in the spring of 1225. Back at home, he planned yet another
campaign: In 1223 the Tangut ruler had without warning withdrawn his
forces, which had been supporting Mongolian operations against the Chin,
and the Mongolian leader was determined to exact a heavy penalty for this
faithlessness.
Mukhali's
campaigns
against the Chin
When Chinggis khan reached the Keriilen in late 1215 or early 1216,
Mongolian operations against the Chin were scaled down temporarily but not
halted. Mukhali, one of Chinggis khan's most able and trusted generals,
continued his efforts to clear the Liao River valley of Jurchen forces, a task
that he completed in 1216. After occupying the major cities of the region,
Mukhali went to Mongolia in the fall of 1217 to report to his sovereign.
Pleased with his work, Chinggis khan gave him the title of kuo-wang, or
"prince of the realm," and placed him in overall command of
a
new campaign
to seize those parts of north China still in Jurchen hands, that is, the land
south of the T'ai-ho Range.
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358 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
Mukhali returned to the south in the same year and set up military-
administrative headquarters at Chung-tu (now renamed Yen) and Hsi-ching
(modern Ta-t'ung). The forces at his disposal included 23,000 troops of the
left wing of the Mongolian army, augmented by 77,000 Chinese, Jurchen,
and Khitan auxiliaries that had either surrendered or defected to the Mongols
during the earlier fighting with the Chin. As a matter of policy the Mongols
encouraged and rewarded such defections, and the results had been gratify-
ing: Many Chin commanders, especially those of non-Jurchen origin, came
over with their units intact. It was the addition of these crucial auxiliaries,
which comprised three quarters of the troops available to Mukhali, that
enabled the Mongols to maintain unremitting pressure on the Chin even after
the greater part of their army, the center and right wing, had been with-
drawn from north China and committed in the west.
1
''*
In the initial phase of the new campaign, the Mongols launched a three-
pronged attack from Chung-tu and Hsi-ching designed to wrest Shansi,
Hopei, and Shantung from Chin control. Pushing into Hopei with the center
and main column, Mukhali soon encountered stiff
resistance.
Cities had to be
taken by direct assault, at high cost to both sides. On several occasions cities
won at such a high price were lost and had to be retaken. Though the going
was difficult, Mukhali was nonetheless making slow progress. In 1218,
leaving the Chin defector Chang Jou behind to consolidate Mongolian gains
in Hopei, Mukhali shifted his attention to Shansi.
T'ai-yiian, the main Chin bastion in the northwest of the province, was
taken in October, and the Mongols were then able to drive steadily to the
south. By the end of 1219 only the southernmost strip of Shansi remained
outside Mongolian control. Mukhali now returned to central Hopei and
received the surrender of
the
remaining Chin-controlled cities, including the
key garrison at Ta-ming, during the summer and fall of 1220. Thereafter he
pressed on into western Shantung, taking its chief city, Chi-nan, in October,
without a fight.
The relatively easy campaigning of 1220 was made possible by the Chin
dynasty's ill-advised military involvement in the south. In 1217, during the
lull in the fighting with the Mongols, the Chin emperor had foolishly
consented to open a campaign against the Sung, which had suspended its
tribute payments to the Jurchen court three years earlier. The series of annual
44 The number of troops available to Mukhali was carefully calculated by Huang Shih-chien in "Mu-hua-li
kuo wang hui hsia chu chiin k'ao," Yuan shih lun ts'ung, i (1982), pp.
57—71.
For accounts of the
campaign, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Muqali, Bol, Tas and An-t'ung,"
Papers on
Far
Eastern
History, 15
(1977),
pp. 45—55; and Martin, The rise ofChingis khan, pp. 239—82. On the role of the Sung in the
Mongolian—Jurchen conflict of 1217—25, see Charles A. Peterson, "Old illusions and new realities:
Sung foreign policy, 1217—1234," in China
among
equals: The Middle
Kingdom
and its
neighbors,
10th-
14th
centuries,
ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 204-20.
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CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 359
offensives launched by the Chin between 1217 and 1224 were often success-
ful on the local level, but they never brought decisive victory. The Sung,
refusing to negotiate despite initial setbacks, continued to resist and on one
occasion in the summer of 1219 even managed to destroy a major Jurchen
army in the Han valley.
The Chin decision to divide their military effort proved costly. The mar-
ginal gains at the expense of the Sung in no way compensated them for their
losses to the Mongols in the north and in the long run clearly undermined
their ability to cope with Mukhali's forces. Undaunted, however, in 1220 the
Chin mobilized a new army and prepared a counterthrust in the hope of
recouping some of their losses. Though initially formed, it appears, to strike
at eastern Shantung, where an army of anti-Jurchen Chinese rebels (the
Hung-ao or Red Coats) had been organized, the new force soon attracted
Mongolian attention. Once he became aware of
its
existence, Mukhali moved
south from Chi-nan in late 1220 and attacked the new Chin army at Huang-
ling kang, a ford on the south bank of the Yellow River not far from K'ai-
feng. He decisively defeated his foes, and with this victory the Mongols
extended their control over most of the Jurchen territory north of the Yellow
River, except for eastern Shantung, which remained in the hands of
the
Red
Coats,
and Shensi, which remained under Chin authority.
Placing Chinese defectors in charge of the surrendered areas, Mukhali
returned to the north, conducting mop-up operations along the way. In the
meantime, the Chin court, its counteroffensive having failed, sent an em-
bassy headed by Wu-ku-sun Chung-tuan to Chinggis khan in the west to
discuss possible terms. The Mongolian demands that the Chin emperor
accept the title of prince
(wang),
and thus recognize Chinggis khan as his
sovereign, and that Shensi be evacuated were, however, considered excessive,
and so the hostilities continued.
Mukhali renewed pressure on the Chin by initiating a major campaign in
Shensi and eastern Kansu (Kuan-chung) in
mid-1221.
After first crossing the
Ordos (with the acquiescence of the Tanguts, who also contributed auxiliary
contingents numbering fifty thousand), Mukhali spent the remaining part of
the year and the beginning of the next reducing the major cities of northern
and central Shensi. In the spring of 1222 he left one of his lieutenants,
Monggii Bukha, in charge of operations in Shensi and crossed the Yellow
River into Shansi to forestall a new Chin offensive in this quarter. In the
fighting that followed, the Mongols took Ho-chung and other fortified cities
along the river. In Shensi, meanwhile, Monggii Bukha had become bogged
down in extensive blockade operations. Even after the return of Mukhali and
his troops to Shensi in the fall of 1222, the Mongols were still unable to force
the capitulation of many key cities, including Ch'ang-an and Feng-hsiang.
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360 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
The sudden withdrawal of the Tangut auxiliaries at this critical juncture
further undermined the Mongols' military position. His striking power now
much reduced, Mukhali lifted the siege of Feng-hsiang in early 1223, and
following a brief retaliatory attack on the Hsi Hsia frontier, he moved back to
Shansi, where he shortly after fell ill and died (in March or April).
The deceased commander was immediately replaced by his brother,
Dayisun, but the Mongolian offensive had lost its momentum. Making the
most of this opportunity, the Chin hastily ended hostilities with the Sung,
moved its troops back into southern Shansi, and recovered some of the
territory previously lost to the Mongols. Supported by the Sung, with whom
they were loosely allied, the Red Coats also took advantage of
the
situation to
extend their hold in Shantung and, briefly, to seize territories in Hopei. This
latter move precipitated a rebellion by Wu Hsien, a former Chin commander
who had recently defected to the Mongols. In 1225 he changed sides once
again, this time throwing his lot in with the Sung. In the face of these
setbacks and Chinggis khan's determination to deal next with the perfidious
Tanguts, the Mongols had to content themselves with a holding operation in
north China for the following few years.
Administration of
north
China
The Mongols, as Chinggis khan himself recognized, knew little of the "laws
and customs of
cities"
and were ill equipped to undertake the administration
of complex sedentary societies on their own. It was therefore necessary to
recruit numerous technical specialists, particularly people with experience in
government or commerce who were willing to help the Mongols administer
and exploit the agricultural and urban populations under their control. Even
before his invasion of the Chin, Chinggis khan began building up a cadre of
such specialists from among the Khitan and Chinese officials who, for a
variety of reasons, left Chin service and submitted to the Mongols.
45
By the
time operations commenced against the Jurchens in 1211, Chinggis khan
had in his entourage a body of advisers who were intimately familiar with
both the Chin administrative system and conditions in north China.
As the Mongolian campaign gathered momentum, the number of defec-
tors increased markedly. Officials of Chinese origin were most numerous in
this second wave, but for the first time a few Jurchens also came over to the
Mongolian camp and offered their services. Civil officials who defected or
surrendered without resistance were routinely left in their old posts adminis-
45 In preparing this section I relied heavily on Igor de Rachewiltz's excellent study, "Personnel and
personalities in North China in the early Mongol period," Journal ofthe
Economic
and
Social History
ofthe
Orient, 9 (1966), pp. 88-144.
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